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Maite Ezcurdia UNAM
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BEGINNING

LOGOS — Grupo de lectura. Sesión 29/10/03
Peacocke, C-: "How Are A Priori Truths Possible", *European Journal of Philosophy* 1: 175-99 (1993).

Objetivos del artículo: 1) ofrecer una caracterización de lo a priori que emane de la teoría de los conceptos defendida en *A Study of Concepts*; 2) ofrecer una elucidación de ciertas nociones que se explican a partir de la noción de a priori, como la noción de justificación, de demostración matemática y de constante lógica. 3) Ubicar el análisis ofrecido respecto a la discusión sobre la analiticidad en Frege, Carnap y Quine.

Esquema de contenidos:
Sección 1:
a) Exposición de la teoría de lo a priori que emana de la teoría de los conceptos defendida en *A Study of Concepts*. Teoría metasemántica ('teoría MS' para abreviar).
b) Comparación con la noción de analiticidad en Frege.
c) Carácter a priori de condiciones de posesión y teorías de la determinación.

Sección 2: Comparación con el convencionalismo.

Sección 3: Ubicación de la teoría MS de lo a priori con respecto al debate Quine-Carnap sobre la analiticidad.

Sección 4: Elucidación de la noción de justificación a partir de la teoría MS.

Sección 5: Dos aplicaciones filosóficas de la teoría MS de lo a priori: elucidación de la noción de demostración matemática y de la noción de constante lógica.

Sección 6: Sobre el estatus a priori de las condiciones de posesión.

Sección 1
Parte a). Nociones previas:
Condiciones de posesión...
Teoría de la determinación: explica cómo una condición de posesión, conjuntamente con el mundo, determina un valor semántico para el concepto individuado por la condición de posesión.
Relación de dependencia mutua entre condiciones de posesión y teorías de la determinación: (i) la condición de posesión de un concepto debe formularse de tal modo que dé cuenta de hechos conocidos acerca del valor semántico del concepto; (ii) la teoría de la determinación debe asignar un valor semántico a un concepto de tal modo que haga correctas las transiciones inferenciales y las prácticas de formación de creencias que se formulen en su condición de posesión.

Teoría MS de lo a priori: *un contenido es a priori si y sólo si las condiciones de posesión y las correspondientes teorías de la determinación de los conceptos que aparecen en él garantizan que es verdadero.*

Parte b).
(i) Todo contenido analítico en el sentido de Frege es a priori según la teoría MS.
(ii) Casos de a prioricidad como 'Yo estoy aquí' vienen recogidos por la teoría MS si bien no son analíticos en el sentido de Frege.
(iii) La teoría MS puede explicar el carácter a priori de las verdades aritméticas sin comprometerse con el logicismo.
(iv) La teoría MS es compatible [de hecho lo implica] con la existencia de contenidos a priori relativos a determinadas circunstancias empíricas, como 'si estoy percibiendo correctamente, entonces esto es cuadrado'. [Lo implica porque, como él mismo dice, para cualquier conjunto de conceptos habrá verdades a priori que los involucran, puesto que la teoría de la determinación de un concepto opera con la restricción de asignar un valor semántico que haga verdaderas las prácticas de formación de juicios mencionadas en su condición de posesión].

Parte c)
Una condición de corrección de la teoría MS de lo a priori es que las condiciones de posesión y las teorías de la determinación de conceptos sean a priori (pues de ellas se deriva la verdad de los contenidos a priori según la teoría). Pero ciertamente han de serlo, pues su verdad deriva de las condiciones de posesión y teorías de la determinación de los conceptos implicados. Analogía: derivación de la verdad de un enunciado mediante una teoría tarskiana de la verdad.

Sección 2
Todo convencionalista entiende que la explicación de la verdad de algo verdadero a priori es, en primer lugar, distinta en género de la explicación de resto de verdades y, en segundo lugar, que involucra la apelación a convenciones.

1) Según la teoría MS esto no es así. Las condiciones de verdad de cualquier enunciado, sea o no a priori, se establecen de idéntico modo, a saber, en función de los valores semánticos asignados a los conceptos implicados por las teorías de la determinación correspondientes. Lo que ocurre es que en el caso de las verdades a priori las condiciones de verdad son tales que podemos garantizar de antemano que se cumplen.

NEXT

Objeción de Dummett al convencionalismo moderado. Según esta forma de convencionalismo hay ciertas verdades que se estipulan sin más como correctas y otras en cambio que derivan de esas convenciones. Dummett objetó que esta noción de derivabilidad no puede ser convencional aunque debe ser a priori.

De nuevo, una objeción parecida no se aplicaría a la teoría MS, pues habrá una explicación MS del carácter a priori de las prácticas inferenciales que aparezcan en las condiciones de posesión de los conceptos.

2) Por otro lado, lo verdadero a priori no es verdadero por estipulación, según la teoría MS, pues las condiciones de posesión no se formulan arbitrariamente sino que están sujetas a las restricciones mencionadas en la sección 1 (además, de ellas deben derivarse nuestros juicios acerca de las posibilidades epistémicas que involucran los correspondientes conceptos, como se explica en la sección 6).

Discusión con Wittgenstein... [semejanzas que no parecen muy semejantes, debido a que Wittgenstein supone claramente un estatus semántico especial para los conceptos lógicos que la teoría MS no les concede].

Sección 3
En principio la teoría MS se alinea con Carnap al ofrecer una elucidación de la noción de a priori. Sin embargo, hay algunos puntos de coincidencia con Quine.
a) No existen verdades puramente por convención o en virtud meramente del significado lingüístico. Todas las verdades, incluso las a priori, lo son en virtud de que se cumplen las condiciones de verdad. No obstante, es cierto que se requiere aceptar ciertas verdades para comprender o poseer ciertos conceptos [Este punto de coincidencia parece muy traído por los pelos. Si se requiere aceptar las verdades a priori para poseer los conceptos que las expresan este es un sentido en que puede hablarse de verdades en virtud puramente del significado lingüístico, esto es, de lo que debe saber un hablante competente por el hecho de serlo].
b) No hay una noción de a priori relativa a un lenguaje. Lo único convencional es qué expresiones del lenguaje expresan qué verdades [Por ejemplo, un mismo enunciado tipo E podría ser a priori en un lenguaje L y a posteriori en otro lenguaje L' pero ello sólo es debido a que las mismas expresiones tipo que integran E están asociadas convencionalmente a conceptos distintos en L y en L'].
c) Las reglas básicas de inferencia y los axiomas básicos del hablante pueden justificarse. No por el papel que juegan en toda la teoría aceptada por el hablante, como quiere Quine, sino sólo por los conceptos de posesión y teorías de la determinación de los conceptos implicados en esas reglas y esos principios.

En todo caso, la teoría MS da la razón a Carnap en que aceptar ciertos enunciados es constitutivo de comprender los conceptos expresados en ellas. Ello por sí mismo, no obstante, no explica que esos enunciados sean en efecto correctos, como querría Carnap [supongo que se refiere a que según la teoría MS esos enunciados tienen condiciones de verdad que se cumplen].

Sección 4
La idea general es que qué creencias justifican qué otras es algo que viene determinado por las condiciones de posesión de los conceptos implicados (del contenido a justificar) [¿No es eso muy fuerte? Pensemos en la justificación de teorías científicas].

Para el caso de justificación suficiente y directa es posible formular un principio más preciso:
Un conjunto de contenidos S proporciona justificación suficiente y directa para aceptar un contenido P si y sólo si se sigue de las condiciones de posesión de los conceptos que aparecen en S y en P que aceptar los contenidos de S es suficiente para juzgar que P.

Esta elucidación de justificación es razonable dada la restricción con la que operan las teorías de la determinación de conceptos expuesta en la sección 1.

En general las condiciones de posesión de los conceptos que integran un contenido especifican qué otros contenidos es necesario aceptar. En este sentido la justificación a priori es un caso límite en que se sigue de las condiciones de posesión que el contenido es aceptable independientemente de la aceptación de otros contenidos. El caso es análogo al de la inferencia lógica y las verdades lógicas.

La teoría MS no quita la razón a filósofos como Burge que niegan que justificación a priori implique justificación no revisable empíricamente. Acceder a un contenido a priori puede requerir tener una serie de experiencias, como en el caso de la percepción en una demostración matemática. [Duda: si se distingue entre justificación impersonal, como sugiere Peacocke, y justificación para un hablante, ¿tiene sentido hablar de justificación impersonal a priori revisable empíricamente? Yo diría que no.]

Sección 5
Una demostración matemática [o lógica, supongo] *es una cadena de inferencias el carácter preservador de la verdad de cada una de las cualess se sigue meramente de las teorías de la determinación de los conceptos implicados.*

O es una constante lógica si y sólo si en su condición de posesión se mencionan únicamente inferencias a partir de enunciados que contienen O ó hacia enunciados que contienen O y se especifican de tal modo que no se dice nada acerca de los contenidos implicados excepto a qué categoría semántica pertenecen.

Sección 6

Existe un método russelliano de hallar verdades a priori: encontrar axiomas de los que se deriven verdades a priori conocidas de antemano. Este es el método que sigue el defensor de la teoría MS para hallar las condiciones de posesión de los conceptos. Los hechos a priori conocidos de antemano son en este caso las posibilidades e imposibilidades epistémicas del concepto a elucidar.

El mismo método, aplicado a niveles superiores, permite hallar tesis filosóficas generales sobre los conceptos usando verdades a priori sobre condiciones de posesión y teorías de la determinación, e incluso obtener la propia teoría MS. Todas esas verdades a priori, que se usan para explicar otras verdades a priori, se explican en la teoría MS del mismo modo en que se explican las verdades a priori en general. . A diferencia de lo que le ocurre con el convencionalista que no estaría dispuesto a aceptar que su propia teoría convencionalista de lo a priori es sólo aceptable por pura convención.

Bonjour, In Defense of Pure Reason, cap. 4
Manuel García-Carpintero
Seminario LOGOS, 19/11/2004
Universitat de Barcelona

1. Racionalismo moderado (RM): algunas creencias están revocablemente justificadas a priori. El objetivo del capítulo es mostrar la plausibilidad intuitiva o fenoménica básica de RM a partir de ejemplos específicos, y formularlo con más detalle a partir de los mismos.

2. Los ejemplos son proposiciones, o proposiciones(-conclusión) consideradas relativamente a otras(-premisa); lo que ocurre con ellos es que la comprensión de las proposiciones, que conlleva la de sus constituyentes, basta para ver, captar o aprehender directamente, sin mediación aparente, que son necesariamente el caso, o que, necesariamente, son el caso a condición de que lo sean las premisas. B. prefiere evitar 'intuición' y llamar *rational insight* (¿penetración racional? ¿discernimiento racional?) al acto intelectual de ver, captar o aprehender tales conexiones necesarias. Se caracteriza por ser directo, inmediato, no-discursivo, aunque ateniente a razones.

3. Ejemplos: (casos particulares de) exclusión de colores; transitividad de *más alto que*; inexistencia de cuadrados redondos; silogismo disyuntivo.

4. Están típicamente presentes en los ejemplos imágenes mentales; ello puede no ser necesario, y no afecta a la aprioridad del acto. No importa que no sean interesantes, porque se trata de probar la existencia del conocimiento a priori.

5. Las características en (2) proporcionan la formulación inicial de RM. La experiencia puede ser necesaria para la comprensión requerida, pero los actos de penetración racional no dependen ulteriormente de la experiencia. Son irreducibles, pero lo mismo vale para otros actos mentales que otorgan justificación, como las experiencias perceptivas o las impresiones mnemónicas. No se reducen a algo distinto describiendo las proposiciones en cuestión como "verdaderas en virtud del significado". Fenoménicamente, no se presentan como careciendo de razón, como cuando nos viene a la mente el nombre de algo que teníamos en la punta de la lengua, sino incluyendo el porqué de la necesidad de la proposición accedida, de manera que en esta medida no son misteriosos.

6. La necesidad de las proposiciones conocidas a priori de acuerdo con RM es metafísica, o lógica en sentido amplio.

7. La penetración racional es falible, y sus productos revocables. Así lo muestra la historia: geometría euclídea, paradojas conjuntistas; discrepancias filosóficas; errores de cálculo. Describir los fallos así ilustrados como involucrando penetración racional aparente, no genuina es sólo una propuesta terminológica; la cuestión, en estos términos, es que la mera apariencia quizás errónea de penetración racional proporciona justificación (a priori, por tanto). La falibilidad de la penetración racional sí pone de relieve que sólo produce justificación si se ejerce con cuidado, e involucra comprensión del carácter necesario de la proposición o dependencia condicional entre proposiciones en cuestión.

8. Algunos errores son sólo externamente corregibles (ilusiones y alucinaciones en el caso perceptivo), otros son internamente corregibles: el sujeto está en posición de advertir el error por reflexión (introspección, razonamiento a priori y conocimiento adquirido de esos modos) atendiendo mejor a los procesos involucrados, o pensando más cuidadosamente sobre ellos. B. sugiere que los casos de penetración racional meramente aparente son del segundo tipo. Una apelación limitada a la coherencia puede ser el mejor recurso; tal apelación es limitada porque presupone la incorregibilidad de algunos principios a priori, los que caracterizan los criterios de coherencia. Se sigue de esto que la justificación a priori es también cuestión de grado.

9. En réplica a Kitcher, B. defiende que las creencias justificadas a priori pueden ser revocadas sobre la base de consideraciones empíricas, no directas, pero sí de tipo teórico o social (testimonio), pero insiste en que ello presupone la justificación a priori de otras creencias.

10. Siguiendo a Burge, B. argumenta que la existencia de precondiciones empíricas (memoria, estar consciente, considerar las proposiciones con cuidado, comprender su necesidad) no invalida el carácter a priori del conocimiento adquirido a través de la penetración racional. Esto muestra que también este conocimiento tiene una dimensión externista: puede impugnarlo la no satisfacción de condiciones inaccesibles al sujeto por reflexión.

Tamar Gender: 'Empiricism, Rationalism and the Limits of Justification'
Gilbert Harman: 'General Foundations versus Rational Insight'
Albert Casullo: 'Experience and A Priori Justification'
Lawrence Bonjour: 'Replies'
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXIII/3, 2001

LOGOS Discussion Group – 17.XII.03
Dan López de Sa

Experience
Bonjour: [*P* is justified a priori for someone iff] that person has a reason for thinking *P* to be true that does not depend on any positive appeal to experience or other causally mediated, quasi-perceptual contact with contingent features of the world, but only on pure thought or reason, even if the person's ability to understand *P* in question derives, in whole or in part, from experience.
where *experience* should include any process that is perceptual in the sense of:
(a) being a causally conditioned response to particular, contingent features of the world and (b) yielding doxastic states that have as their content putative information concerning such particular, contingent features of the actual world as contrasted with other possible worlds.

Casullo: Rational insight satisfies (a), given that it is responsive to the character of properties via instantiations. Empirical investigation can fail to satisfy (b), given that it may justify some necessary propositions.
Bonjour: Rational insight does not satisfy (b), but even if it did not, that would not jeopardize the aprioricity of the provided justification. Besides, empirical investigation depend, even when justifying necessary propositions, on experience.

Master Argument
Bonjour: Could an argument of any sort be entirely justified on empirical grounds? It seems that the answer to this question is 'no.' Any purely empirical ingredient can, after all, be formulated as an additional empirical premise. When all such premises have been explicitly formulated, either the intended conclusion will be explicitly included among them, or it will not. In the former case, no argument nor inference is necessary, while in the latter case, the needed inference clearly goes beyond what can be derived directly from experience.

Casullo [Jose?]: An empiricist like Kitcher might grant that the required justification is non-experiential, but reject that is a priori given that it is acknowledgedly defeasible.
Bonjour: That is merely terminological.

Gendler [Jose?]: What if the relevant transitions are such that we happen to make them without being justified?
Bonjour: The best explanation of why we happen to make them is that we are apriori justified.

Harman: What if everything is by default justified?
Bonjour: That is simply not credible.

Logos, sessió del 21/01/04.
On the obvious, Robin Jeshion, *University of Southern California*

0. Introduction.
Thesis: One can (even must) be *a priori* justified in believing some false propositions
(= ¬ infallibilism)
Infallibilism (first approx.): For a subject S to be *a priori* justified in believing p, that which justifies S's belief that p must guarantee the truth of p.

1. Infallibility.
Infallibilism (second approx.): if agent A is *a priori* justified in believing p, and A's basis for belief involves no inductive reasoning, that which justifies A's belief that p must guarantee the truth of p.
(To overcome the problem with a priori inductive justification).

  RATIONALE.
(X)   Standards for justification for beliefs based on deductive reasoning or conceptual understanding alone ought to be more stringent than standards for beliefs based on perception.

• Two disanalogies between the two cases in Casullo's argument suggest two more possible rationales; apart from invalidating that argument for fallibilism for the *a priori*.
   The cases: [A] A priori Case: Mary/p→q
                          [B] Perceptual Case: Mary/square paper.
• Disanalogy 1:
Mary's mistake in [A] is *avoidable* (i.e., at the time of forming the false belief, she did not used all the evidence she had, which include evidence against its content).
Mary's mistake in [B] is *unavoidable* (i.e., at the time of forming the false relieve, she had evidence for its content, and no evidence against it).
RATIONALE
(y1) If at t one has a false relieve that p yet possesses all the information needed for avoiding believing p, one is unjustified in believing p, and (y2) all cases of false beliefs base on deductive reasoning and conceptual understanding alone are avoidable.

• Disanalogy 2:
Mary's mistake in [A] inherently involves some kina of confusion or unclarity in the reasoning that makes her form the false relieve.
This is not necessarily so with respect with Mary's mistake in [B]
RATIONALE
(z1) If one's belief in a false proposition is base don deductive reasoning or conceptual understanding alone, one's basis for belief must involve a confusion or unclarity, and (z2) if a belief is based on deductive reasoning or conceptual understanding that is confused or nuclear, one's belief is unjustified.

2. Infallibility: a Critique
R. Jeshion will not question (X), neither (y2) nor (z2); and even will assume them.
The argument. [We should understand it as an argument such that, an infallibilist would accept as valid and would also accept its premises as true; that is, as an argument (for the infallibilist) showing that infallibilism is self-defeating.]:
[1]   For any true proposition p that someone S can know, S can relieve p with the services of only justified beliefs, and, in particular, without the services of beliefs that are accidentally attained.
[2]   If infallibilism is true, then [1] is false.
So, infallibilism is false.
In support of [1]: "it begs no question against infallibilism and seems a natural constraint on any epistemic theory. For any epistemic theory that did not ensure the possibility of the attainment of true beliefs without the use of unjustified assumptions would effectively break down the widely accepted connection between being rational and being justified." (351)

In support of [2]: Cauchy.
• Lena's Case: [P] *There does not exist a greatest prime number*.
           Obvious(Lena, t, [P])
           ¬Obvious(Lena, t', [P])   t < t'
Salient feature: At t, Lena had the same conceptual resources she has at t' (i.e., both at t and at t' Lena had the same conception of *prime*, but at t she is not doing all her best)
By (y1), Lena's first judgment is unjustified. Also, by (z1), there is something confused or unclear in her reasoning.
• Cauchy's Case: [C] *The continuity of a function implies its derivability*
           Obvious(Cauchy, t, [C])
           ¬Obvious(Cauchy, t', [C])   t < t'
Salient feature: At t, Cauchy has a different conception of *continuity* from the conception he has at t', and at t he is fully using the conception he has.
By (z1), Cauchy's first judgement involves some confusion or unclarity. But (y1) cannot be applied here because, at t, Cauchy is not obviating anything of his conception of *continuity*.

NEXT

• Premise [2] says that if infallibilism is true, then there is a proposition, p, and an agent, S, such that S could know p and yet, could not truly believe p using only beliefs that the infallibilist takes as justified.
• Suppose infallibilism is true. What Jeshion proposes is that
S = Cauchy   and   p = [C*] (= the correct analytical definition of *continuity*) are good candidates for showing the truth of [2]; for, could Cauchy come to know [C*] "*using only the services of beliefs regarded as justified by the infallibilists?*" Jeshion: Only if (α or β), but none of them is plausible.

α = if he were in some way endowed with the correct conceptual understanding of *continuity*.
This is not the case. Correct conceptions are discovered by reasoning. Tacit knowledge of [C*] does nothing to support a positive answer to the question because, in reasoning, it is our "*unclear and incomplete conceptions of concepts that we draw upon*". (349)

β = if he could recognize his perceptual understanding of *continuity* as standing in need of analysis without making use of beliefs that the infallibilist claims to be unjustified.
          He cannot. If Cauchy recognizes Bolzano's counterexample as a counterexample, he is judging that [D]: "x is a counterexample to [C]". (I.e., this would be a premise in an argument for [C*].) This judgment is grounded (i) on one's conceptual understanding alone, and (ii) "*on the same unclear conceptual understanding that one initially thought with in finding the false proposition obvious*". (350). Thus,
The Z-infallibilist will straightforwardly take [D] as being unjustified.
The Y-infallibilist should take it to be unjustified if he does not want to *ad hoc* distinguish between the status of [D] and [C].

3. Obviousness and conceptual understanding.
Occurent conceptual understanding   vs. *Comprehensive conceptual understanding*.
Non-exhaustive employment   Exhaustive employment
of the conception of a concept.
Obvious(S, t, p)   iff   S finds p true on the basis of her occurent conceptual understanding alone.

Peacocke, C.: Explaining the A priori: The Programme of Moderate Rationalism

I. Introduction
Having taken for granted that (i) the classical rationalist distinction between experience-dependent and experience-independent justifications or entitlements is intelligible, and that (ii) none of these classes is empty, Peacocke is concerned with the question about what makes possible an a priori way of coming to know a given proposition (more specifically, about the relation between this particular way of coming to know that proposition and the identity of the concepts in it). However intuitive the appealing to the notions of understanding and reason in the traditional rationalist answer to that question might be, it is the answer to the how-question ('How does understanding, or concept-possession, have this epistemological power?') the one that, in the author's view, has remained quite obscure in the rationalists' position. Accordingly, Peacocke's main goal in this paper is to make some proposals about the form explanations of how understanding has that epistemological power should take.

II. Moderate explanatory rationalism
Peacocke distinguishes two radically different general types of rationalist answer to the question about the relation between a priori ways of coming to know and the identity of the concepts in the content that is known, namely: minimalism and moderate rationalism. **Minimalism** is the thesis that it is simply primitively constitutive of the identity of one or more concepts in p that W is a priori way of coming to know that p, provided that W is an *atomic* way of coming to know p (that is, a way of coming to know that cannot be broken down further into other ways of coming to know; e.g. the individual transitions at each line of the fully analysed proof of a logical truth). In other words, the fact that an atomic way W is an a priori way of coming to know that p is a brute fact, so to speak: there is simply no further answer to the question 'Why do the concepts in p have that epistemic property?' One variant of minimalism holds that when a thinker comes to know via an atomic a priori way that p, she judges that p because of her grasp of the concepts in p. According to this minimalist version, this statement is a genuinely explanatory true one, and so there is nothing more to be said on the a priori status matter. **Moderate rationalism**, in the sense in which Peacocke uses that label, is incompatible with any form of minimalism. According to the moderate rationalist, for any a priori way of coming to know that p, there is a substantive explanation of why it is a way of coming to know that has a priori status, an explanation which involves the nature of the concepts in p (first component of the moderate rationalist's view; p. 260).

Before suggesting ways in which the moderate rationalist's explanatory programme could be carried through, Peacocke offers an argument (first argument against minimalism; p. 260-1) according to which we should prefer moderate rationalism to either variety of minimalism the key premise of which seems to be that it is only because the a priori status of a certain principle is explicable in terms of the meaning of the expressions occurring in it that it seems rational to accept that principle. Yet since according to minimalists –even those who insist that grasp of concepts explains acceptance of a priori principles– there is no feature of meaning and understanding which explains a priori status, they cannot account for the rationality of accepting an a priori principle. Accordingly, they appear to be impelled to regard the impression of rationality as an illusion. But from any rationalist point of view –even the minimalist one– that cannot be the case. Therefore, minimalism is somehow incoherent.

Second argument against minimalism (p. 261): According to any rationalist position –even the minimalist one– there are principles connecting understanding with a priori ways of coming to know. But these principles cannot be primitive: they must have their source in the nature of knowledge, as well as in the nature of understanding, and the consequent relations between the two. Therefore, minimalists are faced with a sort of dilemma: they should deny the existence of those principles (not being rationalists any more) or they should reject that those principles are primitive (not being minimalists any more).

Both arguments are supposed to be/contain arguments/reasons in favour of developing a position which endorses the first component of a moderate rationalist's treatment of the a priori (see above). But the following component should be added in the characterisation of such a position if the moderate status attributed to it has to be preserved: the theory of understanding by means of which the moderate rationalist is committed to account for a priori ways of coming to know certain contents should be a moderate one, that is, a theory according to which causal or explanatory relations between properties of things are not involved in understanding –and so do not occur in a separate conceptual realm, so to speak– (second component; p. 262). Another reason of principle for wanting to include this second component is that a priori positions hold in the actual world, however the actual world may be; in other words, what makes a piece of knowledge a priori cannot be fully accounted for by causal relations to what is known.

Yet the explanatory programme the feasibility of which any moderate rationalist should be committed to involves different tasks that can be divided into four broad categories: (a) an *identification task* (by means of which the way in which something comes to be known is identified), (b) the *explanatory task* (by means of which the moderate rationalist explains why a particular way of coming to know p is a priori, on the basis of the nature of the concepts in p), (c) the task of *extension to non-conclusive cases* and (d) the task *of extension to reliance on informational states*. From now on, Peacocke will be concerned *just* with the explanatory task facing the moderate rationalist who holds that concepts are individuated by the conditions for possessing them. This kind of task might concern the a priori status of a way W of coming to know some particular content containing essentially –for example– the concepts C and D. Accordingly, our moderate rationalist has to discover a relation (the *key* relation) between the following terms: (1) the respective possession conditions for the contained concepts C and D, (2) the semantic values of C and D; and (3) the way W. In order to unlock the explanation of the a priori status of the given content, all the elements must be present: element (1) could be formed otherwise –in accordance with the corresponding nature of concepts– if concepts were not individuated in terms of their possession conditions (but it would be present anyway). Since the semantic value of the concepts C and D contribute to the determination of the truth-value of the a priori proposition and provided that what is a priori is true however the actual world is, element (2) must also be part of the explanation.
NEXT

Finally, since the status of a belief as a knowledge depends on how it is reached, element (3) must be present too. Although there is a special case in which finding such a relation is not especially challenging (the case in which it is written into, or is a consequence of, the possession conditions for one or more concepts in the given principle that, to possess those concepts, the thinker must be willing to accept the principle, by reaching it in that way; e. g. the case for acceptance of the a priori principle that from A&B it can be inferred that A...), the moderate rationalist might attempt to carry through her programme in some more challenging cases, those of a priori principles which neither are, nor follow from, the principles mentioned in the relevant possession conditions. In section III two different cases in which the concepts involved are tied to the individuation of a property or a relation will be addressed.

III. Concepts tied to the individuation of properties: two cases

First case: colour concepts and their a priori relations

Argument for the a priori character of colour incompatibility judgements: a colour's phenomenal properties are constitutive of it (so they hold in all possible circumstances). There is a close relation between the way a colour is individuated and the condition for grasping the corresponding concept which refers to that colour (in other words, the possession conditions for the concept *red*, for example, are tied to the very conditions which individuate the colour red; in short: the colour concept is tied to the individuation of its reference). Therefore, when we come to know that no perceptible shade is both a shade of red and a shade of green we come to know it with no particular course of perceptual experience: we come to know it in a way which is a priori.

Second case: arithmetical relations

Argument for the a priori status of arithmetical judgements: consider the following arithmetical relation: 'n is the sum of m and K'. At the level of the arithmetical relation itself, what is for a triple of natural numbers to stand in this relation is given by their standard recursive definitions. Methods of calculating a given sum should respect the standard recursive definition of addition. So, judgements about the sum of two numbers, made by counting correctly, and without other mistakes, will be correct in the actual world. But given that they involve thinking of the corresponding arithmetical relations in ways tied to their very individuation, they will also be correct whatever the actual world is like. Therefore, these ways of coming to know the sums of two numbers are a priori ways of coming to know.

Tim Williamson's *Knowledge and its Limits*. Archive. 2004/2005

'Introduction'
13.10.04, presented by Dan López de Sa (handout 1)

'1 A State of Mind,'
(1.1-1.4)20.10.04, presented by Genoveva Martí (handout 2)
J McDowell 1995: 'Knowledge and the Internal,' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 55, 877-93
(1.5)27.10.04, presented by Manuel García-Carpintero (handout 3)

'2 Broadness,'
03.11.04, presented by Max Kölbel

'3 Primeness,'
(3.1-3.4)10.11.04, presented by Fabrice Correia (handout 4)
(3.5-3.8)17.11.04, presented by Jose A Díez

'4 Anti-Luminosity,'
1.12.04, presented by Andrea Iacona

'5 Margins and Iterations,'
22.12.04, presented by David Pineda

'6 An Application,'
12.01.05, presented by Pepe Martínez

'7 Sensitivity,'
19.01.05, presented by Luis Robledo

'8 Scepticism,'
26.01.05, presented by Manuel Pérez Otero (handout 5)

T Willamson 2000: *Knowledge and its Limits*, OUP, 'Introduction'
13/10/04 – Dan López de Sa

Main aim of the book: to defend an account of knowledge as a mental state which constitutes the evidential standard for assertion and belief, as opposed to the *orthodox view*, according to which belief conceptually prior to knowledge.

Aim of the introduction: to give the reader a rough overall picture.

Alleged Grounds for Orthodoxy

(A)   Knowledge entails belief, but not vice versa. But this being so does not entail that knowledge is factorizable in a reductive way.

(B)   Known candidate analysis of knowledge analyze it in terms of belief. But they are flawed: either circular, or false.

(C)   Even if flawed, they might approximate knowledge. But this by itself does not vindicate orthodoxy: *ancestor* is not conceptually prior to *parent*.

(D)   Internalism about the mind. But if the content of a mental state can depend on the external world, so can the attitude to that content. Knowledge is one such mental state, indeed it can be understood as the most general of such truth-entailing mental states. (This entails that radical skeptical scenarios require radical impoverishment of mental life.) (Ch. 1 & 2)

(E)   If knowledge is a state of mind, it should occur significantly in causal explanations of action, and these explanations seem to require only belief. But the latter is not true, as knowledge is more "robust to evidence" than mere true belief. (Ch. 3)

Non-Orthodoxy

If orthodoxy is not assumed, one may use the concept of knowledge to elucidate the concepts of justification and evidence. In particular, one's total evidence is one's total knowledge. Knowledge is what justifies, and not what gets justified. One might call some of one's knowledge into question, and assess it relative to one's independent evidence. (Ch. 9).

The fundamental rule of assertion is that one should assert *p* only if one knows *p*. (Ch. 11).

Possible Worries

Fact: One is not always in a position to know whether one knows something.

Hence, (i) knowledge is not a state of mind, if mental states are accessible; (ii) knowledge is not evidence, if rationality requires one to be in a position to know one's evidence; and (iii) Knowledge is not the rule of assertion, if one is always in a position to know whether one's assertion conform to the rule.

The three objections assume that some non-trivial states meet the accessibility requirement: one is always in a position to know whether one is in one of then, i.e. that the condition that one is in one of them is *luminous*. But no condition, except some trivial ones, are luminous.

Margins for Error

The anti-luminous argument depends on the following: Where one has only a limited capacity to discriminate between cases in which *p* is true and cases in which *p* is false, knowledge requires a margin for error: cases in which one is in a position to know *p* must not be too close to cases in which *p* is false. (Ch. 5)

Interesting consequences: Truth outruns warranted assertion. It is false that knowing p requires that if p were false, one would not belief p, which in turn bear on skeptical arguments. (Ch. 7). There are unknowable truths. (Ch. 12)

Tim Williamson: *Knowledge and its Limits* (1.1-1.4)
20/Oct/2004 Presented by: G. Martí

Chapter 1 (and 2): general defense of the thesis that knowledge is a state of mind. Descartes, C.I. Lewis (*An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* and *Mind and the World Order*), Prichard had defended that knowledge is a state of mind, distinct from belief. Williamson: externalist conception of knowing as a state of mind.

Section 1.1 Factive attitudes.
Knowing - mental state of a subject, like loving, being in pain, believing/hoping/fearing something to be so. Knowing p: not merely being acquainted with p [being acquainted with p: ability to entertain p], but "knowing that something is so, something that is so if and only if p is true." (p.19) Thus knowing is a factive attitude (like regretting or remembering).

Knowing p involves believing p. This shows that being in the mental state of believing p is necessary for being in the mental state of knowing p. [cartesianism required the capacity to tell by self-inspection whether the state was knowledge or mere belief; after abandoning cartesianism: from "we can't tell the difference from inside" to "sameness of mental state"]

Traditional view: factiveness entails knowledge not a mental state; belief and knowledge the same "from inside." Same then should go for perceiving, or remembering (indistinguishability of remembering from seeming to remember) or regretting.

Pre-theoretical status of knowledge: initial presumption should be that it is a mental state. Factive and non-factive attitudes similar in relevant respects. "... it is not clear that there are any pretheoretic grounds for omitting factive attitudes from the list of *paradigmatic* mental states." p. 22

Purpose of chapter 1 (and 2). To deflect arguments regarding putative differences between knowing and non-factive attitudes that allegedly disqualify knowledge from being a mental state. Such putative differences include: constitutive dependence on the environment, first-person accessibility and causal efficacy.

section 1.2 - addresses issues connected to scepticism and self-knowledge

section 1.3 - knowledge as a mental state vs the traditional conception of knowledge as the conjunction of appropriate justification, truth and belief.

section 1.4 - first stab towards a positive proposal

Section 1.2 Mental states, first-person accessibility and scepticism
Descartes' mistake - not to postulate that K is a mental state but in the view "that one must always be in a position to know what mental state one is in." p. 23

Will defend that one can know that p without being in a position to know that one is in such a state (i.e., without knowing that one knows that p). For the moment will focus on the less controversial claim that "one can fail to know p without *being in a position* to know that one fails to know p." (p. 24)

(1) Objection: transparency of mental states: under normal conditions, one is in a position to tell whether one is in S for any mental state S.

W: paradigmatic mental states that are not transparent. For instance: hoping p. Also, believing p (vs fancying p), for "the difference ... depends in part on one's dispositions to practical reasoning and action manifested only in counterfactual circumstances, and one in not always in a position to know what those dispositions are." (p. 24). [Tradition according to which what we believe cannot be told jut by self-inspection but has to be read off from our actions (or dispositions to act, in this case)]

(2) Objection: W's view erases the asymmetry between knowledge of one's own mental states and those of others.

W: that does not follow. Agreed: we do have some non-observational knowledge of our own mental states and not of those of others. But the same is true of knowledge. "Knowing is characteristically open to first-person present-tense access; like other mental states, it is nor perfectly open." p. 25.

(3) Objection: knowing that one knows p requires evaluating reasons for and against p in a way that is not required for knowing that one believes. W: knowing whether one rationally believes p also requires such evaluation.

Counter: knowing and rationally believing are not mental states for they are normative. W: "Belief attributions have a normative element too, for to have any mental attitude to a content one must in some sense grasp that content, and therefore have some minimal ability to deal rationally with it..." p. 25

(4) Objection: belief that one knows p is defeasible, belief that one believes p is not. W: (a) example of defeasible belief (that one believes the world will end); but even if we concede, (b) belief that one is in other mental states is defeasible (belief that one is thinking clearly)

Requirements of privileged access regarding mental states are mild; and knowledge satisfies them all.

NEXT

<u>Traditional pattern of skeptical argument</u> (More on scepticism - chapter 8)

(a) Subject s with true belief Bel could be in same total mental state and Bel be false. (b) Bel fails to constitute knowledge in the latter case. Hence Bel fails to constitute knowledge in the original situation.

Assumption: if mental state is the same in both situations, s' knowledge is the same. W. agrees. But: difference in knowledge constitutes a difference in mental state. Subject s is not in the same mental state in both situations, although the difference is not detectable by her.

Sceptic means to construct a case in which Bel is false although the mental state is the same. Sceptic, at most, has constructed a case in which Bel is false and the situation is not discriminably different to subject.

<u>Section 1.3 Knowledge and Analysis</u>
Necessarily *everything that is in* <u>knowing p</u> *is in* truly believing p. Necessarily *everything that is* in truly believing p *is in* <u>believing p</u>. Knowing p and believing p are mental states. Truly believing p is not: "believing truly is not a mental state but the combination of a mental state and a non-mental condition." p. 28

Analogy: geometrical properties (being an equilateral triangle - being a triangle whose sides are indiscriminable in length by the naked human eye - being a triangle).

Compare: subject is in mental state S* <u>if and only if</u> subject is in mental state S and non-mental C obtains
if subject is in mental state S** <u>then</u> subject is in mental state S and non-mental C obtains

<u>States</u> and <u>concepts of states</u>: A state is mental iff there could be a mental concept of that state (there may be non-mental concepts of a mental S). Conceptual and metaphysical issues: That believing truly is not a mental concept does not entail that believing truly is not a mental state, as there could be a mental concept of the state of truly believing. That knowing is a mental state does not entail that the concept of knowing is mental. Knowing could be a non-mental concept of a mental state.

A conjunctive concept is mental if and only if all the concepts in the conjunction are mental. Thus believing truly not a mental concept of a state ("x is sad and such that gold's atomic # is 79" - "x is in believe-p and such that p is true"). Argument generalizes to any logical connective. However: presence of non-mental concepts in the content clause of an attitude ascription do not make concept non-mental ("believes that there are numbers" mental even if concept of number is not).

De facto failures of proposed analyses of the concept of knowledge. On general grounds there are reasons to not expect the concept of knowledge to have a non trivial analysis. Even accepting general grounds perhaps there is some reason to expect success in the case of knowledge? We already have necessary conditions: belief and truth ... W's counter: examples (*colored* and *red*; *parent* and *ancestor*; *identical to* and *weighs no less than*, p. 32-3).

<u>Section 1.4 Knowing as the most general factive state</u>.

Preliminary remarks. Factive attitude: one necessarily has it only to truths. States vs processes (proving). 'Know' factive mental state operator (FMSO).

FMSOs, φ Syntax: a verb; Semantics: unanalyzable: (1) φ typically takes an animate subject and a propositional object; (2) φ is factive: 'S φs that A' entails <u>deductively</u> A; (3) 'S φs that A' attributes a propositional attitude to S.

(a) A is a deductive consequence of 'S φs that A' not just a cancellable presupposition. (see (1) and (2) p. 35). Observation: the implication from "does not know that A" to A is cancellable (see (3) and (4) p. 35).

(b) FMSOs are stative (states vs processes).

(c) FMSOs ascribe attitudes to propositions. The subject grasps the proposition.

(d) FMSOs are semantically unanalyzable but they may be syntactically complex (see (14) and (15) as well as (16) and (17) on pg. 37.

Potential objection to W: *perceive that A* and *remember that A* do not entail *know that A*. W's answer: seeing a situation in which A is the case vs seeing that A is the case (differences between the chess and the raining case: in the former there is a failure in the grasping of some concept). Similarly between remembering a scenario in which A is the case and remembering that A was the case)again, difference between the chess and the rain example).

Vital to the account that believing truly not be counted as a mental state: "To entail knowing, the mental state itself must be sufficient for truth. p. 39.

Account makes no use of concepts such as *justified*, *caused* and *reliable*. The challenge: connections should be explored and understood. A hint: "... a necessary condition for being in some states may be having entered them in specific ways." p. 41

Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits, 1.5
Manuel García-Carpintero
LOGOS Wednesday Discussion Group, 27/10/2004
Universitat de Barcelona

(1)   On the account so far, knowing is the most general factive & stative propositional attitude. What is the relation with believing? Two schematic suggestions: (a) If S knows that A then S believes that A; (b) If S knows that A then S does not believe that A.

(2)   Although schema (b) might seem correct, this is only for pragmatic reasons; it should be rejected, on the basis of an argument that bears elaboration: **42, § 3,** ***Whether I know that A … excluded believing***.

(3)   Some objections to schema (a) – alleged cases of remembering or perceiving without believing already discussed in the previous section – are rejected because the relevant intuitions (both of knowing and of not believing) are shaky.

(4)   There are grammatical divergences between 'know' and 'believe'; cf. replacements of 'that' with 'the proposition that' vs. 'the fact/condition/possibility that' in 'Pau believes/says/hopes/knows/sees/fears/imagines that mother is not home'. (I am not sure about W's own examples, **42, § 5**.) Vendler's explanation is that, while believing is a relation to propositions, the other attitudes are relations to facts, or analogous entities (truthmakers, conditions) that do not exist if they are merely possible, and therefore cannot be identified with true propositions.

(5)   W rejects the view on the basis of (i) an argument in a previous paper, and (ii) countervailing intuitions that bear examination, **43, § 2bot**. (Regarding (i), W basically argues on the basis of considerations involving the validity of the converse Barcan formula that there must be possible truthmakers which do not exist, and thus it is not merely the truthmaker, but its existence, that makes a proposition true, which he takes to contradict the truthmaking principle, that, if a proposition *P* is true, it is made true by something *F* such that, necessarily, if *F* exists then *P* is true.

(6)   W claims that acceptance of Vendler's suggestion would be compatible with his view, merely requiring (extensive) rephrasing. Presumably, knowing can be taken to be a relation to a fact corresponding to a proposition; there then is a related propositional attitude, *knowing**, in which a subject S stands to a proposition *p* iff S knows FC(*p*). This shows that Vendler's view is compatible with the truth of (a), thus understood: If S knows FC(that A) then S does not believe that A. A question that arises is: Given the modification, is W's a theory of knowing or rather one of knowing**? What is it that is "first", and a mental state?

(7)   The a priori validity of (a) is compatible with W's view. There might be a priori connections between *knowing* and *believing*, even if the two concepts are independent. A second possibility is "knowledge first": it is not *knowing* that is defined in terms of *believing*, but rather the other way around. W explores two ways for this to be so, the one he embraces, and McDowell's disjunctivism, which he rejects both in a conceptual and a metaphysical version.

(8)   According to disjunctivism, believing (perceptually experiencing) is analyzed as a disjunction of two radically different, mutually exclusive states, knowing (perceiving) and "opining" (illusorily/hallucinatorily experiencing) which nevertheless are such that in some cases instances of the second are mistakenly taken to be instances of the former. Believing (experiencing) is not the highest common factor of the two; there is no such h.c.f.

(9)   Against the conceptual analysis version of disjunctivism, W argues from the premise that it requires that the concept *opines* be grasped independently of the concept *believes*; his argument for this bears elaboration, **44, bot,** ***For otherwise … the first time***. It does not work (i) to say that to opine that *p* is to have a mere belief that *p*, for this presupposes grasp of *believes*; neither (ii) to say that it is to have an attitude to a proposition *p* that one cannot discriminate from knowing, one which is, for all one knows, knowing; for then the first disjunct in believing *p*, knowing *p*, entails the second, and the analysis is not disjunctive; nor (iii) is there any reason to think that *opines* can be explained by giving a list of cases of mere belief, for it will be open-ended, the unifier being again *believes*.

(10)   Objection (iii) also goes against the metaphysical version, which cannot be objected on the basis of (i) and (ii). There is no reason to think that opining is a unified state, as opposed to believing being such.

(11)   W proposes a non-disjunctive analysis, a variant of the analysis of *opines* before: to believe that *p* is to have an attitude to a proposition *p* that one cannot discriminate from knowing, one which is, for all one knows, knowing. To avoid counterexamples (animals without the concept *knows*, leaps of faith), W modifies this for: to believe *p* is to treat *p* as if one knew *p*. A suggestion that bears elaboration, **46, § 2bot**, is that the account can explain the Humean difficulty for believing at will, in terms of the difficulty for knowing at will. On the view, belief aims at knowledge, not just truth.

(12)   This captures "the spirit, if not the letter" of disjunctivism: although believing is common to knowing and opining, it is not a factor of knowing, the most inclusive *factive* state. "What matters is not acceptance of a disjunctive account of believing but rejection of a conjunctive account of knowing"; **fn 9** bears elaboration.

Tim Williamson, KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS, Chapter 3, Sections 1-4.
Fabrice Correia

Aim of chapter 3: to deepen the critique of internalism, by (sections 3.2 and 3.3) showing that many mental states are not equivalent to conjunctions of a purely internal state with a purely external state, and (section 3.4) showing that concepts of mental states which are neither purely internal nor equivalent to such conjunctions play an uneliminable role in causal explanations of behaviour. Section 1 gives some definitions important for what follows.

Section 3.1.
• Two cases are *internally alike* iff their agents are in the same physical state;
• A condition is *narrow* iff there are no internally alike cases such that the condition holds in one but not in the other;
• A condition is *broad* iff it is not narrow;
• Two cases are *externally alike* iff their external environments are in the same physical state;
• A condition is *environmental* iff there are no externally alike cases such that the condition holds in one but not in the other;
• A condition is *composite* iff it is the conjunction of a narrow condition with an environmental condition;
• A condition is *prime* iff it is not composite.

Section 3.2.
Internalists hold that certain mental conditions (in particular knowing that p) are composite, and the aim of this section is to argue that they are prime.

• Where C is a condition, (i) *virtual*-C is the conditon that holds in a case iff C holds in some case internally alike that case, and (ii) *outward*-C is the condition that holds in a case iff C holds in some case externally alike that case.

(Virtual-C is the strongest narrow condition entailed by C, and outward-C the strongest environmental condition entailed by C.)

Where C is a broad mentalistic condition, internalists regard virtual-C as the pure mental reality underlying C (e.g. they identify virtual-knowing p with believing p or rationally believing p).

If C is composite (i.e. a conjunction of a narrow condition with an environmental condition), then it is the conjunction of virtual-C with outward-C. So if there are cases where virtual-C and outward-C obtain but not C, then C is prime.

C is prime iff there are three cases α, β and γ such that (i) γ and α are internally alike and g and b are externally alike, and (ii) C obtains in α and β but not in γ. This provides us with a recipe for showing that a condition C is prime.

Williamson presents a general method for finding cases satisfying (i) and (ii) for an arbitrary mental condition (and so for showing that the condition is prime), and then illustrate it by taking various cases. I just sum up the application of the method to knowledge:

Case α. One knows by testimony that the election was rigged (*amañanada*?). Smith and Brown both tell one that the election was rigged, and (i) Smith is trustworthy and one trusts him, (ii) Brown is not trustworthy and one does not trust him.

Case β. One knows by testimony that the election was rigged. Smith and Brown both tell one that the election was rigged, and (i) Brown is trustworthy and one trusts him, (ii) Smith is not trustworthy and one does not trust him.

Case γ (internally like α and externally like β). Smith and Brown both tell one that the election was rigged, and neither has the following property: that of being both trustworthy and being trusted by one.

Assuming that in neither of the 3 cases, one has other ways of knowing that the election was rigged, in both α and β one knows it, but not in γ.

It is assumed that in order for one to know that p on the basis of testimony, the source should be trustworthy. One may be trustworthy with respect to some persons but not with respect to others, and at some times but not at others. Presumably, in the various cases trustworthiness is to be understood as relative to the agent of the cases at the times Smith and Brown talk to the agent.

Another example involving knowledge is perhaps the following (adaptation of Williamson's first example in the section):

Case α. One knows that there is a glass of water by seeing that there is a glass of water. One sees that there is a glass of water as a result of having a certain visual experience with his right eye. His left eye receives light rays from a glass of gin which are exactly like those a glass of water would emit. A head injury prevents one from processing any input from one's left eye.

Case β**. One knows that there is a glass of water by seeing that there is a glass of water. One sees that there is a glass of water by having a certain visual experience with his left eye. His right eye receives light rays from a glass of gin which are exactly like those a glass of water would emit. A head injury prevents one from processing any input from one's right eye.**

Case γ **(internally like** α **and externally like** β**). A head injury prevents one from processing any input from one's left eye, and one's right eye does not receive light rays from any glass of water.**

Assuming that in neither of the 3 cases, one has other ways of knowing that there is a glass of water, in both α **and** β **one knows it, but not in** γ**.**

Section 3.3.

Free recombination is the principle that given any cases α and β, there is a further case internally like α and externally like β. In the various examples, the principle was assumed. Is it correct?

The internal and the external are not independent: (i) the external arguably *nomically* determines the internal (in virtue of physical laws, what goes on at a certain moment in the environment has consequences for what goes on in the head of people in subsequent moments), and (ii) the external and the internal *constitutively* depend upon one another (the region occupied by one determines the region occupied by the other).

Yet it is possible to handle such interdependencies, by suitably modifying the framework (in particular by restricting what aspects of the past are to be taken as environmental). And anyway, internalism presuppose free recombination.

Not sure I got it. He seems to say that (i) and (ii) undermine free recombination as it was originally formulated, and that it is possible to 'restrict what aspects of the past count as environmental' and make other restrictions in such a way that free recombination holds. But, for one thing, "restricting what aspects of the past count as environmental" can have no effect on free recombination, since the principle is not formulated in terms of environmentality.

One hypothesis is that what Williamson wants to say is this: (i) and (ii) undermine free recombination as it was originally formulated, but it is possible to restrict what aspects of the past count as *external* and make other restrictions in such a way that free recombination holds. If this is so, then, it seems to me, there are 2 ways of understanding what he then says about the internalists:

(1) They need the NEW version of free recombination.

(2) They need the ORIGINAL version of free recombination.

This may have some importance, for if what they need is only the new version, and if Williamson's examples (though maybe compatible with the original one) are incompatible with it, then internalists escape his objections.

Section 3.4.

We need concepts of prime conditions for the same reasons for which we need concepts of broad conditions generally.

"Concepts of broad mental conditions give us a better understanding of connections between present states and actions in the non-immediate future, because the connections involve interaction with the environment."

If one was thirsty, saw water at a certain moment and drank it soon after, between the two moments one has been in a series of internal states which match the environment which enabled one to reach one's goal, and that matching is not accidental. On the other hand, if at the first moment, instead of seeing water one was just hallucinating water (a "true" hallucination: there is water where one's internal state represents water to be), one may well have been in the same series of internal states matching the environment, and drink water at the end. But in that case, the matching is purely accidental.

A situation like the first is more likely to obtain than one like the second. An explanation of why one drank invoking one's seeing water is better than one invoking instead one's being in a certain internal state.

The whole section 4 is hard to understand. Williamson goes on with other examples of prime conditions (belief that tigers growl, knowledge) to make the same kind of point, and it is hard for me to see exactly what the point is. We could discuss that.

T. **Williamson**'s *Knowledge and its Limits*. Chapter 8: **Scepticism**
(, 2 / 2 / 2005. Manuel Pérez Otero)

§ 8.1 PLAN

Let's consider three theses:
(A)   Rational thinkers respect (/ must respect) their evidence   (*Normativity* of evidence)
(B)   Thinkers always know (or are in a position to know) what their evidence is   (*Knowledge* of evidence)
(C)   Evidence in the good case = Evidence in the bad case   (*Sameness* of evidence)

(The good case = things appear generally as they ordinarily do, and are that way.
  The bad case = things appear generally as they ordinarily do, but are some other way.)

Williamson accepts (A), but rejects (B) and (C). Most of the chapter is dedicated to the discussion and rejection of a form of scepticism that   (*)   takes (B) as a requeriment for (A), and derives (C) from (B);
                              (**)   derives sceptical theses from (C).

Other anti-sceptics (relevantists and contextualists) endorse thesis (C) and would reject the derivations in (**). Williamson, nevertheless, has no objection to (**). He objects to the transition from (A) to (B), in (*).

•   § 8.2: Non-sceptics postulate an asymmetry between the good and the bad case regarding knowledge.
          § 8.3: Sceptics reject the asymmetry by claiming sameness of evidence (thesis (C)). But thesis (C) is controversial.
          § 8.4:   An sceptical argument is presented. It can be seen as a detailed version of the derivation from (B) to (C).
          § 8.5: Thesis (C) leads to a phenomenal conception of evidence.
          § 8.6: (which is the core of the chapter) Against thesis (B), Williamson presents a new argument (parallel to the argument in § 8.4) leading from premise (B) to a clearly false conclusión. The new argument relies on the limits to our powers of discrimination.
          § 8.7: Thesis (B) is false, although thesis (A) is true. In general: rational subjects are not always in a position to know what rationality requires of them
          § 8.8: These conclusions generalize to sceptical arguments not based on (C).

§ 8.2 SCEPTICISM AND THE NON-SYMMETRY OF EPISTEMIC ACCESSIBILITY

An example of proposition *p*, true in a good case and false in the bad case: the proposition that one has hands

•   Sceptics and non-sceptics agree on this claim:
          – It is consistent with everything one knows in the <u>bad</u> case that one is in the <u>good</u> case.
Sceptics: This second claim is true, by symmetry:
          – It is consistent with everything one knows in the <u>good</u> case that one is in the <u>bad</u> case.
Non-sceptics: There is an asymmetry between the two cases. That second claim is false, for in the good case one knows *p* and these three propositions are jointly inconsistent: (a) One is in the bad case
                                                      (b) If one is in the bad case then *p* is false
(Of course, in the good case one also knows (b).)   (c) *p*

• (That argument does not assume a further knowledge claim that the non-sceptics may hold:
                                                      (d) In the good case one also knows that one is not in the bad case.)

• (Stating the asymmetry in the terminology of <u>epistemic logic</u>:
Def.: a case b is *epistemically accessible* from a case a iff everything which one knows in a is true in b.
          According to the anti-sceptic: the good case is epistemically accessible from the bad case, but the bad case is not epistemically accessible from the good case.)

•   The symmetry claim is supported if we invoke the notion of discriminability: we cannot discriminate one case from the other, and indiscriminability is a symmetric relation.

<u>Reply</u>: discriminability is relative to ways or modes of presentation.
          The good case can be presented in two relevant ways:
descriptively: "the good case" (in the good case or in the bad case) / indexically: "my present case" (in the good case)
          The bad case can be presented in two relevant ways:
descriptively: "the bad case" (in the good case or in the bad case) / indexically: "my present case" (in the bad case)
          With respect to the discrimination between the two cases, there are 3 possibilities:
ID = to discriminate between the good case presented indexically and the bad case presented descriptively;
DI = to discriminate between the bad case presented indexically and the good case presented descriptively;
DD = to discriminate between the good case presented descriptively and the bad case presented descriptively.

DD discrimination is trivial: you know that the good case is not the bad case (even if you don't know which case you are in).

Sceptics and non-sceptics agree that the two cases are DI indiscriminable: in the bad case one cannot discriminate the bad case (presented as "my present case") from the good case (presented descriptively).

But DI indiscriminability does NOT imply ID indiscriminability. The non-sceptic denies ID indiscriminability, because she holds that in the good case one knows that one is not in the bad case.

[Williamson is describing now a non-sceptic that holds the further knowledge claim mentioned above:

(d) In the good case one also knows that one is not in the bad case.]

§ 8.3 DIFFERENCE OF EVIDENCE IN GOOD AND BAD CASES

•   If we assume (C), then believing *p* with the evidence one has in the good case is insufficient for the truth of *p* (in the sense that there are cases –e.g., the bad case– where one falsely believes *p* on the same evidence). The sceptic extracts from that a sceptical conclusion: in the good case you don't know *p*.
•   – Many anti-sceptics endorse (C) but hold that, al least in some contexts, the bad case is in some sense irrelevant to the attrribution of knowledge in the good case.
       – On this point, Williamson agree with the sceptic: (C) supports sceptical conclusions.

• A natural argument for (C), by reductio ad absurdum: "Suppose that one has different evidence in the two cases. Then one can deduce in the bad case that one is not in the good case, because one's evidence is not what it would be if one were in the good case."
• Reply: the argument relies on premise (B), because it assumes that in the bad case one knows what one's evidence is.

Next section contains a more detailed version of the argument.

§ 8.4 AN ARGUMENT FOR SAMENESS OF EVIDENCE

•   An interpretation of premise (B), as it is used in the argument:

One can identify the specific content of her (total) evidence in a intrinsic and transparent way:
       For every specific content of one's total body of evidence, E,
              there is a class (p_1, ..., p_n) of *appropriate* properties that E (and no other content) has,
                     each of which one's knows E to have under some canonical specification of the
property
(Assumption: if a property is appropriate, so is its complement.)

•   The argument:

       (1)   For any appropriate property p, in any case in which one's evidence has p, one knows that one's
              evidence has p.
Premise (1) is a version of (B).

       (2)   For any appropriate property p, if in the good case one's evidence lacks p, then in the bad case one
              knows that in the good case one's evidence lacks p.

       ('the good case' abbreviates a description in which, for each appropriate property, if one's evidence in the good case has the property then that is specified in the description. So, it abbreviates a description with approximately this form: 'the case where one's evidence has the following appropriate properties: ..., and lacks the following appropriate properties: ...', where the properties listed conjointly exhaust the class of appropiate properties. 'the bad case' abbreviates an analogous description.)
       Justification of (2): In the bad case one knows what one's evidence would be if one were in the good case, where the good case is presented descriptively.

       (3)   It is consistent with what one knows in the bad case that one is in the good case.
We restrict 'p' to appropriate properties and assume:
       (4)   In the bad case one's evidence has p.
We suppose further, as an assumption for *reductio ad absurdum*:
       (5)   In the good case one's evidence lacks p.
Premises (2) and (5) entail:
       (6)   In the bad case one knows that in the good case one's evidence lacks p.
Premises (1) and (4) entail:
       (7)   In the bad case one knows that one's evidence has p.
The knowledge one has in the bad case according to (6) and (7) is such that
       (8)   It is inconsistent with what one knows in the bad case that one is in the good case.
Claim (8) contradicts (3). Therefore, we can deny (5) by *reductio ad absurdum*:
       (9)   In the good case one's evidence has p.
Conditionalizing (9) on assumption (4) we obtain:
     (10)   If in the bad case one's evidence has p, then in the good case one's evidence has p.

NEXT

Since the approprite properties are closed under complementation, the entire argument from (1) to (10) can be reproduced with 'not-p' in place of 'p'. The result is

(11)   If in the bad case one's evidence has not-p, then in the good case one's evidence has not-p.

Claim (11) is equivalent to the converse of (10). Therefore, the conjunction of (10) and (11) implies:

(12)   One's evidence in the good case has the same appropriate properties as one's evidence in the bad case,

which is a version of claim (C), sameness of evidence.

§ 8.5 THE PHENOMENAL CONCEPTION OF EVIDENCE

•   Thesis (C) constraints the nature of evidence. It is inconsistent with usual assumptions in science, where some type of true propositions are taken as evidence. For instance: I see that the dial reads 0.407, but –if (C) is true– that the dial reads 0.407 is not part of my evidence; for there is a bad case where the dial does not read 0.407 but I hallucinate and believe that it reads 0.407.

•   Thesis (C) leads to the idea that evidence has a purely phenomenal character. For there are bad cases where even sensory stimulations and brain states differ from the corresponding good cases.

Phenomenal conditions may be seen as luminous. Their existence seems to be guaranteed by the truth of thesis (A) and the idea that thesis (B) is a requeriment for (A). But (for Williamson) if phenomenal conditions must be luminous, then no condition have this phenomenal character.

§ 8.6 SAMENESS OF EVIDENCE AND THE SORITES

To undermine the argument for (12) [the argument for (C)], and in particular its crucial premise (1) [a version of (B)], Williamson constructs a parallel argument from (1) to a clearly false conclusion:

•   Williamson's argument:

(1)   For any appropriate property p, in any case in which one's evidence has p, one knows that one's evidence has p.

Now, $t_0, t_1, ..., t_n$ is a long sequence of times at one-millisecond intervals. One's experience very gradually changes from to t_0 to t_n. But one's evidence at the beguinning of the process is quite different from one's evidence at the end. For $0 \leq i \leq n$, let 'a_i' abbreviate a description of the case one is in at t_i. The description specifies: the time t_i, and the appropriate properties which one's evidence then has and those which it then lacks.

(2i)   For any appropriate property p, if in a_{i-1} one's evidence lacks p, then in in a_i one knows that in in a_{i-1} one's evidence lacks p.

Justification of (2i): Just like the justification of (2), in §8.4.

(3i)   It is consistent with what one knows in a_i that one is in a_{i-1}.

Justification of (3i): The limits to one's powers of discrimination.

We restrict 'p' to appropriate properties and assume:

(4i)   In a_i one's evidence has p.

We suppose further, as an assumption for reductio ad absurdum:

(5i)   In a_{i-1} one's evidence lacks p.

Premises (2i) and (5i) entail:

(6i)   In a_i one knows that in a_{i-1} one's evidence lacks p.

Premises (1) and (4i) entail:

(7i)   In a_i one knows that one's evidence has p.

The knowledge one has in a_i according to (6i) and (7i) is such that

(8i)   It is inconsistent with what one knows in a_i that one is in a_{i-1}.

Claim (8i) contradicts (3i). Therefore, we can deny (5i) by reductio ad absurdum:

(9i)   In a_{i-1} one's evidence has p.

Conditionalizing (9i) on assumption (4i) we obtain:

(10i)   If in a_{i-1} one's evidence has p, then in a_i one's evidence has p.

Since the approprite properties are closed under complementation, the entire argument from (1) to (10i) can be reproduced with 'not-p' in place of 'p'. The result is

(11i)   If in a_{i-1} one's evidence has not-p, then in a_{i-1} one's evidence has not-p.

Claim (11i) is equivalent to the converse of (10i). Therefore, the conjunction of (10i) and (11i) implies:

(12i)   One's evidence in a_{i-1} has the same appropriate properties as one's evidence in a_i.

Now, the transitivity of the relation of *having the same appropriate properties as* justifies the pass from (12_1), (12_2), ..., (12_n), to (13):

(13)   One's evidence in a_0 has the same appropriate properties as one's evidence in a_n,

which is clearly false.

NEXT

•   Objection: the argument is too similar to a sorites paradox.
        Reply: just as in chapter 4 (in a sorites paradox the argument has a premise that is obviously false when the vague terms are sharpened; here that is not so).

• [The last paragraph contains a brief discussion about Fumerton (2000), which I have not understood.]

§ 8.7 THE NON-TRANSPARENCY OF RATIONALITY

•   Could the sceptics avoid the problem if they don't use thesis (B) in the argument (in §8.4) but a more cautious claim that (B') Thinkers always know (or are in a position to know) what their evidence *appears* to be ?
•   Williamson: NO. We can replace 'one's evidence has [/ lacks] p' in the preceding argument (in §8.6) by 'one's evidence appears to have [/ lack] p'. We would obtain (13'), which is clearly false too:
    (13')   One's evidence in a_0 appears to have the same appropriate properties as one's evidence in a_n.

•   Some reflections against the idea that (B) is a requeriment for (A):
     – Standard conception of rationality: we can follow rules of rationality because we are always in a position to know what they require. Doing what a rule of rationality requires is a luminous condition.
     – If the argument in §8.6 is correct, this conception is mistaken. "Just as one cannot always know what one's evidence is, so one cannot always know what rationality requires of one."

•   In order to reflect on one's evidence, one might need evidence about one's evidence, and in order to reflect about the latter evidence, one might need evidence about it, and so on. But this regress is merely potential. At some stage one must rely on unreflective causal sensitivity to evidence. One can be causally sensitive to a factor without being in a position to have exact knowledge of it. For instance: we are causally sensitive to the distances between objects in our environment (with the aid of perception), without being in a position to know these distances with total accuracy.

•   The argument in this chapter does not depend on Williamson's positive account of evidence. That account (which Chapters 9 and 10 will develop) is centered on his equation E = K (one's total evidence is one's total knowledge). What matters in this chapter is that "a salient argument for [thesis (C)] has turned out to rest on a false premise."

•   The problem also affects the non-sceptics (relevantists, contextualists) that endorse (C) but hold that the bad case is irrelevant to the attribution of knowledge in the good case. These non-sceptics have not refuted the hypothesis (endorsed by Williamson and the sceptics) that
    if one knows *p*, then there are no cases (relevant or irrelevant) where one falsely believes *p* on the same evidence

• [The last paragraph contains a brief discussion about possible contextualist replies, which I have not understood.]

§ 8.8 SCEPTICISM WITHOUT SAMENESS OF EVIDENCE

•   Williamson wants to apply the conclusions of the discussion (in sections 8.2 to 8.7) to some other sceptical arguments not based on (C). These other sceptical arguments would use the concept of *method* instead of the concept of evidence. But for the sceptic the methods are individuated by their appearances, in such a way that the methods used in the good case and in the bad case are the same. Therefore, "the underlying dialectic is the same", because even when the sceptic does not assume sameness of evidence, (C), she assumes sameness of methods.

•   [It seems that Williamson's example in this section is not the right kind of example for the discussion. The sceptical argument discussed in the chapter is not about *p*, but about knowledge (in the good case) of *p*. So, the examples should involve cases where we would say pretheorically that one knows *p*. This is not so with Williamson's example in §8.8, where one decides to believe *p* by a random method: even if *p* is a necessary truth, one does not knows *p*. The "sceptic" here (the "sceptic" who denies that one knows *p*, not the skeptic who denied *p*) is right.]

•   [The last paragraph contains some further general morals Williamson apparently extracts from the whole discussion. I have not understood Williamson positions in this last paragraph.]

Foundations of Probability Theory

Gillies, Donald (2000): Philosophical Theories of Probability. London:Routledge.

Galavotti, Maria Carla (2005): Philosophical Introduction to Probability Chapter 5: "The propensity interpretation".

Lewis, David (1980): "A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance", reprinted in D. Lewis Philosophical Papers. Vol. II, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Hoefer, Carl (book in progress): Chance in the World: a Skeptic'sGuide to Objective Chance.

Elga, Adam (2000): "Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem", Analysis 60, 2000, pp. 143-147.

Lewis, David (2001): "Sleeping Beauty: reply to Elga", Analysis 61, 2001, pp. 171-176.

White, Roger (forthcoming): "The generalized Sleeping Beauty problem: A challenge for thirders", forthcoming in Analysis.

Timetable: From the 9th of March, every other Thursday. Hour: 11:15-13:30

Inquires: Manuel Pérez Otero (perez.otero-at-ub.edu).

Natural Kinds Essentialism
Selected Readings:
Donnellan, Keith: "Kripke and Putnam on Natural Kind Terms".
Putnam (1977) "Meaning and Reference", in *Naming, necessity, and natural kinds*, ed. Stephen P Schwartz, Cornell University Press.
Dupre (1981) "Natural Kinds and Biological Taxa", *The Philosophical Review*, XC, N. 1, pp. 66-90.
Laporte (1996) "Chemical Kind, Term Reference and the Discovery of Essence", *Noûs* 30, 112-132.
Jackman (1999) "We Live Forwards but Understand Backwards: Linguistic Practices and Future Behavior", *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 80, 157-77.
Segal, G. (2003) "Ignorance of Meaning", in *Epistemologyof Language*, ed. Alex Barber, Oxford University Press.
Brown, J. (2003) "Externalism and the Fregean Tradition", in *Epistemology of Language*, ed. Alex Barber, Oxford University Press.
Boyd (2001) "Truth Through Thick and Thin", in *What IsTruth? Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy*, Vol. 1, Ed. Richard Schantz, Walter de Gruyter, Inc.
Inquiries: Genoveva Martí & Oscar Cabaco.
This RG took place during the first semester of the academic year 2005-2006.

The metaphysics of persistence.
Selected readings:
Haslanger, Sally. 2003. "Persistence through Time".
Hawley, Katherine. 2001. *How Things Persist*, ch. 1.
Lewis, David. 2002. "Tensing the Copula"
Lowe: "Vagueness and Endurance".
Zimmerman, Dean W. 1998. "Temporary Intrinsics and Presentism".
Zimmerman, Dean W. 2005. "The A-Theory of Time, the B-Theory of Time and Taking Tense Seriously".
Inquiries: Marta Campdelacreu & Pablo Rychter.
This RG took place during the first semester of the academic year 2005-2006.

Archive. 2006/2007

Fictionalism

Formal Semantics

Metaethics

MetaMetaphysics (e-reading group)

Michael Dummet's Elements of Intuitionism

Modality

Temporal Modality

Comentari Filosòfico-Literari de L'home sense atributs

Propositional Attitudes

Transcendental arguments and scepticism

BEGINNING

Fictionalism

Schedule
Starting date October 6
Meeting times every Friday from 12:30 to 14:30

Sessions
20/10 Russell (1905); Crittenden (1991) ch. 1 and 2 (handout 1 and comments)
26/10 Adams et al (1997); Quine (1953) (handout 2 and comments)
10/11 Parsons (1980) Intro and part I (handout 3 and comments)
17/11 Parsons (1980) ch. 6 and 7.

Inquiries
M. García Carpintero (**{** HYPERLINK "mailto:m.garciacarpintero@ub.edu?subject=Fictionalism reading group" **}**) and
Roman Frigg (**{** HYPERLINK "mailto:r.pfrigg@ise.ac.uk?subject=fictionalism reading group" **}**)

Proposed Readings
What follows is a list with reading suggestions rather than a seminar plan. The program is meant to be flexible, in order to be able to take the participants interest into account.

Unit 1 Deflationist Accounts
 We could start with the following
Russell, Bertrand (1905): 'On Denoting', repr. In Logic and Knowledge, London 1956.
– (1917): 'Logical Atomism' [The passages that deal with definite descriptions]
Quine, Willard Van Orman (1953): 'On What There Is', in: From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge/Ma.
– (1960): Word and Object. Cambridge/Ma: MIT Press. [The passages dealing with fictions, in particular § 37 (maybe also § 38, § 39, and § 43)]

Then we could read some critics
Crittenden, Charles (1991): Unreality. The Metaphysics of Fictional Objects. Ithaca and London: Cornell UP. [Chs. 1-3 in which he is critical about the Russell-Quine approach.]

We could have a look at the following additional readings
Adams, Fred, Gary Fuller and Robert Stecker (1997) 'The Semantics of Fictional Names' Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78, 128-148.
Woods, John (1974): The Logic of Fiction. The Hague: Mouton.

Unit 2 Make-believe Accounts
The starting point seems to be
Evans, Gareth (1982): The Varieties of Reference. Ed. by John McDowell. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Then we could read (parts of) one of the following
Currie, Gregory (1990) The Nature of Fiction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Walton, Kendal L. (1990) Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Additional reading
Kroon, Frederick (1994) 'Make-Believe and Fictional Reference', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52: 207–14.

Unit 3 Hospitable Theories
Meinong, Alexius (1904): 'Theory of Objects', in R.M. Chisholm (ed.) Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, Glencoe, IL: Free Press 1960, 76-117.
 Then
Parsons, Terrence (1980): Nonexistent Objects, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. [Selected parts only; the entire book would be too much.]
– (1982): 'Are There Nonexistent Objects', American Philosophical Quarterly 19, 365-71.
– (1995): 'Meinongian Semantics Generalised', Grazer Philosophische Studien 50, 145-61.
Crittenden, Charles (1991): Unreality. The Metaphysics of Fictional Objects. Ithaca and London: Cornell UP. [Chs. 4-6.]
Inwagen, Peter van (1977): 'Creatures of Fiction', American Philosophical Quarterly 14, 299-308.

If we then feel like more, we could also have a look at
Howell, Robert (1979): 'Fictional Objects: How They Are and How They Aren't', Poetics 8, 129– 77.
Wolterstorff, Nicholas (1980) Works and Worlds of Art, Oxford: Clarendon Press. [Selected passages only.]

Unit 4 Pragmatist Approaches
Rorty, Richard (1982) 'Is There a Problem About Fictional Discourse?', in Consequences of Pragmatism, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 110-138.
Sainsbury. Mark (2005): Reference Without Referents. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Selected pars only.]

Unit 5 Possible Worlds Semantics
 We might begin by reading
Lewis, David (1978): 'Truth in Fiction', Repr. in David Lewis: Philosophical Papers, Volume I, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1983, 261-280.
– (1986): On the plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell. [Selected parts only.]

Further readings TBA

Unit 6 Further Approaches
Vaihinger, Hans (1911): The Philosophy of 'As If'. English Translation London: Kegan Paul 1924.

Fictionalism Reading Group, 20 October 2006

1. Russell: On Denoting
Russell's theory is not commonly read as theory of fiction. However, this is not as far fetched as it may seem at first sight. Towards the end of the discussion, Russell claims: 'The whole realm of non-entities, such as 'the round square', 'the even prime number other than 2', 'Apollo', 'Hamlet', etc. can now be satisfactorily dealt with. All these are denoting phrases which do not denote anything.' (OD 54). The mention of Hamlet and Apollo shows that Russell took his analysis to encompass fictional contexts as well.

Russell argues, against Meinong, that we should not believe in the existence of such an entity. His main point is that the structure of the sentence fools us into thinking that we are talking about an entity, while we are not. Once we analyse the sentence correctly, the alleged commitment to a fictional entity vanishes. This correct analysis is provided by Russell's theory of descriptions.

(1) Existence: $(\exists x)(x$ is the present king of France$)$
(2) Uniqueness: $(\forall y)(y$ is the present king of France $\rightarrow x=y)$
(3) Predication: x is the present king of France $\rightarrow x$ is bald

Hence, upon closer analysis what looks like a standard subject-predicate sentence turns out to be an existence claim in disguise. So, contrary to fist appearance, definite descriptions are not singular terms; they do not name an object; and assertions containing such terms apparently denoting non-existing entities can be paraphrased into statements that do not contain these expressions but instead assert the existence of these objects (see also PLA 247).

Trivially, then, the sentence 'the present king of France is bald' turns out to be false because it asserts the existence of something that does not exist.

Crittenden: Unreality Chs. 1 and 2.
Ch. 1, Sec. 2: Critique of Russell's Paraphrase Account
Problem: sentences about fictional characters come out false under Russell's analysis, which implies that there are no true assertions about nonexistent objects. This seems wrong. Consder the following two sentences:

(1) The chief cyclops lives in a cave.
[(2) The chief cyclops likes chewing gum.]

Russellian Analysis:

(1a) There exists exactly one chief cyclops and it lives in a cave.
[(2a) There exists exactly one chief cyclops and it likes chewing gum.]

Under Russells analysis both come out false, while we would normally regard (1a) as true and only (2b) as false. Hence Russell's paraphrase does not capture the meaning of (1).

[Comment (M. G-C): Crittenden says "this … conflicts with ordinary beliefs, for we take it as true that the chief cyclop in the *Odyssey* lives in a cave" (p. 23). But there are no "ordinary beliefs" about technically developed notions of meaning. It is consistent with ordinary beliefs a theory such that, although the meaning of (1) is such that literally speaking it is false, for essentially Russell's reasons (it entails that there are cyclops, which is false), it pragmatically conveys a different claim, for instance the one that would be literally expressed by (3) below, which is true.]

Remedy 1: Put an operator in front:

(3) In the Odyssey, the chief cyclops lives in a cave.

Two possible Russellian analyses of this sentence:
(3a) There exists exactly one chief cyclops and in the Odyssey it lives in a cave.
(3b) In the Odyssey, there exists exactly one chief cyclops and it lives in a cave.

The first of these is wrong for the same reasons as (1a). What about (3b)? It seems that one can regard (3b) as true only if we take the Odyssey to make the false claim that there is exactly one cyclops. This in turn amounts to taking the Odyssey to be a historical account the actual course of events, and one that is also false. This is a misconstrual of the character of fiction; fiction is not journalism.

[Comment (M. G-C): Crittenden seems to be equating the operator theory with a particular version of it, and a very implausible one at that, namely, one that assimilates 'the *Odyssey* has it that' to 'John asserts/judges/believes that', or, in general, to truth-committal acts, propositional acts characterized by norms requiring the truth in the actual world of the proposition. But the defender of the operator account of the interpretation of (1) according to which it is true needs not make this assimilation, and should not. There are other more plausible operators with which to make the analogy; for instance, 'John wishes that' or 'John imagines that'. These are not truth-committing; the norms (if this is the proper way to understand types of propositional acts, mental or linguistic) characterizing them do not require that the actual world makes true the relevant propositions. And (as in Walton's analysis) story-telling is indeed related to the imagination, not to belief; the point of story-telling is leading audiences to imagine propositions.]

NEXT

Remedy 2: Revert to story tellers:

(4) Someone wrote a story containing 'The chief cyclops lives in a cave.'

The strategy here is to shift from use to mention, and hence deny that the sentence refers to anything at all. Crittenden's criticisms of this position are not all too clear, but the thrust of his argument (pp. 27-8) seems to be that fiction would not make sense to us when we read it if this suggestion were true.

Remedy 3: Understand the prefix 'In the Odyssey' as introducing a non-extensional context (p. 28). Then expressions in fictional contexts do not refer because they (a) are cannot be substituted by coreferential terms salva veritate and (b) no existential quantification can be applied.

Criticism: (i) the status of these two 'tests' is controversial. (ii) They don't always fail (p. 28-9).

[Comment (M. G-C): As José Díez put it, the failure of substitutivity and of existential generalization criteria of intensionality require only that those inference patterns fail in some cases in the relevant contexts, not that they fail always. And they appear to do. Substitutivity: The Conan Doyle stories have it that Holmes lives in Baker street; Holmes is the most famous fictional detective; the Conan Doyle stories have it that the most famous fictional detective lives in Baker street. Existential Generalization: The Conan Doyle stories have it that Holmes lives in Baker street; There is someone such that the Conan Doyle stories have it that he lives in Baker street. As Prades pointed out, it is an interesting fact about the propositional act signified by 'such-and-such-work of fiction has it that ...' that failures of substitutivity are "less-to-be-expected" than in other cases; M. G-C. suggested that this has to do with the "transparent" nature with the content of fictions, and therefore with the nature of fictional characters, i.e., with the fact that their nature is fully revealed to whoever properly understands the relevant fiction. But the point remains that Crittenden's criticisms of the operator account do not pass muster. Alejandro pointed out, however, that one could reject the counterexample to substitutivity by claiming that 'Holmes' means two different things in the first and second premise (as, for instance, in Kripke claims in *Reference and Existence*), and thus the apparent failures of substitutivity are only apparent. But perhaps the only requirement for failing the substitutivity test is apparent failure, not real failure relative to a proper theoretical account of the semantics of the cases.]

Conclusion: the paraphrase account cannot deal with fiction. In fact, it is an account of how to deal with mistakes rather than with fiction.

[Notice: the exactly same problem crops up in scientific contexts. Consider the following example
(1') The Bohr model of the hydrogen atom has discrete energy levels.
(2') The Bohr model of the hydrogen atom has continuous energy levels.
(3') In Bohr's theory of the atom, the Bohr model of the hydrogen atom has discrete energy levels.

The Russellian analyses of theses sentences come out as above and they are problematic for the same reasons.]

Questions:
- Are Crittenden's arguments convincing? I.e. is Russell's paraphrase theory unacceptable as an account of fiction?
- If yes, is this an 'accidental' feature of Russell's account, or are there (or could there be) other paraphrase accounts that are subject to Crittenden's objections?

Ch. 1, Sec.1: History
Russell's 'conceptual' alcriticism of Meinong:
- Denying items a foothold in reality makes it unreasobale to consider them objects at all. (p. 9-10).
- It infringes the law of contradiction (p.10)

Question: are these points valid? Are they good guides to developing an account of fiction?

Ch. 2: Reference As 'Talking About'
Main idea: reference as identifying reference in Strawson's sense: referring expressions enable a hearer to identity the particular which is being referred to. 'In identifying reference a speaker is singling out something for an audience through employing an expression used in accordance with the rules of language.' (p. 32)

The conditions on p. 33 provide a formal rendering of this idea, which basically amounts to a speech act theory of reference.

Problem: This seems question begging. The very question at stake is *what* is singled out by the speaker when using the expression. It seems that there must be an object to which we refer.

Crittenden acknowledges the problem on p. 35 and tries to give an answer on pp. 39ff. The upshot seems to be that this object need not exist (p. 41). I.e. the objects of reference need not exist.

What does Crittenden has to offer in defence of this (as he admits: unorthodox) view? Not much it seems. There is appeal to Thomas Reid, and some example reaffirming what no one ever disputed, that fictional talk seems to make sense. So it seems that we are back to where we started.

RF2006

Fictionalism Reading Group, 20 October 2006

1. Quine

Russell's theory deals with definite descriptions (like 'the present king of France'). Quine extended this analysis to all singular terms, including proper names, arguing that each is eliminable by logical paraphrase. The main idea is to regard singular terms as definite descriptions in disguise. For instance, 'Socrates' is has to be regarded as a shorthand for 'Xanthippe's husband'. If there is no definite description available, then we can simply turn the name into a predicate; i.e. we can turn 'Socrates' into 'socratise' and 'Pegasus' into 'pegasise'. In this way we can dispense with Names altogether. Hence the sentence 'Pegasus does not exist' turns into 'nothing pegasises'.

To sentences thus paraphrased we then apply the following criterion of existence: 'a theory is committed to those and only those entities to which the bound variables of the theory must be capable of referring in order that the affirmation made in the theory be true.' (On What There Is, pp. 13-14) Or in short: 'To be is to be the value of a variable' (*ibid.*, p. 15)

A prima facie question is what is meant by 'theory'. Quine is clear that the relevant theory is science (broadly construed).

Given the above method of paraphrase and the criterion of existence, apparent ontological commitment to fictional entities like Pegasus can be renounced.

The theory is highly effective when it comes to getting rid of unwanted entities. But it faces serious problems when understood as a theory of fiction. These are by and large the same as the problems of Russell's theory.

First, as all sentences containing singular terms for fictional characters turn out to be false because they involve false existence claims. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which 'James Bond drives an Aston Martin' is true while 'James Bond drives a Volkswagen' is false. The paraphrase account (in either Russell's or Quine's version) cannot capture this difference as both sentences come out false under the paraphrase analysis.

Second, even if one adds a qualification of the kind 'in the movie …' the paraphrase account does not offer an account of truth in fiction. That is it does not provide the resources to say that the first sentence is true wile the second is false *in the Bond movies.*

In conclusion, if understood *as a theory of fiction*, Quine's account is equally unsatisfactory as Russell's.

2. Adams/Fuller/Stecker

(The following summary consists merely in a selection of quotations from the paper; it does not attempt to summarize their criticisms of other views, merely theirs.)

A problem for the semantics of fictional discourse is to say what is the meaning of "Ivan Ilych" and "Ivan Ilych got married" within works of fiction. ... A second problem for semantics is to say what is the meaning of "Ivan Ilych" and "Ivan Ilych got married", when we talk about fictional works. (128)

We stand by the intuition of the first problem – accepting that "Ivan Ilych" is vacuous *both* when it occurs in a work of fiction and when it occurs in discourse about fiction. We explain away the appearance of conflict of intuitions associated with the second problem. We say that "Ivan Ilych got married", in the context of speaking about fiction, asserts something true, even though the term "Ivan Ilych" lacks a referent. The truth it asserts is that "in the novel, using the name "Ivan Ilych", Tolstoy fictionally asserts that x got married". (129)

We defend a direct reference theory of names where the meaning of a name on an occasion of use (if it has one) is its bearer. Vacuous terms, like "Vulcan", therefore lack meaning. Sentences such as "Vulcan exists" or "Vulcan does not exist" or "Vulcan is small" lack a truth value. (130)

On this view one cannot truly say that Vulcan does not exist. The information that nothing satisfies such descriptions is easily conveyed by saying "Vulcan does not exist". It is no part of this view that any of these descriptions give any part of the meaning of "Vulcan" (we are not sense theorists). Rather, the conveyance of this information is pragmatic, not semantic. (130-1)

Therefore, the meaning of "Doyle's Sherlock Holmes did not uncover Nazi spies" is that in Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes stories, Conan Doyle did not fictionally assert or imply the unfilled proposition x uncovered Nazi spies using the term "Sherlock Holmes" or related terms. (134)

Suppose someone says "Holmes is smarter than Poirot". What would one be saying? This sentence might occur in at least two contexts. First, it might occur when talking about the works of Conan Doyle and Agatha Christie. In this context, one is asserting something about these works. One is asserting that in the Conan Doyle works it is fictionally implied that x is smart to degree n, (using the name "Holmes" for x) and in the Agatha Christie works it is fictionally implied that y is smart to degree n' (using the name "Poirot" for y), and n > n'. (135)

Main motivation: First, while there are metaphysical accounts upon which "Ivan Ilych" refers, we find such accounts implausible. Second, a semantics is available which offers a unified account of the meanings of terms both within fiction and without. In general, unified accounts are to be preferred, on grounds of theoretical elegance. (129)

Issues:

Problems for the Millian Account of Empty Names (the following is a selection of quotations from Braun, Empty Names, Fictional Names, Mythical Names, *Noûs* 39:4 (2005) 596–631, where a related view to the authors' is defended, and objections to it considered and disposed of; the goal is to try to think what the authors' responses would be.)

If ordinary speakers judge that 'Vulcan' and 'Sherlock Holmes' are meaningful, then they have semantic contents. Yet Millianism entails that they do not have semantic contents.

If Millianism is true, then the names 'Vulcan' and 'Sherlock Holmes' have no semantic content. If a name lacks semantic content, then sentences in which the name appears also lack semantic content. Therefore, if Millianism is true, then sentences containing 'Vulcan' or 'Sherlock Holmes' have no semantic content. If a sentence has no semantic content, then ordinary speakers will judge that it is not meaningful. But ordinary speakers think that many sentences containing these names are meaningful, for instance, the sentences 'Vulcan does not exist' and 'Sherlock Holmes is a detective'.

If Millianism is true, then sentences containing the names 'Vulcan' or 'Sherlock Holmes' have no truth value. But some sentences containing 'Vulcan' or 'Sherlock Holmes' do have truth values. For instance, the sentences 'Vulcan exists' and 'Sherlock Holmes is a grapefruit' are false, and the sentences 'Vulcan does not exist' and 'According to certain stories by Conan Doyle, Holmes is a detective' are true.

Generally, a person sincerely and assertively utters a sentence only if she believes its semantic content. (For instance, a person sincerely and assertively utters 'George W. Bush is a Republican' only if she believes the proposition that George W. Bush is a Republican.) But if Millianism is true, then the sentence 'Vulcan does not exist' has no semantic content. Therefore, if Millianism is true, then it is not the case that anyone believes the (nonexistent) semantic content of 'Vulcan does not exist'. Thus, if Millianism is true, then no one ever sincerely and assertively utters 'Vulcan does not exist'. But clearly some people do.

Problems for the pragmatic account of the intuitions:

Pragmatic proposals of this sort cannot explain all intuitions about the truth values of sentences containing empty names. Consider a person who is ignorant of astronomy and who hears Hawking utter 'Vulcan does not exist', but never hears anyone express an opinion about Vulcan's location. This person may come to believe the gappy proposition that Vulcan does not exist, but never entertain the proposition that there is (or is not) a planet between Mercury and the Sun.

[Comment, M. G-C: Independently of this objection by Braun, one could object that these views place all interesting issues (for the semantics and ontology of fiction) under the rug of pragmatics, and, what is worse, in the case of the authors' proposal, merely by fiat, by suggesting two or there impressionistically acceptable paraphrases, but without providing a general account of how the allegedly pragmatically conveyed (interesting) meanings can be systematically derived from what they take to be semantic contents, using only tools which everybody would accept as necessary ingredients of the pragmatics kit.]

Problems for the motivation for uniformity:

As Braun says,

Thomasson and van Inwagen point out that there are seemingly true utterances of sentences such as (1) and (2) that apparently entail the existence of novels and plots.
(1) Some novels were written in the 19th century.
(2) Dickens's novel Martin Chuzzlewit has a complex plot.
Most philosophers do not resist the conclusion that there are such things as novels and plots. But there is similar evidence for the existence of fictional characters.

It seems that everybody is committed to entities like plots and novels; the authors themselves appear to be so committed. Compare:

Even in transfictive contexts, we claim that one refers (at least implicitly) to works and what they fictionally assert. Our account posits neither roles nor characters to give the meaning of transfictive sentences. (137)

But, if we accept in our ontology plots and novels, what reason there is not to accept characters, which can be taken to be "parts" of novels and their plots?

Terence Parsons, *Nonexistent Objects*, Introduction and Part I.

Introduction.

One of the paradigm beliefs of contemporary philosophy is that everything exists, and one of the paradigm techniques used in metaphysics is Russell's theory of descriptions - a theory Russell used to get rid of Meinongian non-existent objects. (Names for non-existents are in fact definite descriptions, by Russell's view, a definite description in a sentence does not designate.)

Most philosophers have followed Russell because (i) he gave convincing arguments against Meinong, and (ii) on the basis of his views about existence and definite descriptions, he erected an impressive philosophical system.

The aim of the book is to give a theory of (concrete) objects which leaves room for non-existents, which can be understood by the members of the orthodox tradition and which agrees with the tradition on the properties of existent objects.

Part I. Initial exposition.

1. <u>Initial sketch of the theory</u>.

Two basic principles:

> (1) No two objects have the same nuclear properties.
>
> (2) Given any set of nuclear properties, there is an object which has exactly those
> properties (comprehension principle).

An object is *complete* iff for every nuclear property, the object either has that property or it has its negation. The *negation* of a nuclear property p is the property q such that for every *existing* object x, x has q iff x does not have p. Given any nuclear property p, principle 2 ensures that some (non-existent) objects have both p and non-p.

Comment:

The nuclear negation of a nuclear property *p*, non-*p*, is defined as follows: it is the nuclear property that all existing objects have iff they don't have *p*. (p. 19) According to Parsons, non-*p* is assumed to be nuclear as well. This strikes me as implausible as it has the counterintuitive consequence that there are objects that instantiate a determinable without instantiating a corresponding determinate. For instance, *p* = having blue eyes. Therefore: non-*p* = not having blue eyes. According to Parsons there are objects which have *no other property* (regarding their eyes, at least) than non-*p*. This seems implausible. In a description one can, of course, leave it open what eye color a person has; but the person must have *some* eye color, which is not blue. That is, the person's eyes must be either green or brown or … Abstractly put, the point is that it seems to be a basic (a priori?) principle that an object cannot instantiate a determinable without also instantiating a corresponding determinate; e.g. something can't be colored without also being green or red or blue or … Parson's theory violates this principle.

A reaction to this comment:

By the comprehension principle, there is an object which has only the property of not having blue eyes. This does not violate the principle that an object cannot have a determinable without having one of the corresponding determinates (call it the *DD principle*), for since the object has no other property than the one mentioned above, it does not have the property of having eyes of a certain color. Now , presumably, by the comprehension principle, there is an object having exactly the following property: having colored eyes. *This* violates the DD principle. Parsons could reply that the DD principle is false, and that what is a basic, a priori principle is only a restriction of the principle to existents, i.e. that an *existing* object cannot have a determinable without having a corresponding determinate.

All existing objects are complete (by definition of negation). Some non-existents are complete, some not.

Completeness and logical closure are distinct. The object corresponding to the set of nuclear properties TP minus 'hazel-eyed' plus 'non-hazel-eyed' is complete but not logically closed. The set of all nuclear properties entailed by {being a mountain, being golden} is logically closed but incomplete.

An object x is *possible* iff it is possible that some existing object has (at least) all of x's nuclear properties. All existing objects are possible, the object corresponding to {being a mountain, being golden} as well, but the one corresponding to {being square, being round} is not.

Comment:

What motivation for impossible objects? In certain stories, descriptions impossible objects are introduced *on purpose* – a story may even be intended to have such objects as main characters.

Principles:

>   (a) Completeness + possibility => logical closure.
>
>   (b) Impossibilty + logical closure => completeness.
>
>   (c) Except for (a) and (b) all combinations of completeness, possibility and logical closure are manifested.
>
>   (d) Some non-existents are complete, possible and logically closed.

Examples of nuclear and extra-nuclear properties (or predicates). Principles giving sufficient conditions for being extra-nuclear entailed by the theory.

Against the Quinean protest that the concept of identity does not apply to non-existents: all objects obey the principle of the identity of nuclear indiscernibles.

2. Meinong and motivation.

The major motivation for non-existents does not come from the Meinongian satisfaction principle for definite descriptions (all definite descriptions - from a certain, restricted class - refer). It rather comes from many propositions we believe and which seem to commit us to non-existents, e.g. 'Sherlock Holmes is more famous than any real detective' and 'Zeus was worshipped by the Greeks'.

One way to sidestep apparent commitment to objects for such propositions: they involve non-extensional contexts. But the propositions in question allow for substitutivity of identicals and existential generalization (for 'there is', not for 'there exists').

Another way: appeal to substitutional quantification (in the case of quantified sentences like 'there is something such that it is a fictional detective and it is more famous than any real detective'). But substitutional quantification at best provides a mechanism for avoiding committment to non-existents, not a reason to avoid it.

The main orthodox reaction to sentences we believe and which seem to be about non-existents is to claim that they can be paraphrased so that committment to non-existents disappear. But the possibility of paraphrase does not diminish the *prima facie* plausibility offered by such sentences that there are non-existents, because (i) it is very difficult to find such paraphrases, and (ii) it is implausible to paraphrase these sentences but not similar sentences which contain only names for real objects, while the latter are unproblematic.

Russell against Meinong.

First objection. Impossible objects lead to contradiction. E.g. the round square is both round and square; what is square is not round; therefore the round square is both round and not round.

Reply: 'what is square is not round' is true when the quantifier is restricted to possibly existing objects, but false if the quantifier is unrestricted.

Second objection. 'the existent gold mountain' is supposed to designate, and if it does, it designates something which exists and is a glod mountain. But there is no such thing.

Meinong's reply: the existent gold mountain is existent, but it does not exist. Parsons accepts the reply but with a special view on what property 'being existent' expresses. The theory has it that there is at least one nuclear property had by all and only the real objects. Such a property can appropriately be taken to be expressed by 'being existent', and since it is nuclear, its combination with being golden and being a mountain corresponds to an object, which does not exist.

3. A sketch of a theory of fictional objects.

With regard to a given story, a fictional object can be *native* (the story creates the object) or *immigrant* (non-fictional like London, or fictional if the object has been created in another story). The theory deals with native objects of stories only.

Comment:

Are there really real objects which are immigrant in stories, e.g. London? One may be reluctant to admit that there are such immigrant objects in stories. Reply: presumably, (many) *properties and kinds* expressed by predicates or designated by general terms used by authors are immigrant in most stories; this being granted, why be suspicious about the idea that particulars like London be?

(*) The F of story s = the x such that for every nuclear property p, x has p iff the F of s is such that in (i.e. according to) s it has p.

Normally, fictional objects are incomplete. Note that (*) does not generally apply to immigrant objects (s can attribute London a property it does not have).

There are immigrant objects in stories, e.g. London in the Conan Doyle stories. They all have *surrogates.* The surrogate of London in the Doyle stories, which may be designated by 'the London of the Doyle stories', is the fictional object picked out by an application of (*) to that expression. Contrary to London, it does not occur in the Doyle stories.

A problem with relations. Suppose in story s Holmes is said to see Gladstone, a real object immigrant to s. By (*), Holmes has the property of having seen Gladstone. But many think, and Parsons follows them here, that real objects cannot bear relations to unreals, so that Gladstone does not have the property of having been seen by Holmes. What to do? Parsons bites the bullet.

Metaethics

Schedule
Wednesdays from 12 to 14

Starting date
October 11th

Proposed Readings
The reading group intends to read different texts on meta-ethics --including
texts that will allow those with little background on the topic to gain it. The meta-ethics reading group will have some
focus on non-cognitivism

At the first meeting we will discuss these texts by Hume:
Treatise..., book II, section III: Of the influencing motives of the will. (6 pages)
Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Section I: On the general principles of Morals, (5 pages)

(if you do not have these texts, please let Josep L. Prades know, and he'll send them to you, as he has scanned
them).

Also recommended as additional reading for this first meeting:
"Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism", *Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, (**{** HYPERLINK
"http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/" \t "_blank" **}**)

We intend to read afterwards:
HARMAN, Gilbert, and THOMSON, Judith Jarvis, *Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell,
1996.

As we go along reading Harman&Thomson(1996) we will also read other relevant papers, most of which we can get
from the two following anthologies (the two anthologies have actually quite a lot of material in common):

Moral Discourse and Practice, edited by Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton (Oxford: OUP, 1997).
Meta-Ethics, edited by Michael Smith (Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995)

Other relevant texts that we might read (at least in part), not included in these two anthologies:
Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons " Expressivism, Yes! Relativism, No!" (ms. http://www.dingo. sbs.arizona.
edu/~thorgan/ papers/Expressivism.Yes5. htm).
Alexander Miller. *An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics* (Cambridge: Polity, 2003)
Dorr, C. (2002) "Noncognitivism and Wishful Thinking", *Nous* 36.
M. Smith, *The Moral Problem* (Blackwell 1994)
Stoljar, D. "Emotivism and truth conditions", *Philosophical Studies*, 70: 80-101. (1993).

MetaMetaphysics

Schedule
This is an e-RG, entirely run at The Blogos –the provisional blog of Logos **{** HYPERLINK
"http://www.blogblogos.blogspot.com/" **}**
New posts should be titled in the format 'MM author: subject' (For instance, 'MM Bennett: analyticity and extension
tothe 3D-4D case)

sessions
Posts on Bennett (2007) are expected to start around November 20.
Posts on our second reading (TBA) are expected to start around December 11

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Proposed Readings
Bennett, K (2007): "Composition, Colocation and Metaontology". forthcoming in D. Chalmers, D. Manley and R.
Wasserman (eds), Metametaphysics (Oxford U. Press).
McCall, S. & Lowe, E. J. (2006): "The 3D/4D Controversy: A Storm in a Teacup" Noûs 40: 570–578.
Sider, T. (2001): "Criteria of Personal Identity and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis", Philosophical Perspectives 15:
189-209.
Sider, T. (2007): "Ontological Realism", forthcoming in D. Chalmers, D. Manley and R. Wasserman (eds),
Metametaphysics (Oxford University Press).
Dorr, C. (2005): "What we disagree about when we disagree about ontology" in M. E. Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in
Metaphysics (Oxford University Press).

Modality

Schedule
Thursdays,15:30 to 17:30

Starting date
October 5th

Place
Seminar room, Department of Logic, UB

Inquires
Sònia Roca

Proposed Readings
Here is a list of the proposed readings

Fine
Fine: "Essence and Modality"
-"Senses of Essences"
-"Ontological Dependence"
-"Plantinga on the Reduction of Possibility Discourse"
-"Postscript: Prior on the Construction of Possibile Worlds and Instants"
-"The Problem of Possibilia"

Miscellanea
Melia: *Modality*
Mackie: "Essence, Origin and Bare Particulars"
Plantinga: "Actualism and Possible Worlds"
Williamson: "Bare Possibilia"
-"Necessary Existence"
Linski&Zalta: "In Defence of the Simplest QMD"
Divers: *Possible Worlds.*

Loux: The possible and the actual
Chisholm: "Identity Through Possible Worlds"
Kaplan: "Trans-world Heir Lines"
Lewis: "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic"
Plantinga: "Trans-world Identity or World-Bound Individuals?"
Lewis: "Possible Worlds"
Adams: "Theories of Actuality"
Stalnaker: "Possible Worlds"
Plantinga: "Actualism and Possible Worlds"
Lycan: "The trouble with Possible Worlds"
Burgess: "Quinus ab omni nævo vindicatus"

Stalknaker: Ways a world might be
Stalnaker: "Counterparts and Identity"
-"Conceptual Truth and Metaphysical Necessity"

Temporal Modality

Schedule
Starting date November 8th
Meeting times Wednesdays from 12 to 14. There will be 3 sessions per month

Sessions
08/11 Mc Taggart (1908) (handout 1 and comments)
22/11 Dummett (1960)
13/12 Fine (2005)

Place
Carrer Montalegre 6, 4ª planta, aula 401

Inquires
Roberto Ciuni (ciuniroberto@yahoo.it) and Fabrice Correia (fabrice.correia@urv.net)

Proposed Readings
The temporal modalities play a role in the formulation of certain important philosophical claims – e.g. the claim that, alongside with past possibilities which are still possibilities, there are expired possibilities (some things were possible but are no longer so), the indeterminist claim that it is possible that there will be a see battle tomorrow as well as possible that there won't be a see battle tomorrow, or the determinist claim that given any state of affairs whatsoever (belonging to such or such a class), either it must be the case that it will obtain, or it must be the case that it will fail to obtain. Although modality simpliciter and tense simpliciter have separately received detailed attention in the past decades in philosophy and philosophical logic, the temporal modalities have been somehow neglected. The aim of this reading group is to run through the topic.

Time and Tense
J. M. McTaggart (1908) "The Unreality of Time", *Mind*, 17: 457-474
Arthur Prior (2003) "Tense logic and the Logic of earlier and later", in *Papers on Time and Tense*, Oxford : OUP
M. Dummett (1960) "A Defense of Mc Taggart's Proof of the Unreality of Time", *The Philosophical Review*, 69, 4: 497-504
Kit Fine (2005) "Tense and Reality", in *Modality and Tense*, Oxford : OUP

Future Contingents
G.E.M. Anscombe (1956) "Aristotle and the Sea Battle ", *Mind*, 65: 1-15 [JSTOR]
J. Hintikka (1964) "The Once and Future Sea Fight: Aristotle's Discussion of Future Contingents in De Interpretatione IX", *The Philosophical Review*, 73, 4: 461-492
Arthur Prior (1967) "Time and Determinism" , in *Past, Present and Future*, Oxford : OUP
J. MacFarlane (2003) "Future Contingents and Relative Truth", *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 53: 321-36

Possibility and Time
J. Hintikka (1973) "Aristotle on the Realization of Possibilities in Time", in *Time and Necessity*, Oxford , OUP
White M. (1984) "The Necessity of the Past and Modal-Tense Logic Incompleteness" , *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, 25, 1: 59 –71[projecteuclid. org]
Arthur Prior (1967) "Appendix A", in *Past, Present and Future*

Time, existence and objects
A. Prior (2003) "Tense Logic for non permanent existents", in *Papers on Time and Tense*
C. Menzel (1991) "The true modal logic", *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 20: 331-374

J. Ellis McTaggart, "The Unreality of Time".

Time is unreal, because the A-series is essential to time and the A-series cannot exist.

1. The A-series, the B-series, the C-series, and time.

Positions in time (as well as events, i.e. the contents of positions in time) seem to be distinguished along two dimensions: earlier than, later than and simultaneous with / past, present and future.

The first dimension orders positions in time (and events) into a **B-series**, the second dimension into an **A-series**.

There is no time without change: a universe without change is a timeless universe. And **there is no change unless time is ordered into an A-series**. For suppose time does not form an A-series but only a B-series.

(i) A change consists in an event ceasing to be an event or beginning to be an event? Impossible since time forms a B-series alone.

(ii) A change consists in an event becoming another event? Back to case (i).

(iii) An account of change in terms of the numerically different moments of time? Back to case (i).

[Talk of events, and not things, changing is controverial. And event if we grant that certain events change, some of them do not, and their occurrence would presumably be sufficient for there to be time (granted that time requires change).]

The features of events which change are the properties which define the A-series.

The B-series is essentially temporal, and so it cannot exist without the A-series. Still, if we "substract the determinations of the A-series from time", we are left with a series, the **C-series**, which is like the B-series except that it has no direction. The A-series and the C-series are "ultimate", not the B-series. A-series + C-series => B-series (and time).

[An idea for defining the C-series: use exclusively distance relations or exclusively the betweenness 3-place relation.]

[(a) McTaggart claims that directionality is essentially temporal, but this is controversial. (b) Why is the A-series not sufficient to generate the B-series? Can we not define e.g. 'x is earlier than y' by 'the following is past, present or future: that x is present and y future'.]

2. The A-series cannot exist.

The terms of the A-series are characteristics of events and positions in time. They are either relational or qualities.

(i) Suppose they are **relational**. Then they must be relations to something outside the time-series, because they change and relations between items of the time-series do not change. But it is hard to see what these things outside the time-series could be.

Past, present and future are incompatible determinations. But every event or time-position has them. So the idea that time forms an A-series is inconsistent. Reply: no contradiction, because the determinations are had not simultaneously, but successively. McTaggart's reply: this explanation involves a vicious circle - it's formulation makes use of the determinations of the A-series.

(i) Suppose they are **qualities**. Same objection as above.

3. Conclusion

The A-series does not exist, so time is unreal and the B-series does not exist either. But (probably) the events form a C-series.

Meta-metaphysics / Metaphilosophy

Transparencia del contenido y autoconocimiento

Pragmatics

Decision Theory & Bayesianism

Science for Philosophers

Foundations of mathematics

Semantics

BEGINNING

Transparencia del contenido y autoconocimiento

Curso 2007/08
Horario Viernes, de 12.30 a 14.30 h.
Fecha de inicio 19 Octubre 2007
Periodicidad cada dos semanas

Moderador
Manuel Pérez Otero

Lecturas
BURGE, Tyler (1988): "Individualism and Self-Knowledge", en Journal of Philosophy 85, 11, 1988, pp. 649-663. Reimpreso en P. Ludlow y N. Martin (eds.).
McKINSEY, Michael (1991): "Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access", Analysis Ii, 1991, pp. 9-16. Reimpreso en P. Ludlow y N. Martin (eds.).
BRUECKNER, Anthony (1992): "What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori", Analysis IiI, 1992, pp. 111-118. Reimpreso en P. Ludlow y N. Martin (eds.).
BOGHOSSIAN, Paul A. (1989): "Content and Self-Knowledge", Philosophical Topics xvii, 1989, pp. 5-26. Reimpreso en P. Ludlow y N. Martin (eds.).
WARFIELD, Ted A. (1992): "Privileged Self-Knowledge and Externalism Are Compatible", Analysis IiI, 1992, pp. 232-237. Reimpreso en P. Ludlow y N. Martin (eds.).
BROWN, Jessica (1995): "The Incompatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access", Analysis IV, 1992, pp. 149-156. Reimpreso en P. Ludlow y N. Martin (eds.).
LUDLOW, Peter (1995): "Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and the Prevalence of Slow Switching", Analysis. Reimpreso en P. Ludlow y N. Martin (eds.).
WARFIELD, Ted A. (1997): "Externalism, Privileged Self-Knowledge, and the Irrelevance of Slow Switching", Analysis. Reimpreso en P. Ludlow y N. Martin (eds.).
LUDLOW, Peter. (1997): "On the Relevance of Slow Switching", Analysis. Reimpreso en P. Ludlow y N. Martin (eds.).
BERNECKER, Sven (1998): "Self-Knowledge and Closure", en P. Ludlow y N. Martin (eds.), Externalism and Self-Knowledge, pp. 333-349.
BURGE, Tyler (1998): "Memory and Self-Knowledge", en P. Ludlow y N. Martin (eds.), Externalism and Self-Knowledge, pp. 351-370.
DAVIES, Martin (2003): "The Problem of Armchair Knowledge", en S. Nuccetelli (ed.), pp. 23-55.
McKINSEY, Michael (2003): "Transmission of Warrant and Closure of Apriority", en S. Nuccetelli (ed.), pp. 97-115.
PRYOR, James (2007): "Externalism about Content and McKinsey-style Reasoning", en S. Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007.
GOLDBERG, Sanford C. (2000): "Externalism and Authoritative Knowledge of Content: A New Incompatibilist Strategy", Philosophical Studies, 100, pp. 51-79.
WIKFORS, Asa: "Knowledge of Content", Canadian Journal of Philosophy, (forthcoming).
BILGRAMI, Akeel (1998): "Self-Knowledge and Resentment", en C. Wright, B. C. Smith y C. Macdonald (eds.), pp. 207-241.
SMITH, Barry C. (1998): "On Knowing One's Own Language", en C. Wright, B. C. Smith y C. Macdonald (eds.), pp. 391-428.
HIGGINBOTHAM, James (1998): "On Knowing One's Own Language", en C. Wright, B. C. Smith y C. Macdonald (eds.), pp. 429-441.
DRETSKE, Fred (2004): "Knowing What You Think vs. Knowing that You Think It", en R. Schantz (ed.), pp. 389-399.
NISBETT, R. E. & WILSON, T. D. (1977): "Telling more than we can know: verbal reports on mental processes", Psychological Review, 84, pp. 231-259.

Pragmatics

Schedule
Starting date January 30
Meeting times every Wednesday. from 12.00 to 14.00
Meeting place Seminari de Filosofia

Inquiries
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Sessions
January 30th, 2008
Paul Grice, "Logic and conversation",
February 6th, 2008
Paul Grice, "Further notes on Logic and Coversation"
J.L. Austin, "Performative Utterances" (handout 1 Josep Macià)
February 13th, 2008
John Searle, "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts"
February 27th, 2008
Lauri Karttunen, "Presupposition and Linguistic Context".
Theoretical Linguistics 1 181-94, 1974, "http://www2.parc.com/istl/members/karttune/" (handout 2
Dan Zeman)
March 5th, 2008
Robert Stalnaker "Pragmatic Pressupositions"
March, 13th, 2008
Irene Heim "On the projection problem for presuppositions"

Proposed Readings

The list below gives just an indication of some of the readings we might choose among.
Readers
Davis, Steven, 1991, Pragmatics. A reader. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Horn, Laurence R. and Gregory Ward (eds.), 2004, The Hanbook of Pragmatics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Reimer, Marga and Anne Bezuidenhout, A., 2004, Descriptions and beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Szabo, Z. (2004) Semantics versus pragmatics. (this is a collection of recent papers)
Some classic texts
Austin, John L., 1961, "Performative Utterances," in J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock (eds.) Philosophical Papers,
Oxford: Clarendon.
Austin, John L., 1962a, How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Clarendon.
Grice, H. Paul, 1967a, "Logic and conversation."
Grice, H. Paul, 1981, "Presupposition and Conversational Implicature."
Searle, John, 1969, Speech Acts: An essay in the philosophy of language.
Searle, J. 1979 Expressions and Meaning. Cambridge UP.
Relevance theory
Blakemore, Diane, 1992, Understanding Utterances. Oxford: Blackwell.
Carston, Robyn, 1999, "The semantics/pragmatics distinction: A view from Relevance Theory." In Ken Turner (ed.),
The Semantics/Pragmatics Interface from Different Points of View, 1999, 85-125.
Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson, 1987, "Précis of Relevance: Communication and Cognition." Behavioral and Brain
Sciences 10: 697-754.
Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson, 2002, "Pragmatics, modularity and mindreading." Mind and Language 17: 3-23.
Contextualism, hidden-indexical theory, minimalism, literalism
Cappelen, Herman & Ernest Lepore, 2005, Insensitive Semantics. A Defence of Semantic Minimalism and Speech
Act Pluralism. Oxford: Blackwell.
Cappelen, Herman & Ernest Lepore (forthcoming), "Unarticulated constituents and hidden indexicals. An abuse of
context in semantics." In M. O'Rourke and C. Washington (eds.) Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of
John Perry. Cambridge, Mass : MIT Press/Bradford Books.
Neale, Stephen, 2004, "This, that, and the other," In M. Reimer and A. Bezuidenhout (eds.) Descriptions and Beyond,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 68-182.
Recanati, François, 1989, "The Pragmatics of What is Said." Mind and Language 4: 295-329.
Recanati, François, 2002, "Unarticulated Constituents." Linguistics and Philosophy 25: 299-345.
Stanley, Jason, 2000, "Context and Logical Form," Linguistics and Philosophy 23: 391-424.
Stanley, Jason and Zoltan G. Szabo, 2000, "On quantifier domain restriction." Mind and Language 15: 219-61.
Travis, Charles, 1997, "Pragmatics." In B. Hale and C. Wright (eds) 1997, A Companion to the Philosophy of
Language, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 87-107.

Implicatures, explicatures

Bach, Kent, 1999b, "The myth of conventional implicature." Linguistics and Philosophy 22: 262-83.
Bach, Kent and Robert M. Harnish, 1979, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Influential effort to integrate speech act theory and the Gricean theory of conversational implicatures).
Carston, Robyn, 1988, "Implicature, explicature, and truth-conditional semantics." In R. Kempson (ed.), Mental Representations: The Interface between Language and Reality, pp. 155-81. Reprinted in Davis (ed.) 1991, pp. 33-51 and in Kasher (ed.) 1998, pp. 436-79.
Carston, Robyn, 1998, "Negation, 'presupposition' and the semantics-pragmatics distinction." Journal of Linguistics 34, 309-50.

Background, other texts

Bach, Kent, 1999a, "The semantics-pragmatics distinction: What is it and why it matters." In Ken Turner (ed.), The Semantics/Pragmatics Interface from Different Points of View, 1999, pp. 65-84.
Bach, Kent, 2004, "Pragmatics and the Philosophy of Language." In Horn and Ward (eds.) 2004, pp. 463-87.
Levinson, Stephen, 1983, Pragmatics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Stalnaker, Robert, 1979, "Assertion". in Stalnaker 1999
Stalnaker, Robert, 1998, "On the representation of context"

Pragmatics Reading Group. J.L. Austin "Performative Utterances".
6/February/2008. Josep Macià.

[First part] On the big distinction between stating something and making a performative utterance

(1) I do (in a wedding ceremony)   (3) I name this ship *Queen Elizabeth*
(2) I apologize   (4) I bet you sixpence that it will rain tomorrow

• In using any of (1)-(4) (in the appropriate circumstances) one is doing something rather than merely saying something
• Statements are true or false, sentences in (1)-(4) are not.
• Utterances using sentences such as the ones in (1)-(4) are *performative utterances*

Infelicities: uses of a performative utterance that do not satisfy certain rules:
(i) The conventional procedure that we are purporting to follow in doing our utterance must exist and be accepted (I can not divorce my wife by just saying to her at home "I divorce you")
(ii) The circumstance in which we purport to invoke this procedure must be appropriate for its invocation ("I appoint you consul" said to a horse (also possible to classify this as a case of violation of rule (i)))
(iii) The procedure must be carried through correctly and completely (I say "I do", but the other person at the wedding ceremony doesn't)

If (i)-(iii) are not met there is a misfire, the act is void, without effect.

Another kind of infelicity: the procedures are designed to be used by people who have certain believes and intentions. If these believes and intentions are not present then there is infelicity, though the performative act still takes place ("I promise to do X" –when I do not have any intention of doing X, "I welcome you" –when I intend to treat you as if you were unwelcome). In this kind of cases we say that the conventional procedure that allows us to make performative utterance was *abused*:

Other cases of infelicity: • Misunderstanding (I mishear you, or misunderstood what object you intended to refer to); • you make the utterance under threat, or under other circumstances that make you non-responsible for what you did [?]; • you utter the sentence in a play [isn't this already a violation of (ii)]

II. How to characterize when an utterance is a performative utterance?
Grammatical criterion-1: The sentence is in the first person singular present indicative active and contains a verb from certain list: a verb is in the list if there is an asymmetry between the uses in the first person present and other uses ("I promise…" vs. "He promises…").
Troubles for grammatical criterion: "Open the door!", "Passengers are warned to cross the line by the bridge only", "You are hereby authorized to…".
Grammatical criterion-2: A performative utterance is one that could be analysed into one that has one of these two forms: "I…. (present indicative)" or "You (or he) hereby….", and includes a verb in the list mentioned above. "I order you to shut the door" is an explicit performative, "Shut the door" is not.
We must distinguish between *making explicit* what act it is we are performing and *stating* what act we are performing (analogy to bow while saying "Shalaam").

[Second part] On the non (significant) distinction, after all, between stating something and making a performative utterance

• Troubles for the grammatical criterion-2: "Hurrah!" (we perform an act of cheering), "Damm" (swearing). Not clear how to classify "I am sorry". "Out" (said by an umpire) is a performative but must also connect with the facts.
"I sate that…" seems also to make clear that we are performing an act: an act of stating
• Making an statement is performing an act
• Statements are true or false, but also liable to infelicity ("The cat is on the mat, but I do not believe it is", "All of Johns children are tall" (when John does not have children)).
• "Performative utterance", beyond being evaluable as felicitous or not, can be evaluated with respect to their relation to facts "I warn you…." (Was it a justified warning? Did it come off?) "I advise you…" (Was it sound advice?). [this is NOT like truth --question of justification also arise, for assertions]
• We must distinguish between what an utterance *means*, and what the *force* of the utterance is (Was it an order, a warning, or an advise?)

Verificacionists: too radical in dismissing any utterance that can not be evaluated as true or false (Open the door!); Wittgensteinians too loose in their talk of "indefinitely many different language uses".

NEXT

FIRST PART: on the big distinction between stating something and making a performative utterance

(1) I do (in a wedding ceremony)   (3) I name this ship *Queen Elizabeth*
(2) I apologize   (4) I bet you sixpence that it will rain tomorrow

• In using any of (1)-(4) (in the appropriate circumstances) one is doing something rather than merely saying something
• Statements are true or false, sentences in (1)-(4) are not.
• Utterances using sentences such as the ones in (1)-(4) are *performative utterances*

Infelicities: uses of a performative utterance that do not satisfy certain rules:

(i) The conventional procedure that we are purporting to follow in doing our utterance must exist and be accepted (I can not divorce my wife by just saying to her at home "I divorce you")
(ii) The circumstance in which we purport to invoke this procedure must be appropriate for its invocation ("I appoint you consul" said to a horse (also possible to classify this as a case of violation of rule (i))
(iii) The procedure must be carried through correctly and completely (I say "I do", but the other person at the wedding ceremony doesn't)

If (i)-(iii) are not met there is a misfire, the act is void, without effect.

Another kind of infelicity: the procedures are designed to be used by people who have certain believes and intentions. If these believes and intentions are not present then there is infelicity, though the performative act still takes place ("I promise to do X" –when I do not have any intention of doing X, "I welcome you" –when I intend to treat you as if you were unwelcome). In this kind of cases we say that the conventional procedure that allows us to make performative utterance was *abused*:

Other ways in which a performative act can be "unfelicitous" ("go wrong"):
• Misunderstanding (I mishear you, or I think you refered to one object, you intended to refer to another one); • you make the utterance under threat, or under other circumstances that make you non-responsible for what you did (?); • you utter the sentence in a play [ins't this already a violation of (ii)]

II. How to characterize when an utterance is a performative utterance:

Grammatical criterion-1: The sentence is in the first person singular present indicative active and contains a contains a verb from certain list. The verbs in this list are the ones fro which there is an asymmetry between the uses in the first person present and other uses ("I promise…" vs. "He promises…").
Troubles for grammatical criterion: "Open the door!", "Passangers are warned to cross the line by the bridge only", "You are hereby authorized to…".
Grammatical criterion-2: A performative utterance is one that could be analysed into one that has one of these two forms: "I…. (present indicative)" or "You (or he) hereby….", and includes a verb in the list mentioned above. "I order you to shut the door" is an explicit performative "Shut the door" is not.
We must distinguish between making explicit what act it is we are performing and stating what act we are performing (analogy to bow while saying "Shalaam").

SECOND PART: on the non (significant) distinction, after all, between stating something and making a performative utterance

• Troubles for the grammatical criterion-2: "Hurrah!" (we do perform an act of cheering), "Damm" (swearing). Not clear how to classify "I am sorry". "Out" (said by an umpire) must connect with the facts.
"I sate that…" seems also to make clear that we are performing an act: an act of stating
• Making an statement is performing an act
• Statements are true or false, but also liable to infelicity ("The cat is on the mat, but I do not believe it is", "All of Johns children are tall" (when John does not have children).
• "Performative utterance", beyond being evaluable as felicitous or not, can be evaluated with respect to their relation to facts "I warn you…." (Was it a justified warning? Did it come off?) "I advise you…" (Was it sound advice?).
• We must distinguish between what an utterance *means*, and what the *force* of the utterance is (an order, a warning, an advise)

Pragmatics Reading Group, February 27, 2008. Presentation: Dan Zeman
Lauri Karttunen, "Presupposition and Linguistic Context" (*Theoretical Linguistics*, 1, 1974)

I The earlier view
- no adequate purely semantic notion of pp (truth-conditions), but a pragmatic notion (not one of the *speaker*'s pps, though)

> **(1)** Surface sentence A pragmatically presupposes a logical form L, if and only if it is the case that A can be felicitously uttered only in contexts which entail L.

The "projection problem" for presuppositions: what can we say about pps of complex sentences formed by means of embedding and sentential connectives?
Solution: **(2)** $P_{if\ A\ then\ B} \subseteq P_A \cup P_B$. Counterexample: "If Haldeman is guilty, Nixon is guilty too."
The right solution:

> **(4)** (a) $P_{if\ A\ then\ B/X} = P_{A/X} \cup (P_{B/X \cup A} - (E_{X \cup A} - E_X))$, where E_X is the set of logical forms entailed by X, and X ∪ A is the result of adding the logical form of A to X.
> (b) The presuppositions of "If A then B" (with respect to context X) consist of
> (i) all of the presuppositions of A (with respect to X) and
> (ii) all of the presuppositions of B (with respect to X ∪ A) except for those entailed by the set X ∪ A and not entailed by X alone.

II The later view
The central notion: *satisfaction of presuppositions*

> **(5)** Context X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of A just in case X entails all of the basic presuppositions of A (that is, $P_A \subseteq E_X$). [A is a simple, non-compound sentence.]

The basic pps of A can be determined from the lexical items in the sentence and from its form and derivational history.
For complex sentences, satisfaction is defined recursively by associating each part of the sentence with a different context (without computing their pps explicitly):

- <u>Complex sentences formed with sentential connectives:</u>

> **(7)** Context X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of "If A then B" just in case (i) X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of A and (ii) X ∪ A satisfies-the-presuppositions-of B.

The two ways can be shown to be equivalent. However, the new way is superior when it comes to more complicated sentences. Example:

> **(16)** Context X satisfies-the-presupposition-of "If (A and B) then (C and D)" just in case
> (i) X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of A, (ii) X ∪ A satisfies-the-presuppositions-of B,
> (iii) X ∪ A & B satisfies-the-presuppositions-of C, and (iv) X ∪ A & B ∪ ¬C satisfies-the-presuppositions-of D.

- <u>Complex sentences with sentential subjects or objects:</u>

Three kinds of verbs: type I - verbs of saying (*say, ask, tell, announce*), including external negation; type II - verbs of propositional attitude (*believe, fear, think, want*); type III - factives, semi-factives, modals, one- and two-way implicatives, aspectual verbs, internal negation.
Type I: "transparent" with respect to the pps of their complements
Type II and III: "opaque"

> **(19)** If v is of type III, context X satisfies-the-presupposition-of "v(…A…)" only if X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of A.
> **(21)** If v is of type II, context X satisfies-the-presupposition-of "v(a, A)" only if $B_a(X)$ satisfies-the-presuppositions-of A. [$B_a(X)$ is the set of beliefs attributed to a in X.]
> For type I verbs, it is not necessarily required that the pps of the complement are satisfied.

III Context
-in ordinary conversation, the pps of the next sentence uttered are not always satisfied by the current context. Nevertheless, in such cases the utterance is not infelicitous:

> **(26)** (a) We *regret* that children cannot accompany their parents to commencement exercises.

-we can still hold that a sentence is an increment to a context that satisfies its pps. If the current conversational context does not suffice, the listener is entitled to make the same tacit extensions as the speaker appears to have made.

Semantics

Schedule
Starting date October 18 at 14.00
Meeting times To be decided at the first meeting.
Meeting place We will alternate between Univ. Pompeu Fabra-Rambles, and Facultat de Filosofia, UB

Sessions
18/October/2007
Asher, N (2004) "Discourse Topic", (Theoretical Linguistics, 30)
30/October/2007,
Bott, Stefan (2007) "Givenness as anaphora resolution", ms.
15/November/2007
McNally, Louise (1998) "On Recent Formal Analyses of Topic" , J. Ginzburg, Z. Khasidashvili, C. Vogel, J.J. Lévy, and E. Vallduví (eds.), The Tbilisi Symposium on Language, Logic, and Computation: Selected Papers, CSLI Publications, Stanford, CA, 147-160.
Vallduví, E. and Elisabeth Engdahl (1996). The Linguistic Realization of Information Packaging. , Linguistics 34, 459–51.
29/November/2007
Sainsbury, M. (2005) "Pronouns: anaphora and demostration", Chapter 4 of Reference Without Referents (OUP 2005) (pp. 125-153).
13/December/2007
Glanzberg, Michael (2007) "Context, Content, and Relativism" (forthcoming in Philosophical Studies).
17/January/2008
Wilson, Deirdre & Dan Sperber, (2002) "Relevance Theory" [in L. Horn and G. Ward (eds.) Handbook of Pragmatics, (Oxford: Blackwell)]

Inquiries
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Proposed Readings
There is no list of readings. At each session we will decide what reading we will discuss at the following meeting.