Projects
The Philosophy of Hybrid Representations
1 Sep 2021 / 31 Aug 2024 |Foundations and Methods of Natural Language Semantics
30 Dec 2016 / 29 Dec 2019 |List of Publications
| 2022
Saying, commitment, and the lying – misleading distinction
The Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
| 2022
Fictions that purport to tell the truth
Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)
| 2021
Lying: Knowledge or Belief?
Philosophical Studies
| 2021
Truth: the rule or the aim of assertion?
Episteme
| 2021
Assertion
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
| 2021
Assertion: a (partly) social speech act
Journal of Pragmatics, 181, 17-28
| 2021
Should I say that? An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion
Cognition, 212, 104657
| 2020
Retweeting: its Linguistic and Epistemic Value
Synthese
| 2021
Lies, Common Ground, and Performative Utterances
Erkenntnis
| 2020
Lying, speech acts, and commitment
Synthese
| 2019
Immoral lies and partial beliefs
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
| 2019
The norm of assertion: a ‘constitutive’ rule?
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
| 2014
Lying as a scalar phenomenon: insincerity along the certainty-uncertainty continuum
Cantarini, Abraham & Leiss (ed.) Certainty-uncertainty – and the attitudinal space in between. (John Benjamins Publishing). [DOI:10.1075/slcs.165.09mar]
| 2015
Normative Accounts of Assertion: from Peirce to Williamson, and back again
Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio
| 2016
Lying by Promising: a study on insincere illocutionary acts
The International Review of Pragmatics, 8 (2): 271-313. [DOI:10.1163/18773109-00802005]
| 2018
Lying and Certainty
J. Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
| 2018
Truth and Assertion: rules vs aims
Analysis, 78 (4), 638–648, doi:10.1093/analys/any008
