Searle on Perception
Teorema 18/1, 19-41
The Ontological Commitments of Logical Theories
European Review of Philosophy 4, 157-182.
“Lewis, Language, Lust and Lies ”
Inquiry 41 (Sept 1998), pp. 301–15.
“Meaning and Other Non-Biological Categories”
Philosophical Papers, 27 (2), pp. 129-150.
“The Implicit Conception of Implicit Conceptions. Reply to Christopher Peacocke”
Philosophical Issues, 9, pp. 115-120.
"Davidson, Correspondence Truth and the Frege-Gödel-Church Argument"
History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 19, pp. 63-81
Autores: M. García-Carpintero, M. Pérez Otero
"Las distinciones modales de Kripke y el concepto de proposición"
Teorema XVII, pp. 61-74
"On the Utility of Global Supervenience"
Crítica, vol. XXX, núm. 90, pp. 3-21
A Paradox of Truth-Minimalism
C. Martínez, U. Rivas & L. Villegas-Forero (eds.), Truth in Perspective, Ashgate, Aldershott (UK), pp. 37-63.
Davidson, Correspondence Truth, and the Frege-Gödel-Church Argument
History and Philosophy of Logic, pp. 63-81.
Descripción, prescripción e interpretación
C. Solís (ed.), Alta tensión: filosofía, sociología e historia de la ciencia, Paidos, Barcelona 1998, pp. 235-258
Fregean versus Kripkean Reference
Teorema 17/1, 21-44
Fundamentos de Filosofía de la Ciencia
Ariel, Barcelona
Hacia una teoría general de la representación científica
Theoria, 13/1, San Sebastián, pp. 157-178
Indexicals as Token-Reflexives
Mind 107, pp. 529-563
Rigidity and the Description of Counterfactual Situations
Theoria, vol 13: 3, pp.477-490
The Significance of the Distinction between Concept Mastery and Concept Possession. Response to James Higginbotham
Philosophical Issues, vol 9, pp. 163-167
“Ecological Content ”
Pragmatics and Cognition, 5 (2), pp. 257-285.
“Pulp Naturalism”
Il Cannocchiale, Rivista di Studi Filosofici, 2 [special issue on Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science], pp. 185-195.
“Twin Pleas: Probing Content and Compositionality”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57, (4), pp 871-889.
