Projects   >   Philosophy of Social Cognition

Philosophy of Social Cognition

1 Sep 2022 / 31 Aug 2026
PID2021-124100NB-I00

Principal Investigators

Jules Holroyd (Sheffield)
Katharine Jenkins (Glasgow)
Mari Mikkola (Amsterdam)
Susanna Schellenberg (Rutgers)
Susanna Siegel (Harvard)
Robin Zheng (Glasgow)

Summary

The focus of this research project lies at the interface between the philosophy and the scientific understanding of human social cognition, i.e., the study of how we perceive and understand socially relevant categories. It addresses key philosophical issues concerning social perception, social cognition, and social ontology.

The central idea is to examine the conceptual and empirical relationships among the perceptual and cognitive processes that underlie socially relevant mental representations and the nature of the social structures thus represented.

The general objective of this research project is to examine the conceptual and empirical foundations of human social cognition. The perception of members of socially relevant categories often unknowingly and unintentionally activates social knowledge. This automatic activation of social knowledge includes explicit and implicit attitudes and social stereotypes, which influence people’s judgments and behaviour. Therefore, the general hypothesis that drives this project is that an analysis of the conceptual and empirical underpinnings of our socially relevant mental lives needs to investigate the relationships between our mental representations of social facts—both at the perceptual and cognitive level—and the nature of such social facts. 

The project is structured around three general objectives:

1.     To provide a philosophical understanding of the processes of perceptual information relevant to human social cognition.

2.     To examine the role of social knowledge, and the concepts of which it is built, in the perception of and the behaviour toward members of socially relevant categories.

3.     To offer an account of the ontology of relevant social categories.

The project will be developed along three different dimensions: social perception, social cognition, and social ontology. 

Key words: implicit attitudes, social perception, social cognition, social concepts, social ontology 

Total budget: €68.050,40
1 FPI Fellow

Related publications

Esa Díaz-León   |   2026
Analytic Feminism

In M. Rossberg (ed.) The Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.

Esa Díaz-León   |   2026
Conceptual Engineering as Resistance: A Hybrid Account of Conceptual Revision
Esa Díaz-León   |   2026
Social Construction, Grounding, and Amelioration

In Y. Kappes, A. Passinsky, J. De Rizzo & B. Schnieder (eds.) Facets of Reality, Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 341-61.

Esa Díaz-León   |   2025
Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Revision without Changing the Subject: A Haslangerian Account

In: Isaac, Manuel Gustavo; Scharp, Kevin & Koch, Steffen (eds.), New Perspectives on Conceptual Engineering, Synthese Library, Springer Nature, pp. 25-46.

Esa Díaz-León, Ann Cudd; Robin Andreasen   |   2025
Feminist Theory: A Philosophical Anthology, 2nd Edition

Co-edited by Robin O. Andreasen, Ann E. Cudd & E. Díaz-León, Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN: 978-1-394-17267-2

Esa Díaz-León   |   2025
Gender Identity, First-Person Authority, and Belief

Phenomenology and Mind, 29: 114-23. DOI: 10.17454/pam-2910 

Josefa Toribio   |   2025
Memory and Implicit Bias

Forthcoming in A. Sant’Anna and C. Craver (Eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. Oxford: OUP.

Esa Díaz-León   |   2024
“Disagreement and the Meaning of Gender and Racial Terms”

In Baghramian, Maria, Carter, J. Adam & Cosker-Rowland, Rach (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement. Routledge, pp. 133-47.

Josefa Toribio   |   2024
“Seeing Wrongness”

Journal of Moral Philosophy, 22 (3–4): 314–335. DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20244289

Esa Díaz-León   |   2024
The Metaphysics of Gender

Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009264167

Josefa Toribio   |   2022
“Responsibility for implicitly biased behaviour: A habit-based approach”

Journal of Social Philosophy, 53: 239-254. DOI: 10.1111/JOSP.12442