Dretske on the Causal Efficacy of Meaning
Mind and Language 9 (2), 181-202
Ostensive Signs: Against the Identity Theory of Quotation
Journal of Philosophy, 91, 253-264.
Propiedades teleológicas y superveniencia
Éndoxa, volumen 3, pp. 121-145
Theories as Nets: Combinatorial Measurement Theory
in P. Humphreys (ed.), Patrick Suppes, Mathematical Philosopher, Kluwer Ac. P., Dordrecht 1994, pp. 275-297.
The Grounds for the Model-Theoretic Account of the Logical Properties
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 34, núm. 1, 107-131
The Source of Intensionality
Philosophical Perspectives, vol 7 (1993). pp. 197-206
“Causal Efficacy, Content and Levels of Explanation”
Logique et Analyse, 135-136, pp. 297-318.
“Why There Still Has to Be a Theory of Consciousness”
Consciousness and Cognition, 2 (1), pp. 28-47.
Aboutness and Substitutivity
Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Vol. XIV (1989). pp. 127-139
A Non-Causal Account of the Explanatoriness of General Relativity
Submitted
A Novel Approach in Characterising Misogyny
forthcoming in Hypatia
A Posteriori Russellian Physicalism, Revealed (forthcoming) Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
A posteriori Russellian physicalism: a new solution to the meta-problem of consciousness (Forthcoming) Philosophical Quarterly
Botin, M. (2022). “The phenomenal concept strategy cannot explain problem intuitions”. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 29(7-8), 7-31.
Botin, M. (2023). “Russellian Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong”. Philosophical Studies.
Chatbot Solitaire: Language games in LLMs (in progress)
Coordination and Cooperation in Online Conversation (in progress)
Information-Thermal Paradoxes. Conceptual flaws in the informational approaches to thermal physics
Proper Names: Ideas and Chains
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 34:sup1, 129-155, DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2004.10717603

