Truth in Fiction Reprised
British Journal of Aesthetics, 62 (2), 307-324
Ugliness Is in the Gut of the Beholder.
Valor semántico y contenido asertórico en Frege
Revista de la Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España, 66, 44–46
What Do Propositions Explain? Inflationary vs. Deflationary Perspectives and The Case of Singular Propositions
Synthese, DOI: 10.1007/s11229-022-03467-7
Who knows what Mary knew? An experimental study
Philosophical Psychology, 35: 522-545.
Williamson on Defining Knowledge
Episteme. A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology 19/22, pp. 286-302. DOI: 10.1017/epi.2020.27. (URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2020.27). Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 July 2020.
‘Augustine on Active Perception, Awareness, and Representation’, Phronesis 66 (2021): 84–110.
https://doi.org/10.1163/15685284-bja10035
‘Colocationist Answers to the Grounding Problem’
Theoria. A Swedish Journal of Philosophy 87 (6): 1444-1467.
‘Veritism Refuted? Understanding, Idealizations, and the Facts’, Synthese 198 (2021): 4295–4313.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02342-2
“Are visuomotor representations cognitively penetrable? Biasing action-guiding vision”.
Synthese, 198 (Suppl. 17): S4163–S4181.
“Implicit Bias and the Fragmented Mind”
In Dirk Kindermann, Cristina Borgoni and Andrea Onofri (Eds.), The Fragmented Mind, pp. 303–324. Oxford: OUP.
“On Language and Sexuality”
In Routledge Handbook of Social Philosophy of Language, edited by J. Khoo & R. Sterken, pp. 377-88.
“Una explicación aretaica del impacto de los sesgos implícitos sobre la justificación de las creencias”.
In David Pérez Chico and Modesto Gómez (Eds.). Ernesto Sosa: Conocimiento y Virtud. With Miguel Ángel Fernández, pp. 187–210. Zaragoza: PUZ.
‘Every Word is a Name: Autonymy and Quotation in Augustine’, Mind 130 (2021): 595–616.
https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaa043
"Accessibilism, implicit bias, and epistemic justification"
Synthese 198 (7): 1529–1547.
A Role for Conscious Accessibility in Skilled Action.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 12, 683-697.
Aesthetic science book review
Against the Distinction between Intentions for the Future and Intentions for the Present.
Philosophical Quarterly, 58(4), 333-346
An Argument from Normativity for Primitive Emotional Phenomenology
Philosophical Papers 50 (1-2):31-52.
Assertion
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
