The primary strand of my research is on the epistemology of imagination. In this work, I am developing a theory of how imagination justifies empirical belief. This has given me the opportunity to think about a lot of interesting questions like: Can we reconcile the justificatory force of the imagination with its voluntariness? Is imagination reducible to inference? Can the imagination generate new justification or does it merely preserve existing justification? Are there epistemic norms governing what you ought to imagine? Does the vividness of an imagining determine its justificatory force? How can the epistemic role of the imagination inform theorizing about its nature? In future work, I plan to investigate the epistemic role of the imagination in generating hypotheses, grounding understanding, engaging with fiction, and knowing other minds.

I also have an ongoing research project on iconic representation. Consider the difference between a painting of a brown dog and the sentence 'there is a brown dog.' They both repesent a brown dog. But they do so in very different ways. The painting is iconic while the sentence is not. My research investigates the nature of this difference. Along the way, I've thought about the metaphysical grounds of representational format, the semantics of iconic representation, whether there are iconic representations in the mind, and the epistemic and practical advantages and disadvantages of iconic representation.

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