| 1993
The Grounds for the Model-Theoretic Account of the Logical Properties
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 34, núm. 1, 107-131
| 1993
The Source of Intensionality
Philosophical Perspectives, vol 7 (1993). pp. 197-206
| 1991
“Causal Efficacy, Content and Levels of Explanation”
Logique et Analyse, 135-136, pp. 297-318.
| 1991
“Why There Still Has to Be a Theory of Consciousness”
Consciousness and Cognition, 2 (1), pp. 28-47.
| 1989
Aboutness and Substitutivity
Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Vol. XIV (1989). pp. 127-139
A Non-Causal Account of the Explanatoriness of General Relativity
Submitted
A Posteriori Russellian Physicalism, Revealed (forthcoming) Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
A posteriori Russellian physicalism: a new solution to the meta-problem of consciousness (Forthcoming) Philosophical Quarterly
Botin, M. (2022). “The phenomenal concept strategy cannot explain problem intuitions”. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 29(7-8), 7-31.
Botin, M. (2023). “Russellian Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong”. Philosophical Studies.
Chatbot Solitaire: Language games in LLMs (in progress)
Coordination and Cooperation in Online Conversation (in progress)
Information-Thermal Paradoxes. Conceptual flaws in the informational approaches to thermal physics
Proper Names: Ideas and Chains
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 34:sup1, 129-155, DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2004.10717603
Rethinking the holobiont: A framework for the hologenome concept of evolution
Sympletic Battlefronts. Phase Space Arguments for (and against) the Physics of Computation
The Supervenience of Mental Content
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 94 (1994), pp. 117-135
title publication
Tras el laberinto Humeano: Una concepcion material de la induccion sin tesis ontologicas
Anta, J. (forthcoming). Tras el laberinto Humeano: Una concepcion material de la induccion sin tesis ontologicas. Ideas y Valores.
