Projects   >   PERSP – Philosophy of Perspectival Thoughts and Facts

PERSP – Philosophy of Perspectival Thoughts and Facts

17 Dec 2009 / 15 Dec 2015
CSD2009-00056

Summary

According to a natural way of thinking, objective reality is independent from us – independent from our thought and talk. Hence, when we have knowledge of it, it allows for a description whose truth does not depend on our perspectives. Nonetheless, we are familiar with the phenomenon that the truth-value of some of our claims, on the face of it perfectly apt to represent how things objectively are, essentially varies depending on our perspectives.

 

Thus, the statement "Dinosaurs last roamed the earth 60 million years ago", true when uttered now, would not have been true if it had been uttered, say, 10 million years ago; the claim "Time is running slower for Pollux, because he's travelling at 99% of the speed of light" might be true uttered relative to some reference frame but not others; “Lentils are tasty” and, more controversially, “Gay marriage is acceptable” are also perhaps true only when made relative to particular gustative or moral perspectives; and, to provide a totally commonplace example, the claim “I am hungry” is true when uttered by some agents at some times, but not when uttered by others, or by the same agent at a different time. How can this variation in truth-value be reconciled with our conception of facts as being perspective-independent? Are not those perspectives from which the truth-value of claims like these essentially depends also an aspect of objective reality? Our project aims to contribute to the field of research aiming at its core to answer questions like these. These issues have been studied in depth in contemporary philosophy by researchers working on only some of the crucial cases for understanding the perspectival character of our thought, and their work has provided important results. However, while the complexity and diversity of the phenomena makes understandable the piecemeal approach that so far has been taken, we think that a unified attack is needed, for which the exploiting of synergies and complementarities and the collaborative efforts that a CONSOLIDER project allows are mandatory.

 

More information: http://www.ub.edu/persp/

Related publications

Manuel Pérez Otero   |   2018
El dominio de lo mental en la filosofía de Williamson

THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, vol. 33/1, pp. 23-40.    

Manuel Pérez Otero   |   2018
Semántica y ontología de mundos posibles

David P. Chico (coordinador)  Cuestiones de la filosofía del lenguaje, Zaragoza: Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza, pp. 199-233.

Max Kölbel   |   2017
"About Concerns "

In Ilse Depraetere and Raphael Salkie (eds.), Semantics and Pragmatics: Drawing a Line, Amsterdam: Springer, 197–214.

Manuel Pérez Otero   |   2016
Variedades del escepticismo y del anti-escepticismo    

Análisis Filosófico 36/1, pp. 7-27.

Sven Rosenkranz   |   2015
'In Defense of Ockhamism'

in Fischer, J.M./Todd, P. (eds.), Freedom, Fatalism, and Foreknowledge, New York: Oxford University Press, 343-60 (reprint of the 2012 Philosophia article)

Sven Rosenkranz, Fabrice Correia   |   2015
'Presentism without Presentness'

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4, 19-27

Sven Rosenkranz, Fabrice Correia   |   2015
'Return of the Living Dead: Reply to Braddon-Mitchell'

Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 9, 376-89

Max Kölbel   |   2015
"Moral Relativism "

In Tim Crane (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2015, London: Routledge.

Max Kölbel   |   2015
"Relativism 1: Representational Content"

Philosophy Compass 10/1, pp. 38–51.

Max Kölbel   |   2015
"Relativism 2: Semantic Content"

Philosophy Compass 10/1, pp. 52–67.

Dan López de Sa   |   2014
‘What Could Vague Objects Possibly Be?’

in Akiba & Abasnezhad (eds.), Vague Objects and Vague Identity, Springer, 257-71

Max Kölbel   |   2014
"Agreement and Communication"

Erkenntnis 79, pp. 101–120.

Sven Rosenkranz   |   2013
'Determinism, Open Future, and Branching Time'

in: Correia, F. and Iacona, A. (eds.), Around the Tree, Synthese Library Vol. 361, 47-72

Sven Rosenkranz, Fabrice Correia   |   2013
'Living on the Brink, or Welcome Back, Growing Block!'

Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8 (2013), 333-50

Sven Rosenkranz   |   2013
'Realism and Anti-Realism'

in: Pritchard, D. (ed.), Oxford Bibliographies: Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/obo/page/philosophy

Dan López de Sa   |   2013
‘Rigid vs Flexible Response-Dependent Properties’

Hoeltje, Schnieder & Steinberg (eds.), Dependence, Philosophia Verlag

Manuel Pérez Otero   |   2013
Contingentism about Individuals and Higher-Order Necessitism    

Theoria, vol. 28/3, pp. 393-406.

Manuel Pérez Otero   |   2013
Purposes of Reasoning and (a New Vindication of) Moore’s Proof of an External World    

Synthese, vol. 190, pp. 4181-4200. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-013-0256-6.

Sven Rosenkranz   |   2012
'In Defence of Ockhamism'

Philosophia – Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 40, 617-31 (to be reprinted in Fischer, J. M./Todd, P. (eds.), Freedom, Fatalism and Foreknowledge, Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2013)

Sven Rosenkranz   |   2012
'Radical Scepticism without Epistemic Closure'

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85, 692-718

Genoveva Martí   |   2012
Empirical Data and the Theory of Reference

Kabasenche,  W.; O'Rourke, M.; Slater, M. (eds.): Topics in Contemporary Philosophy: Reference and Referring. MIT Press: 63-82

Manuel Pérez Otero   |   2012
La prueba de Putnam contra el escepticismo radical: dos reinterpretaciones basadas en el autoconocimiento

Crítica, vol. 44, pp. 35-63.

Manuel Pérez Otero   |   2012
Los propósitos de razonar, ilustrados con el argumento externista anti-escéptico de Putnam

Theoria, 27/1, núm. 3, pp. 55-74

Sven Rosenkranz, Fabrice Correia   |   2011
'Eternal Facts in an Ageing Universe'

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90, 307-20

Sven Rosenkranz   |   2011
'European Functionalism'

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2011), 229-49

Sven Rosenkranz, Fabrice Correia   |   2011
As Time Goes By

monograph, Paderborn 2011: Mentis

Genoveva Martí, José Martínez-Fernández   |   2011
General Terms, Rigidity and the Trivialization Problem

Synthese 181, 2 (2011), pp. 277-293; doi:10.1007/s11229-010-9802-7

Manuel Pérez Otero   |   2011
Modest Skepticism and Question Begging Proper

Grazer Philosophische Studien 83, pp. 9-32.

Manuel Pérez Otero   |   2010
El debate entre externistas e internistas sobre la racionalidad inferencial

Análisis Filosófico, vol. 30, No. 2, Noviembre 2010, pp. 163-186.

Genoveva Martí, José Martínez-Fernández   |   2010
General Terms as Designators: A Defence of the View

H. Beebee & N. Sabbarton-Leary: The Semantics and Metaphysics of Kinds. Routledge, pp. 46-63

Manuel Pérez Otero   |   2010
Invariantism versus Relativism about Truth

Teorema (Vol. XXIX/3, pp. 145-162).

David Pineda   |   2010
Non-committal Causal Explanations.

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24/2: 147-70.

Manuel Pérez Otero   |   2010
Possible Worlds: Structure and Stuff

Philosophical Papers vol. 39, No. 2 (July 2010), pp. 209-237.