"El argumento antiintelectualista de Wittgenstein sobre la comprensión del lenguaje"
Theoria, vol. 15, pp. 155-169
"Epistemología representacionalista y realismo científico metafísico en Locke"
Teorema XIX/2, pp. 5-17
A Presuppositional Account of Reference-Fixing
Journal of Philosophy, 97 (3),109-147.
Filosofía del lenguaje.(Autores: M. Pérez Otero y M. García-Carpintero.)
Barcelona: Edicions Universitat de Barcelona
Lógica y metodología de la ciencia. Resultados clásicos y nuevas ideas
Barcelona: Vicens Vives
Autores: D. Quesada, O. Fernández Prat, M. Pérez Otero
Structuralist Analysis of Fundamental Measurement Theories
in W. Balzer, C. U. Moulines and J. Sneed (eds.), Structuralist Knowledge Representations. Paradigmatic Examples,
Poznan Studies 75, Rodopi, Amsterdam 2000, pp. 19-49.
Watermelonsand RedWatermelons. A Case Against Compositionality?
Theoria, 15/2, San Sebastián, pp 281-285
“Extruding Intentionality from the Metaphysical Flux”
Journal of Experimental and Theoretical AI, 11, 1999, pp. 501-518.
“Meaning, Dispositions, and Normativity”
Minds and Machines, 9 (3), pp. 399-413.
“Naturalism and Causal Explanation”
Communication and Cognition, 32 (3/4), pp. 243-258.
“Saving Relativism from its Saviour ”
Crítica 31 (April 1999), pp. 91–103.
"El carácter epistemológico del concepto de significado"
Análisis Filosófico, Volumen XIX, núm. 2, pp. 173-186
"The Ontological Commitments of Logical Theories"
European Review of Philosophy 4, pp. 157-182
A General Representation for Internal Proportional Comparison-combiantorial Systems When the Operation is Not Necessarily Closed
Theoria 14/1, 1999, pp. 157-178
Conceptos modales e identidad
Barcelona: Edicions Universitat de Barcelona
Searle on Perception
Teorema 18/1, 19-41
The Ontological Commitments of Logical Theories
European Review of Philosophy 4, 157-182.
“Lewis, Language, Lust and Lies ”
Inquiry 41 (Sept 1998), pp. 301–15.
“Meaning and Other Non-Biological Categories”
Philosophical Papers, 27 (2), pp. 129-150.
“The Implicit Conception of Implicit Conceptions. Reply to Christopher Peacocke”
Philosophical Issues, 9, pp. 115-120.
