BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//wp-events-plugin.com//7.4.0.1//EN
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2210@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20270308T000000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20270309T000000
DTSTAMP:20260526T073330Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/bw13-artefacts/
SUMMARY:BW13 - Artefacts
DESCRIPTION:
CATEGORIES:Conferences
LOCATION:UB\, Barcelona
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=UB\, Barcelona:geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2207@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20270211T000000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20270212T000000
DTSTAMP:20260515T102016Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/biap-collaborative-research-ev
 ent-expert-testimony-and-rules-of-evidence/
SUMMARY:BIAP collaborative research event: Expert Testimony and Rules of Ev
 idence
DESCRIPTION:More information: https://biap.ub.edu/calendar/biap-collaborat
 ive-research-event-expert-testimony-and-rules-of-evidence/\n
CATEGORIES:Conferences
LOCATION:University of Girona
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=University of Girona:geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2205@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20270208T000000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20270209T000000
DTSTAMP:20260508T095930Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/biap-cooperation-workshop-with
 -vita-salute-san-raffaele-university-and-the-university-of-munster/
SUMMARY:BIAP Cooperation Workshop with Vita-Salute San Raffaele University 
 and the University of Münster
DESCRIPTION:More information: https://biap.ub.edu/calendar/biap-cooperation
 -workshop-with-vita-salute-san-raffaele-university-and-the-university-of-m
 unster/
CATEGORIES:Conferences
LOCATION:UB (Barcelona)
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=UB (Barcelona):geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2176@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260820T000000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260820T000000
DTSTAMP:20260303T145739Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/tsa-colloquium-7/
SUMMARY:TSA Colloquium
DESCRIPTION:https://www.upf.edu/web/thought-sharing-in-action/tsa-colloquiu
 m \n\n 	Format: Online\n 	Speakers: Michael Devitt\, Jeremy Pober\n 	Time
 : TBA\n\nPlease email tsa.colloquium@upf.edu for registration and zoom lin
 k
CATEGORIES:Extra talks
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2175@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260730T000000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260730T000000
DTSTAMP:20260303T145634Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/tsa-colloquium-6/
SUMMARY:TSA Colloquium
DESCRIPTION:https://www.upf.edu/web/thought-sharing-in-action/tsa-colloquiu
 m \n\n 	Format: Online\n 	Speakers: Dorit Bar-On\, Tadeusz Ciecerski\n 	T
 ime: TBA\n\nPlease email tsa.colloquium@upf.edu for registration and zoom 
 link
CATEGORIES:Extra talks
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2203@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260717T000000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260719T000000
DTSTAMP:20260325T103631Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/philosophical-foundations-ai-e
 pistemic-methods-language-and-logic/
SUMMARY:Philosophical Foundations: AI\, Epistemic Methods\, Language\, and 
 Logic
DESCRIPTION:BIAP Cooperation workshop and Pilot workshop of the LOGOS proje
 ct Method-Centred Epistemology\n\n\nUnderwood International College\, Yons
 ei University (Seoul)\, 17-19 July\, 2026\n\nProgramme to be announced.\n\
 n
CATEGORIES:Conferences
LOCATION:Underwood International College\, Yonsei University (Seoul)
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=50 Yonsei-ro\, Seodaemun-gu
 \, Seoul\, South Korea\, Seoul\, South Korea\, HW8Q+HF\, South Korea;X-APP
 LE-RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Underwood International College\, Yonsei University 
 (Seoul):geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2212@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260709T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260710T180000
DTSTAMP:20260708T101905Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/final-workshop-on-the-represen
 tational-penumbra/
SUMMARY:Final Workshop on the Representational Penumbra
DESCRIPTION:\n\nThursday 09/07/2026\n9:30– 10:45 Nicholas Shea (Instit
 ute of Philosophy\, University of London) AI and the Synergy Between Persi
 stence and Goal-Directedness.\n\n10:45 – 12:00 Anastasia Garbayo (Univer
 sitat de València) Mapping the representational penumbra: anticipatory be
 havior and associative learning.\n\n    – Coffee Break 12:15 –\n\n13
 :30 Manolo Martínez (Universitat de Barcelona)- Communication and Grip.\n
 \n– Lunch 15:30 – \n\n16:45 Peter Schulte (Umea University) Where Stru
 cturalism About Mental Representation Goes Wrong: Putting Structural Simil
 arity in Its Place.\n\n16:45 – 18:00 Marc Artiga (Universitat de Valènc
 ia) Assessing Deflationism about Mental Representations.\nFriday 10/07/202
 6\n9:30– 10:45 Joulia Smortchkova (University of Grenoble Alpes) First i
 mpressions as an interface kind.\n\n10:45 – 12:00 David Pineda (Universi
 tat de Girona) Understanding Emotional Recalcitrance.\n\n    – Coffee 
 Break 12:15 – \n\n13:30 Carlota Serrahima (University of Copenhagen/Univ
 ersitat de València) The Duality of Touch and the Notion of Tactile Field
 .\n\n– Lunch 15:30 –\n\n16:45 Adex Izquierdo (Universitat de València
 ) Offline Information Transmission: A Hybrid Theory of Reference for Episo
 dic Memory.\n\n16:45 – 18:00 Karl Bergman (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) Nor
 ms of assertion and of communicative success: Unifying the debates.\n\nOrg
 anizers: Marc Artiga and Manolo Martínez\nAcknowledgments: This workshop 
 is possible thanks to the projects ‘The Representational Penumbra’ (PI
 D2021-125936NB-I00) and Normative Limits of Our World View: Revisionist Pr
 ojects on communication\, Knowledge and Agency (PID2023-151071NB-I00) fund
 ed by the Ministerio de Ciencia\, Innovación y Universidades.\n&nbsp\;\n\
 nDownload program
CATEGORIES:Conferences
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia\, Faculty of Philosophy (4th floor)\, Univer
 sity of Barcelona
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia\, Faculty of Philosophy (4th floor)\, Unive
 rsity of Barcelona:geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2174@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260625T000000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260625T000000
DTSTAMP:20260303T145516Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/tsa-colloquium-5/
SUMMARY:TSA Colloquium
DESCRIPTION:https://www.upf.edu/web/thought-sharing-in-action/tsa-colloquiu
 m \n\n 	Format: Online\n 	Speakers: Miguel Ángel Sebastián\, Matheus Va
 lente\n 	Time: TBA\n\nPlease email tsa.colloquium@upf.edu for registration
  and zoom link
CATEGORIES:Extra talks
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:902@ub.edu
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20260617
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20260620
DTSTAMP:20251003T051842Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/philosophy-of-language-and-min
 d-plm-2026/
SUMMARY:Philosophy of Language and Mind (PLM 2026)
DESCRIPTION:more info
CATEGORIES:Conferences
LOCATION:Barcelona
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Barcelona:geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2208@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260610T094500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260610T181500
DTSTAMP:20260603T095655Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/final-workshop-inner-speech-in
 -action/
SUMMARY:Final Workshop Inner Speech in Action
DESCRIPTION:Program and Abstracts Inner Speech in Action\n\n&nbsp\;
CATEGORIES:Conferences
LOCATION:Room 23.103   Building Mercè Rodoreda Campus Ciutadella Pompeu Fa
 bra University c/ Ramon Trias Fargas\, 25-27 08005 Barcelona
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=Room 23.103   Building Merc
 è Rodoreda Campus Ciutadella Pompeu Fabra University c/ Ramon Trias Farga
 s\, 25-27 08005 Barcelona \, Barcelona\, Barcelona\, 08005\, Spain;X-APPLE
 -RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Room 23.103   Building Mercè Rodoreda Campus Ciutadel
 la Pompeu Fabra University c/ Ramon Trias Fargas\, 25-27 08005 Barcelona:g
 eo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2169@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260610T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260610T170000
DTSTAMP:20260609T183849Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/tba-20/
SUMMARY:Understanding higher-order metaphysics
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Unlike first-order logic\, higher-order logic permits
  quantification into syntactic positions other than name position\, such a
 s predicate position and sentence position. The contemporary movement call
 ed ‘higher-order metaphysics’ is based on higher-order logic. But ther
 e is significant confusion about how higher-order metaphysics relates to e
 xisting questions in metaphysics\, which in turn clouds our understanding 
 of the merits and demerits of higher-order metaphysical theories. Building
  on work done by Lukas Skiba\, I use the notion of conceptual engineering 
 to offer clarification.
CATEGORIES:Colloquium
LOCATION:Sala de Juntes (ground floor\, rear entrance\, Faculty of Philosop
 hy\, UB)
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=C/ Montalegre 6\, Barcelona
 \, Barcelona\, 08007\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Sala de Juntes (gr
 ound floor\, rear entrance\, Faculty of Philosophy\, UB):geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2211@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260604T140000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260604T160000
DTSTAMP:20260529T082958Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/training-session-how-to-apply-
 to-a-phd-in-philosophy/
SUMMARY:Training session: How to apply to a PhD in philosophy
DESCRIPTION:A BIAP and LOGOS training event for the APhil\n\nSpeaker: Ryan 
 P. Doran\n\nA training session offering guidance on applying to PhD progra
 mmes in philosophy\, including information on PhD structures in different 
 countries\, application processes\, funding sources in the UK and Spain\, 
 and advice on preparing applications.\n\nFurther information is available 
 on the APhil website.
CATEGORIES:Extra talks
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Barcelona) / Zoom
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Barcelona) / Zoom:geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2190@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260603T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260603T170000
DTSTAMP:20260202T111556Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/true-beauty/
SUMMARY:True Beauty
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: What is the nature of the concept beauty? Does it d
 iffer fundamentally from nearby concepts such as prettiness? It is argued
  here that beauty\, but not prettiness\, is a dual-character concept. A
 cross a number of contexts\, it is proposed that beauty has descriptive 
 senses that refer to\, inter alia\, having intrinsically pleasing appearan
 ces\, and a normative sense associated with deeply held values. This accou
 nt is supported across two\, pre-registered\, studies (N=500) and by drawi
 ng on analysis of corpus data. It is suggested that this can help to expla
 in why beauty\, unlike prettiness\, is thought to be deep in both the sens
 e of being important and in the sense of being less closely tied to sensor
 y surfaces.
CATEGORIES:Seminar
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia (Faculty of Philosophy\, UB\, Barcelona)
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia (Faculty of Philosophy\, UB\, Barcelona):ge
 o:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2173@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260528T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260528T180000
DTSTAMP:20260527T110715Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/tsa-colloquium-4/
SUMMARY:TSA Colloquium: Artiga and Hochman
DESCRIPTION:https://www.upf.edu/web/thought-sharing-in-action/tsa-colloquiu
 m \n\n 	Format: Hybrid\n 	Location: Sala 24.202\, Mercè Rodoreda Buildin
 g\, Campus Ciutadella\, UPF.\n\n 	Or online via Zoom.\n\n\n 	Speakers: Cat
 herine Hochman\, Marc Artiga\n 	Time: 15.00–18.00\n\nFor more info\, vis
 it https://www.upf.edu/web/thought-sharing-in-action/tsa-colloquium-may-28
 .\n\nPlease email tsa.colloquium@upf.edu for registration and zoom link
CATEGORIES:Extra talks
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2168@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260527T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260527T170000
DTSTAMP:20260511T084006Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/tba-19/
SUMMARY:The threat-detection mechanism
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Everyone believes that pain\, fear\, and anxiety are 
 different capacities. And everyone is right. In this talk\, however\, I sh
 ow that if we take a synoptic look at pain\, fear\, and anxiety\, it becom
 es apparent that these capacities share several surprising features. I arg
 ue that the best explanation of this fact is that pain\, fear\, and anxiet
 y are underpinned by a common cognitive mechanism\, whose function is to d
 etect threats. If this threat-detection mechanism collapses\, so do pain
 \, fear\, and anxiety.\nThe talk is based on this forthcoming article:\nh
 ttps://philpapers.org/rec/BARLFT-10
CATEGORIES:Colloquium
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Faculty of Philosophy\, 4th floor)
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Faculty of Philosophy\, 4th floor):ge
 o:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2206@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260526T000000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260527T000000
DTSTAMP:20260512T140423Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/representation-and-affect-in-c
 ognitive-science/
SUMMARY:Representation and Affect in Cognitive Science
DESCRIPTION:Schedule\n\nMay 26\n15:00 - 16:00: Aida Roige (Universidad Carl
 os III de Madrid) - On the Possibility of Mixed Affective States\n\n16:05 
 - 17:10: Abel Martínez-Suñé (Universitat de Barcelona) - Representing V
 alence: From Philosophy to Mindfulness Interventions\nMay 27\n09:30-10:30:
  James Turner (Umeå University) - Selected-Effects Functions for AI Frogs
 \n\n10:35-11:35 Fabian Hundertmark (Universitat de València) - Etiologica
 l Service Functions for Teleosemantics\n\n11:40-12:40: David Castells (Uni
 versitat Autònoma de Barcelona) - Theory of the Emo-Sensation Appearance 
 of Music: A Solution to the Problematic of Musico-Emotional Features\n\n12
 :40-15:00: Lunch\n\n15:00-17:00:  Luca Barlassina (University of Sheffiel
 d) - The Threat-Detection Mechanism\n\n17:10-18:10: Andrea Rivadulla (Univ
 ersitat Autònoma de Barcelona) - Creative Transitions
CATEGORIES:Conferences
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2193@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260521T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260521T180000
DTSTAMP:20260209T103243Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/grsem-on-moral-luck/
SUMMARY:GRSem: On moral luck
DESCRIPTION:
CATEGORIES:Graduate Research Seminar (GRSem)
LOCATION:Seminari María Zambrano\, UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari María Zambrano\, UB:geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2198@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260520T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260520T170000
DTSTAMP:20260508T104049Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/tba-7/
SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering as a response to Negative Experimental Philo
 sophy
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Conceptual engineering is an increasingly popular phi
 losophical program that offers an alternative to the traditional view of p
 hilosophy as centered on conceptual analysis. Rather than aiming to descri
 be our current concepts\, conceptual engineers aim to improve those concep
 ts in order to better suit our aims and purposes. While there is now a wea
 lth of literature on the nature and benefits of conceptual engineering\, t
 here is surprisingly little work connecting conceptual engineering to the 
 other major movement in recent metaphilosophical debate – experimental p
 hilosophy. In this talk\, I’ll argue that the adoption of conceptual eng
 ineering as a core philosophical method provides a promising reply to the 
 methodological criticisms pressed by ‘negative’ experimental philosoph
 ers. Conceptual engineering fundamentally involves a license to reject cur
 rent classificatory judgments\; it allows pragmatic reasoning to trump our
  immediate judgments on philosophical cases. As such\, it reduces reliance
  on the sorts of ‘intuitive’ mental states that negative experimentali
 sts criticize. The adoption of conceptual engineering will not fully elimi
 nate reliance on ‘intuitive’ judgment - no methodology possibly could\
 , nor would it be desirable to do so. However\, I’ll argue that the judg
 ments that are most likely to be dismissed during a conceptual engineering
  exercise are exactly those that experimental findings suggest to be the m
 ost epistemically defective.
CATEGORIES:Colloquium
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Faculty of Philosophy\, 4th floor)
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Faculty of Philosophy\, 4th floor):ge
 o:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2179@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260514T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260514T180000
DTSTAMP:20260511T095552Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/grsem-tba-2/
SUMMARY:GRSem: Facts and Access: Reframing the Integration Challenge for Re
 alists and Anti-Realists
DESCRIPTION:Christopher Peacocke's (1999) Integration Challenge asks us to 
 reconcile\, for any given domain\, a plausible account of what is involved
  in the truth of statements in that domain with a credible account of how 
 we come to know them. I develop a new formulation on which the task is to 
 explain how epistemic access to facts in a given domain is possible\, give
 n a metaphysical account of their nature. This formulation has two advanta
 ges. First\, it replaces the metaphorical notion of "integration" with the
  more tractable demand to explain the relation between a domain's subject 
 matter and our access to it. Second\, by setting aside the notion of truth
 \, it prevents theorists from sidestepping the challenge by denying that s
 tatements in the domain have truthmakers.\n\nThe Integration Challenge is 
 often taken to be particularly pressing for realist theories\, on which th
 e facts in a domain are mind-independent\, objective\, and (in some cases)
  causally inert. Anti-realist theories are supposed to ease the difficulty
  by denying mind-independence\, thereby making epistemic access less myste
 rious. In the case of modality\, Amie Thomasson's (2021) Modal Normativism
  promises just that. I argue\, however\, that her account does not yet pro
 vide a sufficient explanation. Specifically\, Modal Normativism merely rel
 ocates the Integration Challenge to a different domain\, in a way structur
 ally analogous to a familiar objection against realist accounts.
CATEGORIES:Graduate Research Seminar (GRSem)
LOCATION:Seminari María Zambrano\, UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari María Zambrano\, UB:geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2167@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260513T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260513T170000
DTSTAMP:20260508T133912Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/tba-18/
SUMMARY:Reference and persistence
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: The aim of this talk is to bring together work in me
 taphysics and the philosophy of language to shed light on how speakers use
  referential expressions to pick out per-sisting entities. Focussing on pr
 oper names and pronouns\, I argue that ordinary speakers use proper names 
 and pronouns variably to pick out temporal segments or phases of objects\,
  rather than entire spacetime worms\, instantaneous stages or wholly prese
 nt objects. And I suggest that this semantic variability is best construed
  as a kind of context-sensitivity\, which I call persistence context-sensi
 tivity. Persistence context-sensitivity matters for metaphysics: while the
 ories of persistence are commonly assessed in terms of how well they fit w
 ith ordinary language use\, it becomes apparent that none of the standard 
 theories of persistence are in line with such use. And persistence context
 -sensitivity matters for semantics and metasemantics: it supports the view
  that names are context-sensitive\, strengthens parallels between names an
 d pronouns\, bears on the distinction between stage-level and individual-l
 evel predicates and raises metasemantic questions about how referential ex
 pressions receive a semantic value in context.
CATEGORIES:Colloquium
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia\, Faculty of Philosophy (4th floor)\, Univer
 sity of Barcelona
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia\, Faculty of Philosophy (4th floor)\, Unive
 rsity of Barcelona:geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2195@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260507T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260507T180000
DTSTAMP:20260504T081324Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/grsem-tba-5/
SUMMARY:GRSem: Aporetic Causal Models
DESCRIPTION:
CATEGORIES:Graduate Research Seminar (GRSem)
LOCATION:Seminari María Zambrano\, UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari María Zambrano\, UB:geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2188@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260506T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260506T170000
DTSTAMP:20260504T091606Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/are-skeptical-possibilities-le
 ss-normal-than-actuality/
SUMMARY:Are Skeptical Possibilities Less Normal Than Actuality?
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: According to the safety account\, knowledge is incom
 patible with falsely believing in relevantly close worlds. One of the main
  motivations for this account is that it preserves knowledge in the face o
 f skeptical possibilities. In this talk\, however\, I argue that skeptical
  possibilities undermine the safety account\, regardless of one’s prefer
 red individuation of methods. On a positive note\, I formulate a normic ac
 count of knowledge\, Dispositional Normicism\, where methods are understoo
 d as dispositions to believe. I present a new argument\, based on a proper
  functionalist understanding of normality\, for the claim that skeptical p
 ossibilities are less normal than actuality. For Dispositional Normicism\,
  then\, skeptical possibilities are irrelevant worlds because they are les
 s normal than actuality\, which is an anti-skeptical strategy unavailable 
 to the safety theorist.
CATEGORIES:Seminar
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia (Faculty of Philosophy\, UB\, Barcelona)
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia (Faculty of Philosophy\, UB\, Barcelona):ge
 o:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2172@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260430T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260430T130000
DTSTAMP:20260407T124530Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/tsa-colloquium-3/
SUMMARY:TSA Colloquium: Stojanovic &amp\; Deroy
DESCRIPTION:For more info\, see https://www.upf.edu/web/thought-sharing-in-
 action/tsa-colloquium-april-30\n\nDate and time: April 30th\, 10:00–13
 :00 (CET)\n\n​​​​​​​Format: Hybrid\n\nLocation: 23.103\, M
 ercè Rodoreda building\, Campus Ciutadella\n\nAnd on Zoom: https://upf-e
 du.zoom.us/my/tsa.colloquium\n\nSpeakers: \n\n 	Isidora Stojanovic (Univ
 ersitat Pompeu Fabra)\n 	Ophelia Deroy (Ludwig Maximilian University)\n\n
 ​​​​​​Everyone welcome. To register\, email tsa.colloquium@up
 f.edu\nProgram\n10:00–11:10 - Ophelia Deroy\n\n11:10–11:20 - break\n\n
 11:20–12:30 - Isidora Stojanovic\n\n17:30 - Wrap-up
CATEGORIES:Extra talks
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2194@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260430T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260430T180000
DTSTAMP:20260427T132145Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/grsem-tba-4/
SUMMARY:GRSem: Locating Mnemic Injustice: A Taxonomy of Memory Tampering
DESCRIPTION:
CATEGORIES:Graduate Research Seminar (GRSem)
LOCATION:Seminari María Zambrano\, UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari María Zambrano\, UB:geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2189@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260429T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260429T170000
DTSTAMP:20260202T110709Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/on-the-nature-of-philosophical
 -intuitions/
SUMMARY:On the nature of philosophical intuitions
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Recently\, Loev (2022) presented a new account of th
 e nature of philosophical intuitions as an alternative to doxasticism an
 d perceptualism\, two long-standing opposing views which have led to a sta
 lemate in the debate on the nature of intuitions: affectivism. According 
 to affectivism\, intuitions are emotional experiences. Although it might
  initially look like a viable middle ground between doxasticism and percep
 tualism\, this account raises significant concerns. Firstly\, it crucially
  relies on the concept of valence\, which remains an obscure notion in the
  literature\, diminishing its supposed explanatory power. Secondly\,  giv
 en the gradeability feature of intuitions and assuming that valence has 
 a bipolar dimensionality\, as Loev seems to do\, we are led to an undesira
 ble consequence: predicting the potential existence of intuitions which 
 assert indifference towards their content. Finally\, while Loev's affectiv
 ism implies that so-called positive intuitions and their counterparts fe
 el different\, we can easily find cases in which the purported phenomenolo
 gical distinction between them is not present.
CATEGORIES:Seminar
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Faculty of Philosophy\, 4th floor)
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Faculty of Philosophy\, 4th floor):ge
 o:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2202@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260422T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260422T170000
DTSTAMP:20260325T102336Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/conspiracy-theories-are-not-fi
 ctions-2/
SUMMARY:Conspiracy Theories Are Not Fictions
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: On September 10\, 2024\, during the Harris-Trump ABC
  presidential debate\, Donald Trump uttered (i):\n\n(i) In Springfield\, 
 they are eating the dogs. The people that came in\, they are eating the ca
 ts. They’re eating – they are eating the pets of the people that live 
 there\n\nThe current US Vice President JD Vance had made these allegations
  about Haitian legal immigrants living in Springfield on the social netw
 ork X before Trump\, although the Republican city manager of Springfield
  had told his staff that they were “baseless”. US National Security C
 ouncil spokesman John Kirby called Vance’s comments “dangerous” and 
 a “conspiracy theory... based on an element of racism”. Now\, admittin
 g in a CNN interview on September 15 that the claim was false (a “cat me
 me”)\, Vice President Vance said that “If I have to create stories so 
 that the American media actually pays attention to the suffering of the Am
 erican people\, then that’s what I’m going to do”. Vance suggests he
 re that both Trump’s and his own utterances about Springfield’s immig
 rants lacked assertoric commitment: they were just fictions (created “st
 ories”)\, even if\, as such\, they were meant to convey assertoric commi
 tment to some general claims (say\, that immigrants cause much suffering t
 o US citizens).\n\nVance is not alone in characterizing his “conspiracy 
 theory” as just a fiction. Some philosophers working on the topic argue
  that this is indeed what conspiracy theories (the term understood pejorat
 ively\, so that they don’t just posit an explanatory conspiracy like the
  official explanation of 9/11 but are manifestly epistemically deficient) 
 in general are. Thus\, Ichino (2022\, forthcoming) defends that they are f
 ictions in the somehow revisionary sense articulated by Kendall Walton\; w
 hile Munro &amp\; Rini (forthcoming) argue that “conspiracy theorizing i
 s a form of shared\, participatory storytelling”. While Munro &amp\; Rin
 i accept that some storytelling is done with assertoric commitment\, they 
 emphasize cases in which it is meant as just fiction. In support of their
  views\, these authors point out that conspiracy theorists don’t show a 
 very strong belief attachment to their views – sometimes accepting incon
 sistent theories – and fail to act on the basis of their conspiracy the
 ories\, among other considerations. In my talk I’ll argue that the data 
 is compatible with a straightforward assertoric commitment to their theori
 es by conspiracy theories\, and that the fictionalist accounts have unacc
 eptable normative implications.\n
CATEGORIES:Seminar
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Faculty of Philosophy\, 4th floor)
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Faculty of Philosophy\, 4th floor):ge
 o:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2204@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260416T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260416T180000
DTSTAMP:20260410T100118Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/grsem-tba-6/
SUMMARY:GRSem - The Dark Side of a Structural Logic
DESCRIPTION:
CATEGORIES:Graduate Research Seminar (GRSem)
LOCATION:Seminari María Zambrano\, UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari María Zambrano\, UB:geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2201@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260415T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260415T170000
DTSTAMP:20260323T074731Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/tba-23/
SUMMARY:TBA
DESCRIPTION:
CATEGORIES:Seminar
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Faculty of Philosophy\, 4th floor)
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Faculty of Philosophy\, 4th floor):ge
 o:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:915@ub.edu
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20260407
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20260410
DTSTAMP:20251121T100804Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/biap-distinguished-lectures-wi
 th-ruth-chang-university-of-oxford/
SUMMARY:BIAP Distinguished Lectures with Ruth Chang (University of Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:more info
CATEGORIES:Conferences
LOCATION:University of Barcelona
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=University of Barcelona:geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2171@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260326T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260326T180000
DTSTAMP:20260303T145058Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/tsa-colloquium-2/
SUMMARY:TSA Colloquium
DESCRIPTION:https://www.upf.edu/web/thought-sharing-in-action/tsa-colloquiu
 m\n\n\n\n 	Time: 15:00–18:00\n 	Location: ​​​​​​​Online\
 n 	Speakers: ​​​​​​​Manolo Martínez\, David Barack\n\nPlea
 se email tsa.colloquium@upf.edu for registration and zoom link\n\n\n
CATEGORIES:Extra talks
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2178@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260326T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260326T180000
DTSTAMP:20260323T085638Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/grsem-tba/
SUMMARY:GRSem: Deflating Truth in the Fourteenth Century: Henry Hopton’s 
 Account
DESCRIPTION:
CATEGORIES:Graduate Research Seminar (GRSem)
LOCATION:Seminari María Zambrano\, UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari María Zambrano\, UB:geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2166@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260325T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260325T170000
DTSTAMP:20260127T103033Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/tba-17/
SUMMARY:The Many Problems of the Many
DESCRIPTION: Abstract: The problem of the many is a problem about ordinar
 y objects and their parts. There is a single cloud in the sky\, but a numb
 er of different collections of water droplets. Which collection composes t
 he cloud? It seems there is no principled way to answer this question. In 
 this paper\, I will diagnose the problem of the many as a series of four s
 eparate problems. Three of these are already separate issues\, but one is 
 distinctive. I will then offer new solutions to these problems. The diagno
 sis will rely on the use of a theoretical tool – situations. The solutio
 ns rely further on a controversial metaphysical picture that can be articu
 lated using this tool\, and which I have developed elsewhere.
CATEGORIES:Colloquium
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Faculty of Philosophy\, 4th floor)
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Faculty of Philosophy\, 4th floor):ge
 o:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2155@ub.edu
DTSTART:20260319T150000Z
DTEND:20260319T170000Z
DTSTAMP:20260225T203824Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/tba-12/
SUMMARY:GRSem: Is a normal life an immoral life?
DESCRIPTION:
CATEGORIES:Graduate Research Seminar (GRSem)
LOCATION:Seminari María Zambrano\, UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari María Zambrano\, UB:geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2196@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260317T133000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260317T150000
DTSTAMP:20260312T091810Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/standpoints-and-spect-actors-p
 hilosophical-reflections-on-theatre-of-the-oppressed/
SUMMARY:Standpoints and Spect-actors: Philosophical Reflections on Theatre 
 of the Oppressed
DESCRIPTION:
CATEGORIES:Extra talks
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Faculty of Philosophy\, 4th floor)
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Faculty of Philosophy\, 4th floor):ge
 o:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2200@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260317T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260317T180000
DTSTAMP:20260312T091324Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/gabriel-uzquiano-usc-patterns-
 of-truth-location-and-modality/
SUMMARY:Patterns of Truth: Location and Modality
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: When is a proposition true at a location\, whether a
  time\, a place or a world? And what is it for a proposition to be true ex
 actly at a given location\, as opposed to being true all over or entirely 
 within that location? We develop a unified modal framework for these disti
 nctions designed to capture a family of locational relations for propositi
 ons\, but we find that exact location is resistant to this treatment. We a
 rgue that to be true exactly at a location is not just a matter of what pa
 ttern of truth across locations a proposition may exemplify.
CATEGORIES:Extra talks
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia:geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2156@ub.edu
DTSTART:20260312T150000Z
DTEND:20260312T170000Z
DTSTAMP:20260205T113919Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/assessing-the-debate-on-mathem
 atical-rigor/
SUMMARY:GRSem: Roadmap to a Feminist Philosophy of Mathematics (WiP)
DESCRIPTION:
CATEGORIES:Graduate Research Seminar (GRSem)
LOCATION:Seminari María Zambrano\, UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari María Zambrano\, UB:geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2164@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260311T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260311T170000
DTSTAMP:20260223T163215Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/tba-15/
SUMMARY:Chance\, Necessity\, and the Evolution of Evolvability
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: The concept of evolvability has sparked considerable 
 debate since it first emerged in evolutionary biology. Initial discussions
  centered on the intriguing question of the evolution of evolvability itse
 lf\, which has often been framed as paradoxical. For many\, the idea of th
 e "evolution of evolvability" suggests the notion of "selection for evolva
 bility\," which raises theoretical challenges. Over time\, however\, the l
 iterature on the evolution of evolvability has grown significantly\, and a
  range of hypotheses have been proposed to address this issue\, enriching 
 our understanding of how evolvability might be integrated into evolutionar
 y processes. This talk presents the conceptual landscape of these differen
 t hypotheses\, examining the philosophical implications of naturalizing th
 e evolution of evolvability. In particular\, it explores how the notion of
  evolvability arose as an epistemic need in evolutionary biology and how
CATEGORIES:Colloquium
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia\, Faculty of Philosophy (4th floor)\, Univer
 sity of Barcelona
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia\, Faculty of Philosophy (4th floor)\, Unive
 rsity of Barcelona:geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2133@ub.edu
DTSTART:20260306T120000Z
DTEND:20260306T140000Z
DTSTAMP:20251003T051759Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/training-session-for-biap-logo
 s-phd-students-session-3-experience-advice-from-current-postdocs/
SUMMARY:Training Session for BIAP/LOGOS PhD Students - Session 3: Experienc
 e & Advice from Current Postdocs
DESCRIPTION:
CATEGORIES:Extra talks
LOCATION:Seminari Ramon Llull (Faculty of Philosophy\, UB)
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari Ramon Llull (Faculty of Philosophy\, UB):geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2159@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260305T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260305T180000
DTSTAMP:20260226T141522Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/grsem-non-binary-three-valued-
 logics-and-the-validity-paradox/
SUMMARY:GRSem: A Non-binary Naïve Validity Theory
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: By adding a validity predicate Val to a propositional
  language\, we develop a validity theory that fully and correctly captures
  its metalinguistic validity. This project faces two challenges. First\, w
 eak validity and logical principles are inconsistent because of the Validi
 ty Paradox. Second\, all existing validity theories\, even those that avoi
 d the paradox\, get some features of validity wrong. More precisely\, we s
 how that they do not prove that all and only valid inferences\, metainfere
 nces\, and higher-level metainferences are valid\, or they do not prove th
 at all and only invalid ones are invalid. We formalize these desiderata wi
 th the V-schemata. We say that a validity theory is naïve iff it satisfie
 s all the V-schemata. We point out why existing validity theories cannot b
 e naïve. We develop a logical framework\, which we call non-binary\, to o
 vercome this limitation. We define a validity theory based on a non-binary
  logic and a fixed-point interpretation for the validity predicate. We pro
 ve that this non-binary validity theory is consistent and naïve: it avoid
 s paradoxes and satisfies all the V-schemata.
CATEGORIES:Graduate Research Seminar (GRSem)
LOCATION:Seminari María Zambrano\, UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari María Zambrano\, UB:geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2197@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260304T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260304T123000
DTSTAMP:20260224T144101Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/subjective-and-objective-ratio
 nality/
SUMMARY:Subjective and objective rationality
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: An agent is objectively rational iff she believes and
  acts in accordance with what the objective rules of rationality dictate\,
  whatever these rules might be. In the case of subjective rationality\, ag
 ents believe and act according to their own standards of rationality\, i.e
 .\, they believe that p iff they believe that it is rational to believe th
 at p. There are several structural analogies between subjective rationalit
 y and objective rationality. For example\, both can involve higher-order b
 eliefs and complex processes of inquiry\, self-reflection\, and belief-rev
 ision. In this paper\, I will first compare and contrast subjective and ob
 jective rationality along various dimensions. Then\, I will investigate th
 e requirements for merely subjectively rational agents to become objective
 ly rational. As I will argue\, this procedure requires from the agent some
  form of epistemic akrasia.
CATEGORIES:Extra talks
LOCATION:Seminari Ramon Llull (4th floor\, Facultat de Filosofia\, UB)
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari Ramon Llull (4th floor\, Facultat de Filosofia\, UB):geo
 :0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2165@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260304T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260304T170000
DTSTAMP:20260202T111926Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/tba-16/
SUMMARY:Core beliefs and epistemic injustice
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Epistemic injustice occurs when—due to identity pre
 judices or structural marginalization—subjects are wronged in their capa
 city as knowers (Fricker 2007). According to Fricker\, epistemic injustice
  can take two forms: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In
  this talk\, I identify a further\, hitherto unrecognized\, form of episte
 mic injustice that is rooted in stereotypes which enter a subject’s cogn
 ition in the form of core beliefs. I proceed as follows: First\, I explic
 ate the key features and the specific functional profile of core beliefs. 
 Second\, I explore how social identity stereotypes and adversity faced whe
 n (dis)conforming to these stereotypes can lead to the formation of distor
 ting core beliefs. Third\, I analyze various ways how such core beliefs ge
 nerate epistemic injustice. Finally\, I argue that due to the specific pro
 file of core beliefs\, this type of epistemic injustice is particularly ha
 rd to resolve.
CATEGORIES:Colloquium
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Faculty of Philosophy\, 4th floor)
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Faculty of Philosophy\, 4th floor):ge
 o:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2182@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260227T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260227T140000
DTSTAMP:20260122T084841Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/phd-course-2025-2026-ernest-so
 sa-3/
SUMMARY:PhD course 2025-2026\, Ernest Sosa
DESCRIPTION:\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\
 n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTuesday February 24 (Seminari de 
 Filosofia)\, Thursday February 26 (aula 410) and Friday February 27\, 12-1
 4 (Seminari de Filosofia)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\
 n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\
 n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\
 n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nProf. Ernest Sosa (Rutgers\,
  http://www.erniesosa.com/) will offer next month the PhD seminar we had 
 to cancel the previous academic year. It will take place on Tuesday Febru
 ary 24 (Seminari de Filosofia)\, Thursday February 26 (aula 410) and Frida
 y February 27\, 12-14 (Seminari de Filosofia). As probably you already kn
 ow\, the annual PhD course is a mandatory training activity for LOGOS PhD 
 students or those registered in the philosophy branch of CCiL. I am lookin
 g forward to seeing you all there.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nAs usually\, the cours
 e will be based on a new book taht Ernesto is concluding\,  title and abs
 tract below\, from which he will select his three presentations (and his C
 olloquium on Wednesday February 25). Professor Sosa has prepared extended 
 outlines of the chapters to be discussed\, which can be found in a dropbox
  file\, link below\; let me know if you have any problems accessing it.\n\
 n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\
 n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nDawning Light Epistemology and Bounded Knowledge\, E. Sos
 a (Rutgers)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\
 n\n\n\n\n\nThe seminar (and the colloquium talk scheduled for Wednesday of
  that week) will take up some chapters of a book manuscript in progress.\n
 \nA main concern of the seminar will be to explore an alternative to famil
 iar philosophical methodologies\, whether internalist and evidentialist\, 
 or naturalist\, or x-phi. A sort of dawning light epistemology conceptuall
 y engineers a supportive setting for realist armchair intuitions. This wil
 l be the subject of the first session. The paper for that first session pr
 esents a defense of a traditional\, intuitions-and-counterexamples methodo
 logy still in wide use for work published in contemporary analytic journal
 s. So\, the methodology defended in this paper is familiar and widely empl
 oyed. But the defense of it in this paper is novel and very unusual\, and 
 relies heavily on the rejection of both internalist foundationalism and ag
 gressive naturalism.\n\nA second main feature of the seminar will be the i
 dea of "default assumptions." And here are two ways default assumptions ac
 quire philosophical interest: (a) They define and sustain a distinctive an
 d surprising addition to epistemic psychology\, that of assumptions/taking
 s. I argue that they warrant attention because of the pervasive presence t
 hey have and deserve (though generally unrecognized) in human doxastic per
 formance. (b) Relatedly\, they provide a basis for a novel approach to phi
 losophical skepticism.\n\nIn later sessions of the seminar\, time permitti
 ng\, we will consider two main objections to the virtue epistemology defen
 ded in the book. One of these is a line of objection against the very idea
  of instrumental rationality invoked in telic virtue epistemology. And the
  other line of objection we might consider\, finally\, is the Lackey dilem
 ma\, which has proved persuasive to many\, but which is highly questionabl
 e\, as is argued in this final paper.\n\nThe papers to be discussed are av
 ailable here: https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fo/rznda7exbgb5efrdgn4eh/AOd0R7
 50gbG161pJayK5kCI?rlkey=uoqbhngiam2fhsbjhdb1w1u5a&amp\;st=oau04kqp&amp\;dl
 =0\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
 \n(The manuscript in progress aims to enhance the telic virtue epistemolog
 y laid out in Judgment and Agency (OUP\, 2015) and Epistemic Explanations 
 (OUP\, 2021). But the new work goes beyond those texts\, and no prior fami
 liarity whatever with the earlier work will be presupposed.)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
CATEGORIES:Conferences
LOCATION:UB (Barcelona)
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=UB (Barcelona):geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2181@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260226T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260226T140000
DTSTAMP:20260122T193319Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/phd-course-2025-2026-ernest-so
 sa/
SUMMARY:PhD course 2025-2026\, Ernest Sosa
DESCRIPTION:\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\
 n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTuesday February 24 (Seminari de 
 Filosofia)\, Thursday February 26 (aula 410) and Friday February 27\, 12-1
 4 (Seminari de Filosofia)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\
 n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\
 n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\
 n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nProf. Ernest Sosa (Rutgers\,
  http://www.erniesosa.com/) will offer next month the PhD seminar we had 
 to cancel the previous academic year. It will take place on Tuesday Febru
 ary 24 (Seminari de Filosofia)\, Thursday February 26 (aula 410) and Frida
 y February 27\, 12-14 (Seminari de Filosofia). As probably you already kn
 ow\, the annual PhD course is a mandatory training activity for LOGOS PhD 
 students or those registered in the philosophy branch of CCiL. I am lookin
 g forward to seeing you all there.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nAs usually\, the cours
 e will be based on a new book taht Ernesto is concluding\,  title and abs
 tract below\, from which he will select his three presentations (and his C
 olloquium on Wednesday February 25). Professor Sosa has prepared extended 
 outlines of the chapters to be discussed\, which can be found in a dropbox
  file\, link below\; let me know if you have any problems accessing it.\n\
 n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\
 n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nDawning Light Epistemology and Bounded Knowledge\, E. Sos
 a (Rutgers)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\
 n\n\n\n\n\nThe seminar (and the colloquium talk scheduled for Wednesday of
  that week) will take up some chapters of a book manuscript in progress.\n
 \nA main concern of the seminar will be to explore an alternative to famil
 iar philosophical methodologies\, whether internalist and evidentialist\, 
 or naturalist\, or x-phi. A sort of dawning light epistemology conceptuall
 y engineers a supportive setting for realist armchair intuitions. This wil
 l be the subject of the first session. The paper for that first session pr
 esents a defense of a traditional\, intuitions-and-counterexamples methodo
 logy still in wide use for work published in contemporary analytic journal
 s. So\, the methodology defended in this paper is familiar and widely empl
 oyed. But the defense of it in this paper is novel and very unusual\, and 
 relies heavily on the rejection of both internalist foundationalism and ag
 gressive naturalism.\n\nA second main feature of the seminar will be the i
 dea of "default assumptions." And here are two ways default assumptions ac
 quire philosophical interest: (a) They define and sustain a distinctive an
 d surprising addition to epistemic psychology\, that of assumptions/taking
 s. I argue that they warrant attention because of the pervasive presence t
 hey have and deserve (though generally unrecognized) in human doxastic per
 formance. (b) Relatedly\, they provide a basis for a novel approach to phi
 losophical skepticism.\n\nIn later sessions of the seminar\, time permitti
 ng\, we will consider two main objections to the virtue epistemology defen
 ded in the book. One of these is a line of objection against the very idea
  of instrumental rationality invoked in telic virtue epistemology. And the
  other line of objection we might consider\, finally\, is the Lackey dilem
 ma\, which has proved persuasive to many\, but which is highly questionabl
 e\, as is argued in this final paper.\n\nThe papers to be discussed are av
 ailable here: https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fo/rznda7exbgb5efrdgn4eh/AOd0R7
 50gbG161pJayK5kCI?rlkey=uoqbhngiam2fhsbjhdb1w1u5a&amp\;st=oau04kqp&amp\;dl
 =0\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
 \n(The manuscript in progress aims to enhance the telic virtue epistemolog
 y laid out in Judgment and Agency (OUP\, 2015) and Epistemic Explanations 
 (OUP\, 2021). But the new work goes beyond those texts\, and no prior fami
 liarity whatever with the earlier work will be presupposed.)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
CATEGORIES:Conferences
LOCATION:UB (Barcelona)
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=UB (Barcelona):geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2170@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260226T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260226T194000
DTSTAMP:20260219T111850Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/tsa-colloquium/
SUMMARY:TSA Colloquium
DESCRIPTION:\n\n\n\nhttps://www.upf.edu/web/thought-sharing-in-action/tsa-c
 olloquium-february-27th\n\nOr online at https://upf-edu.zoom.us/my/tsa.col
 loquium\n\nSpeakers: ​​​​​​​Elisabeth Pacherie\, Hong Yu Wo
 ng\, Stephan Torre. Krisztina Orbán\n\nTo register\, email tsa.colloquium
 @upf.edu\n\n\n\n\n\n\nProgram\n\n\n\n\n\n\n14:30 - Introduction\n\n14:40
 –15:50 - Elisabeth Pacherie\n15:50–17:00 - Hong Yu Wong\n\n17:00–17:
 20 - coffee break\n\n17:20–18:30 - Stephan Torre\n18:30–19:40 - Kriszt
 ina Orbán\n\n19:40 - wrap-up\n\n&nbsp\;\n\n\n\n
CATEGORIES:Extra talks
LOCATION:Room 24.112\, Mercè Rodoreda Building\, Campus Ciutadella\, Unive
 rsitat Pompeu Fabra
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=Carrer de Ramon Trias Farga
 s\, 25\, 27\, Sant Martí\, 08005 Barcelona\, Barcelona\, Spain;X-APPLE-RA
 DIUS=100;X-TITLE=Room 24.112\, Mercè Rodoreda Building\, Campus Ciutadell
 a\, Universitat Pompeu Fabra:geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2162@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260225T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260225T170000
DTSTAMP:20260224T085841Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/tba-13/
SUMMARY:Dawning Light Epistemology and Bounded Knowledge
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: The colloquium talk is embedded in the PhD course ta
 ught this same week. The course and the talk will take up some chapters of
  a book manuscript in progress. The main new components are in the first s
 eminar session on Tuesday and in the colloquium on Wednesday.\nA main conc
 ern of the event will be to explore an alternative to familiar philosophic
 al methodologies\, whether internalist and evidentialist\, or naturalist\,
  or x-phi. A sort of dawning light epistemology conceptually engineers a s
 upportive setting for realist armchair intuitions.\nThis will be the subje
 ct of the first teaching session. The paper for that first session present
 s a defense of a traditional\, intuitions-and-counterexamples methodology 
 still in wide use for work published in contemporary analytic journals. So
 \, the methodology defended in this paper is familiar and widely employed.
  But the defense of it in the paper is quite unusual\, and relies heavily 
 on argued rejection of both internalist foundationalism and aggressive nat
 uralism.\nA second main feature of the course will be the idea of “defau
 lt assumptions.” And here are two ways default assumptions acquire philo
 sophical interest: (a) They define and sustain a distinctive addition to e
 pistemic psychology\, that of assumptions/takings. I argue that they warra
 nt attention because of the pervasive presence they have and deserve (thou
 gh generally unrecognized) in human doxastic performance. (b) Relatedly\, 
 they provide a basis for a novel approach to philosophical skepticism.
CATEGORIES:Colloquium
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia\, Faculty of Philosophy (4th floor)\, Univer
 sity of Barcelona
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia\, Faculty of Philosophy (4th floor)\, Unive
 rsity of Barcelona:geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2183@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260224T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260224T140000
DTSTAMP:20260122T084634Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/phd-course-2025-2026-ernest-so
 sa-2/
SUMMARY:PhD course 2025-2026\, Ernest Sosa
DESCRIPTION:\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\
 n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTuesday February 24 (Seminari de 
 Filosofia)\, Thursday February 26 (aula 410) and Friday February 27\, 12-1
 4 (Seminari de Filosofia)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\
 n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\
 n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\
 n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nProf. Ernest Sosa (Rutgers\,
  http://www.erniesosa.com/) will offer next month the PhD seminar we had 
 to cancel the previous academic year. It will take place on Tuesday Febru
 ary 24 (Seminari de Filosofia)\, Thursday February 26 (aula 410) and Frida
 y February 27\, 12-14 (Seminari de Filosofia). As probably you already kn
 ow\, the annual PhD course is a mandatory training activity for LOGOS PhD 
 students or those registered in the philosophy branch of CCiL. I am lookin
 g forward to seeing you all there.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nAs usually\, the cours
 e will be based on a new book taht Ernesto is concluding\,  title and abs
 tract below\, from which he will select his three presentations (and his C
 olloquium on Wednesday February 25). Professor Sosa has prepared extended 
 outlines of the chapters to be discussed\, which can be found in a dropbox
  file\, link below\; let me know if you have any problems accessing it.\n\
 n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\
 n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nDawning Light Epistemology and Bounded Knowledge\, E. Sos
 a (Rutgers)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\
 n\n\n\n\n\nThe seminar (and the colloquium talk scheduled for Wednesday of
  that week) will take up some chapters of a book manuscript in progress.\n
 \nA main concern of the seminar will be to explore an alternative to famil
 iar philosophical methodologies\, whether internalist and evidentialist\, 
 or naturalist\, or x-phi. A sort of dawning light epistemology conceptuall
 y engineers a supportive setting for realist armchair intuitions. This wil
 l be the subject of the first session. The paper for that first session pr
 esents a defense of a traditional\, intuitions-and-counterexamples methodo
 logy still in wide use for work published in contemporary analytic journal
 s. So\, the methodology defended in this paper is familiar and widely empl
 oyed. But the defense of it in this paper is novel and very unusual\, and 
 relies heavily on the rejection of both internalist foundationalism and ag
 gressive naturalism.\n\nA second main feature of the seminar will be the i
 dea of "default assumptions." And here are two ways default assumptions ac
 quire philosophical interest: (a) They define and sustain a distinctive an
 d surprising addition to epistemic psychology\, that of assumptions/taking
 s. I argue that they warrant attention because of the pervasive presence t
 hey have and deserve (though generally unrecognized) in human doxastic per
 formance. (b) Relatedly\, they provide a basis for a novel approach to phi
 losophical skepticism.\n\nIn later sessions of the seminar\, time permitti
 ng\, we will consider two main objections to the virtue epistemology defen
 ded in the book. One of these is a line of objection against the very idea
  of instrumental rationality invoked in telic virtue epistemology. And the
  other line of objection we might consider\, finally\, is the Lackey dilem
 ma\, which has proved persuasive to many\, but which is highly questionabl
 e\, as is argued in this final paper.\n\nThe papers to be discussed are av
 ailable here: https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fo/rznda7exbgb5efrdgn4eh/AOd0R7
 50gbG161pJayK5kCI?rlkey=uoqbhngiam2fhsbjhdb1w1u5a&amp\;st=oau04kqp&amp\;dl
 =0\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
 \n(The manuscript in progress aims to enhance the telic virtue epistemolog
 y laid out in Judgment and Agency (OUP\, 2015) and Epistemic Explanations 
 (OUP\, 2021). But the new work goes beyond those texts\, and no prior fami
 liarity whatever with the earlier work will be presupposed.)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
CATEGORIES:Conferences
LOCATION:UB (Barcelona)
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=UB (Barcelona):geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2192@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260223T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260223T130000
DTSTAMP:20260218T174601Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/problems-of-universal-quantifi
 ers-in-logical-neural-networks/
SUMMARY:Problems of Universal Quantifiers in Logical Neural Networks
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Deep learning models achieve high performance in var
 ious downstream tasks\, yet their complexity hinders the evaluation of the
 ir underlying reasoning. The field of eXplainable Artificial Intelligence 
 (XAI) addresses this challenge through diverse approaches\, ranging from e
 xplaining opaque models (or black boxes) to developing inherently transpar
 ent architectures. Logical Neural Networks (LNNs) are one such approach\, 
 where neurons emulate logical vocabulary (such as atomic propositions and 
 connectives) governed by real-valued semantics (e.g.\, Łukasiewicz logic)
  to form interpretable expressions. In classification or prediction tasks\
 , LNNs can learn logically expressed rules that can later be directly inte
 rpreted\, mainly by leveraging the expressibility of first order logic. Th
 is is done\, for instance\, by taking information from a knowledge base as
  an assignment for atomic formulas\, and then computing the corresponding 
 assignments for complex formulas. However\, the seminal development of the
 se networks\, in an unpublished work by Riegel et al. in 2020\, lacks a sa
 tisfactory treatment of universal quantifiers\, and the majority of publis
 hed uses for LNNs are based on propositional logic. This limits the potent
 ial for LNNs in the XAI field. In this talk\, I will present some choices 
 for defining universal quantifiers in the LNNs framework\, and their assoc
 iated challenges.
CATEGORIES:Extra talks
LOCATION:Seminari Ramon Llull (4th floor\, Facultat de Filosofia\, UB)
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari Ramon Llull (4th floor\, Facultat de Filosofia\, UB):geo
 :0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2153@ub.edu
DTSTART:20260219T150000Z
DTEND:20260219T170000Z
DTSTAMP:20260211T100837Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/on-moral-luck/
SUMMARY:GRSem: On what we mean (more or less) by internalized stigma
DESCRIPTION:Internalized stigma is a pervasive phenomenon commonly endured 
 by people with mental health conditions. It typically refers to the degree
  to which individuals vulnerable to stigma internalize negative social ste
 reotypes\, believe them to be true of themselves\, and experience self-dev
 aluation as a result. Although this phenomenon has been increasingly explo
 red in the empirical literature\, the philosophical exploration of the mod
 els developed remains scarce. To address this gap\, I provide a conceptual
  analysis of the dominant empirical models in internalized stigma in menta
 l health\, exploring how unexamined conceptual assumptions generate incons
 istent understandings of the phenomenon. More precisely\, I demonstrate th
 at these models inadvertently disagree on two fundamental aspects: first\,
  different authors may consider additional features besides the acceptance
  of public stereotypes and the resulting self-devaluation\, thereby diverg
 ing in the necessary and sufficient conditions they specify for what count
 s as internalized stigma\; and second\, they disagree on how to characteri
 ze the phenomenology of self-devaluation.
CATEGORIES:Graduate Research Seminar (GRSem)
LOCATION:Seminari María Zambrano\, UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari María Zambrano\, UB:geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2186@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260218T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260218T170000
DTSTAMP:20260127T103608Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/tba-21/
SUMMARY:Why inner speech is agentially diminished
DESCRIPTION:ABSTRACT: Inner speech is often explained by drawing an analog
 y with outer speech. In various views\, inner speech is functionally\, dev
 elopmentally and mechanistically continuous with outer speech. In this pap
 er\, I present the aspects in which inner speech is discontinuous with res
 pect to outer speech. These are condensation\, agency\, and imagery. I the
 n argue for the agency discontinuity and show that inner speech is agentia
 lly diminished. I show how this is supported by relevant strands of the ph
 ilosophical and psychological literature. I finish by proposing two paths 
 the explanation of this agential impoverishment can take.
CATEGORIES:Seminar
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia\, Faculty of Philosophy (4th floor)\, Univer
 sity of Barcelona
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia\, Faculty of Philosophy (4th floor)\, Unive
 rsity of Barcelona:geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2157@ub.edu
DTSTART:20260211T230000Z
DTEND:20260212T230000Z
DTSTAMP:20251121T100502Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/biap-collaborative-research-ev
 ent-lies-fiction-and-manipulation-in-propaganda/
SUMMARY:BIAP Collaborative Research Event: Lies\, Fiction\, and Manipulatio
 n in Propaganda
DESCRIPTION:Link to program\n\nOrganizers: Andrei Bespalov (UPF) and Teresa
  Marques (UB)\n\nFurther details about this conference will be provided in
  due course.
CATEGORIES:Conferences
LOCATION:Pompeu Fabra University Mercè building\, carrer de la Mercè\, 12
  Barcelona\, 08002 Spain
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=carrer de la Mercè\, 12\, 
 Barcelona\, 08002\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Pompeu Fabra Universi
 ty Mercè building\, carrer de la Mercè\, 12 Barcelona\, 08002 Spain:geo:
 0,0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/Madrid
X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/Madrid
BEGIN:STANDARD
DTSTART:20251026T020000
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:CET
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
DTSTART:20260329T030000
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
TZNAME:CEST
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
DTSTART:20261025T020000
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:CET
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END:VCALENDAR