

**A Basic Handbook of Lullian Logic and Its Introduction.
Edition and Study of Two Unknown Logical Texts of the
Medieval Lullian Tradition: The *Nove et Compendiose
Introductiones Logice* and the *Loyca Discipuli Magistri
Raymondi Lulli.***

Dissertation by

Eleonora Buonocore

Phd Candidate

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements.....	p. 5
Foreword.....	p. 10
Introduction. Ramon Lull, man and philosopher.....	p. 16
Chapter one: The peculiarities of Lullian Logic, in the context of the evolution of Lullism in its first period (1316-1417).....	p. 35
A. The <i>status quaestionis</i> on the studies on Ramon Lull and Lullism.....	p. 36
B. The peculiarities of Lullian logic.....	p. 46
i) The originality of the Lullian theory of demonstration: the <i>demonstratio per aequiparantiam</i>	p. 57
ii) The Lullian doctrine of the correlatives.....	p. 60
iii) The evolution of the concept of <i>medium</i> : the importance of finding the middle term.....	p. 64
Chapter two: The Threads of Lullism.....	p. 67
A. Lull's Will: The Beginning of a Complex Tradition.....	p. 67
B. Early Lullism in France: Le Myésier and the Threads inside the <i>Electorium</i> .	
C. Early Lullian Schools in Catalonia Aragon: A Knot of Threads.....	p. 69
i) The tradition of confessional treatises as the 'Missing Link' at the very beginning of Lullian Schools.....	p. 73
ii) Issues of Marian Theology, An Additional Thread in the Lullian Tradition.....	p. 75
D. The Tradition of Lullism in the Later Middle Ages and the Early Renaissance: the entangling of the Threads.....	p. 78
i) Lullism in Paris after Le Myésier: from the Aversion to Lullism of Jean Gerson to the revival of Lullian studies in the Intellectual Circle of Lefèvre.....	p. 78
a. Jean Gerson's aversion to Lullism: a witness to the persistence of Lullian studies in Paris?.....	p. 83
ii) The Schools of Southern France as the Meeting Point of a Converging Tradition.....	p. 85
a. The University of Toulouse.....	p. 85
b. The Franciscan School of Lyon.....	p. 87
iii) Lullism in Italy in the Fifteenth century: the weaving of a network between Catalan, French and Italian Intellectual environments p 88	
a. The exodus: Catalan <i>magistri</i> teaching Lullism in Italian settings.....	p. 88
b. Pere Dagui.....	p. 91
c. Jaume Janer.....	p. 94
d. The closing of the circle: Italian Lullists in Majorca, Barcelona and Valencia.....	p. 95
E. The thread of Hermitism inside the Lullian Schools: Lull as the ' <i>pius eremita</i> '.....	p. 98

F. An obscure and understudied Thread inside the Lullian Schools: Two Pseudo Lullian Logical treatises as the only surviving witnesses of a Genoese Lullian Tradition.....	p. 100
Chapter three. The pseudo Lullian Logical treatises as one of the threads of Medieval Lullism.....	p. 103
A. The Manuscripts and Textual Tradition of the <i>Loyca Discipuli</i> and the <i>Nove Introductiones</i>	p. 103
i) A new beginning.....	p. 108
ii) The <i>Loyca discipuli magistri Raymondi Lulli</i>	p. 109
iii) The <i>Nove et compendiose introductiones logicae</i>	p. 116
iv) The <i>Logica parva</i>	p. 118
v) The <i>Logica brevis et nova</i>	p. 128
B. Textual Correlations Between the <i>Logica Parva</i> , the <i>Logica Brevis et Nova</i> and the <i>Nove Introductiones</i> : The Presence of an Ur-text for Late Medieval and Renaissance Lullian Logic.....	p. 136
Chapter four. From the <i>Nove Introductiones</i> to the <i>Loyca Discipuli</i> : analysis of the transformations of a Lullian handbook for Logic.....	p. 151
I. The <i>Nove Introductiones</i> between Lullian and Scholastic Logic.	p. 152
A. The beginning of the text: Incipit, Invocation to God and definition of the Object and Principles of Logic.....	p.152
i) The term.....	p. 159
ii) The proposition.....	p. 161
iii) The predicables.....	p. 168
B. Elements of theory of demonstration in the <i>Nove Introductiones</i> .p.	172
i) Correct forms of reasoning: The Syllogism and its figures.....	p. 175
ii) Incorrect form of reasoning: Paralogism and Fallacies.....	p.180
C. The closure of the text : methods of arguing and explicit.....	p. 182
Chapter five. The <i>Loyca discipuli magistri Raymondi Lulli</i> : An Ockhamistic Introduction to the <i>Nove Introductiones</i>	p. 189
A. Textual history and title of the <i>Loyca Discipuli</i> : a copyist error?.....	p. 189
B. The structure of the <i>Loyca Discipuli</i>	p. 192
i. The qualities of the term.....	p. 196
ii. The predicables.....	p. 205
iii. An episode of Italian Lullism: the marginal note in ms. Terni, Biblioteca Comunale, 61.....	p. 212
Conclusion.....	p. 215
Appendix 1. Transcription of Ms. Firenze Riccardiana 1001, collated with ms Munich, BSB, lat. 10542: <i>Nove et compendiose Introductiones logice</i>	p. 223
CRITERIA OF THE EDITION.....	p. 223
TEXT.....	p. 225

Appendix 2. Transcription of the text of the <i>Loyca discipuli magistri Raymondi Lulli</i> . From the only extant manuscript: Ms. Firenze, Riccardiana 1001	p. 318
CRITERIA OF THE EDITION.....	p. 318
TEXT	p. 320
Appendix 3. The Structure of the Three Pseudo Lullian Handbooks for Logic: A Comparison.....	p. 353
Appendix Four. A Textual Comparison.....	p. 360
Appendix Five. Iconographical Apparatus.....	p. 390
Bibliography.....	p. 396
A. Manuscript Sources.....	p. 396
B. Primary Sources.....	p. 397
1. Early Printed Editions.....	p. 397
2. Modern and Contemporary Editions and Reprints.....	p. 399
C. Secondary Sources: Critical Studies.....	p. 404
D- On-line Resources and Databases.....	p. 414

Aknowledgments

The completion of a doctoral dissertation is a lengthy and complex enterprise, one that is not possible to bring to an end without the help of many different people. In the course of my doctoral studies I have been blessed by the friendship and support of important scholars from all over the world, but none has been more influential in shaping my intellectual development, personal growth, and the progress of this very dissertation, than Prof. Michela Pereira. I owe Prof. Pereira my whole academic formation, from the first class I attended as an undergraduate at the University of Siena in 1998 to the last revisions and corrections to the present dissertation and to the critical edition of the two texts offered in the Appendices. I will never be able to thank Prof. Pereira enough for her support, her guidance, her encouragement during hard times, as well as for her constant help in shaping my ideas, in sharpening and fine tuning my vision of Ramon Lull's thought, of Lullism and of medieval philosophy in general. Without her mentoring this project would not have been started, let alone completed.

At the University of Arezzo, I need to thank Prof. Ferdinando Abbri, the coordinator of the PhD program in Philosophical Sciences for his patience and support of my non-conventional doctoral experience, and for always believing that I would successfully complete the present dissertation.

Moreover, I had the honor of benefiting from the help, support, experience, and advice of Prof. Anthony Bonner. His unrivalled hospitality in Majorca, his availability in reading and commenting my work, his encouragements and his advice have played a key role during the course of my doctoral work. It is also thanks to him that I had the

possibility to consult many manuscripts in various libraries in Majorca. Once again I thank him and all the staff of the Ramon Lull Database project for the constant help and punctual remarks that have helped me in avoiding some errors in the transcription of various texts. I am, nevertheless, responsible for all remaining errors.

During my doctoral studies I have received the financial and institutional support of many prestigious institutions that I now have the honor and pleasure to thank.

I was allowed to work at the Società Internazionale per lo Studio del Medioevo Latino (SISMEL) inside the Fondazione Franceschini at the Certosa del Galluzzo, Florence. I would like to thank all the staff working there, from the director, Prof. Claudio Leonardi and the co-director of the *Medioevo Latino* (MEL) project, Dr. Lucia Pinelli, to Prof. Francesco Santi, whose help at the beginning of my research proved to be invaluable, to every single member of the staff who has helped me in a crucial time in my academic development. Among the scholars working at the Certosa, I would like to thank particularly Dr. Gabriella Pomaro, who has kindly shared with me the results of her current research, and who has constantly put her great philological and codicological competence at my disposal.

Other scholars to whom I am indebted for sharing their (at the time) still unpublished work with me are Dr. Alexander Fidora and Dr. Marta Romano, I would like to thank their academic generosity and willingness to share their research in progress. Already during my undergraduate years, I had started to collaborate with the Raimundus Lullus Institut of the Albert-Ludwigs Universität in Freiburg im Breisgau. My deepest thanks to the director Prof. Peter Walter, to Prof. Fernando Dominguez- Reboiras, Prof.

Charles H. Lohr, to the secretary Uta Feger and especially to Dr. Viola Tenge-Wolf, who has helped me greatly by providing an online version of several pseudo-Lullian manuscripts with incredible celerity.

My doctoral research was also rendered possible by the support and financing of two American Institutions: the Medieval Institute and the Erasmus Institute at the University of Notre Dame, IN. The Medieval Institute has provided me with a place to do research, an academic community always ready to engage in constructive criticism alongside with access to a wonderful library and library facilities. I would like to thank everyone in the Institute: the former director, Prof. Thomas Noble, the current director, Prof. Olivia Constable, and all the staff of the Institute, Roberta Baranowski, Linda Major, Marina Smyth, Derek Webb, Margaret Cinninger, and Professors Kent Emory, Stephen Gersh, and Stephen Dumont.

In the spring of 2005 I was awarded a Dissertation Fellowship in the Erasmus Institute at Notre Dame. It was an experience that will mark the rest of my academic career. Being an Erasmus fellow allowed me to meet and be in close intellectual and personal contact with an incredibly sparkling academic environment, and was instrumental for the successful completion of the first two chapters of the current dissertation. I would like to thank all my colleagues there, and in particular the director of the Erasmus Institute, Prof. Robert Sullivan, and all the staff working there, in particular Diane Philips.

At the University of Notre Dame I would also like to thank the Department of Romance Languages, and in particular Prof. Theodore Cachey, Christian Moevs and John

Welle, for their constant encouragement. In addition, I would like to thank Prof. Zygmunt Baranski and Prof. Martin Bloomer for having gifted me with their wisdom and friendship.

Finally, this project could not have been completed without the constant help and support of my two families and of my friends, spread between two continents. I would like to thank my American family: John and Judy Kriesel, Tony Kriesel and all the Kriesel family for welcoming and supporting me. My friends at Notre Dame: Charles and Brynn Leavitt, Philip and Katie Balma, Giulia Cardillo, and Krysta Dennis. My friends and colleagues in Siena: Serena Capodagli, Nicola Delli, Margherita Di Stasio, Massimiliano Falchi, Clelia Gozzini, Stefano Reksten, Giulia Vivi.

This dissertation would never have been completed without the constant support of my family: my father Giuseppe, my mother Maria Angela, my sister Federica, nonno Vittorio, zia Vinicia Passalacqua, and Novilia Veltroni, thanks so much to all of them for putting up with me through all my dissertation work.

And, in the end, I would like to spend a special word to thank the person that has been closer to me in these years, the person that has showed me that I could do it, with his love, support, faith in me and our constant academic conversations and his never ending language revisions: my beloved James Kriesel.

This dissertation is dedicated to the loving memory of two very different people whose influence has made it possible for me to be who I am: Zio Santi Passalacqua, who has showed me that everything is possible, and Prof. Roberto Gagliardi, who has gifted me with a deep love for everything medieval and for a research that does not content itself with the surface of things.

Eleonora Buonocore
November, 7th 2008
Notre Dame, IN.

I would like to add a special thank you to Prof. Loris Sturlese who read the present dissertation before the official defense, which took place on May 22nd 2009 in Arezzo, and who helped me review the editions of the texts offered in the Appendixes.

Eleonora Buonocore
March 14th 2011,
New Haven , CT

Foreword

The development of Lullism between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, namely of that cluster of doctrines professed by the followers of the great Catalan philosopher Ramon Lull, represents one of the more fascinating topics facing modern philosophical historiography, as it opens up a window onto a huge network of intellectual relationships that included the whole of Europe, from Catalonia to France, from Germany to Italy in a broad period of time, ranging from the death of Lull himself (1316) to the entire Renaissance and up until the time of Leibniz. Through the combined study of many figures of so called “minor” intellectuals, school teachers, and of some major philosophers (such as Ramon de Sibiude, Nicolas of Kues, Giordano Bruno) it is possible to reconstruct not only how the Lullian doctrines changed but also how in these very changes we can find one of the threads that leads us to understand the developments of western thought, towards a new awareness of the meaning of the individual and towards a more complete understanding of the limits of human reason.¹

My study does not pretend to explore the entire history of Lullism (this task could be, in fact, the job of a whole lifetime), rather I prefer to dwell upon an aspect of this question that in many ways has still to be brought to the attention of scholars, in contrast with other areas, such as the early Lullism in France, analyzed in details by N.J. Hillgarth, the pseudo-Lullism linked to Alchemy, broadly studied by Michela Pereira, Lullism as a mnemotechnic device and the hermetic Lullism, the subject of the works of

¹ Santi Francesco (2004) “El Lullisme a Itàlia” in Batllori M. (2004) *Il lullismo in Italia. Tentativo di sintesi*, ed. and intr. by Francesco Santi and Michela Pereira; trad. Francisco José Díaz Marcilla, Pontificio Ateneo Antonianum, Roma, p. 33.

F. A. Yates and P. Rossi, or Lullism as a Mariological tradition, more recently studied by F. Santi e J. Perarnau².

Moreover, this study does not provide a codicological and paleographical reconstruction of the manuscripts of Lullian logic or of the first printed edition of them: the work of Rogent and Duran on the early printed editions and the never-ending researches of Perarnau on the manuscripts of the Bayerische Stadtsbibliothek of Munich alongside with the recent researches of G. Pomaro in fact offer a sufficiently good recognition of the corpus of manuscripts available for study³.

Inevitably, my work is influenced by the past scholarship on the subject, which sheds a different light on the history of Lullism between XIV and XVI century, but the main aim of my work is not so much to reconstruct the manuscript tradition of Lullian logic as it is to clarify the role of logic, and in particular of two inedited texts of pseudo-Lullian logic, the *Loyca discipuli magistri Raymundi Lulli* and the *Nove Introductiones* (a first edition of both works is offered in the appendix), inside the context of the complex Lullian tradition and in particular inside the first century of Italian Lullism. I will then go on to analyze how the text of the *Nove Introductiones*, probably written around 1330, later influenced the field of Lullian logic, as it is shown by its correlations to two other

²Rossi Paolo (1960) *Clavis Universalis*; Yates Frances (1972) *L'Arte della Memoria*; Pereira Michela (1989) *The Alchemical Corpus Attributed to Raymond Lull*, London, The Warburg Institute (University of London); Pereira Michela (1984), Bernardo di Lavineta e la diffusione del Lullismo a Parigi, *Interpres V*; Santi Francesco (1986), "Osservazioni sul manoscritto 1001 della Riccardiana di Firenze" *ATCA 5*; Perarnau Josep M (1983), "Consideracions Diacroniques" *ATCA 3*.

³Rogent Elies and Duràn Estanislau (1989), *Bibliografia de les impressions lul·lianes* vol. I, Palma de Mallorca, Miquel Font, [reprint from the 1927 edition]; Perarnau i Espelt Josep (1983), "Consideracions diacronique entorn del manuscrits lul lians medieval de la Bayerische Staatsbibliothek" *ATCA 2*, 1983, pp. 123-169; Perarnau i Espelt Josep (1986), *Els manuscrits lul·lians medievals de la «Bayerische Staatsbibliothek» de Munic. II. Volums de textos llatins* Facultat de Teologia de Catalunya, Barcelona; Pomaro, Gabriella (2005), "«Licet ipse fuerit, qui fecit omnia»: il Cusano e gli autografi lulliani", *Raimondo Lull und Nikolaus von Kues: eine Begegnung im Zeichen der Toleranz. Raimondo Lullo et Niccolò Cusano: un incontro nel segno della tolleranza*, ed. Ermenegildo Bidese, Alexander Fidora i Paul Renner, Brepols, Turnhout.

pseudo-Lullian logical texts, the *Logica Parva* and the *Logica Brevis et Nova*, which became famous as it was included in the great work of synthesis of the Franciscan friar Bernard of Lavinheta, the *Explanatio compendiosaque applicatio Artis Raymundi Lulli*. The initial idea for this work came to my mind reading Anthony Bonner's introduction to the anastatic edition of the original edition of Lullian and pseudo Lullian works edited by Lazarus Zetzner in 1651, which drove my attention towards a deeper understanding of pseudo Lullian logic and Lullism in the Renaissance.

Moreover F. Santi's 1986 article, the first concerning the manuscript Riccardiana 1001 and the pseudo Lullian text known as *Loyca discipuli magistri Raymundi Lulli*, together with the essay by A. D'Ors published in 1996 on the *Logica Parva* have shifted my attention towards Lullian logic in the early XV century, while Bonner's review of D'Ors' essay, published in *Studia Lulliana* 1998 was a huge help in focusing my studies on the detailed textual analysis of the texts of the *Loyca discipuli* and the *Nove Introductiones* and in their comparison to the tradition of logical texts in Renaissance Lullism. The *Nove Introductiones*, as will be shown in the following pages, has strong textual ties both with the pseudo Lullian *Logica Parva*, subject of D'Ors' study, and with the *Logica Brevis et Nova*, which was then to become a part of the huge Lullian synthesis and encyclopedia of knowledge found in Bernard of Lavinheta's *Explanatio compendiosaque applicatio artis Raymundi Lulli* of 1523. In some sense my whole work in this dissertation can be seen as a direct answer to Bonner's request for a more detailed study on this subject and on these texts.

Thus, this thesis begins with an introductory section (Introduction and chapters One and Two), in which I try to offer the reader the basis from which I am starting my

analysis of Lullian logic between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. In the Introduction I provide a short narrative concerning Ramon Lull's life and importance in his own time. The purpose of the first chapter is twofold: on the one hand I sketch a brief history of the studies on Ramon Lull and Lullism, on the other hand I provide an analysis of the peculiarities of Lullian logic that make this topic worthy of a further study. The second chapter contains a summary of the history of the Lullist movement in its first century of development and an analysis of the interaction between the various Lullian schools between the late middle ages and the early Renaissance, including all the major figures that influenced the Lullian tradition.

The third chapter, instead, starts to present the original results of my research, starting with the *status quaestionis* on pseudo Lullian logical texts and then presenting the various manuscripts and editions that I have consulted; in its second part I analyze the textual correlations between the three major texts of pseudo-Lullian logic, the *Nove Introductiones*, the *Logica Parva* and the *Logica Brevis et Nova*, all written in the period between 1330 and 1523 (the related materials are offered in Appendix Three and Four). From the text comparison I conclude that the *Logica Parva* and the *Logica Brevis et Nova* are autonomous excerpts taken from the text of the *Nove Introductiones*. Therefore the *Nove Introductiones* assumes an outstanding role, almost as an Urtext, a base from which, throughout the whole later Middle Ages and early Renaissance, the Lullian masters could depart to create their own handbook for logic.

The fourth chapter, consequently, deals extensively with the text of the *Nove Introductiones* (edited in Appendix One), tracing the Lullian and non Lullian influences

present in it, trying to place this text in the context of school handbooks for logic and inside the European Lullian tradition in general and Italian in particular.

The fifth chapter analyzes the other text (edited in Appendix Two), called *Loyca discipuli* after the title appended to the compilation of ms. Riccardiana 1001, where the *Nove Introductiones* are added to it, creating a unitary text. The clear Ockhamistic influences present in the *Loyca discipuli* are analyzed and an attempt is made to understand how those influences could coexist and be harmonized with Lullian doctrines of clear realist import, apparently in direct opposition with the Ockhamists' beliefs. To such an end it will be necessary to investigate how, inside the *studia* of the Franciscan order in the period between the last decades of XIV and the firsts of XV century, we often find, mainly for teaching's sake, a peculiar unification of three very different Franciscan philosophical traditions such as Ockhamism, Scotism and Lullism. The compilation in ms. Riccardiana 1001 is thus placed in the context of the Italian Lullism of the early XV century, helping to reconstruct the intellectual climate of the convent where it was produced, with its blend of different philosophical trends, and giving an independent witness to the Urtext role of the *Nove Introductiones*.

The conclusions offer a brief overview of the results of my research, stressing the importance of the *Nove Introductiones*. Such a text is striking both for its didactical character, a basic handbook for logic, clearly intended for use in a school context, and for its function as the point of departure for further elaboration of similar handbook for logic in the Lullian school. In fact, already in the fifteenth century we find this text circulating in three different forms: by itself under the title of *Nove Introductiones* (as it is shown in ms. Munich, BSB, lat. 10542); together with an Introduction based on the principles of

Ockham's logic, under the title *Loyca Discipuli* (as it appears in ms. Riccardiana 1001), and in a slightly shortened and modified excerpt called *Logica Parva* (as it is shown by the ms. Salamanca, BU 2465).

Let's start now with a brief recapitulation of Ramon Lull's biography and with an analysis of how his figure and the Lullian school have been considered in the major works of philosophical historiography and in the history of logic, starting from the twenties of last century until today.

Introduction:

Ramon Lull, man and philosopher.

Ramon Lull is one of the most fascinating personalities of his time. His strong character, his eclectic intellect and interests, the huge variety and quantity of his works have left a clear mark in the western philosophical tradition. This influence is more recognizable throughout the later Middle Ages and Renaissance than among his own contemporaries, who often rejected his ideas and labeled him as weird figure, an outcast, in his own words a *phantasticus*.

Nevertheless, the man and the philosopher Lull was a product of his times. He was born in Majorca, the main island of the Balearic archipelagos, in 1232⁴, a few years after the Reconquest of that land by James I, king of Aragon, which took place in 1230. Lull's father, also called Ramon, was probably one of the knights who followed the king during the military campaign and that then established his family in the island; his wife Isabel followed him and his son was born in Majorca. Lull's family most likely belonging to the small nobility and very well linked to the crown, as proved by young Ramon's rapid career inside the court of James I. He was the preceptor of the king's son (the future James II of Majorca) and he became Seneschal before the age of 30⁵ as it is stated in the first lines of his own autobiography, the *Vita coetanea*, written inside Lull's own circle of

⁴ For Lull's biography, I am following the dates given by Bonner (1985) in *Selected Works of Ramon Lull*.

⁵ For the date of Lull's appointment as seneschal see Hillgarth (1971), *Ramon Lull and Lullism*, p. 3 note 10.

trusted disciples around 1311 and meant to circulate among the ecclesiastics and intellectuals during the council of Vienne.

*Raimundus senescallus mensae regis Maioricarum, dum iuuenis*⁶...

After the Reconquest, the kingdom of Majorca was added to the possessions of the house of Aragon, fitting in the larger project of expansion of the Catalan monarchy. At the time the Kingdom of Aragon was linked to the County of Barcelona through a dynastic alliance, thus forming a wealthy and strong domain, whose main strength laid in its aggressive and energetic merchant class. The need to increase the territory of the reign towards the Mediterranean sea was in fact, mainly economical: the main intent of this process was to open the so called “island’s path”, namely to establish a series of strongholds which could in turn ensure a safe commercial route towards the rich Middle East for the Catalan merchants⁷. In this light we can interpret the conquest of the Balearic Islands to the South (1229-35) and of the western coast towards Valencia (1238-45).

Such an increase in territory and population had very important repercussion on the composition of the already varied populace of the reign of Aragon: the Islamic component reached almost a third of the total, and even the Jewish minority was well represented and economically well endowed. It was probably this blend of religions and cultures that facilitated the emerging of a very original and stimulating intellectual climate. As a reflection of this social, economical and political situation, the Catalan

⁶ *Vita Coaetanea*, ROL 8, p. 272.

⁷ Piccinni G. (1999), *I mille anni del Medioevo*, Bruno Mondadori, Milano, p. 339.

language became a sort of common tongue for all Southern Europe, not only used for trade purposes but also proposing itself as an alternative language for courtly love and culture as a whole.

Lull's first attempts at writing probably happened in the Catalan vernacular, inside the court of Majorca: in the opening lines of the *Vita coetanea*, the young Ramon is described in the act of writing poems of mundane love in Catalan.

*dum iuuenis adhuc in uanis cantilenis seu carminibus componendis et aliis lasciuuis saeculi deditus esset nimis...*⁸

It is at this point that the unknown author of the *Vita coetanea*, probably someone very close to Lull, following a common trope in hagiography, introduces the first divine intervention in Lull's life. Around the year 1263, when Ramon was in his early thirties, Jesus on the cross appears to him one night, provoking a strong emotional turmoil which will result in a complete turn in the life of Lull, his Conversion. Ramon was at the time married with Blanca Picany, a rich noble woman and had two children: Domenic and Magdalen. We know from archival documents that the marriage must have taken place some time before September 1257, as we have a notary act dated September 24th 1257, where Blanca put Ramon in charge of her material possession on Catalan ground⁹. When he received the call though, he left all his old secular life behind and enthusiastically turned himself to the world of spirituality and to the battle to spread Christianity among

⁸ *Vita Coaetanea*, ROL 8, p. 272.

⁹ For the official documents concerning Ramon Lull's life see Hillgarth NJ (2001), *Diplomatari lul·lià: documents relatius a Ramon Llull i a la seva família*, trad. L. Cifuentes, Edicions de la Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona.

the infidels. This led the young Ramon to the study of philosophy and theology and to understand how fundamental was to have a good education for any aspirant missionary or preacher: Lull will uphold this principle for the rest of his life, contributing in many ways to the institution of colleges for the instruction of preachers and missionaries, with a particular eye to the learning of languages¹⁰.

After the Conversion, we find Lull praying and studying, going on pilgrimages to Compostella and Rocamadour, in search for the right way of devoting his life to the service of God. The turning point in this part of his life seems to be the encounter with Ramon De Penyafort, a former General of the Dominican Order, which probably took place in 1265 in Barcelona during the first stages of a planned trip to Paris, whose main aim must have been to learn the basis of Scholastic philosophy and theology, from the best teachers of his times.

In these years, Penyafort was still a very influential figure both in the Aragonese court and in the Dominican order: his main interest consisted in finding ways of converting all sorts of Infidels, being them Moors, Jews or Heretics. His personal experience in predication had taught Penyafort that the traditional way of disputing with infidels was clearly not sufficient: when faced with the Islamic thought simply referring to a better interpretation to the Sacred Scriptures was not enough. It was necessary to find a superior common authority, which both contenders could accept, namely God's primary gift to mankind, reason.

¹⁰ The most important example of such a drive towards instituting language schools is the foundation of the monastery of Miramar in Majorca in 1274. Another sign that this interest will always be fundamental for Lull is the fact that at council of Vienne (1311-1312), he proposed the foundations of colleges to teach languages to future preachers.

According to Penyafort the good Christian apologetic preacher should be able to demonstrate how Christianity was more in accord to reason than Islam, Judaism or any heresy. It was due to the constant work and charismatic appeal of Penyafort that the Dominican order became so heavily involved in predication and conversion to be known as the Preachers Order par excellence. And it was due his encouragements and open suggestions that some of the most influential apologetic books of the time were conceived: in fact in these same years Penyafort advised Thomas Aquinas to write the *Summa contra Gentiles* (1270-72) and Ramon Marti to write *Pugio Fidei* (1278). Penyafort's influence is evident in all the early stages of Lull's intellectual career, and especially in his somehow troublesome relationship with the mendicant orders.

During their meeting in Barcelona, Penyafort consolidated and formally approved Lull's intention to devote his apologetic efforts towards the conversion of the Moors, and suggested him to reconsider his project of studying in Paris and to return to Majorca, where he could undertake the study of Arabic as a language, of Arabic thought, as well as get a basic education in Christian philosophy and theology, inside the Dominican Studium of Majorca. As it is summarized in the *Vita coetanea*:

*Sed ab hoc itinere parentes et amici sui, et maxime frater Raimundus de ordine Praedicatorum, qui quondam domini Gregorii noni compilauerat Decretales, suis persuasionibus et consiliis diuerterunt, et eum ad ciuitatem suam, Maioricarum scilicet, redire fecerunt.*¹¹

¹¹ *Vita Coetanea*, ROL 8, page 278. The brother *Raimundus* of the Dominicans described here as the author of a *Commentary on the Decretales* is without doubt Ramon de Penyafort.

Hence, Ramon came back to Majorca, bought himself an Islamic slave and started an intense period of study, which lasted nine years (1265-74), during which he learned Arabic language and culture, as well as the fundamental texts of the Christian tradition. It has been argued in Lullian scholarship that the place in which he actually studied in Majorca was the Cistercians monastery of La Real, even if it seems that the range of text quoted in Lull's early work exceed the manuscripts present at La Real, thus suggesting a broader range of sources for Lull's formation, including the Dominican *Studium* of Majorca and possibly a period in Montpellier, both inside the Cistercian monastery there and at the university¹².

In 1270 Lull wrote his first book, the *Compendium Logicae Al Gazehelis*, probably in Arabic, which he then translated into Catalan and Latin. As the title says, this is a commentary on Al Ghazalis' text *Magasid Al-Falasifah (Objectives of Philosophers)*, which shows not only that by this time Ramon had achieved a good knowledge of the Arabic language and philosophic culture, but also an interest towards logic, even at this early stage of his career.

The year 1274 will be a key one in Lull's intellectual development. Three important books are dated to this year: the *Liber gentilis*, a surprisingly open-minded comparison between the three main monotheistic religions; the *Liber contemplationis*, a long text,

¹² Hillgarth N. J. (1963), «La biblioteca de La Real: Fuentes posibles de Lull», *Estudios lullianos* 7, p. 12-15. Bonner A. (1985), *Selected Works*, p. 19 n. 71.

The question posed by Lull's sources is a puzzle of difficult solution, which deserves a much broad treatment than the one possible in this introductory and narrative chapter. For more information on this topic see Chapter II of my 'tesi di laurea' and the related bibliography, in Buonocore E., *Ars et logica et metaphysica. Lo sviluppo della logica Lulliana da ars inventiva a venatio medii* (Tesi di laurea, Università degli Studi di Siena, 2001).

which combines an interest towards religious disputes and preaching, a section on prayer and contemplation with a treaty on rhetoric and a theory of predestination. It is also in this work that we find some of the metaphysical roots of what will become the Lullian Art, and especially the first use of the *dignitates*, intended as divine attributes.

Before Lull wrote the third book of this year, divine intervention steered his life again. It is the famous illumination, which took place on Mount Randa, and which earned Ramon the title of *Doctor Illuminatus*. As the *Vita coetanea* tells us:

*Post haec Raimundus ascendit in montem quondam... .accidit quadam die, dum ipse staret ibi caelos attente respiciens quod subito Domino illustravit mentem suam, dans eidem formam et modum faciendi librum, de quo supra dicitur, contra errores infidelium*¹³

The book that the *Vita* refers to is the *Ars Compendiosa Inveniendi Veritatem*, also written 1274, a work that in Lull's intention had to fulfill the original command he received from God at the moment of his own conversion and be instrumental in the conversion of all the infidels.

*...intrauit cor eius vehemens ac implens quoddam dictamen mentis, quod ipse factururus esset postea unum librum, meliorem de mundo, contra errores infidelium.*¹⁴

¹³ *Vita Coaetanea*, ROL 8, p. 280.

¹⁴ *Vita Coaetanea*, ROL 8, p. 275.

Therefore, the *Ars compendiosa* presents itself as the best book of the world, containing a powerful, revealed doctrine which had the power to lead the human soul to see truth and thus to convert to Christianity. What does this powerful doctrine consist of? What was revealed to Lull during his contemplation on Mount Randa? The most straightforward answer to this question is the *ars combinatoria*, which from now on, in many different forms, will underlie almost all of the vast Lullian production (a production that includes over 300 works).

As we have seen, Lull claims to have received the Art directly from God, in a moment of spiritual and intellectual illumination, although it would be interesting to see how this self-confidence and certainty in the value of his methods actually increased during the course of Ramon's life. As it has been shown¹⁵, the reference to the illumination as such starts to appear only around 1294, in a work dedicated to Celestin V¹⁶ and seems to become more frequent every time Lull needed to endow his method with more authority, especially when he had to deal with the papal court. The *Vita coetanea* itself is a perfect example of that, elaborated right before the Council of Vienne in 1311 and diffused among the curial circles, with the intention of supporting Lull's petitions to the Council.

In the earlier period Lull often complains about the scarce authority given to his work; it is in this light that we can understand how divine revelation becomes the perfect way for Lull to give *auctoritas* to his position. It is not our place to investigate if he truly had a mystical experience; rather, what is clear from the text of the *Ars compendiosa*, is that

¹⁵ Cfr. Badia L. (1995) "Ramon Llull: autor i personatge" in *Aristotelica et Lulliana*, Instrumenta Patristica XXVI, Nijhoff; and Ruiz Simon JM (1999), *L'art de Ramon Llull i la teoria escolàstica de la ciència*, Assaig, Quaderns Crema, Barcellona.

¹⁶ *Petitio Raymundi Pro Conversione Infidelium ad Coelestinum V Papam*, MOG II.

at this point Lull was able to clarify the ideas already present in his previous works and elaborate a synthesis of Christian and Arabic thought, which resulted in his method of finding truth, his *ars inveniendi veritatem*.

At this first stage, Lull's art is centered on the doctrine of the *dignitates*. We have already found the *dignitates* in the *Liber contemplationis*, but what is exactly a *dignitas*?

The origin of the *dignitas* can probably be traced to the tradition of the meditation on God's names, which was widely spread around the Mediterranean culture, and had a place inside each of the three monotheistic religions (for example, the Arabic 100 names of God, the Jewish sephirot etc). In the early stages of Lull's Art, the *dignitates* become the absolute principles of his system, they are God's attributes, in which all creation is reflected, and as such they are cognitive principles, capable through their intrinsic resemblance of leading man to a true understanding of reality. The *dignitates* are imbedded in the very structure of the universe, because they were instrumental to its divine creation. Each *dignitas* has placed its resemblance in the world, so that, for example, the goodness (*bonitas*) of the creature mirrors the goodness of God, the greatness (*magnitudo*) of the creature mirrors God's greatness, and so on (for each *dignitas*). Therefore, the *dignitates* become a privileged way to access truth, as they investigate the truth in the creatures in direct correlation to the truth in God.

With the *Ars compendiosa* begins the first period of the Lullian Art, also known as Quaternary phase¹⁷. In this early stage the number of *dignitates* is sixteen, four squared, a number which seems to be linked to the cosmology of the four elements, which constituted a fundamental part of the scientific knowledge of the time, both found in

¹⁷Cfr. Bonner A. (1985), *Selected Works*, p. 56.

Aristotelian physics and in Galenic medicine. The use of the number four as the basis of a whole system, which is theological as well as epistemological, is probably a direct response to the need of finding a rational knowledge common to the three major monotheistic religions. As the studies of F. Yates have shown¹⁸, Lull identifies this knowledge with the medical and scientific thought based on the theory of the four elements: this set of concepts formed the standard accepted platform upon which every scientific and theological understanding in the Mediterranean basin relied. Thus, the Lullian Art can be interpreted as an attempt to unify all sciences, grounding them with a common methodology and a common set of metaphysical assumptions; all proceeding together towards the common goal, the ultimate truth, which for Lull is found in its purest form inside Christianity.

In 1275 the *Ars compendiosa* got its first approval by a Franciscan friar¹⁹, while Lull wrote the *Ars demonstrativa*, another major work of the quaternary phase, in which we find for the first time an emphasis towards the importance of demonstration and therefore logic.

By this time, Lull must have become an important figure in the island of Majorca. He was summoned to Montpellier by his former pupil James II, now king of Majorca, to explain his thought. His doctrines must have been considered valuable, as James II agreed to finance the founding of a Monastery in Miramar²⁰, where thirteen Franciscan friars could be instructed in the Lullian method and in the languages of the infidels with the final goal

¹⁸ Yates F. A. (1982 A). "The Art of Ramon Lull: an approach to it through Lull's theory of the elements" in *Collected Essays: Lull and Bruno*, Routledge and Kegan, London.

¹⁹ Bonner A. (1985), *Selected Works*, pp. 25-28. Bonner suggests in Note 92 that it could be Bertran Berenguer, following Wadding (1931), *Annales Minorum*, Vol. 5, p. 182.

²⁰ The founding of the monastery in Miramar was approved by a papal *bull*a on October 17th 1276, issued by the Curia of Pope John XXI (also identified with the logician Peter of Spain).

of preaching Christianity directly in missionary lands. This was the first and one of the most concrete results of Lull's activity.

Lull must then have realized the importance of having a powerful political patron and therefore started looking for more important figures than James II of Majorca: he turned to Philip IV of France and to the Pope himself. His first travel to Rome dates back as early as 1287, and resulted in nothing, as Lull arrived right after the death of Pope Honorius IV. He subsequently opted for a visit to Paris, where he tried to meet the king while he started contacts with the professors of theology at the University. This is Lull's first attempt to face the larger European political and intellectual scene. Though there is evidence of him giving lectures in Paris, his main aim was probably to raise funds and to win a rich and powerful ally to his cause, founding colleges to teach his doctrines and oriental languages to preachers, following the model of Miramar.

The relationship between Lull and the masters of theology and philosophy at Paris proved to be a difficult one, and the only practical result of his lectures was the contact with Thomas Le Myésier, who became his only official disciple in Paris. Probably few students and professors understood his hard and convoluted theories, which were expressed in a language so different from that of the current academia of the time. It must have been a moment of realization for Lull, which prompted a complete reevaluation of his thought and resulted in a major change in the structure of his Art. As we learn from the *Vita coetanea*, after leaving Paris he went back to Montpellier:

...ad montem rediit Pessulanum. Ubi de nouo fecit et legit etiam librum ipsum uocans eundem Artem ueritatis inuentiuam; ponendo in ipso libro, nec non et in omnibus aliis libris, quos ex tunc fecit, quattuor tantum figuras, resecatis seu potius dissimulatis propter fragilitatem humani intellectus, quam fuerat espertus Parisius...²¹

The *Ars inventiva ueritatis* marks the beginning of the so-called Ternary phase of Lull's thought. In this work we can observe some fundamental changes to the structure of the Art: the most evident is the reduction of the number of figures, which pass from twelve to four and the cutback on the number of *dignitates*, now called more generally *principia*, principles, which pass from sixteen to nine. Apparently the change is due to the "frailty of the human intellect", but in reality it reflects a much deeper alteration inside the very core of the Lullian system²². The focus on the number three pointed to a shift inside the Lullian world view, from an Exemplaristic conception, in which the material world is a key for understanding the Divine, to what has been called a Trinitarian world picture. The number three lies at the core of the Art now, not only because there are nine principles, but also because the triangles inside the figure T (which represents what would later be called 'relative principles') pass from being five to three, and especially because each *dignitas* can be read through its correlatives²³. The correlative structure is one of the most

²¹ *Vita coetanea*, ROL 8, p. 283.

²² Cfr. Bonner, Anthony (2007), *The art and logic of Ramon Llull: a user's guide*, Leiden- Boston, Brill, pp. 125-134. Bonner proposes a radical revision of the use of Lullian terminology, which took place at the end of the quaternary phase and the beginning of the ternary phase. According to Bonner's account, the term *dignitas* is not used anymore in the ternary phase to refer to all the principles of the figure A and is replaced by a more general use of the word 'principles'. The term *Dignitas* can be applied only to the principles insofar as they refer to God, and therefore are able to be converted one into another.

²³ Cfr. Bonner, Anthony (2007), *The art and logic of Ramon Llull: a user's guide*, Leiden- Boston, Brill, pp. 130-134 and note 25. Bonner suggests that the terms 'principia absoluta' and 'principia relativa' are a

peculiar and original Lullian features, probably derived from the Arabic verbal structure, and it plays a central role in many Lullian devices, from the way of interpreting the figures to the creation of *demonstrationes per aequiparantiam*, the specific Lullian addition to theory of demonstration (as it is apparent in the *Liber de demonstratione per aequiparantiam*, 1305²⁴).

In a broader sense, we can say that the change in the numbers of *dignitates*, and therefore the structure of the Art, mirrors Lull's changed approach towards science and knowledge in general. As it became clear that his project of converting the infidels using science as the common ground for intellectual and theological dialogue had proved to be unsuccessful, Lull searched for a different rational basis for his argumentation and preaching.

It is now that he turned to logic as the natural rational basis for philosophical discussion. This probably reflects Lull's increased knowledge of logical texts, but also explains his growing interest towards logical problems. In the *Logica Nova* of 1303, the Art itself will be portrayed as a sort of Super logic, able to overcome the shortcomings of Aristotelian logic, which sadly could only reach the level of second intentions (of concepts), and thus arrive to the knowledge of first intentions (of the things themselves). The *New Logic*, strengthened by the Art, could be understood both as a way to systematize all knowledge and as an inventive method: this method allowed the artist to

later invention by a Renaissance commentator, Berhard of Lavinheta, and that from him they have passed to the later tradition of Lullian scholars.

²⁴ *Liber de demonstratione per aequiparantiam*, ROL 9, ed. A. Madre, 1981.

always be able to create valid arguments which could in turn be applied to the practice of preaching and therefore help in converting the infidels²⁵.

The years 1292-1293 sign a definitive turn in Lull's life. After a period of reflection, which ends up in a moment of deep spiritual crisis during his stay in Genoa, he finally decided to join the Franciscans as a tertiary. It was a dramatic decision for Lull, whose early career had been marked by Dominican influence, but he felt compelled to choose the Minors due to the better reception that his art had inside the Franciscan order. As the *Vita coetanea* narrates, "Ramon, considering on the one hand his personal damnation, if he did not join the Preachers, and on the other hand the loss of his Art and his books if he did not stay with the Minors, chose, very surprisingly, his own eternal damnation over the possibility of losing the aforementioned Art, which he knew he had received from God in order to save many and especially in order to honor God Himself²⁶".

There is evidence of contact between Lull and the Franciscans even before that, as is proven by a letter of recommendation of Raymond Gaufredi, general of the Minors, dated October 26, 1290, which entitled Lull to teach his Art in the Franciscan convents around Italy. To this period can also be traced the first relationship between Lull and the Spirituals, the most extremist and purist faction inside the Franciscan order, which advocated a strict observance of the Franciscan rule, including evangelical poverty and which was developing apocalyptic tendencies of Gioachimite origin. Gautieri himself

²⁵ I have analyzed in detail Lull's treatment of Logic in my undergraduate dissertation, Buonocore E., *Ars et logica et metaphysica. Lo sviluppo della logica Lulliana da ars inventiva a venatio medii* (Tesi di laurea, Università degli Studi di Siena, 2001).

For a more extensive explanation of the devices of Lullian Art, of the correlative system and on the *demonstratio per aequiparantiam*, I point the reader to my second chapter in this dissertation.

²⁶ *Vita Coetanea*, ROL 8, p. 287, my translation.

was known as a supporter and protector of many Spirituals, among which can be mentioned Bernard Delicieux and the Catalan Arnau of Villanova, a compatriot of Lull²⁷. The Spirituals were also in contact with many European Royal Houses, especially with king Fredrick III of Sicily and Philip of Majorca: and it is to them that Lull will turn along the course of his life for material support in organizing his apologetic missions in the lands of the infidels²⁸.

The following years in Lull's life are dense of events. He went on his first missionary expedition to Tunis, got expelled from there due to the turmoil provoked by his teachings (1293-94), traveled to Naples, Majorca, Barcelona and followed the Papal Court from Rome to Anagni (1295-96). What emerges from this is a clear attempt to muster support, to find powerful sponsors and protectors for his cause, his teaching and his missionary project. These were also years of intense intellectual activity. Lull managed to write an incredible amount of books while traveling, including the *Tabula generalis* and the substantial scientific treatises, which form the *Arbor Scientiae* (1295-96). The *Tree of science* is a work of encyclopedic intent whose aim was to present the various disciplines of human knowledge inside a Lullian framework, which used the mechanisms of the Art and the physical diagram of the tree (probably derived from the Porphyrian tree) as a way of explaining and hierarchically connecting the various sciences.

²⁷ Cfr. Hillgarth N. J. (1971), *Ramon Lull and Lullism in Fourteenth-century France*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p .53-54, and Olivier A. (1965), "Ramon Lull y la escuela francescana de los siglos XIII-XIV" *Estudios Lulianos* 9, p. 55-70.

²⁸ After the disappointing result of the Council of Vienne (1311-1312), Lull went to Sicily, at the court of Frederick III, and from there he organized his last missionary travel to North Africa, probably to Tunis.

Lull's second stay in Paris can be placed right after this period, in the years 1297-99. Here Lull was operating at many levels; at the academic level we find him involved in lectures, debates and disputes, trying to convince the Parisians masters of the superiority of his method and its adherence to the dictate of the faith (an example of that can be found in the *Declaratio per modum dialogi edita*). At a political level, we find Lull still intent to winning the favor of Philip IV to his cause, testified by his dedication of a few works to Philip and his wife (the *Arbor philosophiae amoris* and the *Contemplatio Raymundi*).

It was probably the scarce success of these attempts that prompted Lull to return to Majorca and to revert to his former pupil and patron James II for support. Lull was in Barcelona and then Majorca from 1299 to 1301, traveled between Genoa, where he had found a rich and powerful patron in the noble Spinola family, and Montpellier one of the most important universities in the Aragonese kingdom. In 1305 he wrote the *Liber de fine*, dedicated to James II, where he advocated a crusade for the Reconquest of Granada, then he was shortly in Paris again in 1306 and finally in 1307 he decided to go on his second missionary attempt in Bougie. Here Lull preached the superiority of Christianity by means of his Art and engaged the Islamic intellectuals in academic disputes, but he must have had little fortune, if we find him imprisoned for six months and in the end expelled and packed on a ship back to Christendom. During his journey back Lull experienced a shipwreck, which cost him the loss of almost all the manuscripts he had taken with him, and which forced him to spend some time in Pisa in 1308.

The apex and at the same time the end of the ternary phase is represented by the *Ars generalis ultima*, which had been conceived during all these last years 1305-1308 and by its shorter version, the *Ars brevis* (completed in Pisa in 1308), which constitute the best synthesis and systematic explanation of the Lullian doctrines. These versions of the Art will be the most diffused and influential in the later Middle Ages and throughout the whole Renaissance period, as it is shown by the relatively large number of manuscripts and early printed editions which preserve them. The *Ars brevis* in particular was included in several anthologies during the XVI and early XVII centuries, including an edition by Alsted in 1612 and the famous volumes edited by Lazarus Zetzner, dated Strasbourg 1598.

The later period of Lull's life, despite his old age, is characterized by an increase in the already enormous volume of his production, even if the length of each work sensibly diminishes. In the fall of 1309 Lull arrived for the last time in Paris, where he remained for two years while writing almost thirty works, among which seven were dedicated to Philip IV. This is the start of the final phase of Lull's intellectual development, the Post Art phase, which spans from 1309 to his death, in 1316. Lull now seems to have realized the inutility of his efforts to divulge a reformation of the whole system of knowledge and decided to try to solve one issue at a time by writing shorter texts, *opuscula*, *libelli*, mainly dealing with one problem, mostly of theological, philosophical and logical nature.

Logic became one of the major focal points of Lull's thought at this time, especially intended as a tool to counter Christian heretical thinkers and movements such as Averroism²⁹.

In 1311-1312 there was the famous Council of Vienne. We know that Lull attended the works of the council and that he talked in one hearing, pleading for his project of institution of language colleges for missionaries. But the council turned out to be another delusion for him. Lull's expectations, which included the foundation of new knightly monastic order to replace the fall of the Templars, the establishing of four colleges for the study of Arabic, Hebrew and Caldean and the call for a new crusade, were only partially and superficially met.³⁰

After the council, Lull came back to Montpellier and Majorca, and began preparing for his last missionary enterprise. Before that though, on April 26 1313, he settled his personal worldly affairs by drawing up his official will, in front of a notary. This is an important document in which we find not only Lull's intention to take care of his family and children, but especially his desire to ensure a proper channel for the diffusion of his Art and teachings among European countries.

As we will examine later³¹, Lull had in some sense the unique privilege to determine the ways in which his thought would circulate after his death as a result of his will, and the ways in which the Lullian tradition was passed on inside intellectual circles all over the continent is, in a sense, highly dependent on Lull's own terms.

²⁹ I will explore more in detail Lull's treatment of Logic in the next chapter.

³⁰ The new knightly missionary order was never founded, the only act that was taken in that respect was to transfer Templar possessions to the Hospitalier order. Of the four colleges requested only two were actually implemented, one in Paris and one in Rome, inside the Papal curia. The project of a new crusade was definitely abandoned.

³¹ I will explain more in detail the consequences of Lull's will for the beginning of a Lullian tradition in the next chapters.

Right after the completion of his will, Lull sailed to Messina, where he would stay in the court of king Frederick III, the dedicatee of many of his later works, and where he wrote more than thirty small *opuscula*, while organizing his last attempt at converting the infidels on their own ground, in Tunis. He probably received little help once again, if once in Tunis he had to ask James II of Aragon for more support, as it is proven by one of his letters. While in Tunis he wrote his last work, dedicated to the local king, and dated December 1315. According to this evidence, Lull's death should be placed somewhere between January and March 1316, when the *Doctor Illuminatus* was 84 years old. The legend, which flourished in Majorca right after his passing away, tells tales of Lull's martyrdom by stoning, or alternatively of his death on the ship, on his way back to the island. Probably there is little truth to be found in this legend, which is heavily influenced by the hagiographical models of the times. What is certain now is that Lull's mortal remains were buried in the church of Saint Francis in Majorca where they remain till the present day. Moreover, Lull's figure became right away the object of a strong local devotion, which continued through the centuries regardless of the various condemnations issued by Dominican inquisitors such as the famous Nicholas Eymeric.

Chapter one:

The peculiarities of Lullian Logic, in the context of the evolution of Lullism in its first period (1316-1417)

I) The *Status Quaestionis* on the Studies on Ramon Lull and Lullism.

The history of Lullism and the study of Lullian logic in particular had been for a long time a topic neglected by the historians of philosophy and logic: Ramon Lull himself was considered until the fifties a marginal figure, studied mainly in Catalonia, as he was considered the beginner of the literature in vernacular Catalan, thanks to his philosophical *Romans* such as the *Blaquerna* and the *Felix*.

The reception of Lull's theories and the way in which Ramon Lull and Lullism are treated inside the major studies of history of philosophy, theology, and logic is the topic of an article by J. Batalla recently published in ATCA³², which points out to a dichotomy inside Lullian studies. On the one hand there are the so-called "Lullists", namely the professional scholars and university professors who devote their research to the study of Lullian texts and doctrines: it is thanks to this category that there are now critical editions of Lullian works available and studies on the functioning of the Lullian Art and its relationship with the more general trends in medieval philosophy. On the other hand, there are the handbooks of history of philosophy or the major broad studies on medieval theology and logic, which still to this day do not consider Lull a major figure worthy of a

³² Batalla Josep (2007), "Es pot ésser Lul.lista avui dia? Reflexions entorn de Kurt Flasch, El pensament filosòfic a l'edat mitjana", *Arxiu de Textos Catalans Antics*, 26, pp. 617-635.

lengthy exposition. Batalla signals K. Flasch's *Das philosophische Denken im Mittelalter* as basically the sole exception to this trend, and he remarks the main reasons behind the exclusion or the marginalization of Lull as a thinker. Primarily, the fact that Lull never corresponded to the criteria that made a medieval thinker interesting for a determined period or intellectual movement; secondly, the Renaissance fascination for Lull's Art as a way to mechanize reasoning, which has impeded in a sense a deeper knowledge of the whole spectrum of Lull's thought. Finally there are also practical problems behind the limited reception of Lull: most of the more specific Lullian studies are published in Catalan and don't get a wide enough diffusion to reach the greater public and the editions of Ramon Lull's works are not made to be appealing to a wide public. I completely agree with Batalla's reconstruction, which matches the result of my own enquiry. Many of the most famous handbooks of history of philosophy only reserve a few lines to the *doctor illuminatus*: the great French historian Étienne Gilson in his *Histoire de la philosophie Chrétienne dans le Moyen Âge* (first edition published in 1922) speaks of Lull as a strange figure and considers his philosophy and his Art a mere cluster of technical actions, based mainly on a tautological claim to truth, only valuable as the first example of a combinatory art, thus opening the way to the various combinatory arts born during the Renaissance, and in the end to Leibniz's project of a *combinatoria universalis*. Gilson's approach strongly influenced the reception of Lull and Lullism in the cultural circles of France and Italy, with a lasting influence bound to survive almost until a few years ago. In Italy the handbook of history of philosophy by Dal Pra and the work of Rossi- Viano constitute examples of the lasting influence of Gilson's approach to Lull's figure and works. In France A. De Libera, an historian normally always attentive to the

problem of diversity, deals with Lull in a very brief way, only noting his importance as an apologetic missionary deeply involved in trying to convert the infidels and as an anti averroist philosopher, completely neglecting the problem of the originality of Lullian Art and logic. Another French historian P. Vignaux, on the contrary gives more space to Lull's work, striving to understand its originality and its conceptual value, including him in the trend of Universal Exemplarism of Bonaventurian origin. In doing so Vignaux seems to have been influenced by the entry "Lulle" in the DTC, written by Longpré in 1929, one of the first to witness a deeper study on the philosophy of the *doctor illuminatus*, whose philosophical development is placed on the footsteps of Anselm of Aosta and Richard of Saint Victor³³. As far as English speaking historians are concerned, the most important contribution is without a doubt that of Charles Lohr, one of the major experts on Lullian philosophy. In the section on metaphysics of the *Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, Lohr reconstructs the metaphysical system and the theological background of Ramon Lull, analyzing the influence that the social and historical context provided by the island of Majorca right after the *reconquista* had on the philosophy of the *doctor illuminatus*, the importance of the presence of Arabic sources, moreover he explains the structure and functioning of the Lullian Art and of its peculiarities, among which an important place is held by the doctrine of the *dignitates* (God's attributes) and by the presence of a correlative structure of reality. Lohr himself concludes anyway by saying that Lull was an innovator and a man well before his times, in his own words: "Ramon Lull was a man born long before his time. In the Europe of the later Middle Ages his ideas could only be rejected ... His methods of proving the doctrines of the faith

³³ For the bibliographical references to these works, see the Bibliography section at the end of the present dissertation.

had to be rejected by contemporary scholastic theologians, concerned with protecting the role of clergy in the interpretation of Christian revelation. His dynamic understanding of reality could, in his own time, only be regarded as a threat to the hierarchical structure of feudal society”³⁴.

Among the histories of logic, after Prantl text, now entirely outdated by the most recent scholarship, we find that Ramon Lull was mainly considered a forerunner of the contemporary formal logic, often trying to classify his philosophy (in a rather anachronistic way I would say) among those which favour a complete mechanization of human reason and of logic. While there are reasons to argue that, and it is certain that there are strong analogies and direct textual influences between the Lullian Art and some later philosophers, such as Leibniz, I suggest that this approach is limited and in a certain sense fails to understand both the internal complexity of Lull’s system and the historical and cultural context in which Lull himself wrote and in which his art could flourish. The broad exposition of logic by Kneale and Kneale, to take one example, dedicates only a couple of pages to the exposition of Lull’s system, defining him as “a Catalan who turned from soldiering to religion and died while trying to convert the Moors in Africa”³⁵. Of the many Lullian works of logical import, the Kneales consider only the *Ars Magna* (the *Ars generalis ultima*) and reduce the whole complex Lullian system to a mere combinatory art, created by Lull as a mean of converting the infidels, with scarce results and less philosophical value: “His selection of fundamental concepts did not show great philosophical ability; and his method of combining them has not produced any results,

³⁴ Lohr C. H. (1988), “16: Metaphysics”, *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 543.

³⁵ Kneale, W.C., Kneale, M. (1962). *The development of logic*, Oxford, Clarendon Press p. 241-2.

either in the conversion of the Moor or in the advancement of science”. The only claim to fame that the Kneals grant to the Lullian system is to have been a forerunner and probably a direct source of Leibniz’s *ars combinatoria*.

In his *Introduction to Medieval Logic*, Broadie³⁶ does not even mention Lull’s name, probably because he thought that Lull’s ideas were too distant from the logical-scholastic debates of his time.

Even the analysis of E. J. Ashworth is in many ways reductive: she mentions Lull and Lullism only briefly, in the section on the “Other schools of logic” of her introductory chapter on the history of the problem of language in the post-medieval period. As a matter of fact Ashworth only says: “...a few followers of Ramon Lull were to be found throughout the period, but their work seems to offer nothing to those interested in formal logic, semantics or scientific method”³⁷, thus concluding her contribution and not going any deeper in her description.

On the other hand Bochenski in his work on the history of formal logic, shows a different, more balanced approach, even if he still remains in the tradition that views the Art as the only original contribution of Lull to the history of logic. While analyzing the methods of mathematical logic, in the section on logical calculus, he defines Lull “the first to lay claim to a quite general mechanical procedure”³⁸ and defines his work as “a method, which permits one to draw every kind of conclusion by means of a system of concentric, circular sheets of rings”³⁹. Unfortunately, Bochenski does not differ from the other historians so far considered in that he too quotes only one original text of Lull and

³⁶ Broadie A. (1993), *Introduction to medieval logic*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

³⁷ Ashworth, E. J. (1974), *Language and logic in the post-medieval period*, Dordrecht, Reidel, Boston, p. 20

³⁸ Bockenski, J.M. (1970), *A History of Formal Logic*, Translated and edited by Ivo Thomas, Chelsea, New York, p. 272.

³⁹ Bockenski J.M. (1970), *A History of Formal Logic*, p. 272.

he too judges negatively Lull's efforts as they were confused and not clear enough, but on the other hand he at least reports passages from the *Ars generalis ultima*, thus enabling the reader to form his own opinion on the subject.

On a different perspective, Jan Pinborg's approach, totally out of the traditional schemes of interpretation, was fundamental to my understanding of Lullian logic: Pinborg while devoting to Lull only a page, breaks the traditional equation "Lullian logic = art" and includes the Majorcan philosopher in his chapter on the "Metalogic of the late scholastic", thus showing a clear understanding of the fusion of logic and ontology that can be found in Lull's thought⁴⁰. Moreover there are others really interesting suggestions coming from Pinborg, such as the hypothesis concerning the way in which Lull's way of treating the arguments could be related to the scholastic doctrine of the *consequentiae*, and the possibility of a deeper link between the logic of Ramon Lull and that of Ockham: Pinborg concludes hoping for further studies in this direction. There are ways in which my study of the text of the *Loyca discipuli* could be interpreted as an initial answer to this question, since this pseudo Lullian text shows clear Ockhamistic influences, inserted in the frame of the Lullian system of finding the truth.

In a very peculiar way, if compared to other historians of logic, A. Dimitriu devotes a longer part of his work to the exposition of Lull's thought and of the art, and he has the great merit of considering separately Lullian logic and the art, analyzing each of them in a different section of his work, thus underlining how Lull contributed to the developments of logical techniques in two different ways. At first Dimitriu analyzes the contribution that Lullian logic brought to the advancement of classical logic as a logical technique, showing how for Lull the ultimate act of knowledge is an act of illumination,

⁴⁰ Pinborg Jan (1984), *Logica e Semantica nel Medioevo*, Boringhieri, Torino, pp. 91 and 110.

and stressing how important in the economy of Lullian system is to pose strong and clear principles upon which an organic hierarchy of all the sciences and all human knowledge could be founded; Dimitriu concludes this section saying: “the logic of Ramon Lull is not demonstrative, but rather the logic of establishing the place of a truth within the context of truths, in a given hierarchic order”⁴¹. In another section of his handbook Dimitriu analyzes the Lullian art, intended as a contribution to mathematical logic: he provides a synthetic description of the art, as a technique capable of being applied to every context. Here Dimitriu presents the art as a sort of introduction to Leibniz’s logic, completely outside of its own philosophical context, and exactly for this reason he stresses the high logical value of it because “in the art of Lullus it is possible to discern without any doubts a first attempt to axiomatize, that is to separate primitive notions and principles from the derived ones and to establish rules of derivation”⁴².

The work of Martin Gardner, scholar of formal logic and of the functioning of logical machines, represents a singular exception to the traditional scholarship of this field, as he chooses to devote a whole chapter (the first), to the exposition of Lull’s system. In his almost romantic account of Lull’s biography we could still see the influence of Longpré’s dictionary entry, and as a whole his treatment of Lull is not free from the prejudice that considered the *ars* the only valuable contribution of Lull to the history of logic; moreover his clearly analytic (and not historic) approach significantly reduces Gardner’s possibility of a serene judgment of the Lullian Art inside the historic and cultural context in which it was conceived. In fact Gardner only gives us a few observation about the art, saying that “it is clear from Lull’s writings that he thought of his method as possessing many values”

⁴¹ Dimitriu, Antoniu (1977) *History of Logic*, Abacus Press, Tunbridge Wells, p. 81.

⁴² Dimitriu Antoniu (1977) *History of Logic*, IV, p. 14.

and furthermore “the diagrams ... have considerable mnemonic value, an aspect of his art that appealed strongly to Lull’s Renaissance admirers”, concluding “it is an investigative and inventive art” and “the Art possess a kind of deductive power”⁴³. Gardner’s remark on the relationship between Lullian art and scholastic logic are clearly more interesting: “Lull did not, however, regard his method as a substitute for the formal logic of Aristotle and the schoolmen. He was thoroughly familiar with traditional logic and his writing even include the popular medieval diagrams of immediate inference and the various syllogistic figures and moods”, as are also his comments on the role of the art versus the Aristotelian theory of demonstration, “He did think, however, that by the mechanical combinations of terms one could discover the necessary building blocks out of which valid arguments could be constructed”. Gardner in the end judges positively the value of the Lullian method even inside the context of contemporary analytical logic, when he concludes: “there is a sense, of course, in which Lull’s method of exploration does possess a formal deductive character. If we wish to exhaust the possible combinations of given sets of terms, then Lull’s method obviously will do this for us in an irrefutable way”⁴⁴.

Catching a brief glimpse of the monographic studies on Lull’s thought and works, we notice that in the first half of the 20th c. Lull’s figure was studied almost entirely by Catalan authors, often with the intention of praising the Catalan nation, as Lull was considered (as he indeed is) the beginner of Catalan vernacular literature. It is clear that until the fifties Lull was described mainly in two ways: on the one hand as the poet and

⁴³ Gardner Martin (1958), *Logic Machines and Diagrams*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p.17.

⁴⁴ Gardner Martin (1958), *Logic Machines and Diagrams*, p. 17.

the writer of Catalan vernacular, on the other hand as the “fantastic” philosopher, outside of all schemes, isolated from the culture of his own times, a kind of “foul of love” with an adventurous biography as described by A. Peers⁴⁵. For this reason, together with a sort of cultural isolation of Catalan (and Spanish in general) historiography, due to the dictatorship of F.Franco, the tradition of Lullian studies, begun in Majorca and Barcelona between the end of 19th and the beginning of 20th c., remained for many decades marginal inside European medieval studies, as it is still possible to perceive even in the great *Historia de la filosofía española. Filosofía cristiana de los siglos XIII al XV* by the brothers Thomas and Joaquin Carreras y Artau. Only from the second half of the fifties, thanks to the work of Carreras y Artau but especially to the studies of Frances A. Yates⁴⁶ e Robert Pring Mill⁴⁷ the interest for the study of Lullism has arisen even outside of the local context.

The constant support of some important institutions all over Europe, such as the *Maoricensis Schola Lullistica* in Majorca, the Raimundus Lullus Institut in Freiburg im Breisgau and the Warburg Institute in London has facilitated the renewal of the studies on the whole philosophical and Latin corpus of Lullian works, while the reopening of Spanish cultural circles to academic dialogue after the end of Franco’s regime, allowed the circulation in the whole Europe of fundamental researches such as M. Batllori on the history of Lullism and those of E. Colomer on the functioning and the logical value of the

⁴⁵ Peers (1946), *Foul of Love: the life of Ramon Lull*, S.C.M. Press, London.

⁴⁶ Carreras y Artau T. e Carreras y Artau J. (1939), *Historia de la filosofía española cristiana de los siglos XIII al XV*, Real Academia de Ciencias, Tomo I, Madrid; Carreras y Artau T. e Carreras y Artau J. (1943), *Historia de la filosofía española cristiana de los siglos XIII al XV*, Real Academia de Ciencias, Tomo II, Madrid. F.A. Yates (1954) "The Art of Ramon Lull.", in *Journal of the Warburg & Courtauld Institutes* 17, pp. 115–173. [later reprinted in the *Collected Essays* volume of 1982]

⁴⁷ R. Pring-Mill (1956), “ The Trinitarian world picture of Ramon Lull” in *Romanische Jahrbuch* 7, pp. 229-256.

Art⁴⁸. The efforts of F. Stegmüller, the founder of the Raimundus Lullus Institut in Freiburg in Breisgau and the beginner of the project, known as ROL (Raimundi Lulli Opera Latina), have later allowed a better access to the authentic Lullian works for scholarly purposes: the enormous enterprise of providing a critical edition of the entire corpus of the authentic Lullian Latin works is still in progress in the Raimundus Lullus Institut, thanks to the contributions of great scholars such as A. Madre, C. Lohr, and F. Dominguez Reboiras. Of the total of 55 volumes in project, 36 have already been published and many of the others are in print or at least are being planned in the small but incredibly active German institution.

Many fundamental monographic studies on Lull have been published since the seventies, I will only mention here the works of Platzeck, F Yates, R. Pring Mill, E Colomer, C Lohr, and A Bonner⁴⁹, which have provided a method of facing the study of such a complex figure as Lull: at first contextualization and search of the sources, and then analysis of the language and of the texts.

Particularly relevant for my work were also the studies of the American scholar M. Johnston⁵⁰, and those of J. Perarnau, F. Santi, and J. M. Ruiz Simon, which will be often quoted in the following chapters; and also the studies collected by the scholarly journals, *Estudios Lullianos* (now *Studia Lulliana*) and *ATCA (Arxiu de textos Catalans antics)*, which have contributed and still keep contributing to discover new perspectives in the studies on Lull and Lullism.

⁴⁸ Batllori Miguel (1943) "El lulismo en Italia. Ensayo de síntesis" in *Revista de Filosofia* 2, pp. 253-313 and pp. 479-537; Colomer Eusebi (1979), "De Ramón Lull a la moderna informàtica", *Estudios Lullianos* 23, pp. 113-135.

⁴⁹It would be too long to quote all the contributions of these scholars to the history of Lullism: for their major works and studies, I refer the reader to the bibliographical references.

⁵⁰ M. D. Johnston (1987) *The spiritual logic of Ramon Lull*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Now, after having analyzed the status of the research on our issue, I will start to explain briefly the ways of functioning of the Lullian Art and the peculiarities of Lullian logic, which had initially attracted my attention, thus providing the initial sparkle of interest that made this dissertation possible.

II) The Peculiarities of Lullian Logic

To understand the developments of Lullian logic during the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance we have to keep in mind the peculiarities of the logical system used by Ramon Lull, the way in which such a system differs from the Aristotelian logic taught in the universities of the time, its philosophical roots and the consequences of using that system on the broader Lullian worldview.

From the time of his miraculous conversion, the Majorcan philosopher devoted the rest of his life to the conversion of the infidels, a conversion that he intended to achieve through the rational persuasion of the misbelievers (particularly Jews and Muslims), through the use of necessary reasons and especially by writing the most beautiful book of the whole world, namely his Art. Although in the last 50 years the interest of the scholarly community towards Lull's figure and works has sensibly increased, as we have seen above, there are still many unanswered questions concerning his philosophy and especially concerning the logical system that underlies the whole structure of the Lullian Art.

Now I think I should make a little digression to explain the main features of the Lullian Art. The Art, which Lull claims to have received directly from God during a moment of

illumination on the mount Randa in Majorca, seems to be in a certain sense the result of a fusion of many ideas already present in the first works of Lull and represents an attempt to synthesize Christian and Arabic thought⁵¹.

One of the pillars of the first phase of the Lullian Art is the doctrine of the absolute (the famous *dignitates*) and the relative principles⁵², which we can find already in the *Liber contemplationis* (1274): the *dignitates*, the absolute and substantial principles, correspond to God's attributes, while the relative principles functioned as the Aristotelian categories, thus being the schemes through which the human mind works.

Let's see now the role of this doctrine inside the Art. God, insofar as he reveals himself to man, could be known through a series of attributes or essential virtues, which at a closer look could be understood also as the substantial principles of all things: Lull assumes those attributes as the absolute principles of a logical machine whose purpose is to seek truth.

Reflected in the *dignitates* we find all the different aspects of reality, as each *dignitas*, or divine reason, had placed in the world his likeness, so that the goodness of the creature reflects the goodness of God, and so on... These attributes are the instruments of the creative activity of God, which constitute the fundamental structure of the universe.

Therefore the Art is essentially a mean of finding God's truth inside the creatures, namely, how the being of a creature is in harmony with the ultimate truth, which is God. Initially, in the so-called quaternary version of the Art, there were sixteen *dignitates*: this number was probably linked to the Aristotelian cosmology based on the four elements,

⁵¹ Hillgarth NJ (1971), *Ramon Lull and Lullism*, p. 8.

⁵² On the use of the terms 'absolute principles' and 'relative principles', see also Bonner, Anthony (2007), *The art and logic of Ramon Lull: a user's guide*, pp. 130-134 and above, footnotes 22 and 23.

which Lull had studied in Montpellier⁵³. This numerical aspect, as we will see later, was bound to change with time, reflecting the various adjustments of the Lullian Art and the different worldview implied by Lull in his later works.

In particular as has been shown by Frances Yates, the choice of assuming the four elements as basis for an essentially theological argument is a direct answer to the need of finding a common ground, a shared rational knowledge between the three main Mediterranean religions, a knowledge capable of overcoming the *auctoritas* of the Sacred texts and to open up the rational discussion on the truths of faith. Lull at this points realized that this shared rational knowledge already existed and had to be identified with the scientific and medical doctrines of Aristotle, Hippocrates and Galen, based indeed on the theory of the four elements.

The *Ars* was proposed at first as an attempt to unify all the sciences through a scientifically based theology, thus providing a common methodology and a common goal for all sciences⁵⁴.

Lull's stay in Paris (1287-1289) and in particular his contact with the scholars and teachers of the Sorbonne revealed that the Art could seem hard to understand to many traditional thinkers, and right after it the *doctor illuminatus* felt the urge to revise the whole structure of his *Ars magna*, to make it more understandable and less obscure even to a reader coming from a traditional scholastic background. This is one of the many phases of the revision of the Art, at which Lull basically never ceased to work until his death, even if the official final version would be the *Ars generalis ultima*, Pisa 1308.

As Lull himself says in his *Vita coetanea*:

⁵³ This was the great intuition of Frances A. Yates, on of the greater scholars of Lull, then republished in Yates F. A. (1982 A), "The Art of Ramon Lull".

⁵⁴ Pring-Mill R. (1961), *El microcosmos Lul·lià*, Moll, Palma de Maiorca. p. 29-32.

*Perlecto Parisius illo commento, ac ibidem uiso modo scholarium, ad montem rediit Pessulanum. Ubi de nouo fecit et legit etiam librum ipsum uocans eundem Artem ueritatis inuentiuam;ponendo in ipso libro, nec non et in omnibus aliis libris, quos ex tunc fecit, quattuor tantum figuras, resecatis seu potius dissimulatis propter fragilitatem humani intellectus, quam fuerat espertus Parisius, duodecim figuris ex sexdecim, quae prius erant in artem suam.*⁵⁵

From this moment starts the so-called ternary phase of the Art (1289-1308), the crucial moment in Lull's philosophical production, starting with the *Ars inventiva ueritatis* and arriving until the *Ars generalis ultima*. In this period the cosmological structure of reality and the common esemplaristic worldview based on the number four lose their prominence and instead more attention is given to a Trinitarian worldview, based on the number three: the absolute principles are therefore reduced to nine *principia*, articulated through a correlative structure (i.e. using the Lullian correlatives, explained in the following pages) and combined inside four basilar figures (see pictures 1-4)⁵⁶.

One of the fundamental actions taken by Lull to camouflage his Art and to make it less hard to understand for the Parisian theologians was in fact to reduce the number of the figures, from the original sixteen to twelve and then four, and of the *dignitates* inside the figure A, that of the divine attribute, which passes from sixteen *dignitates* to nine *principia*.

More changes were made inside the figure T, the one which illustrates the remaining nine principles (later called 'relative principles') and which constitutes a huge part of the structure of the Art. The number of triangles internal to this figure passes from five to three, eliminating the triangle "God-creature-operation", whose meaning anyway

⁵⁵ *Vita Coaetanea*, ROL 8, p. 283.

⁵⁶ Pring -Mill R. (1990), "The Lullian 'Art of finding Truth': a medieval system of enquiry", *Catalan Review* 4, p. 55- 67. On the use of 'absolute principles' and 'relative principles', see Cfr. Bonner, Anthony (2007), *The art and logic of Ramon Llull: a user's guide*, Leiden- Boston, Brill, pp. 130-134, note 25, and above, footnotes 22 and 23.

is not deleted but absorbed inside the intrinsic activity attributed to the divine dignities, and the triangle “affirmation-doubt-negation”, whose clear logical function is still present in Lull’s treatment of the various *quaestiones* and whose loss was somehow compensated by the increasing attention that Lull in this period is devoting to logical problems.

I’ll start now analyzing more in detail the ways in which Lull’s Art functions in this phase: A. Bonner has recently published the most complete explanation of the Lullian Art, which even in the title declares its intent to be ‘a user’s guide’, a handbook, in the best tradition of the Lullian school⁵⁷.

In summary, the figure A stands at the centre of the whole structure of the Art, and consists of a circle having inscribed on its circumference nine letters from B to K, representing the various divine attributes, with a big letter A standing at the centre of the circle, probably symbolizing God. The basic meaning of this figure is that in God all the *dignitates* coincide and coexists at the same time, and that each *dignitas*, or each divine attribute is convertible in each other: nevertheless there are many possible interpretations of the origins and of the meaning of this figure, which seems to bear some resemblance with some Arabic methods for meditation and whose structure was even compared to that of a *mandala* in the Eastern cultures⁵⁸. The second figure of the Art (T) is another circle with inscribed on its circumference nine letters (the nine ‘relative’ principles) but on the internal part of the circle we find three triangles which represent the relationships between these nine principles, thus constituting the *modus operandi* of the principles when applied to the world. The central figure of this phase of the art is the Third figure,

⁵⁷ Bonner, Anthony (2007), *The art and logic of Ramon Llull: a user’s guide*, Leiden- Boston, Brill.

⁵⁸ Platzeck E. W. (1972) "Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz y Raimundo Llull", *Estudios Lulianos* 16, p. 129-193. On the use of ‘absolute principles’ instead of ‘*dignitates*’ and on the more complex meaning assumed by figure A in the ternary phase of the Art, see Bonner, Anthony (2007), *The art and logic of Ramon Llull: a user’s guide*, Leiden- Boston, Brill, pp. 125-134. For the pictures see Appendix Five.

an innovation due to the main revolution of this new period of the Art, the introduction of the combinatory art. The Third figure is a matrix with thirty-six boxes, obtained by combining the First and the Second figures: in each box we find two letters which represent the subject and predicate of an argument, the task of the Lullian artist is then to find the middle term between these two extremes, and in doing so to construct a syllogism.

This method of finding the middle term is explained in the art through the process known as the “Evacuation of the Third figure”, which means to extract all the possible meanings and combinations from this figure: in this way we find at first twelve statements, then twelve middle terms that allow us to create demonstrative syllogisms to solve all the posed questions. The only restriction that Lull poses to this combinatory operation is there cannot be any contrariety between the results of each combination and that the reached conclusions have to be all concordant: Lull adds this restriction to remark the realist import of his Art and to preserve the ontological truth of the results of the combinations; with this same purpose Lull would create next to the Rules also the *Conditions of the Art*.

To make the principles of the combinatory art even more general and comprehensive Lull presents a very different figure, the Fourth figure, constituted of three concentric circles, each of them containing the nine letters of the *principia*: the first one on the external side is fixed, while the other two are rotating one below the other, thus enabling the artist to form combinations between 3 letters. At this point Lull introduces the process called the “Multiplication of the Fourth” figure, namely a method of combining the letters that allows the artist to discover 816 different valid combinations: after having put them

in a grid (*tabula*), the artists extracts from each box thirty propositions, thirty middle terms and ninety questions⁵⁹. With this figure we experience the principal attempt of Lull to obtain a total mechanization of rational knowledge.

It is indeed possible to inscribe those 816 combinations in a *Tabula*, which represents a sort of big repertoire of *quaestiones*, inside each one of which you could always find the key to its solution: in this way the artist, having always in mind the rules and conditions of the art, and the given definitions, can find the solution to every single possible questions and can banish doubt from the mind of his readers.

After this brief excursus on the basic structures of Art I would like to reflect on the peculiarities of Lullian logic and theory of demonstration, since to trace an history of the importance of logic in the Lullist tradition is necessary to understand the peculiarities of the logical system used by Lull and how those peculiarities affected the Lullian schools created right after the death of the Majorcan philosopher and in the following century.

At first we need to consider that the Lullian logic cannot be analyzed as a whole monolithic block, but is on the contrary a corpus of knowledge in perpetual evolution, modified from work to work, adapting itself to match the philosophical and theological needs of the *doctor illuminatus*.

The Lullian logic tended to change and develop together with the different versions of the Art and especially due to the increased interest for logic of Lull himself when he came in touch with the intellectual climate of the University of Paris.

⁵⁹ Colomer E. (1979) “De Ramón Lull a la moderna informàtica”, *Estudios Lulianos* 23, pp. 113-135. On the use of ‘absolute principles’ instead of ‘*dignitates*’ and on the more complex meaning assumed by figure A in the ternary phase of the Art, see Bonner, Anthony (2007), *The art and logic of Ramon Lull: a user’s guide*, Leiden- Boston, Brill, pp. 125-134.

Simply analyzing the use of the word “logic” in his first works and comparing them with the various definitions of logic proposed in the later treatises we can notice how Lull’s interest towards logical problems keeps increasing with the passing of time. At the beginning of his philosophic and apologetic career Lull was almost completely deprived of any sort of scholastic education (contrary to what it would have been expected from a cleric of his time), thus his knowledge of Aristotelian logic appears to be confused and basic, principally formed by the *Summulae Logicales* of Peter of Spain and by the logic of Al-Ghazzali: therefore I suggest that it could be important to understand the more unique features of Lullian thought to briefly overview how Lull defined logic and dealt with logical problems in different stages of his life.

In the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*, written right after the illumination on mount Randa in 1274, we find rare references to logic as a discipline: at this stage is still lacking that specific attention to logical (and scholastic) problems which we will find in later works such as the *Logica Nova* (Genoa 1303) and the word “logic” is never mentioned in the whole text. In this period Lull consider logic as a part of his Art: the Lullian Art becomes therefore a kind of super-logic, which includes a good method of constructing arguments and valid inferences, capable of serving as proofs.

This is already clear in the prologue, where Lull, after his usual invocation to God, clarifies what are the principal aims of his Art:

*Haec etiam ars docet proponere quaestiones, et necessariis rationibus earum dubitationem breviter solve.*⁶⁰

Lull’s intention here is clearly to deal with logical problems, such as formulate and resolve questions (or better *quaestiones*) through the use of rational arguments, the

⁶⁰ *Ars compendiosa Inveniendi Veritatem*, MOG I, p. 433.

famous necessary reasons (*rationes necessariae*) thanks to which it is possible, according to Lull, to show the infidels the superiority of the Christian faith and its superior coherence with the dictates of the human reason. What is lacking now is only the awareness of the fact that he is dwelling with logic, intended as a discipline in its own right: Lull will reach this awareness only after his first encounter with the *magistri* of the University of Paris.

Later in the *Introductoria in artis demonstrativae* Lull would justify the practical value of his Art stating that his art is a sort of logic:

*Sciendum est igitur, quod haec Ars et Logica et Metaphysica quodammodo circa idem versentur, quia circa omnia est earum intentio, verumtamen in duobus differt ab aliis duabus...*⁶¹

The Lullian art, since the very beginning, is known as something capable of unifying in itself both logic and metaphysics, thus allowing the artist to formulate arguments virtually on everything that exists, including the very object of metaphysics, namely the supreme Being which is cause to himself. Logic instead is introduced as a science that deals only with second intentions, (concepts of second order, or concepts of concepts, which can only have reality inside the human mind) as opposed to the art that deals with first intentions (concepts of first order, or concepts of real things). As Lull says:

*Logica autem considerat res secundum esse, quod habent in anima, quia tractat de quibusdam intentionibus, quae consequuntur esse rerum intelligibilium...*⁶²

I believe that this is the first passage in the whole Lullian corpus where it's given a definition of logic as a science. We can see that Lull has now acquired some confidence with the current logical debates (such as the one on first and second intentions) and with

⁶¹ *Introductoria Artis demonstrativae*, MOG III, p. 55

⁶² *Introductoria Artis demonstrativae*, MOG III, p. 55.

the terminology in use at the time, he is clearly getting ready for his first experience in Paris, proposing his art as a coherent and functioning system of finding arguments. Analyzing more in detail which characteristic of logic is to be considered central in this work, one can see that the first time Lull gives a definition of logic, the discipline is not defined on its own but only by contrast with metaphysics and with the Art. Moreover, logic doesn't seem to have reached its own status as a valuable science yet, as we would find in later works from the *Logica Nova* on. Here logic seems to be almost entirely identified with the art of syllogism, namely the science that teaches how to formulate formally correct demonstrations:

*Logica vero ponit communes regulas et considerationes, ex quibus possit syllogizzari.*⁶³

As we can see, from the very beginning Lull gives logic a methodological value, defining it as the art which teaches correct reasoning: it is for this reason that logic will be a fundamental step in the education of the kind of Christian predicator which Lull intended to create in his schools.

Passing now to analyze how Lull considered logic in the definitive version of the art, namely in the *Ars generalis ultima*, we notice how here in the section on the hundred forms (*de centum formis*) there is a very interesting definition of logic:

*Logica est ars cum qua logicus inuenit naturalem coniunctionem inter subiectum et praedicatum. Quae est medium, cum quo necessarias conclusiones scit facere. Logicus per definitiones medii inuenit medium contiguum per conuenientias, existentes inter subiectum et praedicatum. Et de hoc datur exemplum in multiplicatione quartae figurae*⁶⁴

⁶³ *Introductoria Artis demonstrativae*, MOG III, p. 55.

⁶⁴ *Ars Generalis ultima*, ROL 14, pp. 365-366.

Reading this definition, we immediately realize of how deeply the Lullian understanding of logic has changed here: while before logic was simply a science of second intentions, limited to finding the middle term between subject and predicate of a proposition, now logic is characterized principally as search for the natural conjunction between subject and predicate and is capable of investigating the roots of reality itself and not only its verbal description. We should not forget that the *Ars generalis* was written in the same year of another treaty, less known, that deals entirely with the search of the middle term, the *Liber de venatione substantiae accidentis et compositi*, which is going to have a very peculiar history during the Renaissance. In fact, the Franciscan friar and Lullian master Bernard of Lavinheta excerpted the seven distinction of the *Liber de venatione substantiae*, which deals with the problem of finding the middle term, and added it to the treatment of logic present in his masterpiece, the *Explanatio*, under the title of *Liber de venatione medii*:⁶⁵.

However, the rules of the Art will play an important role in this process of searching the natural middle term, which is stated here to be the first task of a good logician: only by using the system of the Lullian art the logician can find a real connection, a connection at the level of first intention, between subject and predicate. In this section of the *Ars generalis* Lull stresses the importance of using logic correctly and of the interactions between logic and Art.

⁶⁵ On the *De Venatione medii*, see also Buonocore E., *Ars et logica et metaphysica. Lo sviluppo della logica Lulliana da ars inventiva a venatio medii* (Tesi di laurea, Università degli Studi di Siena, 2001), which in turn draws on Vennebush (1972), «De Venatione Medii inter Subiectum et Praedicatum: ein Abschnitt aus “De Venatione Substantiae Accidentis et Compositi” des Raimundus Lullus», *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 14.

*Logicus tractat de differentia differentiando, et de concordantia concordando, et de contrarietate contrariando. Unde intellectus cognoscit, per quem modum logica est applicabilis siue applicanda ad figuram A et T.*⁶⁶

And continues:

*Item: Logicus tractat de definitione, considerata per primam speciem regulae C tantum. Generalis autem artista huius Artis per omnes species regulae C tractat. Logicus tractat de secundariis intentionibus, adiunctis primis.*⁶⁷

We realize here how important could be the use of the Rules of the Art and of the figures for a logic who wanted to be a realist. Using the Art in fact makes it possible to find a way to go beyond the mere logical definitions and to find the real, natural content of each definition, to find and understand the first intentions and not only the seconds, thus arriving to discover the roots of things, a stable basis upon which to construct an argument.

This is the main advantage that the Lullian Art offers to the logician, of course in a Lullian frame of thought: it enables the logician to formulate logic laws that are not only valid on a formal level but also true in reality.

This process of formulating true laws is made possible by the rules and conditions of the Lullian art which allow the logician to penetrate the inner structure of reality itself, thus enabling him to understand its ways of functioning and consequently to intuitively grasp the laws that govern the world.

1) The originality of the Lullian theory of demonstration: the *demonstratio per aequiparantiam*

⁶⁶ *Ars Generalis ultima*, ROL 14 p. 366.

⁶⁷ *Ars Generalis ultima*, ROL 14, pp. 366-67.

In 1283⁶⁸ with the *Ars demonstrativa* we find the first logical changes and the first simplification of the Lullian art: this text, whose main aim was to provide a means of converting the infidels and to search for the truth that stands behind all sciences, offers a method of demonstrating all sorts of truths but especially of the truths of Faith. Let's see now how Lull from the first lines of the prologue introduces the three modalities of demonstration included in his logical system:

Tres sunt species demonstrationis, quarum prima est de aequiparantia, hoc modo videlicet, quando sit demonstratio per aequalia, sicut demonstrare Deum non posse peccare... Secunda vero species demonstrationis est quando effectus probatur per causam, veluti si sol est, dies est (Demonstratio propter quid). Sed tertia species demonstrationis est, quando causa demonstratur per effectum, ut si dies est, oportem solem esse. (Demonstratio quia)⁶⁹

As we can see, Lull considers three ways or degrees through which it is possible to prove the existence or at least the consistency (validity) of a certain being: these three grades of demonstration were already found in the early work *Compendium Logicae Algazelis* 1270 ca.

- a. The first degree corresponds to the positive degree of an adjective in grammar, namely to the material reality, to the world of accidents: this grade is characterized by the *demonstratio quia*, which starting from the effects seen in reality postulates the existence of a bigger cause capable of justifying those effects.
- b. The second degree corresponds to the comparative degree of the adjective in grammar and is shown by the *demonstratio propter quid*, which works through a

⁶⁸ Cfr. Bonner Anthony (1985), *Selected Works of Ramon Lull*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, II. B. 1.

⁶⁹ *Ars Demonstrativa*, MOG. III, pp. 93-94.

mechanism of comparison: we can prove the existence of something through its cause since a cause of greater entity can justify the existence of a lesser reality.

- c. The third degree, which is the major Lullian innovation with respect to the theory of demonstration taught in the schools of the time, corresponds to the superlative degree of the adjective in grammar and dwells with a reality that is in every sense superior to that of the sub-lunar world, namely it deals with God and his attributes. This demonstration, the *demonstratio per aequiparantiam* is similar to a demonstration by means of analogy and is based mainly on the concordance that cannot lack inside the first principle and on equiparation, using also the typical Lullian correlative structure, as we will see later on. To this way of demonstration Lull devoted a special treaty, written in Montpellier 1305, the *Liber de demonstratione per aequiparantiam*.

The principle of comparison which is rooted in the triangle of the figure T of the Art “difference- concordance- opposition”, constitutes the basis of the Lullian logic, especially regarding the definition of the articles of Faith, and finds its parallel in logic in the triangle “principle- middle term- end”, which is applicable principally to inferior degrees of demonstration, namely to demonstrative syllogisms.

Another important triangle is that of “major- equal- minor”: both these triangles presuppose the principle of opposition, typical of traditional logic, thus implying the possibility of contrariety, and therefore must be posed outside the realm of theology insofar as inside God we can find difference, but not contradiction.

But what is, in the end, a *demonstratio per aequiparantiam*? What are its peculiarities and the how does it really function?

It is a kind of demonstration, which starts from equal terms (*per aequalia*), thus differing from the demonstrations *propter quid* and *quia*, which start from non equal terms, namely

a major and minor premises, and which provide the basis for the Aristotelian arguments called *locus a maiori* and *locus a minori*. On the contrary, the *demonstratio per aequiparantiam* does not start from a cause or from an effect, but from premises that are supposed to be equals in every respect, among which is always possible a change of place that will maintain unchanged the truth-value of the demonstration. In this way it is possible to obtain a different genre of demonstration, which leads us to knowledge, not only formally valid but also true and capable of producing advancement in the understanding of reality. However, this sort of knowledge is very different from modern scientific knowledge and was not made to be applied to scientific disciplines, such as medicine (in fact the two classical Aristotelian demonstrations could suffice in the realm of science), but it was mainly conceived to be applied to theology, the science of sciences.

We should never forget here that the main intention of Lull, his principal aim throughout all his works, is that of providing necessary reasons capable of showing to the infidels the superior truth and the superior coherence with God's majesty of the Christian religion in comparison to the other monotheistic faiths. As he states:

*Infideles non stant ad auctoritates fidelium, et tamen stant ad rationes.*⁷⁰

In this perspective, I interpret the *Liber de Demonstratione per aequiparantiam*, which starts with the posing of the absolute principles, the *dignitates*. In this book, the *dignitates*, or God's attributes, are assumed as true and valid, since they are presupposed by all the monotheistic religions and there is a universal consent on them. Thus, from there the artist can start demonstrating the dogmas of the Christian religion, keeping in mind that there would not be any Muslim or Jewish scholar, who would object to the

⁷⁰ *Liber de Demonstratione per Aequiparantiam*, ROL 9, p. 221.

existence of those attributes and to the fact that the attributes are a real part of the ineffable essence of God.

2) The Lullian doctrine of the correlatives

To fully understand the way in which the *demonstratio per aequiparantiam* functions, it is necessary to keep in mind the Lullian system of correlatives. Let's see now how Lull himself exposed and summarized the doctrine of the correlatives in the *Vita coetanea*, his autobiography:

Sed ego per ea quae mihi proposita sunt a uobis, aduerto iam, quod uos omnes Saraceni, qui estis sub lege machometi, non intellegitis, in praedictis et aliis cuius modi diuinis dignitatibus actus proprios esse intrinsecos et aeternos, sine quibus dignitates ipsae fuissent otiosae, etiam ab aeterno. Actus uero bonitatis dico bonificatiuum, bonificabile, bonificare; actus etiam magnitudinis sunt, magnificatiuum, magnificabile, magnificare, et sic de aliis, omnibus diuinis dignitatibus supra dictis et consimilibus⁷¹

These are the famous Lullian correlatives, which must have sounded really peculiar and unusual to the reader of his time as much as they sound to us, as Lull himself in Paris felt obliged to apologize for his obscure way of speaking, defined as “modus loquendi arabicus”. The correlatives, in fact, are one of the main tools that Lull uses to convert Muslims, and they seem to be directly derived from some sort of verbal structure in the Arabic language.

The correlative terms can be better understood if related to the triangle “potency- act-object”: they represent, in fact, three ways of describing the inner activity of God, as God

⁷¹ *Vita Coaetanea*, ROL 8, p. 290.

is the active agent *par excellence* and he is active both *ad intra*, inside himself and *ad extra*, in his relationship with the created world.

The whole correlative structure of reality is presented as a mirror of God's activity:

- the infinite and absolute capability of action in God is represented in the correlative form by the presence of the suffix *-ans* or *-tivum*.
- The object of action, the absolute and inert potency that can be symbolized by the primitive matter, is represented in the correlative form by the presence of the suffix *-bile*.

We can notice that so far we are still lacking a middle term which would allow the proceeding of form to matter, since those two principles alone would only keep excluding each other and not begin any sort of change. What we need now is a third term, a middle term, which would allow us to go beyond the abstract relationship form- matter and which would show us how empirical reality is transmitted from God to created beings.

- This third term, the *actus*, which Lull expresses in the correlative form by using the suffix typical of the verbal actions *-are*, has the function of negating that the concrete being could be assimilated simply with his form. This term represent the *conjunctio*, which bears in itself parts of all the other terms, thus symbolizing the one and trine being inside all realities, without any intent of reducing the other terms or of minimizing their importance.

The intrinsic activity of God is therefore a direct mirror of the Trinity, and can be represented through the correlative structure of reality, which reveals the Trinitarian mark left by God in the creation of the world.

The principles of the *demonstratio per aequiparantiam*, which is based on a realist worldview, are therefore the *actio* (intended here as the process, the way in which a

principle is active), the *distinctio*, the *concordantia* and the *aequalitas*, as we can see in this example:

Sed si diuinus intellectus et diuina uoluntas habent proprios actus, diuina autem bonitas, magnitudo, et sic de aliis, non, realiter se ipsis differrent. Sed constat, quod realiter in Deo non differunt; ergo diuina bonitas, et sic de aliis, proprios habeant actus. Probatum est quod diuina bonitas habet actum, scilicet bonificare: et sic de aliis. Sed quod ex actu sequatur concordantia sic probatur: quia ubicumque est dare actum, est agens et agibile. Sed agens et agibile conueniunt in agere. Ergo ubicumque est actus, est dare concordantiam; sine qua non posse esse ille actus... Quod autem differentia ex concordantia sequatur, sic monstratur... Quod autem ex concordantia et differentia in Deo sequatur aequalitas sic probamus...⁷²

The principles of this demonstration, which in the end coincide with the divine dignities inscribed in the circle of the figure A of the Art, are original, since they found their own cause in themselves (they are in a certain way *Causa sui*), and they belong to the essence of God; moreover these principles are also true, necessary and immediate as Lull clarifies:

*Quod ista principia sint Uera...
Immediata, ex eo quia non est dare medium inter potentiam siue dignitatem et suum proprium actum. sicut inter intellectum et intelligere, voluntatem et velle, bonitatem et bonificare...
Sunt etiam necessaria, quia de necessitate ad intellectum diuinum sequitur intelligere, cum in Deo non sit dare potentiam sine actu; et ad voluntatem velle, et ad bonitatem et sic de aliis...⁷³*

From what we have said so far it is easier to understand how the *demonstratio per aequiparantiam* took as its first assumption the metaphysical definition of God as it is demonstrated through the Anselmian ontological argument (although modified according to the correlative structure): God here is clearly that of whom it is not possible to

⁷² *Liber de Demonstratione per Aequiparantiam*, ROL 9, p. 219, see also Bonner A. (1985), *Selected Works of Ramon Lull*, pp. 227 and 257.

⁷³ *Liber de Demonstratione per Aequiparantiam*, ROL 9, pp. 217-218.

conceive a superior, the perfect and absolute being in which all perfections could be found.

Moreover, I think that the passage quoted above is a key moment to understand how Lull intended the method of demonstration. When he defines the principles as immediate he adds right away that they are immediate insofar as it is not possible to suppose a middle term between a potency and his own act. In saying so, Lull clearly poses himself and his whole system outside of the realm of Aristotelian logic. I believe that when he states here that there cannot be a middle term between a potency and his own act he is in reality intending to say that the divine dignities do not require a logical middle term, in the Aristotelian sense of the word, or in other words I believe that Lull's original idea was that there was no need to suppose a logical middle term between the dignities and their own acts, since the divine dignities already have inside themselves their own middle term, through the correlative structure of reality.

3) The evolution of the concept of *medium*: the importance of finding the middle term.

The term 'medium' is one of the keywords to understand the evolution of the Lullian Art towards being a kind of super-logic. Lull had included the medium as one of the relative principles of his Art and he gives detailed definition of this principle in many versions of the Art, as we will see. In the various versions of the Art the concept of 'medietas', or of being middle, changes from being a general, ontological concept to being more and more

logically connotated, and in the end it emerges as a new concept of mediation, which includes both the medium of the *Ars* and the Aristotelian middle term of a syllogism. In particular, Lull will unify the ontological and logical sense of the term ‘medium’ when, explaining the *demonstratio per aequiparantiam*, he will propose a new kind of middle term: this new ‘medium’ will be able to connect not only concepts (or second intentions) but also real beings, entities (first intentions).

In the ternary phase of the Art, the medium starts to assume some logical characteristics and it is treated as one of the fundamental concepts that allow the logician to discover true and valid arguments to solve any questions that might be posed to him. In the *Ars Inventiva Veritatis*, we find the principle of the ‘medium’ inside the relative principles of the second figure (T), in the center of the central triangle, the red one, formed by the triad Principle-Midde-End. Here is the definition provided by Lull:

*Definitio: Medium est illud subjectum, per quod Finis influit Principio et per quod Principium refluit Fini, sic quod Medium sapiat naturam utriusque, et est imago illorum.*⁷⁴

Lull devotes a whole paragraph to the middle term, and he underlines its importance as what allows the good functioning of a demonstration: the middle term shares something both with the Principle and with the End and it mirrors both, thus permitting the passage from one to another. Such importance is also stressed by all the subdivisions of the medium that he proposes, as the ‘medium’ is then divided in *Medium Conjunctionis*, *Medium Mensurationis*, and *Medium Extremitatum*.

⁷⁴ *Ars Inventiva Veritatis*, MOG V, p. 9.

Moreover, even in the most refined version of the Art, the *Ars Generalis Ultima*⁷⁵, he will reproduce *verbatim* the definition of middle term that we have seen in the *Ars Inventiva*.

The importance of the middle term for the Lullian Art is even stated clearly in the closing passage of the section on medium in the *Ars Inventiva*:

*Istud Principium, quod dicimus Medium, est multum necessarium in hac Arte, nam habente Artista cognitionem de Conditionibus Supremi Medii et infimi cognoscet inventionem conclusionis, attingens Medium proportionatum inter Principium et Finem illius Principii, transeunte Virtute Principii per Medium illius Principii ad suum Finem.*⁷⁶

For Lull, the middle term is fundamental because it allows the Artist to find correct conclusions, but his middle term is strictly linked to his Art: the only way to find a correct middle term that would bring correct solutions is through the mechanisms of his Art. In case of any doubt, the Rules and the Conditions of the Art provide a guide for the Artist, which limits the range of the possible combinations found using the Lullian wheels and tables. It should not be underestimated the importance of the Conditions of the Art for a logician who wanted to be a realist, since those conditions are what ground Lull's logic to metaphysics. In fact, the conditions are the principle of restriction, which limit the amount of potentially unlimited combinations to the only real ones⁷⁷.

It emerges here one of the main differences between Lullian and Aristotelian logic: Lull's logic subsumes syllogistic logic but goes beyond the mere logic of second intention, of the relationships between concepts, it wants to be a realist logic, a logic that connects real entities. Lull intends to provide the Artist, and therefore the logician with an easy way to

⁷⁵ *Ars Generalis ultima*, ROL 14, p. 22. Here Lull gives the same definition as we have reported above: "*Medium est ipsum subiectum, per quod finis influit principio et per quod principium refluit fini, quod subiectum sapit naturam utriusque*".

⁷⁶ *Ars Inventiva Veritatis*, MOG V, p. 9.

⁷⁷ Lull explains how to ground the search for the middle term in the conditions of his Art in *Ars Inventiva Veritatis*, MOG V, p. 14.

find middle terms which will in turn allow them to conclude every argument and to win every dispute: the Lullian Art was an alternative to Aristotelian logic and it was capable of integrating Aristotelian logic, thus allowing the logician to obtain better demonstrations.

It is this aspect of ‘ameliorating’ Aristotelian logic that resulted so appealing to the next generations of logicians and especially of school-masters, since one of the fundamental advantages of the Lullian Art is its relative facility of being learnt. Such a fascination with Lullian logic is testified by the fact that in the later middle ages and in the Renaissance we encounter a flourishing of pseudo-Lullian logical text, as will be shown in the next chapter.

Chapter two: The Threads of Lullism.

D) Lull's Will: The Beginning of a Complex Tradition

During the entire course of his life, one of Ramon Lull's main worries was the preservation and diffusion of his own works. As we have already seen while examining Lull's life, he personally wrote many copies of his texts and tried to ensure further circulation and transmission of them through donations to convents, *studia*, and houses of noble learned families. Among the most famous witnesses to the struggle to spread Lullian doctrines is Ramon Lull's own will⁷⁸, as well as his autobiography, the *Vita coetanea*. In both of these texts, it is evident that Lull tried to establish three main centers of diffusion for his thought: Genoa, Paris and Majorca.

*Diuulgati quidam sunt libri sui per uniuersum; sed in tribus locis fecit eos
precipue congregari; uidelicet in monasterio Cartusiensium Parisius, et apud
quendam nobilem ciuitatis Ianuae, et apud quendam nobilem ciuitatis
Maioricarum.*⁷⁹

⁷⁸ See also Hillgarth N. J. (1971), *Ramon Lull and Lullism*, pp. 140- 143 and J.N. Hillgarth, *Diplomatari lul-lià: documents relatius a Ramon Llull i a la seva família*, trad. L. Cifuentes (Barcelona: Edicions de la Universitat de Barcelona, 2001).

⁷⁹ *Vita Coetanea*, ROL 8, p. 304. Lull's will instead states more in detail: " volo et mando quod fiat inde et scribantur libri in pergameno in romancio et latino ex illis libris, quos divina favente gratia noviter compilavi, videlicet: De vitiis et virtutibus, et De novo modo demonstracionis, et De quinque principiis et De differentia correlativorum et De secretis sacratissime trinitatis et incarnationis et De participatione christianorum et sarracenorum, et De loquacione angelorum, et De virtute veniali et vitali et de peccatibus venialibus et mortalibus, et De arte abbreviata sermotonandi. Sermones autem ibi scripti quos perfeci et compilavi, sunt in summa centum octuaginta duo. Item est ibi Liber de sex sillogismis. De quibus quidem libris omnibus supradictis mando fieri in pergameno in latino unum librum in uno volumine, qui mitatur per dictos manumissores meos Parisius ad monasterium de Xartossa, quem librum ibi dimitto amore Dei. Item mando fieri de omnibus supradictis libris unum aliud librum in uno volumine in pergameno scriptum in

Ramon Lull left a substantial number of manuscripts to the household of a nobleman in Majorca, clearly his own son-in-law Pere de Sentmenat, which were later to be sent to the Cistercian monastery of La Real, near Palma. He also ordered several copies of his manuscripts to be made, and for some of them to be sent to the Chartreuse de Vauvert in Paris, where he had lived during his four stays in the French capital city, and for the other part to be sent to the house of a (not specified in the *Vita*) noble learned man in Genoa. In Lull's will, the noble Genoese friend of Lull can be identified without doubt as Perceval Spinola, who had hosted the *doctor illuminatus* during his stays in Genoa and to whom Lull had already sent a manuscript in 1305⁸⁰.

To understand the development of Lullism in the period immediately subsequent to Lull's death it is fundamental to examine what happened to these three groups of manuscripts and to the three centers of Lullian studies that were supposed to be formed in each of the cities mentioned in Lull's will.

Paris seems to have been the most active place of study, elaboration and diffusion of the Lullian doctrines in the period immediately following Lull's death. This phenomenon not only results from the presence of the Lullian manuscript collection at the Chartreuse of Vauvert), but it is especially due to the work of Thomas Le Myésier (and probably to Le Myésier work in collaboration with the monks at Vauvert)⁸¹.

latino, quem dimitto et mando miti apud Ianuam miser Persival Spinola Item, lego monasterio de Regali unum coffeum meum cum libris qui ibi sunt, quem habeo in hospicio dicti Petri de Sancto Minato..." Hillgarth NJ (2001), *Diplomatari*, pp. 87-88.

⁸⁰ This manuscript has been preserved and is now known as Ms. Munich Lat. 10507, which contains the *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus* and the *Liber de demonstratione per aequiparantiam*. At f. Iv: can be read "Iste liber mittitur Ianuam domino per seval spinola ex parte magistri Rymundi Luyll". The quotation is taken from the Ramon Lull Database, page: <http://orbita.bib.ub.es/ramon/ms.asp?95>.

⁸¹ Hillgarth NJ (1971), *Ramon Lull and Lullism*, p. 197 (Note the manuscript evidence for this collaboration that can be testified by the Catalogues of Lullian works inside the *Electorium*).

II) Early Lullism in France: Le Myésier and the Threads inside the *Electorium*.

Le Myésier, who was *Magister artium* at the Sorbonne University and a canon at Arras, had been Lull's first disciple in Paris and is mainly known as the author of four books of compilations of the Lullian doctrines. These books were of different sizes and philosophical import, probably intended for different kinds of publics. The longest and most complex text is the *Electorium Magnum*, probably destined to circulate among the scholars of the university. This work is now preserved only in three manuscripts (the original Ms. Paris, BNF, lat. 15450 [incomplete], a copy from XV c. Vat. Lat. 11585 [incomplete] and a later XVII c. copy in six manuscripts at Munich, BSB, lat. 10561-10566), and was composed between Paris and Arras around 1325⁸². It shows an elaborate structure, and is divided into five sections, one antecedent and four actual parts. The first part is intended as a preparation for the study of Lullian doctrines, and it was planned to include nine texts, almost fully summarizing the *curriculum* of the faculty of arts at the time⁸³. It is very interesting to note that Le Myésier preceded the *Electorium* with a short treatise on logic, very probably written by him. The *Summula in logicalibus* is based on Petrus Hispanus' *Tractatus*, and it provides a basic introduction to the main logical doctrines taught in the schools.

Between the *pars antecedens* and the rest of the work we find a copy of the *Vita coetanea* or *Vita Raymundi*, the earliest surviving till modern times. After that, we are

⁸² Hillgarth NJ (1971), *Ramon Lull and Lullism*, p. 162 contains this quote taken from ms. Paris, BNF, lat. 15450 f. 547va “*ordinatus in hoc Electorio, anno domini 1325, per Thomam Migerii in Attrebato*” written by Le Myésier own hand.

⁸³ Hillgarth NJ (1971), *Ramon Lull and Lullism*, pp. 199-201, especially n. 10.

introduced to the ‘proper’ *Electorium*, which consists of three main divisions. The *prima pars* is called *dispositiva*, and its aim was to train the intellect and make it ready to receive the Lullian Art (Le Myésier’s *Introductio in artem Remundi* occupies the majority of this section); the *secunda pars* exposed the doctrinal core of the Art, while the third and fourth parts constituted the *pars succursiva* or the ‘support’ part, whose aim was to reinforce the knowledge just learnt.

As a whole, the *Electorium* contains extracts from more than forty original Lullian works among which are: the *De naturali modo intelligendi*; *De ascensu et descensu intellectus*; *Liber de homine*; *Ars inventiva veritatis*; *Ars generalis ultima* and *Ars Brevis*; *Tabula generali*; *Liber correlativorum innatorum*; *Liber de venatione substantiae, accidentis et compositi*; *Ars amativa*; *Liber intellectus*; *Liber Chaos*; *Liber de ente realis et rationis*; *Ars Demonstrativa*; *Principia Philosophia*; *Investigatio generalium mixtionum secundum Artem generalem*.

The second major work of Le Myésier is supposed to be the *Electorium Medium*, of which no exemplar has survived. We have little evidence about its contents, beside the fact that it must have been a text of lesser complexity than the first one, intended as a bridge between the extended *Electorium Magnum* and the short *Breviculum*. The existence of the *Electorium Medium* has been questioned in the past, but there are no real reasons to support this claim, especially as a middle version of the *Electorium* is represented in the last miniature of the *Breviculum*.

The *Electorium parvum* or *Breviculum*⁸⁴ is the shortest and simplest of Le Myésier’s compilations to have been preserved. It was intended for use inside the French court, as

⁸⁴ For more information on the *Breviculum* see the critical edition in *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis* (CCCM-PB 77) Raimundus Lullus Opera latina: Supplementum Lullianum I Breviculum seu

clearly shown in f. 13v of the only surviving manuscript of this text (Ms. Karlsruhe, BLB, St. Peter perg. 92). The first 11 *folia* contain miniatures describing Lull's life and philosophical thought; the twelfth miniature portrays Le Myésier presenting the *Breviculum*, together with the *Electorium Magnum* and *Medium*, to the Queen of France (and to other three court ladies). The following *folia* contain the actual text of this work, which consists of a short compilation from the *Electorium Magnum*, as shown by Hillgarth (1971). It starts with an abridged version of Le Myésier *Introductio in artem Remundi*, and then continues with an exposition taken from the *pars secunda* of the *Electorium*, mainly dependent on Lull's *Ars brevis*. *Folio* 36v presents probably an authentic summary of the *Introductio*, written by Le Myésier, and the *folia* from 40 to 44r contain a mixture of material taken from the *Ars Brevis* and from the *Electorium Magnum*.

Finally, Le Myésier is supposed to have composed the *Electorium minumum*, a further shortening of the *Breviculum*, which has not survived in any manuscript copy. There is no evidence that the *Electorium minumum* was ever written, but Le Myésier had certainly planned its elaboration, since he names it in the *Electorium Magnum*⁸⁵.

Thomas Le Myésier had also written several original treatises on different subjects, ranging from the commentaries on the Lullian art, which were included in the *Electorium Magnum* proper (like the aforementioned *Introductio in artem Remundi*), to original treatises like the *Summula in logicalibus*, which formed the *pars antecedens* (the introductory part) to the *Electorium*.

electorium parvum Thomae Migerii (Le Myésier). Ed. C. Lohr, T. Pindl-Büchel and W. Büchel. Brepols 1990. Also see Hillgarth (1971) *passim* but especially Appendix VIII, pp. 446-462.

⁸⁵ Hillgarth NJ (1971), *Ramon Lull and Lullism*, p. 162 n. 52, which contains the transcription of a marginal note from f. 90 of the *Electorium Magnum*, "Patet ... *minumum*", and n. 53.

During Lull's life, Thomas had sent him fifty *Quaestiones* that dealt with problems of the applicability of the Art. It was in response to these questions that Lull wrote a short treatise in July 1299 known as *Quaestiones Attrebatenses*⁸⁶. Hillgarth also suggested that Le Myésier had submitted the idea, if not a tentative plan for his works of compilation, to Lull himself during his last stay in Paris and that he had obtained the *Doctor Illuminatus*' approval.

The reason why I have analyzed in detail Le Myésier's compilations is not only because they offer an authoritative example for any later work of compilation done inside the Lullian tradition, but also because they show the vitality of Lullism in France from the very beginning years. As the first 'official' disciple of Lull in Paris and a college professor, Le Myésier provided the perfect model for a Lullian schoolteacher. Moreover, his works, besides attesting the practice of compilation inside Lullian schools from the earliest period, highlight right away an interest for logic, intended as the necessary basis to penetrate the Lullian system of doctrines. Such a need for a 'handbook' for logic inside the Lullian schools will continue throughout the entire Middle Ages and Renaissance, and it seems to be inextricably linked to the practice of compilation (also inside texts of logic), and to the tendency towards a simplification, a shortening and a normalization of Lull's thought, which pervaded Lullian intellectual environments from the start.

⁸⁶ For the *Quaestiones Attrebatenses* see Hillgarth NJ (1971), *Ramon Lull and Lullism*, pp. 159-161, and also RL Database <http://orbita.bib.ub.es/ramon/bo.asp>.

III) Early Lullian Schools in Catalonia Aragon: A Knot of Threads.

The same concern about a kind of normalization of the most original and problematic Lullian doctrines can be found inside Catalan Lullism, especially the early Lullian schools in Valencia and Barcelona.

a) The Tradition of Confessional Treatises as the ‘Missing Link’ at the very Beginning of Lullian Schools.

J. Perarnau has proved the direct correlation between Ramon Lull’s teaching during his last stay in Majorca and the first pseudo Lullian treatises that appeared in Valencia right after his death, as early as 1317⁸⁷. This connection is represented materially by the content of a manuscript such as Ms. Salamaca, BU, 2311, which contains at the same time: extracts from the Bible (the *Proverbia Salomonis*), the *Quaestiones* of Berengarius Ros, some works either by Boethius or attributed to him, Thomas Aquinas’ commentary on the *De ebdomandibus*, Calcidius’ Latin translation of Plato’s *Timaeus*, an anonymous treaty from an unknown Valencian Lullist, *Tractatus de decem preceptis legis, de quatordecim fidei articulis et de septem sacramentis*, another two anonymous Lullian texts from Valencia, the *Art Abreujada de confessio*’ and the *Dictat dels Infans* (or *Doctrina dels Infans*), an authentic text by Ramon Lull, the *De virtute veniali et vitali et de peccatis venialibus et mortalibus*, a summary of the aforementioned *Dictat dels Infans*,

⁸⁷ A complete description of the ms. Salamanca, BU, 2311 together with a cogent study on the development of the early Catalan Lullian schools and an edition of the *Art abreujada de confessió* can be found in Perarnau i Espelt, Josep (1985), "El lul·lisme, de Mallorca a Castella a través de València. Edició de l'«Art abreujada de confessió»", *ATCA* 4, pp. 61-172. See also the description of the manuscript in Lilao Franca i Castrillo González, Catálogo (2002), pp. 693-697.

and finally another anonymous pseudo Lullian *Art de confessio*’, dated to 1317 from Valencia.

The simultaneous presence in this codex of the original Lullian *De virtute veniali* (Majorca, April 1313), which is a compilatory work based on the sermons that Ramon Lull gave during his last stay in Majorca in 1312-1313, and of various anonymous confessional treatises from the Lullian Valencian school, shows immediately the connection between the predication of the *Doctor Illuminatus* and the production of his Valencian disciples. According to Perarnau’s analysis, this link is clear also in the doctrinal import of the various works, and emerges especially from the comparison between the various versions of the *Art abreujada de confessio*’.

Perarnau relates Lull’s aspiration to a reformation of the Church, which was very similar to what was invoked by the Franciscan Spiritual movement, to the tendency in the Valencian texts to a union between the thought of Lull and that of the contemporary Catalan thinker Arnaldus of Villanova. As a whole, the 14th century was a very tense period for the beginning Lullian schools, difficult to reconstruct for the scarcity of documents, to which F. Santi refers to as ‘the Lullism of the dark centuries’⁸⁸: especially towards the end of the century with the persecution by the famous inquisitor, the Dominican friar Nicholas Eimeric.

Further evolution of the Lullian school of Valencia can be testified by the intense production of apocryphal texts that took place in that area between the years 1335-1338⁸⁹.

In 1335 there were written both an *Esposicio’ del Libre d’Amic et Amat*, which shows the

⁸⁸ Cfr. Santi Francesco (2004) “*El Lul·lisme a Itàlia*”, pp.16-33.

⁸⁹ For further information on this topic it is still interesting to consult Tarré Josep (1951), “Un quadrienni de producció lul·lística a València (1335-1338)”, *Studia monographica & recensioni* 6, pp. 22-30, which provides a clear analysis of the works mentioned.

persistence of a mystical Lullian tradition, and the *Libre Benedicta tu*, which represents the earliest testimony of a merging between Lullian themes and an interest towards the theological problems raised by the figure of Mary. In 1336 was written a Lullian *Art de Confessio* and in 1337 a short treaty *De magnitudine et pravitate hominis*, both works representing the persistence of the interest for confessional instruction inside the early Lullian Valencian School. A different case is posed by the *Ars Memorativa* by Bernart Garí, composed in Valencia in April of 1338. This text should be analyzed in the context of the early connection that was being established between the Lullian Art and the *ars memorativae*. The Lullian *Ars combinatoria* almost came to be seen as an art of memory: pseudo Lullian treatises on artificial memory were crafted and attributed to the *Doctor Illuminatus*, like the *Liber ad memoriam confirmandam*⁹⁰.

b) Issues of Marian Theology, An Additional Thread in the Lullian Tradition.

The attention dedicated inside the Lullian school of Valencia towards confessional themes very early started to develop into an interest for the Mariological problems that were discussed inside Franciscan *studia*, as a result of the strong believes in the Immaculate conception of Mary found in the work of Franciscan philosophers and theologians such as William of Ware and Duns Scotus.

In his analysis of the tradition of the Lullian apocryphal works on the Immaculate Conception of Mary, F. Dominguez Reboiras provides another link between the early

⁹⁰ I cannot explore the tradition of the pseudo Lullian Arts of memory in this venue. For the edition and a brief commentary on the *Liber ad memoriam confirmandam* redirect the reader to Pseudo-Raimundus Lullus: "Liber Ad Memoriam Confirmandam", in *Studia Lulliana* 36, 1996, pp. 99-121 edd. A. Madre and Ch. Lohr.

Lullian schools and Franciscan thought⁹¹. He traces a short history of the emergence of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, which was born from a strong popular sentiment against a dominant theological view, known as *opinio antiqua*. The debate on the Immaculate Conception in the 14th c. became the focal point of a theological controversy that divided the mendicant orders. On the one hand we find the Dominican thinkers (among which Thomas Aquinas), who were against the Immaculate Conception and maintained that the supposed dogma had no fundament in the word of the Scripture or in the teachings of the Church fathers. Franciscans professors of philosophy and theology instead supported the spiritual movement and the popular feeling by creating a whole Marian theology in favor of the Immaculate Conception. This theological controversy passed through the whole later Middle Ages, the Reformation, the Renaissance, the Baroque Age, the Enlightenment and was finally resolved only in 1854 when pope Pius IX proclaimed it part of the official Catholic Doctrine⁹². The debate often took different local colorings according to the political situation of each region: in Catalonia-Aragon the royal house had shown to be in favor of the new dogma and had defended both the spontaneous celebrations for the Immaculate Conception and the disciples of the Lullian school when it had been prosecuted for heresy by the Dominican inquisitor Nicholas Eimeric⁹³. Although Ramon Lull had not written any specific treatise on the subject of Immaculate Conception, the early proliferation of pseudo Lullian texts

⁹¹ Domínguez Reboiras, Fernando, "Els apòcrifs lul·lians sobre la Immaculada. La seva importància en la història del lul·lisme", *Del frau a l'erudició. Aportacions a la història del lul·lisme dels segles XIV al XVIII*. In *Randa 27*, Barcelona, 1990, pp. 11-43.

⁹² The dogma of the Immaculate Conception was officially proclaimed by Pope Pius IX on December 8 1854, with the bulla "Ineffabilis Deus".

⁹³ The later connections between regional politics in Catalonia-Aragon, Lullism and the debate on the Immaculate Conception has been thoroughly investigated by Perarnau (*ACTA 3*, 1984, pp. 59-191), where is also provided an edition of the pseudo Lullian 'Tractatus de Purissima conceptione virginis' from ms. Copenhagen KB Thott. 105 4^o ff. 77v-78r (Latin) and from ms. Vat. Lat. 10275 ff 160v-161v (Catalan).

on this topic inside the Lullian circles of Valencia shows both a clear intention of introducing Lull's authority inside the Marian theological controversy and an attempt to harmonize Lull with the mainstream Franciscan theologians and place him fully inside Franciscan thought. This same cultural operation, which generally consisted in the 'normalization' of the most original Lullian doctrines (limiting the use of correlatives for instance) and in an attempt to place Lull inside the canonical Franciscan authors, can be found also in pseudo Lullian treatises on logic, as it will be shown more in detail when analyzing the content of the *Nove Introductiones* and the *Loyca discipuli*.

This correlation inside the Lullian schools between Mariological themes and logical doctrines is testified by material evidence as both kinds of texts seem to have had a common manuscript tradition; this can be seen by the fact that they circulated together in at least one case, the extant ms. Copenhagen KB, Ny kgl. Samling 640 8° (XV c.)⁹⁴.

The link between Mariological and logical arguments will also be carried on during the 15c., and will play a fundamental role in the rise of an European Lullism in the early 16th century as it tied together the emerging interests of French scholars with the more scholastic teachings of the Lullian schools of Valencia and Barcelona.

⁹⁴ For a detailed description of this manuscript see below, Chapter III, section II, on the manuscript tradition of Pseudo Lullian logical treatises.

III) The Tradition of Lullism in the Later Middle Ages and the Early Renaissance: the Entangling of the Threads.

a) Lullism in Paris after Le Myésier: from the Aversion to Lullism of Jean Gerson to the Revival of Lullian Studies in the Intellectual Circle of Lefèvre.

At the end of 15th c. in Paris we find a number of publications of Ramon Lull's work that testifies an interest towards the Lullian doctrines, which has often been defined in scholars as the 'Revival of Lullism' in Renaissance Paris⁹⁵. This phenomenon started when the Parisian intellectual circle that gravitated around Jacques Lefèvre D'Etapes and his disciple Charles Bouvelles developed an interest in the mystical and broadly Marian aspects of Ramon Lull's writings. In 1494 Lefèvre himself published an edition of Lull's *Liber De Laudibus B. Mariae Virginis*, followed in 1499 by a second edition of the same text, completed with the addition of the *De Natali pueri parvuli Christi Iesu* and other Lullian short books. Lefèvre had become interested in the Lullian doctrines after reading the *Liber Contemplationis in Deum* and since then he became one of the most active contributors to the diffusion of Lullian thought in France.

Lefèvre had deepened his knowledge of Lull's philosophical system during a journey to Italy, in Rome and in Venice, as he states in a prefatory letter to the 1516 edition of the *Liber Proverbiorum* and the *Arbor philosophiae amoris*, dedicated to Alfonso of Aragon, archbishop of Saragossa and Valencia⁹⁶. In Italy, Lefèvre came in touch with Florentine

⁹⁵ See especially Joseph M. Victor's 1975 article "The revival of Lullism at Paris 1499-1516", in *Renaissance Quarterly* 28, IV (Winter 1975) pp. 504-534.

⁹⁶ Rice E. (1972), *The prefatory epistles of Jacques Lefèvre d'Etapes*, p. 374. See also Batllori Miguel (1943), *El lulismo en Italia*, pp. 507-510.

Neoplatonism, especially with Marsilio Ficino, with a “purified” humanistic Aristotelianism and with the Lullian intellectual environment in Padua, the so called circle of Santa Giustina, whose attention to the mystical and contemplative works of Lull was in direct accord with Lefèvre’s own interests. He understood Lull as an illiterate *idiota*, yet able to show the truth thanks to his illumination by divine wisdom and to the strength of his martyrdom. Lefèvre used the Lullian concept of *concordia* to build his own mystical theology, which represented a connection between the Christianized Neoplatonism of Dionysius, and Lull’s realism, his focus on contemplation, and his aspirations to a spiritual reformation of the Church. In the 1516 epistle, Lefèvre also stresses the possible anti-Averroistic function of reintroducing Lull’s teaching inside the university of Paris.

Even if Charles de Bouvelles’ interest in Lull is probably derived from that of Lefèvre, he developed different aspects of the Lullian doctrines. Bouvelles was influenced by the philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa and by the Neoplatonism of Ficino and Pico della Mirandola⁹⁷, permeated by pythagorism and kabbalistic suggestions, which were brought to the attention of Parisians intellectuals through the mediation of Lefèvre. He developed an interest in the analysis of symbolism, especially in geometric and mathematic symbols, which probably led him to the study of logic, by reading Aristotelian texts, and to even attempt an edition of Aristotle’s *Organon*. Bouvelles’ first work, the *In Artem Oppositorum introductio* was published in 1501, shows his deep interest in the philosophical consequences of Nicholas of Cusa’s principle of the *coincidentia oppositorum*. Three years later, Bouvelles deepened his metaphysical understanding in his second work, the *Metaphysicum introductorium*, where he identifies metaphysics with

⁹⁷ See also Hillgarth N. J. (1971), *Ramon Lull and Lullism*, p. 284.

a deeper wisdom able to investigate the true essence of everything, a supreme knowledge which at the same time encapsulates all the sciences of the material world and is able to go beyond them⁹⁸. From this understanding of metaphysics stems Bouvelles fascination towards encyclopedic knowledge, as from his point of view it is necessary to reach complete ownership of the results of human sciences to then arrive to an analysis of the complexity of the human soul, intended here as a microcosm representing in itself the whole universe. From this perspective we can understand how the Lullian Art fit in Bouvelles's worldview. As a matter of fact, the combinatory art provided the French scholar with an efficient method of classifying knowledge, whose logic also claimed to be able to reach and demonstrate the true roots of real things (arriving to the level of the first intention, and not only of second intention).

This interest in the Lullian doctrines led Bouvelles to strengthen his intellectual ties with the Spanish academic environments during several voyages to Spain. He was in constant contact with the very new university in Alcalà d'Henarez⁹⁹ and it was probably there that he met Nicolas de Pax, a Spanish humanist and Lullian scholar, who was very interested also in logic and with whom he started a fruitful epistolary exchange. It was due to the efforts of Nicolas de Pax that in 1518 in Alcalà was published an edition of the *Logica Parva*¹⁰⁰, which he, following a very common humanistic cliché, claimed to be an authentic work of Ramon Lull, retrieved from an old manuscript and offered in print.

⁹⁸ For a more detailed explanation on the metaphysical conception of Charles Bouvelles see the work of Carreras y Artau (1943) *Historia de la filosofía española cristiana de los siglos XIII al XV*, which remains as of today the one of the deepest analysis of this topic.

⁹⁹ The university of Alcalà was founded in 1508 thanks to the effort of the Cardinal Cisneros. On this topic see also Pereira M. (1984), "Bernardo di Lavineta e la diffusione del Lullismo a Parigi nei primi decenni del '500", *Interpres* 5, pp. 248 e n. 32, who refers to Bataillon (1966), *Erasmus y Espana*, pp. 10-11.

¹⁰⁰ Confront *Logicalia parua Illuminati Doctoris Raymundi Lulli*, Alcalá, Arnau Guillem Brocar, 1518.

This network of intellectual exchanges established by Lefèvre's cultural circle, and by Bouvelles in particular, probably played a crucial role in ensuring the presence of Bernard of Lavinjeta at Paris in 1515. As a matter of fact, around 1515 Lefèvre's influence was able to overcome the resistences of the Sorbonne and have established a chair of Lullism inside the Parisian athaeneum. The first professor of Lullism to hold that chair in Paris was the Franciscan friar Bernard of Lavinjeta, who probably came to teach Lullism Paris at the direct request of Lefèvre or Bouvelles¹⁰¹.

Lavinjeta's career and works represent a moment of unification of many of the currents inside the Lullian schools of the time. His interests span from logic, theology, mysticism, and Marian theology, to a broader encyclopedic ambition.

Bernard of Lavinjeta was a Basque originally from the region of Bearn, as he declares in the introduction to his book *De Incarnatione Verbi*, published in Lyon in 1516. During the 15th c. this area had built intellectual and academic ties with the university of Tolouse, and it is therefore very probable that the young Bernard had completed his doctoral studies in that venue. In 1514 we find Lavinjeta active and publishing Lullian works in Lyon, living in the Franciscan convent of Saint Bonaventure, and it was probably while he was there that he received the invitation to go and teach in Paris. In the years between December 1514 and April 1518 Lavinjeta was the editor of a total of ten publications of Lull's texts, more than a half of the total editions of those years according to Rogent and Durant *Bibliografia*¹⁰², thus becoming the most influential Lullian scholar of this period.

¹⁰¹ On this topic see also Hillgarth N. J. (1971), *Ramon Lull and Lullism*, and Pereira M. (1984) "Bernardo di Lavinjeta e la diffusione del Lullismo a Parigi".

¹⁰² Rogent E. and Duràn E. in *Bibliografia de les impressions lul·lianes* vol. I, Palma de Mallorca, Miquel Font, 1989 [reprint from the 1927 edition], pp. 50-64, list 16 editions of Lullian works, from n° 52 to n°68.

His interest for logic is shown by his two Parisian editions, in 1516 and in 1518¹⁰³ of the pseudo Lullian *Logica brevis et nova*, which he presented as an authentic work of Lull, together with two authentic Lullian short books, which he offered as written by his own hand, the *Tractatu de inventione medii*, (also known as *De venatione medii*) which is an extract from the *Distinctio VII* of the *Liber de venatione substantiae, accidentis et compositi*¹⁰⁴, and the *Tractatu de conversione subiecti & praedicati per Medium*¹⁰⁵.

His main contribution to the development of the history of Lullism, though, does not lay in his publications or his teachings, but in the writing of his own masterpiece the *Explanatio compendiosaque applicatio Artis Raymundi Lulli*, which was published in Lyon in 1523. The *Explanatio* is a work of encyclopedic import, which attempts to carve a space for Lullian philosophy inside the disciplines studied in the universities of his time. Thus, the system of the Lullian Art becomes a framework for all sciences, a method that facilitates learning and memorizing knowledge as a whole. In the introduction, Lavinheta mentions the name of two other works of his which have not been preserved in the modern times, the *Liber de Conceptione Virginis Mariae*, whose very title constitutes a clear proof of the influence of Scotistic theology in Lavinheta, and the *Liber de Unitate*

¹⁰³ These two editions are listed respectively at n° 60 and n° 68 of Rogent and Durant *Bibliografia*.

¹⁰⁴ A more complete treatment of this subject will follow the next chapter on the *Novae Introductiones* and their relationship to the *Logica Parva* and the *Logica brevis et nova*. On the *De Venatione medii*, see also Buonocore E., *Ars et logica et metaphysica. Lo sviluppo della logica Lulliana da ars inventiva a venatio medii* (Tesi di laurea, Università degli Studi di Siena, 2001), which in turn draws on Vennebush (1972), «De Venatione Medii inter Subiectum et Praedicatum: ein Abschnitt aus “De Venatione Substantiae Accidentis et Compositi” des Raimundus Lullus», *Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale* 14, and on A. Madre introduction to ROL XXII (1998).

¹⁰⁵ See *Raymundus Lullius and Bernardus Lavinheta, Dialectica seu logica nova venerabilis eremitae Raymundi Lullii diligenter reposita: restitutis que nuper fuerant sublata. Et additis Tractatu de inventione medii. Item tractatu de conversione subiecti & praedicati per Medium.*, ed. Bade Josse, Paris, 1516. And also see: *Ramon Llull and Bernardus Lavinheta, Dialectica seu logica nova Venerabilis Eremitae Raemundi Lulli diligenter reposita: restitutis quae nuper fuerant sublata. Et additis Tractatu de inventione medii. Item Tractatu de conversione subiecti & praedicari per Medium*, ed. Josse Bade, Paris, 1518.

*Christiana*¹⁰⁶, a work that probably dealt with the problem of unifying all the Christian traditions and with the idea of a reformation of the Church (akin to Nicholas of Cusa's *De pace fidei*). We do not even know if Lavinheta really wrote this latter treatise that he had planned in 1523, as he probably died very soon after the publication of the *Explanatio*. Lavinheta's effort to spread the Lullian doctrines, his interest for logic and his attempt to provide a simplified yet coherent reading of Lull's Art and thought, will influence the history of Lullism in the centuries to come. One of the most concrete evidence of such influence comes from the fact that parts of the *Explanatio* and Lavinheta's editions of Lull's works were later to be incorporated in Lazarus Zetzner's anthology, a text that was published for the first time in Strasbourg in 1598, but which was reprinted many times during the 17th c., representing the main vehicle through which important European scholars such as Leibniz and Descartes came in touch with Lullian thought¹⁰⁷.

i) Jean Gerson's aversion to Lullism: a witness to the persistence of Lullian studies in Paris?

After Le Myésier's activity in Paris (and that of his younger friend and student Pierre de Limoges), little sign can be found of the study of the Lullian doctrines around the Sorbonne, until Lavinheta was called to teach there in 1515¹⁰⁸. Nevertheless, between

¹⁰⁶ Platzeck E. W. (1977), "Einleitung" in Bernardi di Lavinheta *Explanatio compendiosa que applicatio Raymundi Lulli*, pp. 1- 25.

¹⁰⁷ For further information on this topic, I redirect the reader to A. Bonner's insightful introduction to the Anastatic reprint of the Zetzner 1598 edition, in Raimundus Lullus, *Raimundus Lullus, Opera. Reprint of the Strasbourg 1651 edition*, ed. Anthony Bonner, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Frommann-Holzboog, 1996.

¹⁰⁸ Carreras y Artau (1943), *Historia de la filosofía española cristiana de los siglos XIII al XV*, p. 88-91, talk about a persistency of Parisian Lullism in 14th and 15th c. but their arguments do not seem convincing in the light of modern scholarship. As it is often the case in the history of Lullism, the period between

1395 and 1402 the Parisian university produced a document explicitly prohibiting the teaching of Lull's Art inside the faculty of theology: the presence of Lull's thought in Paris was strong enough to be considered a threat to the orthodoxy of the university. Moreover, Jean Gerson, who in 1395 had become chancellor at the Sorbonne, continuously opposed the diffusion of Lullism with a series of polemical treatises and in 1423 he even wrote a short work entitled "*Contra Raymundum Lullum*". The Lullism that Gerson argued with can be characterized as mystical in part was the result of a continuative contemplative tradition carried on at the Chartreuse of Vauvert on the manuscripts deposited there, but it was also a result of 'outside influences' penetrating in the French capital at the time. Gerson had come across the mystical movement of the *devotio moderna* and the works of John de Ruysbroeck¹⁰⁹ during his stay in Flanders around 1397-1401 and in the '*Epistola II*' of 1408 addressed to a certain Bartolomeus, monk at Vauvert, he joins Lull and Ruysbroeck in his condemnation, considering both of them representatives of a dangerous understanding of theology¹¹⁰. Gerson was also aware that Lullian doctrines were professed in Aragon; therefore he was probably conscious of the unsuccessful anti-Lullian campaign that the inquisitor Eimerich had attempted a few years earlier. Hillgarth suggests that Gerson and Eimerich shared a common philosophical ground in their sympathy for Nominalism and in their suspicions

1350-1450 in France still represents a dark area, which would probably deserve further scholarly investigation.

¹⁰⁹ The monastery founded by Ruysbroeck at Groenendal owned a copy in several manuscripts of Lull's *Liber contemplationis*, now preserved in Madrid, BN, 131 and 132. See also Carreras y Artau (1943), *Historia de la filosofía española cristiana de los siglos XIII al XV*, p. 89-91 and RLdatabase.

¹¹⁰ The monk Bartolomeus had given Gerson a copy of Lull's *Liber contemplationis* and in 1406 he had provided the chancellor with a translation of a short polemical work written by the Flemish mystic Johannes de Schoenhavia in defense of his master Ruysbroeck. Gerson's *Epistola* is a response to Schoenhavia's arguments in favor of the orthodoxy of Ruysbroeck. See Carreras y Artau (1943), *Historia de la filosofía española cristiana de los siglos XIII al XV* p. 90-91, Gerson *Opera Omnia* 1706, and Batllori (1973), "Sur le lullisme en France au XV siècle", p. 117-118.

towards the blend of realism and mysticism found in Lull's works on contemplation and in his first followers¹¹¹.

b) The Schools of Southern France as the Meeting Point of a Converging Tradition.

At the end of 14th c. we also begin to see the emerging of a new phenomenon, which will change the evolution of Lullism. Contacts between Spain and France were intensified when several masters and teachers of Lullism left the schools of Valencia and Barcelona and established new centers for the irradiation of Lull's thought. Many causes have been proposed to explain this phenomenon, which cannot be reduced to one origin but must be regarded as the result of a complex series of events, which include Eimerich persecutions, along with the explicit support of Lullian scholars expressed by the Crown of Aragon through official teaching licenses and sometimes the direct request coming from foreign intellectual communities.

As a matter of fact, during the 15th c. we find two other centers for Lullian studies in southern France: Toulouse and Lyon.

i) The University of Toulouse

In Toulouse, the vitality of Lullian doctrines is especially shown by the writings and teachings of Ramon Sibiuda (also found as Ramon de Sebonde), a Catalan scholar who became a master at the university there at the beginning of 15th c. In his *Liber Creaturarum*, also known as *Theologia naturalis*, Sibiuda showed a deep influence of

¹¹¹ Confront also Hillgarth NJ (1971), *Ramon Lull and Lullism*, pp. 269-270.

Lull's understanding of the world and of man in particular. He simplified the mechanisms and symbols of the *ars combinatoria* while stressing the importance of considering the world as a ladder of beings where the *scala naturae* is followed by another ladder, leading man to God through a process of ascent and descent. Man is the central point of the creation, a microcosm, containing in himself all the perfections of the beings who stand below him. This way of simplifying and interpreting Lull had a great impact on the way the Lullian doctrines were interpreted in the Renaissance, as it provided a conceptual grid already similar to that which was to be adopted by the main philosophers of the neo-platonic renaissance (ie. Ficino, Pico). The emphasis placed on ascent and descent (the Lullian *ascensus et descensus*) can be found also in the section dedicated to metaphysics of Lavinjeta *Explanatio*, probably the single most influential synthesis of Lull's teachings in the Renaissance¹¹². Bernhard of Lavinjeta had also been a teacher in Toulouse at the beginning of 16th c., as he recounts in the section on memory of that same work: if this stay in Toulouse was prior or after his time in Paris it cannot be reconstructed from the scarce data in our possess, but it is certain that Lavinjeta had connections there and some scholars went as far as hypothesizing Toulouse as the university in which Lavinjeta had spent a significant part of his intellectual formation and of his *curriculum studiorum*, thus becoming '*doctor artium et theologiae*'¹¹³.

¹¹² On Bernard of Lavinjeta see especially Pereira Michela (1984), "Bernardo Lavinjeta e la diffusione del Lullismo a Parigi nei primi anni del '500", *Interpres, Rivista di Studi Quattrocenteschi* 5, p. 242-265.

¹¹³ The quote is taken from Lavinjeta's *Explanatio* (reprint 1977) p. 522. For the hypothesis of Toulouse as a venue for Lavinjeta's studies see also Platzeck E. (1977) "Einleitung", p. 5 and Pereira M. (1984), "Bernardo di Lavinjeta e la diffusione del Lullismo a Parigi", p. 248.

ii) The Franciscan School of Lyon

On the other hand, the flourishing of the area around Lyon, and especially of the Franciscan monastery of St. Bonaventure in Lyon, as a ‘focal point of Lullist studies’ can be dated to a slightly later period, almost coinciding with ‘the revival of Lullism at Paris’¹¹⁴. It is only at the end of 15th c. and at the beginning of 16th c. that we have evidence of Franciscan scholars interested in Lullian works. The first two names we encounter are those of Jean Labin and Jean de la Grène, who were in epistolary contact with Lefèvre and Bouvelles. Iohannes Lagrenius (de la Grène) was the main vehicle of the connection between the university of Lyon and Lefèvre’s circle in Paris: he was a Franciscan friar and a professor of theology at Lyon and from 1501 we find him engaged in a fruitful intellectual exchange with Lefèvre which was still continuing in 1518¹¹⁵. The most evident outcome of this collaboration between intellectuals in Paris and in Lyon is the completion and publication of Bernhard Lavinjeta’s *Explanatio*, which took place in 1523 while Bernhard was living in the monastery of St. Benedict in Lyon. Although it has not been clarified yet how the relationship between these two intellectual circle functioned, and what exact role did Lavinjeta play as an additional link with the Spanish-Catalan schools¹¹⁶, it has been clearly shown the vital part that Lavinjeta’s re-elaborations of Lullian doctrines had in providing an easily accessible and ready to use

¹¹⁴ Cfr. Victor J.M. (1975), « The Revival of Lullism at Paris 1499-1516», *Renaissance Quaterly* 28, pp. 508-509.

¹¹⁵ For more details on the exchanges between Jean Labin, Jean de la Grene, Lefevre and Bouvelle see also Victor J.M. (1975), «The Revival of Lullism at Paris 1499-1516», p. 509 n. 14 and n. 15, and also Rice E. (1972), *The prefatory Epistles of Jacques Lefevre*.

¹¹⁶ The best account of this intellectual dynamic is still Pereira Michela (1984), “Bernardo di Lavinjeta e la diffusione del Lullismo a Parigi”, who integrated the article by Victor J. M.(1975), «The Revival of Lullism at Paris 1499-1516». Both studies signaled the impossibility of clarifying completely certain aspects of the connections between the intellectual circles of Lyon and Paris and certain obscure moments in Lavinjeta’s biography, thus encouraging further research on the topic.

version of Lull's Art and logic to the European public in the later Renaissance and well inside the 17th c.

c) Lullism in Italy in the Fifteenth Century: The Weaving of a Network Between Catalan, French and Italian Intellectual Environments.

i) The Exodus: Catalan *Magistri* Teaching Lullism in Italian Settings.

Together with southern France, Italy seems to be one of the main points of arrival of the diaspora of Spanish Lullian scholars in the 15th c., especially the areas around Venice and the Veneto. Juan Bolons was one of the first examples of this network of contacts that were established between the Catalan schools and Italian intellectuals. In fact, it is proven that in 1433 Bolons was teaching and writing in Venice, as stated by himself in the *explicit* of his most important work, the *Lectura super Artificium Artis Generalis*: “*finita fuit haec lectura 1433, Venetiis, die lune 28 mensis septembris, per venerabilem magistrum Iohannem Bolons, in domo domini Fantini Dandoli*”¹¹⁷.

The *Lectura* is preserved in nine manuscript copies, among which five are still in Italian libraries (two only in the Marciana library in Venice). The oldest dated exemplar is in a manuscript in Munich, and it is an important witness of the link between the Catalan Lullian school and Fantino Dandolo. Dandolo is a crucial figure in the history of Italian Lullism as he represents a connection not only between Catalan schools and

¹¹⁷ For further information on this subject, I redirect the reader to a very recent article on this topic, which puts Bolons' *Lectura* in the context of early Lullism in Italy: Marta M.M. Romano (2007), "Il primo lullismo in Italia: tradizione manoscritta e contesto della *Lectura* de Joan Bolons" in *Studia Lulliana* 47, pp. 71-115.

Venice and Padua, but also with Nicholas of Cues, who was a personal friend of him and whom Dandolo presented with a copy of Lull's *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem*¹¹⁸. Fantino Dandolo was a Venetian patrician, a priest with a degree in law, and a sparkling intellectual devoted to classical studies. He had a brilliant ecclesiastic career and he became a strenuous supporter of the Lullian doctrines: he played a vital role in establishing an academic venue for the study of Lullism in northern Italy. When in 1448 he was proclaimed bishop of Padua, he invited the Catalan master of Lullism Ros to hold a series of lectures on various Lullian doctrines, with the clear intent of creating a Lullian branch of studies inside the Paduan university, probably as a way of contrasting the Averroistic trends which were very strong in the atheneum of Padua. It is also highly probable that in their voyages to the Veneto Bolons and Ros had brought along with them many manuscript copies of Lull's works, which are now preserved in Italian libraries, thus justifying a Catalan origin of many of the Lullian exemplars in Italian collections¹¹⁹.

Juan Ros was a Valencian Franciscan friar linked to the Lullian school of Barcelona, and it was precisely during his stay in Padua that he completed the writing of his "*Tractatus de Grammatica*" and of the "*Artificium arithmeticae*", respectively in 1449 and 1450¹²⁰. Both works reveal a didactic and didascallic intention, which testifies the

¹¹⁸ This manuscript is now preserved in Bernkastel-Kues, St. Nikolaus Hospital Library ms. 82 and it contains annotations from Nicholas of Cues own hand. It is now available on line in the digital reproduction provided by the Raimundus Lullus Institute of the University of Freiburg.

¹¹⁹ For a punctual analysis of the relationships between the Lullian works preserved in manuscripts now in Italian libraries and the evolution of Lullism in Italy see Batllori M. (1943), "El lulismo en Italia" and especially the recent translation of this work in Batllori M. (2004), *Il Lullismo in Italia*, Antonianum, Roma 2004, edited by F. Santi and M. Pereira, which provide also an updated apparatus of notes and bibliography.

¹²⁰ For further information on Juan Ros see also Hillgarth Jocelyn N. (1991 B), *Readers and books in Majorca 1229-1550*, Editors du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, pp. 214-215 and Index 2.

desire to begin a scholastic tradition, capable of teaching all aspects of knowledge from a Lullian point of view¹²¹.

In the south of Italy, Naples also appears to be a part of the intellectual exchange which saw Lullian masters move from Catalonia towards Italy, probably because of the connections of the Crown of Aragon. In the space of three years we find two royal privileges conceded by king Alphonsus the Magnanimus to two Lullian scholars which allowed them to teach Lullian doctrines in the city of Naples and in all his domains: in 1446 to the mysterious Landulfo de Columba, an obscure English carmelitan friar¹²²; and in 1449 to Jean Llobet¹²³ a well known professor of Lullism in Majorca. He was one of the founders of the Lullian school in Majorca¹²⁴ and he had tried to establish a stable venue for that school in the island of Majorca. After his death in 1460, his teaching inspired the actions of the Italian friar Mario de Passa, who attempted to build a stable college for Lullian studies on mount Randa, which were to be financed by the donations of a noblewoman from Barcelona, Beatriu del Pinos¹²⁵. Llobet is known as the author of an *Ars Notativa*, a text on the rhetorical principles to organize a speech or a scholastic dispute, and also of a not well-known Lullian *Tabula* and of a treaty on logic and one on metaphysics. Thus, his teachings testify a first opening inside the Lullian school towards

¹²¹ The first hypothesis of a connection between Fantini Dandolo and the writings of Juan Ros in Padua was formulated by Batllori M (1943), “El lulismo en Italia”, pp. 481-488.

¹²² See also Hillgarth N.J. (1991 B), *Readers and Books*, p. 216.

¹²³ On Pere Joan Llobet see also Hillgarth N.J. (1991 B), *Readers and Books*, pp. 119, 206-14, p. 219 and Index 2.

¹²⁴ See Batllori M. (1943), “El lulismo en Italia”, pp. 486-488.

¹²⁵ See Carreras y Artau T. and Carreras y Artau J. (1943), *Historia de la filosofia española cristiana de los siglos XIII al XV*, p. 64 and note 19. For more information on Mario de Passa, see later in this chapter and also “Fra Mario de Passa, lul-lista i bibliofil” in Homenatge a A. Rubió i Lluch, 1936, cited by Carreras y Artau and see also Hillgarth N.J. (1991 B), *Readers and Books*, pp. 213-15, pp. 364 and following and Index 1. For further information about Beatriu de Pinos, see also Hillgarth N.J. (1991 B), *Readers and Books*, pp. 101, 213-17, 228, 232, 350 and Index 1.

the elaboration of a more complex philosophical system, which embraced all fields of knowledge: this same concern is evident in Pere Dagui's works.

ii) Pere Dagui

The tradition of Catalan masters bringing Lullian doctrines to Italy continued with Pere Dagui, a priest from Montblanc, near Tarragona¹²⁶. Dagui was the holder of the first official chair of Lullism in Majorca, financed by the donations of Agnes Pacs de Quint, a local noblewoman¹²⁷. Dagui's commentary on the Lullian Art, the *Janua artis magistri Raymundi Lull*, published in Barcelona in 1482, had a very strong impact on the reception of the Art in 16th c.¹²⁸.

Dagui intended the *Janua artis* as an introduction to the physics and cosmology of Lull, but in many issues he broadens his interpretation towards more philosophical and theological themes. While analyzing the concept of substance in Lull, Dagui goes beyond the simple corporeal substance born from the original Chaos, and stresses the importance of the spiritual substances, which should be considered through their acts, by using the mechanism of the Lullian correlatives¹²⁹. This enquiry leads the artist to understand the way in which spiritual substances work, which, in turn, mirrors the actions of their intrinsic faculties: memory, intellect and will (or love). Read in this light, the *Janua Artis* appears to be an attempt to apply Lullian methods to the theological analysis

¹²⁶ For further information on Pere Dagui or Degui see also Hillgarth N.J. (1991 B), *Readers and Books*, pp. 12, 214-15, 217-220, 224-228, 231, 241, 366, 391, and Indexes 1 and 2.

¹²⁷ On Agnes Pax de Quint, honored citizen of Majorca, see also Hillgarth N.J. (1991 B), *Readers and Books*, pp. 218 and following, pp. 227-228 and Index 1.

¹²⁸ See also Batllori M. (1943), "El lulismo en Italia", pp. 494-498.

¹²⁹ See also Pereira M. (1984), "Bernardo di Lavineta e la diffusione del Lullismo a Parigi", pp. 253-254.

of God's acts, thus unifying the Lullian system and cosmology with a Scotist doctrinal basis (rooted in the theory of the *univocitas entis*).¹³⁰

The Majorcan inquisitor Guillem Casellas perceived Dagui's blending of Lullian and Scotists theories as unorthodox, and he persecuted him and the Lullian School of Majorca for the support given to the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, and for their views on Incarnation and on the Trinity¹³¹. It was mainly in response to Casellas' accusations that, at the end of 1482 or at the beginning of 1484, Dagui felt the need to embark in a voyage to Rome, to plea in favor of the orthodoxy of his doctrines in front of Pope Sixt IV (d. August, 1484) and of a commission of theologians (among whom there was the theologian and lullist Fernando de Cordoba), formed to evaluate his adherence to the dictates of the Faith.

Dagui's arrival in Rome and the debate on the orthodoxy of Lullism that followed it marked a period of renewed interest towards Lullian theories in Italy. Already in 1480 we find the first incunable of a Lullian text printed in Venice, the *Ars Generalis ultima* and the apocryphal *Logica Brevis et Nova*¹³², but Dagui's presence in Rome prompted two additional editions of Lullian works, Lull's *Ars Brevis* and Dagui's *Ianua Artis*, both dated 1485, with the clear intention of spreading the Lullian doctrines among Italian intellectual circles. In the same period, Dagui was writing his second work, the *Opus de*

¹³⁰ For the part on the *Janua Artis* see Carreras y Artau J. (1943), *Historia de la filosofía española cristiana de los siglos XIII al XV*, pp.71-73, also confront Pereira M. (1984), "Bernardo di Lavinheta e la diffusione del Lullismo a Parigi", pp 253-254 and Batllori M. (1943), "El lulismo en Italia", pp. 494-498. The connection with Duns Scotus' thought, certain in Dagui, due to the accusations he received by the inquisitor Casellas on the question of Immaculate Conception and of the univocity of being, has never been analyzed in detail as for the philosophical understanding shown in the *Janua Artis*. I cannot pursue this topic further in this venue, but it would be an interesting subject for further research.

¹³¹ The specifics of Casella's accusations to Dagui can be found analyzed in detail in Batllori M. (1943), "El lulismo en Italia", pp. 495-99; and to a lesser extent in Pereira M. (1984), "Bernardo di Lavinheta e la diffusione del lullismo a Parigi", pp. 253-4. For a more punctual analysis of Dagui's controversy with Caselles see also L. Perez-Martinez, in *Estudios Lullianos* 4, 1960, pp. 291-306, which contains an appendix with significant documents for the reconstruction of the history of the Lullian school in Majorca.

¹³² Batllori seems to still consider this text authentic, but his analysis is now outdated.

Formalibus, generally known as *Metaphysica*, less influential than the first one but of a greater philosophical import, which will be published later in 1485 after the master's return to Majorca. In the *Metaphysica* Dagui deepens the realism of his positions both in logic and in metaphysics, almost proposing a Platonic worldview. He analyzes the divine being through four intrinsic principles: quiddity, naturality, essence and existence. This work emphasizes even more Dagui's debt to Scotus' theory of the univocity of being, as he arrives to the conclusion that even when it seems that being is predicated of God in an equivocal modality, this happens only in an apparent way, while in reality the core being remains univocal.

Pere Dagui is a crucial figure in the history of Lullism, not only because he contributed to the diffusion of the Lullian doctrines in Italy but also because thanks to his teachings Lullism became an official discipline of study in Majorca and his chair in the *Studium* became a part of the university of Majorca since its birth. Moreover, it was through Dagui's efforts that the Franciscan friar Francisco Jimenez Cisneros came in touch with the study of Ramon Lull's thought. In 1495 Cisneros became bishop of Toledo and later he was appointed Cardinal: with that authority was able to contribute to the creation of the university of Alcalá de Henares (1508), which became another center of Lullian studies.

On philosophical grounds, Dagui's merits were, on the one hand, to have reinforced the connection between Scotism and Lullism, a link that became a part of the Franciscan intellectual tradition (though without ever becoming a generalized trend¹³³). On the other

¹³³ For further information on the topic of Franciscan Italian Scotist thinkers, I redirect the reader to the studies of Marco Forlivesi, and especially to Forlivesi M. (2008), *Gli scotisti secenteschi di fronte al dibattito tra bañeziani e molinisti: un'introduzione e una nota*, in *Conoscenza e contingenza nella tradizione aristotelica medievale*, a cura di St. Perfetti, E.T.S., Pisa, pp. 243-285.

hand his main merit was to have opened new perspective to the Lullian studies by combining the analysis of the formal and logical aspects of Lull's system with the metaphysical realism that originally permeated Lull's work. This new trend of studies, that combined the interest for logic with metaphysical, ontological and theological theories, would prove to be very fruitful during the later Renaissance.

iii) Jaume Janer

The most influential disciple of Dagui was the Catalan Cistercian Jaume Janer, who never traveled to Italy but attracted many Italian scholars to hear his teachings in Barcelona and Valencia. Janer begun his career inside the school of Barcelona, and it was in Barcelona that he published his two first works: the *Naturae ordo studentium pauperum* in 1489 and the *Ingressus facilis rerum intelligibulum* in 1491. The *Naturae ordo studentium pauperum* was intended as schooltext and it provided an introduction to Lullian philosophy of nature. Janer was able to stress the fundamental realism of Lull's thought while at the same time considering the importance of logic inside the lullian method and proposing a possible application of the Lullian Art as a system for the classification of knowledge. Later, Janer obtained a privilege from the King of Aragon, which allowed him to establish a Lullian center of study in Valencia, and in 1506 in Valencia he published his masterpiece, the *Ars Metaphysicalis*. In this work, Janer, starting from an analysis of Lull's *Ars Generalis Ultima*, investigates the ways in which natural reality functions. He uses the principles and the mechanisms of the *Ars* along with the metaphor of the tree of science to represent in seven steps man's itinerary in his quest for

knowledge. The first step is a thorough study of the Lullian art and its figures, from there the student goes on to analyse the concept of being (ontology), then to the study of physics, astronomy and logic, to arrive in the end to theology and mystics, thus considering all the most important aspects of the concept of substance.

This way of connecting metaphysics within a broader context of study of all the fields of knowledge fits perfectly with the encyclopedic tendency that was present inside Lull's own system and which is represented at its best in the *Arbor Scientiae*. Furthermore, Janer's use of a Lullian framework to present a general system of studies and a way of organizing knowledge represents one of the main ways in which the Lullian Art was understood and accepted during the Renaissance and the Baroque Age. It has been also hypothesized that Bernard of Lavineta had been influenced by the *Ars metaphysicalis* while organizing the structure of his own Lullian work of encyclopedic knowledge, the *Explanatio*¹³⁴.

iv) The Closing of the Circle: Italian Lullists in Majorca, Barcelona and Valencia.

The connection between Catalan and Italian Lullism should not be seen as going only in one direction: the threads of the European Lullian tradition become more and more interwoven.

In terms of production of new texts, it is remarkable to notice that during 14th c. we find a translation of Lull's *Llibre de Meravelles* also known as *Felix*, written in an Italian vernacular heavily influenced by Venetian characteristics. This text enjoyed a vast diffusion, as testified by the five manuscript copies of it still extant, while there are only

¹³⁴ See especially Hillgarth N. J. (1971), *Ramon Lull and Lullism*, p. 292 and note 131.

two surviving manuscripts of the original Catalan version and only one of the French translation¹³⁵. In terms of scholars and personalities who came in touch with Lullism, we have already mentioned the experience of the Italian friar Mario de Passa, who came to Majorca attracted by the teachings of Lloblet and attempted the construction of a stable venue for the Lullian school on mount Randa.

Next to Mario de Passa, it is important to mention Virgilio Bornati, a scholar and a traveller, as he is defined in the documents of the time, and another student of Lloblet¹³⁶. He left an account of his travels, now part of the Biblioteca Morcelliana (cod. 3), in Chiari. From his own words, we learn that he visited Majorca in May 1458, “pro arte generali Raymundi Lulli habenda”, and that he attended the lessons on the principle of the Lullian art, given by a master “Giovanni Luppeto”, clearly identified with John Lloblet.

Carreras y Artau’s study of the early Lullian tradition considers the experiences of Mario de Passa and Virgilio Bornati as evidence of a “vigorous” Lullian movement in 15th c. Italy, also proven by the diffusion of the Italian version of the *Felix*, although the most original synthesis between Lullism and the Italian tradition is certainly found in the *Canti* of Bartolomeo Gentile da Fallamonica.

¹³⁵ For more information on the Italian version of the *Llibre de meravelles*, I redirect the reader to the excellent section on this topic in Batllori M. (1943), “El lulismo en Italia”, pp. 299-303, and also to the work of Brancaleone, who has completed his doctoral thesis in 2000 in the Warburg Institute of London, and to his article: Brancaleone David, “Il *Libro dele Bestie* di Raimondo Lullo nella versione trecentesca veneta”, in *Per leggere i generi della letteratura* 2, 2, 2002, pp. 17-62.

¹³⁶ For further investigation on Virgilio Bornati, I redirect the reader to the article on him by G. De Caro in the DBI, XII, p. 799-801 (Roma, 1970); and to the pages devoted to him in Carreras y Artau J. (1943), *Historia de la filosofia española cristiana de los siglos XIII al XV*, pp. 81-83, and 177-178. Both accounts, though, still draw on the evidence taken from an older article by Luigi Rivetti “Di Virgilio Bornato (o Bornati) viaggiatore bresciano del secolo XV” in *Archivio Storico Italiano*, 5, 1904, pp. 156-171. The most recent study on Bornati is that of R. Capitanio, in *La cultura della memoria. Uomini libri e carte della Biblioteca Morcelliana*. Chiari, Fondazione Biblioteca Morcelli-Pinacoteca Repossi, 2002.

Bartolomeo Gentile da Fallamonica was born in Genoa around 1450, son of a noble family, and his ties with Lullism probably began already inside his family: in fact it is possible that the Gentiles were in contact both with the Spinola family in Genoa, and, through their merchantile trade in Catalonia, that they were in touch with the Lullian school in Valencia. Bartolomeo Gentile spent many years in Spain between the end of the 15th c. and the beginning of 16th c., in particular in Valencia, and he was the financer of many editions published by masters of the school of Valencia: his constant support of the Lullian cause earned him the thanks of scholars such as Jaume Janer and his pupil Alfonso de Proaza. In his late age, Bartolomeo developed a stronger literary and philosophical interest, which led him to the composition of the *Canti*, a book of poetry¹³⁷. The *Canti* consists of fourty-four cantos, in which the author describes his spiritual journey through reality, completed thanks to his master and guide Ramon Lull. This journey takes Bartolomeo through all the kingdoms of the material elements, through an explanation of the hardest points of the Christian doctrine, such as the Trinity, the Incarnation and the Immaculate Conception, and it ends with a travel through the three kingdoms of the afterlife: hell, purgatory and paradise. Even at first glance, the *Canti* seem to integrate perfectly a Dantian poetic echo with a philosophical framework, which is clearly that of Lull's teachings, probably influenced by the Felix.

M. Romano, who has recently studied the work of Gentile, strongly advocates the originality of Bartolomeo's *Canti*, which goes beyond a mere poetical imitation of the *Comedy* or a simple divulgative work of Lullian doctrines: the *Canti* are an autonomous work of poetry, a synthesis in which Lull's guiding helps the poet to reach an

¹³⁷ Carreras y Artau J. (1943), *Historia de la filosofia española cristiana de los siglos XIII al XV*, briefly talk about Bartolomeo Gentile's *Canti* at pp. 82-83.

understanding of reality and of the afterlife that has the ambition of superseding Dante's own vision¹³⁸.

V) The Thread of Hermitism Inside the Lullian Schools: Lull as the '*Pius Eremita*'.

As we have begun to see, another thread inside the history of early Lullian schools in Catalonia Aragon ties together Lullism with Hermitism (the mendicant order of Augustinian friars called hermits). The Parisian intellectual circle of Lefèvre d'Étaples was already aware of the connections between Lull and the hermitic way of living. In his introduction to the 1499 edition of the *Liber de laudibus Mariae*, Lefèvre repeatedly called Lull '*pius eremita*' and his friend Bouvelles entitled his life of Lull, which was the first biography of him to see the light of print, *Epistula in vitam Remundi Lulli Eremitae*, published in Paris, 1511.

Ramon Lull himself had chosen to live as a hermit at the beginning of his new life after the conversion, and he had founded, with Royal approval, a monastery at Miramar, with the intention of training monks to be missionaries and apologists of the Christian faith among Muslims and Jews. This missionary intent was carried on during the whole 14th c., as it is witnessed by the fact that missionaries from Majorca and Catalonia (very likely with a Lullian training) were selected to evangelize the Canary Islands in a series of missions encouraged by all the kingdoms of Spain from 1344 to 1386.¹³⁹ Hillgarth and

¹³⁸ Marta Romano has very recently published a detailed and illuminating study on the figure of Bartolomeo Gentile da Fallamonica and on the importance of his *Canti*. For further information on this topic I redirect the reader to: Romano Marta MM, "I *Canti* di Bartolomeo Gentile da Fallamonica (1450-1510/20). Poesia, scienza e studio di Lullo" in *Pan* 24, 2008, pp. 273-299.

¹³⁹ See Hillgarth N.J. (1964), «Some Notes on Lullian Hermits in Majorca, Saec. XIII-XVII» *Studia Monastica* 6, p. 306, who refers to an article of J. Vinke 1942. Vinke had edited the medieval documents, pp. 299-301.

Perarnau¹⁴⁰ traced the link between hermits and Lullism in 14th c. especially referring to single historical figures. One of these interesting Lullian hermits is Bernat Sala, whose name we encounter in Eimeric's *Dialogus contra Lullistas* (ca. 1369). The name Bernat Sala also is found in two documents of 1330 and 1338 certifying special concessions from the bishop of Barcelona: he seems to have been a priest, hermit and to have belonged to the Franciscan Third Order. Pere Rossell can be taken as another example of this interest for Lullism inside Augustine Hermits. Pere Rossell was also mentioned in Nicolas Eimerich's *Dialogus contra Lullistas*, in which he is depicted as a hermit and a teacher of Lullism in the Valencian region: "quidam modernus heremita begardus frater Petrus Rossell communiter appellatus"¹⁴¹. In 1393 and 1399 we find a friar Pere Rossell named as the recipient of two concessions by the kings of Catalonia-Aragon, which concerned the possibility of teaching the Lullian Art: even if it is not possible to prove that the two names corresponded to the same person, the mere existence of two friars Pere Rossell who were teaching the Lullian Art one in 1369 and the other in 1399, constitute evidence of the persistence of the teaching of Lull's doctrines among Catalan Hermit friars, despite Eimerich's excommunications and persecutions.

¹⁴⁰ Perarnau i Espelt Josep (1991), "Francescanesimo ed eremitismo nell'area catalana" in *Eremitismo nel Francescanesimo medievale. Assisi, 12-13-14 ottobre 1989* Centro di Studi Francescani, Assisi, pp. 165-185.

¹⁴¹ Nicholaus Eimerich "Dialogus contra lullistas", ed. Jaume de Puig i Oliver in "El *Dialogus contra lullistas* de Nicolau Eimeric. Edició i estudi" in *ATCA* 19, Barcelona, 2000, pp. 7-296. For further information on Pere Rossell I redirect the reader to this recent study by de Puig I Oliver and to the studies of Hillgarth N.J. (1964), «Some Notes on Lullian Hermits », pp. 307-308.

VI) An Obscure and Understudied Thread Inside the Lullian Schools: Two Pseudo Lullian Logical Treatises As the Only Surviving Witnesses of a Genoese Lullian Tradition.

Almost all the texts produced inside the Lullian schools in the 14th and 15th centuries show two interesting common characteristics: on the one hand the tendency towards a simplification and a normalization of the most ‘original’ and controversial Lullian doctrines; and the other hand we find the recourse to anonymity, used in the 14th c. as a precaution measure in many treaties of this period, both in Latin and the Catalan vernacular. The *Ars Memorativa* that we have mentioned above, which was written in 1338 by Bernart Garí, a Valencian priest and Lullian scholar, is the only exception to this rule of anonymity and it should be studied inside the context of pseudo Lullian arts of memory¹⁴². The Lullian school of Valencia was from the beginning linked to Franciscan Spirituals circles, and such connection between Lullism and Franciscan Spirituals, together with the tendency to normalize Lullian doctrines continued during the whole 14th c. and will be exported even outside of the reign of Catalonia-Aragon.

Perarnau in his “Consideracions diacroniques dels mss. Lullians” traces a line connecting Catalan Lullism with the Lullian schools developing in the regions of the Empire (mainly Italy and Germany)¹⁴³. In his analysis he uses the content of the ms. Firenze, Riccardiana 1001 and of the ms. Munich, BSB, Lat 10542 to show how not only there was a Lullian school in Italy, but also that it was active and that it produced new texts. Perarnau underlines a textual connection between the *Loyca discipuli* of the ms. Firenze,

¹⁴² Tarré Josep (1951), "Un quadrienni de producció lul·lística a València (1335-1338)", pp. 22-30.

¹⁴³ Perarnau i Espelt, Josep (1983), "Consideracions diacròniques entorn dels manuscrits lul·lians medievals de la «Bayerische Staatsbibliothek» de Munic", *ATCA* 2, Barcelona, pp. 123-169.

Riccardiana 1001 and the *Nove Introductiones* of the ms. Munich, BSB, lat. 10542, almost advocating an identity between the two texts. He points out that the text is of Italian origin, and that the author is clearly not a Catalan, but probably an Italian Lullian scholar, who knew even the later Lullian production, since the text mentions the authentic Lullian *Liber de possibili et impossibili* (Paris 1310).

Perarnau's conclusions are still valid even if they apply only to that part of the ms.

Riccardiana 1001 that contains the *Nove Introductiones*. As we shall see more in detail in the following pages, the final sections of the *Nove Introductiones* do refer to an Italian, more specifically Genoese background, but without specifying much more about its author or the provenience of the text¹⁴⁴. It is hard to understand if there could be any relationship between the primary center of diffusion of Lullism, instituted by Lull himself, in Genoa, in the house of Perceval Spinola, and the production of the *Nove Introductiones*.

The ms. Florence, Riccardiana 1001 helps a little more in reconstructing the history of this text. It presents some marginal notes from its copyist, a Prussian Hermit friar, probably called Nicholas Mukkenwalt, stating that he had compiled the manuscript while in the monastery at the Cervara, in 1417, while a certain dominus Betrammus was underprior. It is very fascinating to note though, that the monastery of San Geronimo della Cervara, in the dioceses of Santa Margherita Ligure was created with the support of members of the Spinola family, and that we often find Spinola in position of power in that region.

¹⁴⁴ See in particular my discussion on the origins and characteristics of the *Nove Introductiones* in Chapter Four.

As I have started to show, the most obscure paths of Lullism seem to lead us to Genoa and to the supposed third center of diffusion of the Lullian thought. The first question that needs to be answered to begin to reconstruct Italian Lullism is therefore, what happened to the manuscript left to Perceval Spinola? The aforementioned recent researches of Marta Romano and Gabriella Pomaro are trying to answer this and similar questions. Many questions are also posed by the ms. Firenze, Riccardiana 1001 and by the text of the *Loyca discipuli* and of the *Nove Introductiones*, which I will try to answer in the course of the following chapters: but first one needs to have a clear look at what has been written in the scholarship on the issue and confront it with the manuscript evidence. While I do not think that conclusive evidence on the relationship between this texts can be drawn till there will be provided a critical edition for both the *Logica Parva* and the *Logica brevis et nova*, I do believe that the very provisory nature of the *Nove Introductiones*, as a sort of Ur-text, tells us something important: this is mainly a school text, a work in progress, intended to be adjusted to the needs of the teacher and of the students, to the beliefs of the time¹⁴⁵. This clearly fits the status of logic as a discipline, therefore, in the following chapters, I will consider the text as such: a handbook of logic for Franciscan schools.

¹⁴⁵ For more details see my analysis of the textual correspondences between the *Nove Introductiones*, the *Logica Parva* and the *Logica brevis et nova* in the second part of Chapter three, and the discussion on the nature and composition of the *Nove Introductiones* in Chapter Four.

Chapter Three. The Pseudo Lullian Logical Treatises as One of the Threads of Medieval Lullism.

I. The Manuscripts and Textual Tradition of the *Loyca*

***Discipuli* and the *Nove Introductiones*.**

One of the few ways to shed some light on what really happened inside the Italian Lullian tradition during the later XIV c. and XV c. is to focus our attention on the manuscripts that survived till our time. In the last century, this field of study had not received sufficient attention by scholars and thus we have few catalogues of Lullian manuscripts and even fewer scholarly analyses of them. The main works that are still the basis of any analysis of Lullian manuscripts are that of Lopez, Batllori's book and Perarnau's studies and catalogues¹⁴⁶. Recently, a renewed interest towards the history of Lullism has arisen among the academic community. Gabriella Pomaro, the director of Manoscritti Datati project, is currently working on reconstructing the main characteristics of what she calls the Lullian *scriptorium*, grounding her analysis on codicological and paleographic elements. Among the manuscripts she describes in detail, there is one that constitutes the core of my study: the ms. Firenze, Riccardiana 1001.

¹⁴⁶ Cfr. Lopez Athanasius (1910), "Descriptio codicum franciscanorum Bibliothecae Riccardianae Florentinae", in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 3, pp. 739-742. Batllori Miquel (1943) "El lulismo en Italia. Ensayo de síntesis" in *Revista de Filosofia* 2, pp. 253-313 and pp. 479-537, and the most recent and updated translation: Batllori, Miquel (2004), *Il Lullismo in Italia. Tentativo di sintesi*, ed. and intr. by Francesco Santi and Michela Pereira; trad. Francisco José Díaz Marcilla, Pontificio Ateneo Antonianum, Roma.

Inside this manuscript, which will be described below, we find the *Loyca discipuli* and the *Nove Introductiones*, the two short texts of Lullian school whose main topic is the teaching of logic and that is a witness to one –until now underestimated- important development of late medieval Lullism, as we have briefly argued. There has been a lot of misinformation and confusion about what exactly was the content of those texts, about a possible date of composition of both works, and even if they were one or two texts.

As A. Bonner repeatedly said, the subject of the teaching of logic inside the Lullian schools is one of the most complex of the whole Lullian tradition. With this study, and providing a primary edition of the texts contained in the ms. Riccardiana 1001, my aim is not only to offer in print for the first time two texts that have so far been unknown to the larger academic community, but also to clarify a few starting points about what really happened inside the Italian Lullian tradition. I believe that the two texts contained in the ms. Riccardiana 1001 play a key role in the unravelling of this tradition.

As far as I know (and based on the data of the Ramon Lull Database) so far the only studies that broach the topic of the pseudo Lullian logical texts included in the ms. Riccardiana 1001 have been those of Francesco Santi¹⁴⁷. The slightly broader subject of pseudo Lullian logical treatises had received more attention, starting with 1971 when C. Lohr published an anastatic reprint of the *Logica Nova* and *Logicalia Parva*.¹⁴⁸ The edition included the text I am calling *Logica Parva*, a pseudo Lullian logical treaty, which combines typical Lullian features with the most standard scholastic logical

¹⁴⁷ Santi, Francesco (1986), "Osservazioni sul manoscritto 1001 della Biblioteca Riccardiana di Firenze, per la storia del Lullismo nelle regioni meridionali dell'Impero nel secolo XIV", in *ATCA* 5, Barcelona, pp. 231-267 and Santi, Francesco (1990), "Episodis del lul·lisme genovès a les acaballes del segle XIV: la confluència amb l'ockhamisme", in *Del frau a l'erudició. Aportacions a la història del lul·lisme dels segles XIV al XVIII*. Randa 27, Barcelona, Curial, pp. 57-69.

¹⁴⁸ Llull, Ramon, *Logica nova. Logicalia parva. De quinque praedicabilibus et decem praedicamentis. Liber de natura*, ed. Charles Lohr, Frankfurt, 1971-2.

doctrines. In his introduction, Lohr briefly addressed the questions of the originality of the *Logica Nova* and of the development of a Lullian tradition across Renaissance Europe, which revolved around intellectual circles such as the group of Lefevre and Bouvelles in France and as Alfonso de Proaza and Nicolas de Pax in Spain.

In the description of the contents of the edition he identified the *Logica Parva* with the *Dialecticae Introductiones* and tentatively attributed the former text to the aforementioned Nicolas de Pax, a Majorcan Lullist of the early 16th c. who was called to occupy the chair of Lullism in the university of Alcalá, which had been founded by the cardinal Cisneros.

Lohr exposed and refined his research in the articles published in the following year¹⁴⁹ and it is his studies that represent the springboard for my work. Since 1972, I have found published only two articles specifically on the subject of pseudo-Lullian logic: that of Francesco Santi in 1986 and one of Angel D'Ors in 1996¹⁵⁰. In addition, there is a chapter in Bonner's introduction to the Catalan edition of the *Logica Nova*¹⁵¹ devoted to the analysis of what he defines "a parallel tradition". Those by F. Santi's are the only studies, as of today, to face the problem of the philosophical implications of the texts preserved in ms. Firenze, Riccardiana 1001. D'Ors, on the other hand, analyses in particular the manuscripts and the text of the *Logica Parva*, reversing Lohr's conclusions. Grounding his study on the manuscripts in Majorca and Salamanca and on the 1512 Alcalá edition, he arrives to hypothesise Lull himself as the real author of the *Logica Parva*, even if he

¹⁴⁹ Lohr, Charles (1972 A), "Ramon Llull, *Logica brevis*", in *Estudios Lulianos* 16, p. 1-11 and Lohr, Charles (1972), "Ramón Llull, «Logica brevis»", in *Franciscan Studies* 32, pp. 144-153.

¹⁵⁰ Angel D'Ors (1996), "Raimundo Lulio, Nicolas de Paz y la 'Logica Parva'", *Documenti e Studi* 7, pp.115-130.

¹⁵¹ Ramon Llull, *Logica Nova*, a cura d'A. Bonner, NEORL, Patronat Ramon Llull, Palma, 1998 pp. XXVI-XXVIII.

auspicates further investigation to better prove his theory. D'Ors' conclusion was immediately criticised by the Lullian scholarly community. Bonner's review of this article¹⁵² called into question the very manuscript evidence that D'Ors used to show his point to demonstrate the impossibility of attributing the *Logica Parva* to Ramon Lull's own hand.

To quote Bonner's own words, there is a clear need for more in depth research on this topic: "Però abans d'arribar a una decisió caldria fer un estudi comparatiu detallat de quatre obres dubtoses: (1) la *Logica parva*, (2) la *Logica brevis*, (3) les *Novae et compendiosae introducciones logicae* i (4) la *Loyca discipuli Raymundi Lulli*; estudiar què han manlevat de (5) la *Lògica nova* genuïna, i de (6) formulacions estandards de la lògica escolàstica, com per exemple les *Summulae logicales* de Pere Hispà; i finalment quina relació tenen amb (7) la *Explanatio compendiosaque applicatio artis Raymundi Lulli* de Lavinheta¹⁵³".

The same conclusion can be found in the Introduction to the *Logica Nova* NEORL edition: there is a real need of a comparative study of these four pseudo Lullian logical works to understand better what happened inside the tradition of Lullian logic from the death of Lull to the rebirth of Lullian studies in the intellectual circles of the Renaissance. This was the *status quaestionis* when I decided to undertake the task of offering an edition and an analysis of the texts of the *Loyca discipuli* and of the *Nove Introductiones*. With the present dissertation, I hope to disentangle this complex textual tradition, in order to provide a firm basis to the philosophical analysis of the texts, whose relevance for the Lullian tradition has already been shown.

¹⁵² Bonner A. (1998), *Ressenya a Studia Luliana* 38, pp. 154-6.

¹⁵³ Bonner A. (1998), *Ressenya a Studia Luliana* 38, pp. 155-156.

I will start by offering a brief analysis of the presence of the pseudo Lullian logical treatise in the catalogues of the works of Ramon Lull, up to the time of Alonso de Proaza and Nicolas de Pax's edition of the *Logica Parva* and Lavinheta's edition of the *Logica brevis et nova*, therefore I will take into account any catalogue of Lullian works up until the year 1530.

First of all, the title "*Nove Introductiones*" is not present in any early catalogue of Lullian works known to scholarship until now. Secondly, the name of a book called "*Loyca discipuli*", or of a possible Catalan version of it called "*Logica del dexeble*" appears only in one early catalogue, the catalogue of Bartolomeu Bols (1439), BOLS 86.

On the other hand, we find the name *Logica Parva* mentioned in two catalogues: that of Alonso de Proaza (1515), PROAZA 233; and that of Joan Bonllavi (a. 1526), which cites a not better specified *Tractatus parvus de logica* – BONLLAVI 68a.

Finally, the *Logica Brevis et Nova*, or a possible versions of such title, is quoted in several catalogues. In the earliest catalogue of the works of Ramon Lull, attached at the end of the *Vita coetanea*, in the *Electorium*, which was probably an *inventarium* of the Lullian books present in the Chartreuse de Vauvert, we find mentioned a, not better specified, *Logica Brevis*, Catalogues Electorii 26. The same name *Logica brevis* is cited in four other catalogues, (two of which probably follow the *Electorium*): Catalogus operum Cusanus 70; BOVILLUS (1511) 26; PROAZA (1515) 234; and MESQUIDA (1526) 75.

I. A New Beginning

Starting anew from the manuscripts, we will try to throw light on the crossing texts and titles inside the tradition of Lullian logic. Manuscripts examined for the present research are:

1) Ms. Salamanca, BU, 2465	Sec. XIV/XV	<i>Logica Parva</i>
2) Ms. Munich, BSB, lat. 10542	Sec. XIV/XV	<i>Nove Introductiones</i>
3) Ms. Firenze, Riccardiana 1001	AD 1417-1418	<i>Nove Introductiones Loyca Discipuli</i>
4) Ms. Copenhaguen, KB, Ny kgl. Samling 640 8°	Sec. XV	<i>Logica Brevis et Nova</i>
5) Ms. Vaticano, BAV, Vat. lat. 3069	Sec. XV	<i>Logica Brevis et Nova</i>
6) Ms. Terni, Biblioteca Comunale, 61	Sec. XV 1 st decades	Note referring to the <i>Loyca Discipuli</i>
7) Ms. Munich, BSB, lat. 4381	AD 1497	<i>Logica Brevis et Nova</i>
8) Ms. Palma, BP, 1061	Sec. XV/XVI	<i>Logica Parva</i>
9) Ms. Palma, BP, 1044	Sec. XVI 1 st half	<i>Logica Parva</i>
10) Ms. Palma, BP, 1082	Sec. XVI 1 st half	<i>Logica Parva</i>
11) Ms. Palma, AD, Causa Pia Lulliana 1	Sec. XVIII	<i>Logica Parva</i>
12) Ms. Palma, BP, 1026	AD 1762	<i>Logica Brevis et Nova</i>
13) Ms. Palma, SAL, 1	Sec. XVIII end	<i>Logica Parva</i>

I will proceed with the description of the manuscripts dividing them according to their content, in particular, according to which of the four texts that we are investigating is contained inside them.

A) Loyca discipuli magistri Raymondi Lulli.

As stated above, only one manuscript copy of the *Loyca discipuli* has survived till modern times and became part of the Biblioteca Riccardiana:

1. Ms. Firenze, Riccardiana 1001 (1417/1418). FF. 14-17v

Description of the Manuscript.

The unique exemplar of the *Loyca discipuli magistri Raymondi Lulli* to have been preserved, the ms. Firenze, Riccardiana 1001¹⁵⁴, is a small parchment codex, 164x120 mm¹⁵⁵, richly decorated. It is divided in eight main blocks or parts, linked together by non-original cross-references, which suggest a later reorganization of the whole manuscript.

Here is a list of the eight parts, completed with the works contained in each of them:

¹⁵⁴ The codex was described by Athanasius Lopez (1910), "Archivum Franciscanum Historicum" 3 then by Francesco Santi, in T. De Robertis- R. Miriello "Manoscritti datati della biblioteca Riccardiana di Firenze" II, SISMEL, Edizioni del Galluzzo, 1999, n. 1, tav. XXXIV, and it is in print now an article by Gabriella Pomaro which deals with it.

¹⁵⁵ Parchment, ff. III, 361, II' (ff. I-II and I'-II' double sheet of modern paper, f. III original parchment flyleaf [foglio di guardia]. 35 fascicules (1¹⁰, 2-3¹⁰, 4^{12/5}¹², 6⁵, 7-8¹², 9⁸ [incomplete]/10⁶, 11¹², 12⁶, 13⁴/14¹⁰/15-16¹², 17¹⁰/18¹⁰, 19¹², 20-21¹⁰, 22¹¹, 23¹², 24¹⁰/25-28¹², 29⁶/30-32¹², 33¹⁴, 34¹², 35⁴).

- 1st part: ff. 2-3v Notes, (contains a deleted possession note as well)
- ff. 4r-13r Calendar, with schemes and rules for chronological computation
- 2nd part: ff. 14r-18r Anonymous, Loyca discipuli magistri Raymondi Lulli
- Inc. Incipit Loyca discipuli magistri Raymondi Lulii. Quoniam secundum philosophum primo elenchorum: “Qui virtutem nomen sunt ignari de facili paralogisantur ...”
- Expl. ...vel sunt entia realia obiective cum sumantur ab obiecto reali mediate vel immediate et hoc sufficit.
- ff. 18r-32r Anonymous, Pseudus-Raimundus Lullus, Novae et Compendiosae Introductiones logicae.
- Inc. Logica est ars et scientia cum qua verum et falsum ratiocinando cognoscuntur et unum ab altero discernuntur verum eligendo et falsum dimittendo.
- Expl. Et ad quem et tamquam ad suum ultimum finem reducendum. Deo gratias.
- ff. 32v-33r Figures for the Ars brevis
- ff. 33v Blank
- ff. 34r-43r Raimundus Lullus, Ars brevis (ROL XII, op. 126)
- ff. 43v-45r Anonymous, (Nicholas Muckenwalt?), Explanatio terminorum, Notes from the main hand (short work made of a series of personal notes)
- 3rd part: ff. 46r-94r Raimundus Lullus, Tabula generalis (ROL XXVII , op. 53)

- ff. 94r-94v Pseudo-Raimundus Lullus, *Introductorium magnae artis generalis* (ROL XII, op. 125, incomplete¹⁵⁶)
- 4th part: ff. 95r-119r Raimundus Lullus, *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem* (MOG I- 1721- op. 3)
- ff. 119r-121r Raimundus Lullus, *Lectura compendiosa super artem inveniendi veritatem* (MOG I- 1721- op. 4)
- 5th part: ff. 123r-166v Raimundus Lullus, *Lectura super figures artis demonstrativae* (MOG III- 1722- op. 36)
- f. 166v Signed and dated note from the main hand.
- 6th part: ff. 167r-240r Raimundus Lullus, *Compendium artis demonstrativae* (MOG III- 1722- op. 40)
- ff. 240r-241v Anonymous, (Nicolaus Muckenwalt?), *De regulis principiorum philosophiae*. Short work written by the main hand.
- f. 241v Signed and dated note from the main hand.
- 7th part: ff. 242r-258r Raimundus Lullus, *Liber Apostrophe seu De Articuli fidei catholice* (MOG IV- 1729- op. 66)
- ff. 259r-295r Raimundus Lullus, *Declaratio Raimundi per modum dialogi edita contra aliquorum philosophorum et eorum sequacium opiniones* (ROL XVII op. 80)

¹⁵⁶ The authenticity of this work has been disputed by Lola Badia in her introduction to the edition of the Catalan version of the *Introductorium* and in *Estudios Lullianos* 21 (1977), pp. 47-48, cfr. Badia Lola (1983), *El «Libre de definicions», opuscle didàctic lul·lià del segle XV*, Ed. Humanitas, Barcelona. Cfr. also the information in the Ramon Lull Database at the web address: <http://orbita.bib.ub.es/ramon/bo.asp> I am indebted for this observation to Anthony Bonner who has kindly contributed to the revision of this chapter.

8th part: ff. 296r-354r, Raimundus Lullus, Liber proverbiorum (MOG VI- 1737-
op. 69)
ff. 354v-359v, Anonymous, Pseudus Raimundus Lullus , Liber de
confessione. Inc. Multi homines sunt qui desiderant scire quid est
confessio. Expl. ... date michi penitenciam salutiferam. Explicit ars de
confessione cum dei laude et benediccione. Amen.
ff. 359v-361, Anonymous, De confessione.

Even if this codex was mainly written by one hand, we can identify also 3 possible other hands¹⁵⁷. The main hand is that of the friar of the order of Augustinian Hermits Nicolaus Muckenwalt “de Prussia” who left throughout the whole manuscript a few notes with his name, a place where the writing process took place, and a dating:

f. 166v : Per manus fratris Nicolai Muckenwalt de Prussia ordinis sancti Augustini, ab incarnatione domini M^oCCCCXVII^o, XX die mensis aprilis in monasterio Sancti Ieronimi de Cervaria...

f. 241v: similar subscription to the note on f.166v, also dated ab incarnatione, “M^oCCCCXVII^o, XX die mensis marcii”, therefore almost a year after the other note.

On the last *folio* f. 361v, he left a sort of colophon or closing note, dated a few years later and very hard to read due to the consumption of the parchment. “Istud opus in scriptura absque calendario et figuris ... completum est per ^omanum Nicolai Muk/klenwalt de Prussia ad fratrum heremitarum sancti augustini donatum ...

¹⁵⁷ For the codicological description I am mainly following G. Pomaro’s forthcoming article (of which she has kindly provided a draft to me) together with my own direct analysis of the manuscript. G. Pomaro has also assisted me during a few sessions of consultation of the manuscript at the Biblioteca Riccardiana in Florence.

provincia thuringie et saxonie ob reverentiam ieronimi in monasterio suo proprio scilicet cervaria Vicem gerens dominus Bertramus royles.....” and the same hand adds in the external margin a precisation M° CCCC XXVIII°.

These notes provide a starting point to reconstruct the history of this manuscript.

To reconstruct the tradition of Lullian logic in Italy in the late 14th century it is important to keep in mind that the name of the *Loyca discipuli* appears quoted in a note to an authentic Lullian text, found in a manuscript, preserved in Terni, Biblioteca Comunale 61, as it had already been noted by F. Santi¹⁵⁸. In addition to examining the ms. Riccardiana 1001, I have therefore given a brief analysis of this manuscript, to underline the only medieval known connection of the *Loyca discipuli*.

2. Ms. Terni, Biblioteca Comunale, 61

The codex contains only one major authentic Lullian work.

- 1) Raymundus Lullus, *Ars compendiosa Dei*. [Acefalus. Incomplete (ROL XIII)]

Description of manuscript.

The manuscript is made of paper, measuring 300 x 215 mm, for a total of 86 *folia*. The

¹⁵⁸ Santi, Francesco (1988), "La fortuna de Ramon Llull a les regions meridionals de l'Imperi al segle XIV. Esbós sobre les perspectives de recerca", *Ateneu. Revista de Cultura* 14, pp. 13-16.

text is written on two columns. The first *folio* of each fasciculation is numbered using roman ciphers at the right bottom of the page. The first letter of each paragraph is always missing; leaving a blank space for a miniature of that letter, since the missing initial is then added in margin by the main hand.

The *Ars compendiosa Dei* was composed in Montpellier in 1308, not in 1314 as it is reproduced in the explicit of this codex.

It is also interesting to note how when the critical edition of this text was published in 1985 in ROL XIII (CCCM 39) the ms. Terni, BC, 61 was not mentioned as a witness of the *Ars compendiosa Dei*¹⁵⁹.

The text presents several marginal notes, mostly corrections or additions to the main text, but also a few that seem to be personal references while studying.

At f. 4v. there is a very interesting note under the text which I decided to transcribe extensively as it represents the only witness of the circulation of the *Loyca Discipuli* as a school textbook for logic):

Hic nota quod infrascripta 3a distinctio et XI distinctio et quasi omnes
distinctiones huius artis procedit per equiparantiam quia dignitas probatur per
dignitatem et e converso et dignitas per actum et actus per actum. Et ideo videas
Tractatum demonstrationis per equiparantiam inventum per magistrum

¹⁵⁹ Raymundus Lullus, *Ars Compendiosa Dei*, ROL XIII, CCCM 39, 1985. On the ms. 61, see also: Catalogo di manoscritti filosofici nelle biblioteche italiane, V, Cesena, Cremona, Lucca, S.Daniele del Friuli, Teramo, Terni, Trapani, Udine, ed. Olschki, Firenze, 1985, p. 237.; Mazzoli Corrado (1993), Tra i gioielli dell'Umbria. Catalogo di manoscritti (sec. XIII-XV) della Biblioteca Comunale di Terni, Vecchiarelli Editore, Roma, p. 61-62. Boccali G. (1990), "Il codice 226 della biblioteca Comunale di Terni" *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 83, pp 307-316.

Raimundum et eciam videas in *Loyca discipuli* Raimundi Lulli terminos
demonstratione per quod et per quia et per equiparantiam¹⁶⁰.

F. 80r. Note: Causam istud ss sensus

F.83v. Note:

tractatus predictus de oppositione docet facere glozas et exponere et
interpretationis in contracum (?) facultate et docet optime et substantialiter facere
sermo

F. 84r. End of the *Ars compendiosa Dei*. Note:

non quo modo doctor demonstrative debet leget et scliare adiscendo premissa in
regulis introductoris in regula de modo et ordine tractandi circa inter? De modo
adiscendi in similia.

F. 84v. Not easily readable title, written with a lighter ink, possibly by a different hand.

Raymundus Lulli claudens pia dogmata nulli
Orbe vadens diro, jacet hic sub marmore miro
Hic meg. Teg. Cum precipit sum sermonibus esse?
Ars compendioids divina
per fratrem Benedictum Rochensem compilata.

F. 84v. Gloss to the text Inc.: "Totum istud capitulum in quo consistit tota theorica..."

Expl.: "...sunt plures species rec pauciores sumero. Raymundi Lulli claudens pia dogmata

¹⁶⁰I am indebted to Anthony Bonner and the staff working on the Ramon Lull Database for correcting and improving my initial transcription of this marginal note.

nulli orbe vadens diro iacet hic sub marmore miro [...] Ars compendiosa divina per fratrem Benedictum Rochensem compilata."

Ff. 85 i 86 are left blank.

B) Nove et compendiose introductiones logice

The second text of the logical section found in ms. Riccardiana 1001, second part (ff. 18r-32r), is called *Nove et compendiose introductiones logice*, and it is extant, independently, in the following manuscript:

1. Ms. Munich, BSB, clm 10542, II (XIV/XV). FF. 42-64¹⁶¹

This codex is made of paper and parchment, total dimensions are 217 x 148, and it consists of 64 *folia*. It contains two main parts and it was written by two different hands (Perarnau identifies three hands): the first hand from *folio* 1r to *folio* 41v wrote with a gothic cursive "notula" handwriting on two columns, while the second part from *folio* 42r to *folio* 64r presents a writing on the whole page on a straight line. According to Perarnau (1986) there are two different hands, one for ff. 42r-49v, using a gothic "notula formata" handwriting and the other starting from line 6 on f. 49v till f. 64r; this handwriting tries to resemble the precedent but is more cursive.

The first section can be dated to the second half of the 14th c. and contains only one work.

¹⁶¹ This manuscript has been described by Perarnau i Espelt, Josep (1986), *Els manuscrits lul·lians medievals de la «Bayerische Staatsbibliothek» de Munic. II. Volums de textos llatins "Studia, Textus, Subsidia" IV*, Barcelona, Facultat de Teologia de Catalunya, pp. 135-138.

1. ff. 1a-41vb, Raimundus Lullus, Liber de novis fallaciis (ROL XI)

The second part is later, dating from XIV/XV. It contains only one work:

2. ff. 42r-64r, Anonymous, Pseudo Raymundus Lullus, Nove et compendiose introductiones logice

Title: In nomine bonitatis optime veritatis quia verissime Incipiunt nove et compendiose introducciones logice.

Inc. Logica est ars et scientia cum qua verum et falsum ratiocinando cognoscuntur et unum ab altero discernuntur verum eligendo et falsum dimittendo.

Expl. Et ad quem et tamquam ad suum ultimum finem reducendum.

Both handwritings are clear, precise. The text is neatly rubricated; titles, subtitles, initials are in red. Few drawings: three faces; one inside the initial letter “I” on f. 42r, one inside an initial “D” on f. 42v, one inside an initial S on f. 48v; and two pointing hands (requesting attention) on f. 47v and 48v. It presents few marginal notes, mainly corrections or additions from different hands.

There still needs to be a certain dating provided for the text *Nove Introductiones*, but I will suggest a possible date of composition in the next chapter, after the analysis of the text.

C) *Logica Parva*

Manuscripts and editions of the *Logica Parva* are the following:

1. Ms. Salamanca, BU, 2465, III (XIV-XV). 113ra-117vb

The manuscript is made of paper and parchment and it is composed of three main sections of different dimensions (390ca x 270 mm; 390ca x 260 mm. and 415 x 280 mm. respectively).

It has been dated in between the end of the 14th c. and the beginning of the 15th c. The foliation is modern; it presents marginal notes mainly of the same 15th c. hand.

The first part (ff. 1-72) is written in a gothic semi cursive handwriting on two columns, with rubricated initials; the second part (ff. 73-112) is again on two columns and semi cursive handwriting, but with a void left in place of the rubricated initials, probably to be filled later. In some *folia* there are headers to mark the book. The third part (ff. 113-117) is also written in a gothic semi cursive handwriting and on two columns, though it presents a more varied decoration: there is a picture of a tree colored in green, the rubricating is done in red, and the initials have drawings in red and blue. The best source of information on this codex in the bibliography is the very recent catalog of the University Library of Salamanca, published in 2002¹⁶².

¹⁶² Lilao Franca i Castrillo González (2002), Catálogo, pp. 835-6.

I Part: ff. 1r-71vb, Nicholas Trevetus OP, Expositio in Boethii De consolatione philosophiae.

f.1 r in the superior margin contains a note from a posterior hand: “Fratris Laurencii rasca tibi restituantur”

II Part: ff. 73r-112va, Anonymous (?), Expositio litteralis in Boethii De consolatione philosophiae.

ff.112va Presents a colophon: “Finito libro, Sit laus et gloria Christo. Hic liber est scriptus, Lambertus sit benedictus. Vivat prudenter, gazas habeat sapienter, amen. And a note added by the later 15c. hand: “Glosa sobre el Boeçio”.

III Part: ff.113ra-117vb, Anonymous, Pseudus-Raymundus Lullus, Logica parva seu Arbor Scientiae Logicalis.

F. 113ra: “Gracia summi radii fontalis pullulat arbor scientie logicalis in arboribus quinque inserta cuius fructus est verum et falsum cognoscere et unum ab altero discernere”.

Inc. “Logica est ars et scientia, cum qua verum et falsum ratiocinando cognoscuntur et unum ab altero discernitur, verum eligendo et falsum dimittendo...”

Expl. “...patet quod non tantum est danda una responsio sed plures cum hec fallacia proveniat secundum multa.

A. D’Ors bases some of his claims on the authenticity of the *Logica Parva* on this codex. But from my personal analysis of the manuscript, there emerges the possibility that the last part of the codex could be dated to a slightly later period, probably early 15th c.

2. Ms. Palma, BP, 1061, II (XV/XVI). 25-56v

The codex is made of paper with a parchment cover, and its total dimensions are 210x145mm. It is composed of two parts; the first part consists of 104 *folia* and the second part of 57 *folia*, the numeration restarts after the first part. A. Madre has identified five different hands. The manuscript contains three main texts:

Part I

- 1) ff. 1-101, Raymundus Lullus, Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus (ROL IX)
f.1r Index of the codex “In soi libro continetur: ...”
Rubricated, written in a gothic textualis handwriting.

Part II

- 2) ff. 1-17v, Raymundus Lullus, Liber praedicationis contra judaeos (Latin)
[incomplete] (ROL XII)
Different, later handwriting, more cursive.
ff.24r-24v Notes on Logic (very cursive handwriting)
- 3) ff. 25r-56v, Anonymous, Pseudus Raymundus Lullus, Logica Parva¹⁶³

¹⁶³ A. Madre in his description of the manuscript for ROL IX pp. XXII-XXIII wrongly identifies this text with the *Logica Brevis et Nova*.

f.25r Title: “Gratia summi radii fontalis pullulat arbor scientiae logicalis in arboribus quinque inserta. Cuius fructus est verum et falsum cognoscere et unum ab altero discernere”.

Inc. “Logica est ars et scientia, cum qua verum et falsum ratiocinando cognoscuntur et unum ab altero discernitur, verum diligendo et falsum dimittendo...”

Expl. “...patet quod non tantum est danda una responsio sed plures cum hec fallacia provenit secundum multa. Finis. Deo gratias”

ff. 57v Blank

It presents many marginal notes.

The two parts of the manuscript can be dated to two subsequent moments, the first part to the end of the 15th c. and the second to the period between the end of 15th c. and the beginning of 16th c.

3. Ms. Palma, BP, 1044 (XVI 1^a m.). 1-30v

The manuscript can be dated to the first half of the 16th c. It seems to be a working copy of a school text. It contains the anonymous *Logica Parva* followed by a few Latin verses by the same hand that copied the text, Vicentius Valerius, who calls himself a disciple of Nicolas Pax. A. D’Ors bases some of his claims on the authenticity of the *Logica Parva* on this manuscript.

- 1) ff. 1-30v, Anonymous, Pseudus Raymundus Lullus, *Logica parva*¹⁶⁴
 Title: “Gratia summi radii fontalis pullulat arbor scientiae logicalis in arboribus quinque inserta. Cuius fructus est verum et falsum cognoscere et unum ab altero discernere”.
 Inc. “Logica est ars et scientia, cum qua verum et falsum ratiocinando cognoscuntur et unum ab altero discernitur, verum eligendo et falsum dimittendo...”
 Expl. “...patet quod non tantum est danda una responsio sed plures cum hec fallacia provenit secundum multa. Deo gratias”

- 2) ff. 30v-31v Latin Poem by "Vincentius Valerius, discipulus Nicholai Pachis". [Pro insperata cuiusdam logices Remundi Lulli repertione]

The *Logica Parva* is written on one column and presents a sort of rudimental scheme of a tree on the external side of the text. It presents also many marginal notes, mainly additions and corrections.

4. Ms. Palma, BP, 1082 (XVI 1^a m.). 15-30

This codex is composed of two parts; the first part (f.1r-14v) is a printed reproduction of the *Logica Parva* in the 1518 edition (see below Editions, n.1), while the second part is a manuscript copy of the same text, probably done for personal study. The

¹⁶⁴ Kristeller O. (1963-1993), *Iter Italicum IV*, p 596 identifies Nicolas Pax as the author of the *Logica parva*.

handwriting is very cursive, and it presents again (at least in the first *folia*) the text on one column and a sort of scheme of a tree on the external side (in a very similar way to what we have observed in ms. 1044)

- 1) ff. 15r-30v, Anonymous, Pseudus Raymundus Lullus, Logica parva
f.15r Title: Gratia summi radii fontalis pullulat arbor scientie logicalis in arboribus quinque inserta cuius fructus est verum et falsum cognoscere et unum ab altero discernere”.
Inc. “Logica est ars et scientia, cum qua verum et falsum ratiocinando cognoscuntur et unum ab altero discernitur, verum eligendo et falsum dimittendo...”
Expl. “...patet quod non tantum est danda una responsio sed plures cum hec fallacia proveniat secundum multa. Deo gratias”

A page of handwritten notes follows the text.

This codex can be dated to the first half of the 16th c. (after 1518).

The last two manuscript exemplars of this text are very late, therefore I did not consult them directly but I relied on the description of them in the RL Database, in the Freiburg Website and in the bibliography.

5. Ms. Palma, AD, Causa Pia Lulliana 1 (XVIII c.). 56-89

This manuscript consists of 186 *folia*, it is made of paper and its total dimensions are 296 x 205 mm. Each *folio* contains 29 lines. The binding is in parchment. The codex presents two main hands; the first hand wrote till f. 89r and the second from f. 94r till the end. It was part of the manuscripts owned by the Causa Pia Lulliana, the society devoted to the sanctification of Ramon Lull. This manuscript contains four major texts:

f.1r Index. B. Raymundi Lulli Tomus iste continet sequentia: 1. Arbor philosophiae desideratae; 2. Arbor scientiae logicalis; 3. Lectura seu brevis practica tabulae generalis; 4. De experientia realitatis Artis generalis

f. 1v Blank

- 1) ff. 2-52, Raymundus Lullus, Arbor philosophiae desideratae (MOG VI-1737)

ff. 52v-55v Blanks

- 2) ff.56-89, Anonymous, Pseudus-Raymundus Lullus, Logica parva
Title: Gratia summi radii fontalis pullulat arbor scientie logicalis in arboribus quinque inserta cuius fructus est verum et falsum cognoscere et unum ab altero discernere”.

Inc. “Logica est ars et scientia, cum qua verum et falsum ratiocinando cognoscuntur et unum ab altero discernitur...”

Expl. “In omnibus istis et sibi similibus patet, quod non tantum est danda una responsio, sed plures; cum hec fallatia proveniant secundum multa.

Deo gratias”

89v-93v Blanks

- 3) ff. 94-141, Raymundus Lullus, Lectura Artis quae intitulatur Brevis practica Tabulae generalis (ROL XX)
ff. 141v-142v Blanks
ff. 143r-147v Missing
- 4) ff.148-186v, IV.4, Liber de experientia realitatis Artis ipsius generalis (ROL XI)

The codex can be dated to the 18th c. and it has been studied by Pérez Martínez, Mallorca [1958-1970], núms. 1-4. Additional information can be found in the critical edition of the two text present in the codex, ROL XI pp. xii-xiii and XX pp. lxiv-lxv.

6. Ms. Palma, BSAL, 1 (end of 18th c.). ff. 8v-25v

Here is a list of the works contained in this late manuscript, dated to the end of the 18th c. (1792). The best description of this codex available in the bibliography is still that given by Pérez Martínez, Mallorca (1958-1970), 93-94, at the numbers 716-728. The codex is bind with parchment, its total dimensions are 200 x 150 mm and it consists of 223 *folia*.

f. 1 reproduces the name of the possessor "Antonio Socies".

f. 2 contains an engraved picture of the Immaculate; there is also a note:
 "Philosophiae cursus ad mentem doctoris M. Illuminati Beati Raymundi Lulli
 martiris. Deus cum tua altissima sapientia [...] in hoc conventu capuccinorum
 Palmae Majoricarum die 24 novembris auctore R. P. Fr. Manuel a Majorica
 lectorali munere laureato, et a me Fr. Dominico Felanigiensi in Seraphica
 Capuccinorum S. P. N. S. Francisci familia alumno professo, licet indigno
 eiusque discipulo in coenobio Majoricensi I. Conceptionis B. V. Mariae fideliter
 acceptus. Anno 1790."

ff. 3-8v, presents an anonymous Introduction, (Proemi), finished on January 26th
 1791

ff. 8v-25v, Anonymous, Pseudus Raymundus Lullus, Logica parva

ff. 25v-29v Appendix questionalis ad artem universalem.

ff. 30-45v: Logica Magna.

ff. 46-76: Metaphisica ad normam atque methodum arcangelici et ill. doctoris B.
 R. L. Ontologia.

ff. 76v-108v: Metaphisica. Pneumatica. Psychologia rationalis. Pars secunda.
 Psychologia empirica. This part was finished on December 17th 1792.

Ff. 109-187v: Phisica generalis et particularis. Note at the end: "Manum a labore
 retrahimus die 18 novembris anni Domini 1793".

F. 188r: Notes on teachers and students in Majorca

Ff. 188v-189v: Fr. Dominicus a Felanix capuccinus subdiaconus. De
 scommatibus.

ff. 190-205: *Mathesis elementa. Phisicae prodromus.*

ff. 205v-215v: *Geometria.*

ff. 216f-220v: Index of the materials in the codex.

f. 222r-v: Anonymous, *Caput unicum de observandis inter arguentem et respondentem.*

Besides the manuscripts, I have extensively used the reproduction of the early printed editions of the *Logica Parva*; therefore I have provided a list of the editions I have consulted.

- 1) *Logicalia parua Illuminati Doctoris Raymundi Lulli* (Alcalá: Arnau Guillem Brocar, 1518)¹⁶⁵.
- 2) *Beati Raymundi Lulli Doctoris Illuminati, et Martyris Tertii Ordinis Sancti Francisci. Logica nova jam Valentiae impressa anno 1512. Et nunc Palmae cum libris Logica parva, de Quinque Praedicabilibus & decem praedicamentis, et de Natura* (Mallorca: Miquel Cerdà-Miquel Amorós, 1744).
- 3) *Ramon Llull, Logica nova. Logicalia parva. De quinque praedicabilibus et decem praedicamentis. Liber de natura*, intr. Charles Lohr, "Opera parva" 2 (Frankfurt/M, 1971-2).

¹⁶⁵ I had an occasion to consult this edition in the copy that is preserved in the Biblioteca Publica in Palma (Majorca), under the call number RLLULL 322. It is a printed copy but it contains handwritten marginal notes to the text. It was very helpful to compare this edition with the text in the ms 1082 in the same library.

D) Logica Brevis et Nova

Several manuscripts are extant of this work. Here follow their descriptions:

1. Ms. Vaticano, BAV, Vat. lat. 3069 (XV). 4v-12

The codex can be dated to the 15th c.; its total dimensions are 240 x170 mm. It consists mainly on parchment and the initial letters are all rubricated. It presents geometrical figures drawn with different colors (figures of the Lullian Art) and a few marginal notes¹⁶⁶. This manuscript contains three major texts:

- 1) ff. 1r-4v, Raymundus Lullus, Introductorium magnae Artis generalis [seu Liber de universalibus] (ROL XII- op. 125¹⁶⁷)
f.1r reports the title Liber de sensuale et intellectuale
- 2) ff. 4v-12r, Anonymous, Pseudo-Raymundus Lullus, Logica brevis et nova Inc. “Logica est ars cum qua verum et falsum ratiocinando cognoscuntur et argumentative discernuntur. In logica...”
Expl. “...contrarietas qua habent circa hoc de quo disputant”.
f.12r adds a short prayer in conclusion “Laudetur dominus noster Iesus Christus per omnes gentes mundi et eius virgo mater pia. Amen”

¹⁶⁶ This manuscript was analyzed by Lorenzo Pérez Martínez (1961), *Los fondos lulianos existentes en las bibliotecas de Roma* "Publicaciones del Instituto de Estudios Eclesiásticos en Roma" Subsidia 3, Roma, pp. 24-25.

¹⁶⁷ On the authenticity of this work see above, footnote 156.

And also adds a few mnemonic verses to remember syllogistic figures and an example of a syllogism in Barbara¹⁶⁸.

3) ff. 13-37v, Raymundus Lullus, *Ars brevis* (ROL XII)

2. Ms. Copenhaguen, KB, Ny kgl. Samling 640 8° (XV). 1-12v [incomplete]

This codex is made of paper and its total dimensions are 91x 70 mm. It consists of 147 *folia*, in octavo. It is written on one column. The manuscript is of Spanish provenience, probably from the library Aiamans, Comte d' in Palma (Majorca), and it was bought in Leipzig in 1921. The first pages (added later) contain various notes in Spanish written in the 19th c. (1827?), while the codex itself can be dated to the end of 15th c (XV ex.).

1) Title, index of the manuscript and advice for the readers (in Spanish)
ff. 1r-12v, Anonymous, Pseudus-Raymundus Lullus, *Logica brevis et nova* [incomplete]¹⁶⁹

No incipit. F.1r starts "...universalis particularis, indefinita et singularis. Universalis est illa cuius subiectum est terminus communis additus signo universali..."

Expl. "...sit ex eo quod idem sumitur ad probationem sui ipsius sub alio vocabulo"

2) ff. 13-56v, Cabaspre, *Liber de superiore et inferiore*.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ The manuscript is available for on line consultation through the University of Freiburg website http://freimore.unifreiburg.de/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/DocPortal_derivate_00010341/schriften.html?hosts= (last accessed for this manuscript on Oct. 24 2007).

¹⁶⁹ ROL XXIV, p. 156* wrongly identifies this text with the authentic Lullian *Logica Nova*, as it had been noted by Viola Tenge-Wolf and reported in the description of the manuscript in the RL Database.

- 3) ff. 57r-60v, Raymundus Lullus, Liber de accidente et substantia (ROL I)
- 4) ff. 61r-76v, Raymundus Lullus, Lectura compendiosa super Artem inveniendi veritatem (MOG I- 1721)
- 5) ff. 77r-80r, Anonymous, Pseudus Raymundus Lullus, Probatio de conceptione virginali.

Title: Cuiusdam lullistae probatio de conceptione virginali.

Inc. "Gratia Dei mediate intendimus probare virginem eius matrem conceptam fore sine peccato originali. Ad probandum Dei genitricem fore sine macula concepta ..."

Expl. "... et sic per Dei gratiam probavimus beatam Virginem et Dei genitricem fore sine macula peccati originalis. Deo gratias. Amen"

ff. 80v-81rv. Blanks

- 6) ff. 82r-106r, Raymundus Lullus, Arbor scientiae (ROL XXIV) [partial, only Arbor XII]
f. 106v: presents a fragment of writing in the Catalan vernacular
- 7) ff. 107-142v, Raymundus Lullus, Ars brevis (ROL XII)
ff. 143-147: Tables and figures of the Lullian Art.

3. Ms. Munich, BSB, clm 4381 (1497). 34v-45v

The codex is composed of two parts, mostly of paper but with some fragments of parchment on the counter-cover and placed inside the manuscript as signaling points. The

¹⁷⁰ This work corresponds to Glorieux, KI.

dimensions of the *folia* are 207 x 149 mm¹⁷¹. It presents two different handwritings and it contains two main texts:

- 1) ff. 1-34, Raymundus Lullus, *Ars brevis* (ROL XII)
- 2) ff. 34v-45v, Anonymous, Pseudus Raymundus Lullus, *Logica brevis et nova*.

Title: Deus cum tua summa perfectione Incipit logica brevis nova

Inc. Logica est ars cum qua verum et falsum ratiocinando cognoscuntur et argumentativ discernuntur. In logica considerantur tria...

Expl. ... contrarietas quam habent circa hoc de quo disputant. Deo gratias.

f.45v contains the date 1497 written in Arabic chirpers. "1497. Finit logica brevis nova die Georgii purpurati."

The handwriting is marked, basically gothic of German origin, but with some traits of the humanistic style, clear and inclined towards the right. It presents blank spaces, left in place of the initials. The incipit of phrases and words used as subtitles are marked more strongly in a kind of bold style.

The second part is dated on the last *folio* to 1497.

¹⁷¹ This manuscript has been studied by A. Madre as part of the edition of ROL XII, and by Perarnau J. (1986), *Bayerische*, pp. 11-12. For further information see those two studies along with the RL Database and the reproduction of the manuscript in the Freiburg's website.

4. Ms. Palma, BP, 1026 (1762). 15-25v

This manuscript is made of paper; it consists of 220 *folia*, most of which blanks. The total dimensions of the codex are 267 x 200 mm. It is a very late manuscript, dating from 1762, but it is interesting since it appears to be a manuscript copy from a 18th c. printed edition.

The title and table of contents preceding the text announces a kabbalistic treatise and others, but the copy is abruptly interrupted in the middle of the third work.

f. 1 Title and table of content resembling an 18th c. printed edition.

Dialectica seu Logica nova Beati Raymundi Lulli Doctoris Illuminati & Martyris item Tractatus de Inventione medij, tum de Conversione Subjecti & praedicati per Medium. & Tractatus Kabbalisticus. & alia

f. 2 Title: Dialectica seu Logica nova Beati Raymundi Lulli Illuminati, Cherubicique Doctoris et Martyris Diligenter emendata: restitutis ijs quae olim fuerant sublata: et additis Tractatu de Inventione Medij, item Tractatu de conversione subjecti, et praedicati per *Medium*. per M. Bernardum Lavinetham in Universitate Parisiensi Doctorem. etc. a F. Francisco de S.ta Margarita Sacerdote, Majoricense Capuccino. etc. pulchriore Capitum, & articulorum distinctione constripta Calari Sardiniae, MDCCLXII

ff. 2v-14v Blanks.

- 1) ff. 15-25v, Anonymous, Pseudus Raymundus Lullus, *Logica brevis et nova* (Latin)
- 2) ff. 26-28, Raymundus Lullus, *De venatione medii inter subjectum et praedicatum* [Extract from *Liber De venatione substantiae accidentis et compositi*, Dist. VII- (ROL XXII)]
- 3) ff. 28v-31, Raymundus Lullus, *De conversione subjecti et praedicati et medii* (ROL VI) [incomplete]
 - ff. 31v-96v Blanks
 - f. 97r illustrations
 - ff. 37v-220 Blanks

The *De conversione subiecti et praedicati et medii* is interrupted in the middle of the III *Distinctio*, “IV. Angelus est bonus: Bonus est angelus. Ista...” The *Tractatus kabbalisticus* was never included in this copy and neither were included the other unspecified treatises mentioned in the beginning. It seems to be a copy from a Renaissance edition of Lull’s work; it could be either a copy of Lavinheta’s edition of the *Dialectica* in 1516, of his edition of the *Logica Nova* in 1518, or it could be a copy of one of the very diffused editions by Lazarus Zetzner (1598 or later) since it includes a kabbalistic work, even if the order of this compilation does not reflect the order of the texts in the Zetzner editions.

The *Logica Brevis et Nova* has received many editions during the Renaissance and the Baroque age. It was the second work of the Lullian tradition to be printed, probably

because its authenticity was not doubted at the time. In my study I have consulted several of these editions. Here is a complete list of all of them in chronological order:

Editions:

- 1) Raymundus Lullus, [Logica brevis et nova] (Venezia: Filippo di Pietro, 1480).
- 2) Raymundus Lullus, Logica abbreviata magistri Raymundi Lull, ed. Gener Jaume, (Barcelona: Pere Posa, 1489).
- 3) Raymundus Lullus, Logica abbreviata (Valladolid: Pedro Giraldi i Miguel de Planes, 1497).
- 4) Raymundus Lullus, Logica abbreviata ([Sevilla: J. Cromberger, 1505-1510 (?)).
- 5) Raymundus Lullus, Tractatus parvus de logica et de disputatione fidei et intellectus (Barcelona: Carles Amorós, 1512).
- 6) Raymundus Lullius and Bernardus Lavinheta, Dialectica seu logica nova venerabilis eremitaе Raymundi Lullii diligenter reposita: restitutis que nuper fuerant sublata. Et additis Tractatu de inuentione medii. Item tractatu de conuersione subiecti & predicati per *Medium*, ed. Bade Josse, (Paris: Josse Bade, 1516).
- 7) Ramon Llull and Bernardus Lavinheta, Dialectica seu logica noua Venerabilis Eremitae Raemundi Lulli diligenter reposita: restitutis quae nuper fuerant sublata. Et additis Tractatu de inuentione medii. Item Tractatu de conuersione subiecti & praedicari per *Medium* (Paris: Josse Bade, 1518).

- 8) Bernardus de Lavinheta, *Explanatio compendiosaque applicatio artis Raymundi Lulli* (Lyon, 1523), ff.9-15v.
- 9) D. Raymundi Lulli *Logicae compendiolum per Antonium Belverium Lullianae doctrinae professorem commentariolis illustratum*, ed. Bellver Antoni, (Mallorca: Gabriel Guasp, 1584).
- 10) Raymundi Lulli *Opera ea quae ad adinventam ab ipso Artem universalem* (Strasbourg: Lazarus Zetzner, 1598).
- 11) Raymundi Lullii *Opera ea quae ad adinventam ab ipso artem universalem* (Strasbourg: Lazarus Zetzner, 1609).
- 12) Lavinheta Bernat de, *Opera omnia quibus tradidit Artis Raymundi Lullii compendiosam explicationem*, ed. Alsted Johann Heinrich, (Köln: Lazarus Zetzner, 1612), 1-19.
- 13) Raymundi Lullii *Opera ea quae ad adinventam ab ipso artem universalem* (Strasbourg: Lazarus Zetzner, 1617).
- 14) Raymundi Lulli *Opera ea quae ad adinventam ab ipso artem universalem* (Strasbourg: Lazarus Zetzner, 1651).
- 15) Bernardus de Lavinheta, *Explanatio compendiosaque applicatio Artis Raymundi Lulli*, intr. Erhard-Wolfram Platzeck, (Hildesheim: Gerstenberg, 1977), 17-30.
- 16) Raimundus Lullus, *Raimundus Lullus, Opera*. Reprint of the Strasbourg 1651 edition, intr. Anthony Bonner, "Clavis Pansophiae. Eine Bibliothek der Universalwissenschaften in Renaissance und Barock" 2,1 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1996), 147-161.

II. Textual Correlations Between the *Logica Parva*, the *Logica Brevis et Nova* and the *Nove Introductiones*: The Presence of an Ur-text for Late Medieval and Renaissance Lullian Logic.

The tradition of pseudo-Lullian logic is very complex, as we have begun to explore in the previous chapters, and it includes at least three texts that had autonomous circulation in the late middle ages and during the course of the Renaissance: the *Nove Introductiones*, the *Logica Brevis et Nova*, and the *Logica Parva*. Here I would like to present the results that stem from my research on the text of the *Nove Introductiones*, compared with that of the two other pseudo Lullian logical texts. The outcome of such research is shown inside two long tables in Appendix Three and Four, which give a visual overview of how the three texts interact with each other: Appendix Three consists in a comparison of the complete outline of the texts, taken from the chapter headlines offered. It documents in a way evident to the first glance how the core of the structure of the three logics has remained the same in each different book, though there has been a process of shortening and reworking of the treatment of some topics. Appendix Four, instead, chooses seven key moments in the texts, both for their particular position and for their philosophical import and it presents long quotes from each book, putting them in a parallel structure, in order to demonstrate how the inter-textual correlations between the three texts are present even at the level of the very wording of the topics, and how one text seems to follow the other or even to constitute a summary of the other.

It appears that the *Logica Parva* and the *Logica Brevis et Nova* are almost like two autonomous excerpts taken from the text of the *Nove Introductiones*.

For the sake of this analysis, I have used the text of the *Nove Introductiones* that I offer in my edition in Appendix one¹⁷², and I have compared it to the text of the *Logica Parva* that I have taken out of the Nicholas de Pax edition of 1512, as it is presented in the anastatic reprint edited by Charles Lohr in 1972¹⁷³, while for the text of the *Logica Brevis et Nova* I have decided to utilize the text present in the 1598 Strasbourg edition by Lazarus Zetzner, as it appears in the anastatic reprint edited by Anthony Bonner in 1996¹⁷⁴.

In both cases, my intention was to compare the *Nove Introductiones* to the most divulged, read, and in a sense “standardized” text of the *Logica Parva* and the *Logica Brevis et Nova*. I have decided not to include a parallel with the *Logica Abbreviata*, as it would have been superfluous: in fact, it is proven that ‘*Logica Abbreviata*’ is only another of the titles under which the *Logica Brevis et Nova* circulated in the late middle Ages and in the Renaissance, as it was also apparent to me when I consulted the printed exemplar of the *Logica Abbreviata* preserved at the Biblioteca Universitaria in Bologna¹⁷⁵.

Already in the titles, it is possible to trace a resemblance, or better, a line, connecting these three works. *Nove et compendiose introductiones logicae* is the title found in ms Munich BSB lat. 10542, as the ms Riccardiana 1001 does not present any separate title for the second text: this heading is typical of a Lullian tradition, as it

¹⁷² Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One.

¹⁷³ Ramon Llull, *Logica nova. Logicalia parva. De quinque praedicabilibus et decem praedicamentis. Liber de natura*, ed. and intr. Charles Lohr, "Opera parva" 2, Frankfurt/M, 1971-2.

¹⁷⁴ Raimundus Lullus, *Raimundus Lullus, Opera*. Reprint of the Strasbourg 1651 edition, ed. and intr. Anthony Bonner, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Frommann-Holzboog, 1996.

¹⁷⁵ These are also the conclusions of the Ramon Lull Database, which has only one entry for the *Logica Brevis et Nova*, and puts the title *Logica Abbreviata* as an alternative title for the same text.

stresses the main advantages that the Lullian logic had over the scholastic Aristotelian logic, brevity, conciseness and novelty, putting them together with a typical title for a didactic text, *introductiones*.

The *Logica Parva*, which, in the edition of Nicholas de Pax is also known as *Dialecticae Introductiones*, seems to carry on this same tradition, simply changing the name of the subject to be introduced, logic for dialectics. On the other hand, the *Logica Brevis et Nova* betrays from the title a desire to return to the purity of Lull's teaching, as it goes back to the title of the *Logica Nova* and to stress the points of brevity and novelty. Such a desire is very compatible with the project of the person who was the first editor of the *Logica Brevis et Nova* at Lyon, in 1516: Bernard of Lavinheta, Franciscan friar and holder of the first chair of Lullism at the Sorbonne in Paris in 1515.

Lavinheta's interests spread from logic and rhetoric, to mysticism, theology (he was in favor of the Immaculate conception) and the Lullian combinatory art: his main contribution to the history of philosophy consisted in the composition of the *Explanatio compendiosaque applicatio Artis Raimundi Lulli*, an encyclopedic work. The *Explanatio*, which included numerous quotes and fragment of authentic Lullian text, is important as it attests a connection between Lullism and encyclopedism, and represents an attempt to use the Lullian Art as a system of classification and exposition for all human knowledge.

I suspect that Lavinheta could be the author, or at least the main reviser behind the text of the *Logica Brevis et Nova*: a text that he not only published autonomously, but also included in his own *Explanatio*, and that entered the famous Zetzner anthology only through the filter of Lavinheta's editions.

I have chosen not to take into account the very first work of logic that comes out of the Lullian tradition, that *Summula sive Introductio in logicalibus*, which Thomas Le Myésier included at the beginning of his account of Lullian doctrines in the *Electorium Magnum*¹⁷⁶. I have omitted a discussion of this text in part because, from the information that can be gleaned from Hillgarth's account of this work, there is no indication that the *Summula* was anything more than a typically scholastic 'elementary' handbook of logic, which "could have been taken up by a boy of thirteen¹⁷⁷". Moreover, this text does not seem to present any specific Lullian traits, and seemingly limits itself to synthesizing a variety of scholastic sources, and mainly of Peter of Spain *Summule Logicales*. What is interesting, though, is that those sources appear to be mainly the same as those used in the *Nove Introductiones*, and that both texts share a similar didactic intent. From an initial inquiry, one could go as far as to hypothesize that Le Myésier's *Summula* could be a first model for the Lullian tradition and that its presence at the beginning of the *Electorium* could constitute one of the driving forces that led later Lullian scholars to write a more 'Lullian' introduction to the study of logic.

In addition, at the present time, the text of the *Summula* is not available in any printed edition (let alone a critical edition), and such a lack makes it very difficult for the scholar to proceed with an analysis and a detailed comparison of this text to the other handbooks for logic in the Lullian tradition. However, this line of research could prove fruitful, and it is only possible to be pursued now that there is a reliable edition of the text of the *Nove Introductiones* available for a textual comparison: it definitely could be a

¹⁷⁶ I have already talked about this work in chapter two, under the subtitle 'Early Lullism in France: Le Myésier and the Threads inside the *Electorium*', I redirect the reader also to that chapter.

¹⁷⁷ Cfr. Hillgarth NJ (1971), *Ramon Lull and Lullism*, pp. 200-203, p. 351, p. 398, here the quote is taken from p. 201.

topic for further research. Nevertheless, a full study of this text is beyond the scope of the present dissertation.

The first and most evident datum that emerges from a simple comparison of the scheme of each of the three logical texts mentioned above (the *Nove Introductiones*, the *Logica Parva* and the *Logica Brevis et Nova*), which are indeed the objects of my analysis, is that the *Nove Introductiones* is by far the longest of the three texts. It contains almost double the number of sections as the *Logica Parva* and exactly four times the number as the *Logica Brevis et Nova*. In the numbered outline, the *Nove Introductiones* has one hundred subdivisions, while the *Logica Parva* shows only fifty-five sections, and the *Logica Brevis et Nova* ends after a mere twenty-four chapters. This might point the scholar in the sense of recognizing a stronger difference between the works than it is actually present, and it would be an error of simplification of the problem.

At a closer look, the structure followed by the three texts is pretty much the same, though the *Nove Introductiones* explains the issues in more detail. The incipit of the three texts is basically *verbatim* the same: “*Logica est ars [et scientia], cum qua verum et falsum ratiocinando cognoscuntur et unum ab altero discernuntur, verum eligendo et falsum dimittendo*”. The text of the *Logica Brevis et Nova* omits the part on science, ‘et scientia’, but other than that the definition remains identical, and probably derived from a reworking of Lull’s statement in the *Introductoria Artis demonstrativae*: “*Unde licet aliquando Scientia et Ars in uno et eodem conjungantur, ut in Logica (Logica enim dicitur Scientia, et dicitur Ars) hoc tamen est per accidens*¹⁷⁸”

After the incipit, the *Nove Introductiones* begins with six introductory sections, which form the ground for the logical instruction and in which the author explains the

¹⁷⁸ *Introductoria Artis demonstrativae*, MOG III, p. 56.

principles and the rules (or questions) that underlie the teaching of each art, and are therefore also logic. These sections are very influenced by the authentic Lullian doctrines, and all six do not appear in the *Logica Parva* or in the *Logica Brevis et Nova*. I believe that both the *Logica Parva* and the *Logica Brevis et Nova* did not need to present such a part since they were composed for a public of people which already knew the basics of the Lullian Art. This hypothesis is consistent with the results of my analysis, which point towards the conclusion that the *Logica Parva* and the *Logica Brevis et Nova* are two autonomous versions, two later re-working of the text of the *Nove Introductiones*.

One of the main philosophical differences between the *Nove Introductiones* and the other two texts is the number of the special principles for logic, which basically constitute the organizing principles around which the *Nove Introductiones* appear to be structured. In the *Nove Introductiones* the ‘*principia specialia logice*’ are five: the term, the proposition, the predicable terms, the ‘*predicamenta*’, or categories, and the argument. Instead, both the *Logica Parva* and the *Logica Brevis et Nova* only list three principles for logic: the term, the proposition and the argument. While this could appear to be a constitutive difference, at a closer analysis it is clear that is only a difference in terminology, since both the *Logica Parva* and the *Logica Brevis et Nova* contain at least two sections devoted to the other two principles of the *Nove Introductiones*, namely predicable terms and categories: they simply do not list them as principles for logic. This probably reflects a different understanding of what predicable terms and the ‘*predicamenta*’, or the ten categories, are: not a constitutive principle of logic, but an further subdivision of the term.

In the *Nove Introductiones* the following group of sections addresses the first special principle of logic: the term. An explanation of the term is present in all three texts, although the *Logica Parva* seems to make an effort to look more similar to the authentic Lullian *Logica Nova* and, at least in the titles, reintroduces the Lullian metaphor of the tree, or the *arbor logicalis*, of which the term would in turn constitute the roots. The *Nove Introductiones* analyzes the term in five subsections, which mirror a Lullian combinatory device, while the other two text only limit the treatment of term to one section. The definition of term is identical in all three texts: “*Terminus est dictio significativa, ex qua propositio constituitur*”, though the discussion in the *Logica Brevis et Nova* is very brief and the few examples cited are the Lullian *dignitates*, intending here the absolute principles insofar as they are Gods attributes¹⁷⁹. The *Nove Introductiones* offer the most complete account of the topic, and the *Logica Parva* seems to follow it very closely. Both texts divide the term in categorematic and syncategorematic, communal, univocal, equivocal, denominative, singular, abstract and concrete, while the *Logica Brevis et Nova* only reports the difference between communal and discrete: the text becomes progressively shorter and simpler with each version.

The next sections of the *Nove Introductiones* deal with the theory of proposition, which occupies sections from twelve to twenty-five. About the proposition, it is interesting to note that the *Logica Brevis et Nova* follows exactly the *Nove Introductiones*, and presents three sections on proposition right after the discussion on the terms. On the other hand though, the *Logica Parva* postpones the treatment of the proposition, a total of seven sections from fourteen to twenty, after that of a section on

¹⁷⁹ On the use of ‘*dignitates*’ and ‘absolute principles’, see Bonner, Anthony (2007), *The art and logic of Ramon Llull: a user’s guide*, pp. 125-134.

intentions and impositions, which is absent from both other texts, and after the section on *predicabilia* and *predicamenta*, predicable terms and categories, which will come up later in the scheme of the *Nove Introductiones* and of the *Logica Parva*. The sections on propositions also constitute the second part of the logical tree, namely the trunk of the tree.

The definition of proposition is again very similar in all three texts, and in particular the text of the *Logica Parva* for long traits reproduces *verbatim* that of the *Nove Introductiones*, which contains again the longest and most detailed exposition. The structure of this section is the same for all the texts: the proposition is subdivided in true, false, categorical and hypothetical. The categorical proposition is in turn divided in particular, universal, indefinite and singular, affirmative and negative: not only the structure but the language used is very similar, and most definitions are identical.

The inter-textual similarities are numerous enough and striking enough to justify the hypothesis of a dependence of the *Logica Parva* and the *Logica Brevis et Nova* from the text of the *Nove Introductiones* or at least to presuppose a common origin of the three texts. Given the fact that the composition of the *Nove Introductiones* can be traced so early in the Lullian tradition though, it seems highly probable that the *Nove Introductiones* was the text that functioned as a guide, as the Ur-text, for all those who wanted to write an handbook of Lullian logic¹⁸⁰. The inter-textual nexus between the tree works is evident throughout the whole length of the exposition, even if the three texts are

¹⁸⁰ As explained above in this chapter, it is possible that Tomas Le Myésier's *Summula sive Introductio in logicalibus*, which opened the *Electorium*, also played a role in the tradition of handbook for logic coming out of the Lullian school. To prove or disprove this point, though, would require access to an edition of this text, unavailable at the present time, therefore this question is outside the scope of the present dissertation.

still clearly differentiated: in the length of the books, in some examples, and in some diverse choices in the organization of the material.

In the *Nove Introductiones*, the clarification of the problems posed by the hypothetical proposition follows the part on general (or categorical) proposition, and it forms a block of eight sections, from 26 to 33: the same scheme applies to the *Logica Brevis et Nova*, in which the whole explanation occupies only one section. The *Logica Parva*, instead, treats the hypothetical proposition after the explanation of proposition in general, therefore after the exposition of *predicabilia* and *predicamenta*. Despite this difference in the placement of the discussion, the definition of hypothetical proposition is identical in all three texts, and its subdivisions are the same: *copulativa*, *disiunctiva*, *conditionalis*, *rationalis*, *temporalis* and *localis*. Even the wording of the definition is almost identical: once again the inter-textual links between these three texts are evident.

One of the main differences in the structure and in the material of the text is that in the *Nove Introductiones*, the section on predicable terms and on the categories comes just after the section on proposition, and it is formed by seventeen distinctions, from 34 to 50. On the contrary, the *Logica Brevis et Nova* only dedicates one section to *predicabilia* and *predicamenta*, and it places it after three sections on suppositions, ampliations and restrictions: such sections are omitted in the *Nove Introductiones*, but are present in the *Logica Parva*, which also allocates them right after the discussion on hypothetical propositions. The definition of the various *predicamenta*, or categories, is also very similar in all three texts, but the text of the *Logica Parva* is sensibly shorter than the *Nove Introductiones* and the *Logica Brevis et Nova* basically reduces the treatment of each category to a mere line.

The sections on *ampliatio*, *restrictio* and on the theory of supposition in general are the only important logical topics that are explained in the other two texts and do not appear in the *Nove Introductiones*. Moreover, in the *Logica Parva* such sections form the third part of the tree of logic, or the branches of the logical tree.

I believe that such a fact can even strengthen my hypothesis that the *Logica Parva* and the *Logica Brevis et Nova* are basically two re-writings, two different versions, two autonomous excerpts from the *Nove Introductiones*. In fact, the need to add a section on theory of supposition points towards a different logical sensibility than that of a simple schoolmaster that was trying to teach logic in a monastery. I believe that Peter of Spain's *Summule Logicales* could represent the source behind this section, as the theory of supposition is explained in the *tractatus VI* of the *Summulae*, which seems to have been ignored by the author of the *Nove Introductiones* in his effort to combine Lull with Peter of Spain.

The long discussion on the theory of demonstration constitutes the next block of sections in the *Nove Introductiones*, from point fifty-one to eighty-one, and it is very influenced by Lullian theories. In the *Logica Parva*, this division is called *De Syllogismo*, it composes the fourth part of the logical tree, the flowers of the tree, and it occupies eleven sections, from thirty to forty, while in the *Logica Brevis et Nova* it comes after the section on predicable terms and categories. It is interesting to note how this is the longest group of sections present in the *Logica Brevis et Nova*: it consists of twelve sections, from ten to twenty-one, and it represents the one topic in which the *Logica Brevis et Nova* seems to follow more closely the exposition offered by the other two texts, though condensing and shortening it. Such consistency is probably due to the importance of the

material, the theory of demonstration, which forms the core of a handbook for logic: it teaches the reader how to create efficacious demonstrations, and therefore how to win an intellectual dispute.

The *demonstratio per aequiparantiam* is probably the most Lullian logical feature explained in all three texts: the definition of this demonstration is identical in all three texts and in the *Logica Brevis et Nova* it basically represents the whole exposition of the topic. Conversely the *Logica Parva* mirrors closely the treatment of the *demonstratio per aequiparantiam* given in the *Nove Introductiones*: both texts describe the three ‘modi’ of the demonstration, both explain why this is the stronger kind of demonstration possible, and strangely enough, in this section the *Logica Parva* offers more examples than the *Nove Introductiones*.

After talking about kinds of argumentation, the following section in all three texts deals with the fallacies, or erroneous reasoning, and it explains why they are wrong and how to avoid falling into a fallacious argument. The *Nove Introductiones* presents a long and detailed section on the fallacies, which consists of the fifteen subdivisions (from eighty-two to ninety-six), listing the traditional thirteen fallacies, the six fallacies ‘*in dictione*’ and the seven ‘*extra dictione*’. In the *Logica Parva*, the section on the fallacies is also comparatively long and detailed, since it is made up of the same fifteen subdivisions, from forty-one to fifty-five, as the *Nove Introductiones*. This section is the last one before the explicit and it forms the fifth part of the logical tree, or the foliage of the tree: the explicit then clarifies that the fruit of the logical tree cannot be explicitly expressed in this book, as the result of logic is the ability to learn all the higher

sciences¹⁸¹. Conversely, the *Logica Brevis et Nova* offers a very brief exposition of the fallacies, which condense all the fallacies in one only section “*De fallaciis*” and which basically limits the treatment of each fallacy to the mere enunciation of where the error in reasoning comes from.

In Appendix four, I have chosen one of the fallacies, the *fallacia accidentis*, as an example to show the textual correlations between the three books: once again the definition of this fallacy is almost identical in all the three texts (and the *Logica Parva* reproduces *verbatim* the text of the *Nove Introductiones*)¹⁸². The main difference is that the *Logica Brevis et Nova* does not explain the three modes of the fallacy, and simply ends the exposition of this topic with a brief example.

After the section on the fallacies, the *Logica Brevis et Nova* ends with another two short subdivisions on the way in which a dispute should be handled, and on the conditions for a good dispute: this is the same topic that the *Nove Introductiones* address in subdivision ninety-seven, *De modo disputandi*, which comprehends both sections of the *Logica Brevis et Nova*. The *Nove Introductiones* includes two more subdivisions, unique to this text, in which the author gives some additional didactical advice on how to better learn the logical art, and a third, *De fine*, (the last, and number one hundred), which contains the actual explicit of the book.

It is noticeable that the *Logica Brevis et Nova* does not present any explicit, but ends with the last words of the section on the conditions of disputation: after that the

¹⁸¹ For a possible source of the treatment of fallacies here see to Fidora Alexander and Wyllie Guilherme (2008-09) “Ramon Llull i el tractat *De fallaciis* del pseudo-Tomàs d’Aquino”, forthcoming in *Enrahonar. Quaderns de Filosofia*.

¹⁸² Fidora Alexander and Wyllie Guilherme (2008-09), “Ramon Llull i el tractat *De fallaciis* del pseudo-Tomàs d’Aquino”, forthcoming in *Enrahonar. Quaderns de Filosofia*, argue very convincingly that the *fallacia accidentis* is in reality an error of the copyist or of Lull himself in the *Logica Nova* for *fallacia antecedentis*. Clearly the *Nove Introductiones* and the *Logica Parva* take the error directly from the Lullian source.

Zeitzner edition has very interestingly placed the short treaty *De venatione medii inter subiecti et predicati*, which was supposedly an original work of the Franciscan friar and Lullian scholar Bernhard of Lavinheta, but which is in reality an excerpt from an authentic Lullian work, as it constitutes the *distinctio VII* of the *Liber de venatione substantiae accidentis et compositi*¹⁸³.

Such an intellectual operation assumes even more meaning if we consider that, as I hope to shown in the analysis of the text of the *Nove Introductiones* in the next chapter, the *Liber the Venatione substantiae* is one of the original Lullian texts that inspired the anonymous author of the *Nove Introductiones*.

To sum up, I hope to have shown how the texts of the *Nove Introductiones*, of the *Logica Parva* and of the *Logica Brevis et Nova*, are related to each other. Though it is evident that they are three autonomous works, that had a very different history and circulation, I believe that they form a sort of textual unity. The *Nove Introductiones* is the earliest, longest and most detailed version of this short handbook for Lullian logic, and it constitutes a clear textual reference, a model, and provides a scheme, a trace, around which the other two texts are organized. Moreover, it provides the very language used and many direct quotes, since long sections, especially of the *Logica Parva*, are *verbatim* reproductions of the text of the *Nove Introductiones*.

¹⁸³ For a more complete treatment of the *Liber de venatione substantiae accidentis et compositi*, I redirect the reader to my ‘tesi di laurea’: Buonocore E., *Ars et logica et metaphysica. Lo sviluppo della logica Lulliana da ars inventiva a venatio medii* (Tesi di laurea, Università degli Studi di Siena, 2001), chapter 4, which in turn draws on Vennebush (1972), «De Venatione Medii inter Subiectum et Praedicatum: ein Abschnitt aus “De Venatione Substantiae Accidentis et Compositi” des Raimundus Lullus», *Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale* 14, and on A. Madre introduction to ROL XXII (1998).

In conclusion, it appears that the *Logica Parva* and the *Logica Brevis et Nova* are two autonomous versions, almost two different redactions, excerpted from the same original: the *Nove Introductiones*.

The final redaction of the *Logica Parva* was probably composed in the circle of Nicholas de Pax and Alfonso de Proaza shortly before its publication in 1512: in the prefatory letter to the edition Nicholas de Pax attributes its paternity to Ramon Lull himself, and in an epigram added at the end of ms. Palma, BP, 1044, his disciple Vicentius Valerius claims that the text had been found in a manuscript lost in a dusty library. While it is certain now that the text is not authentically Lullian, I believe that Nicholas de Pax and Alfonso de Proaza were telling the truth about the lost manuscript. The text they found buried in that old library was that of the *Nove Introductiones*, or a later and more Lullian inspired redaction of it, which they in turn proceeded to readjust, shorten and modify to fit the public of their edition. This hypothesis is compatible with the manuscript evidence: since all the manuscripts of the *Logica Parva*, but for one (ms. Salamanca, BU, 2465), are dependent on the edition of Nicholas de Pax. The history behind the *Logica Brevis et Nova* is probably similar: I believe that this even shorter and more schematic version of the *Nove Introductiones* was elaborated by Bernard of Lavinjeta, probably at the very beginning of his career as a young teacher of logic and of Lullism. The examples of men in the *Logica Brevis et Nova* always refer to a Bernardus, and more importantly, the whole text bears the mark of a serious scholastic master and of a serious Lullian scholar. Lavinjeta cut all the parts in which the text of the *Nove Introductiones* which were redundant and not accurate, and added the parts from Peter of Spain on supposition and in the end a whole authentic Lullian text, the *Liber de*

venatione medii inter subiecti et predicati. The only objection against this hypothesis is that the date of some of the manuscripts, which include the text of the *Logica Brevis et Nova*. While the date 1497 of the ms. Munich, BSB, lat. 4381 could be consistent with the authorship of a young Lavinheta, the more general indication “15th c.”, proposed for ms. Vaticano, BAV, Vat. lat. 3069 and Copenhaguen, KB, Ny kgl. Samling 640 8^o, creates a problem. What is beyond doubt is that the redaction of the *Logica Brevis et Nova* is the work of a very well learned scholar both of logic and of Lullism, and, moreover, it is certain that Lavinheta himself later revised the text to publish it in 1518 and to include it in his masterpiece, the *Explanatio* in 1523. It is through Lavinheta’s corrections and in his redaction that the *Logica Brevis et Nova* was then included in the widespread Lazarus’ Zetzner editions, as an authentic work of Lull, and therefore formed the logical basis for later Renaissance Lullism. It is in this form that it reached fame and was able to influence generations of students of logic, among which the most influential will be Leibniz.

Chapter Four. From the *Nove Introductiones* to the *Loyca*

Discipuli: Analysis of the Transformations of a Lullian

Handbook for Logic.

The history of the text of the *Nove Introductiones* and of the *Loyca discipuli* is still enveloped by mystery: the purpose of the last section of my dissertation is to try to shed some light on such mystery, thus unraveling some of the threads that constitute the tradition of the Lullian school in Italy between the later Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

The only concrete evidence we have to date and place this important document of the tradition of Lullian logic is its appearance in the mss. Riccardiana 1001 and in Munich, BSB, lat. 10542. This text has been almost ignored by scholarship; at the most it has been registered in manuscript catalogues, starting with Lopez in *Archivum Franciscanum*¹⁸⁴ and especially in two studies of Perarnau.¹⁸⁵ The only extensive studies of both text is still that of Francesco Santi¹⁸⁶, while Anthony Bonner and Charles Lohr have considered them in their broader analysis of the pseudo Lullian logical tradition.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁴ Athanasius Lopez (1910), "Descriptio codicum franciscanorum Bibliothecae Riccardianae Florentinae", in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 3 pp.739-742.

¹⁸⁵ Perarnau i Espelt, Josep (1986) *Els manuscrits lul-lians medievals de la «Bayerische Staatsbibliothek» de Munic. II. Volums de textos llatins "Studia, Textus, Subsidia" IV*, Barcelona, Facultat de Teologia, pp. 135-138; and Perarnau J. (1983), "Consideracions diacronique entorn del manuscrits lul lians medieval de la Bayerische Staatsbibliothek" *ATCA* 2, 1983, pp. 152-4.

¹⁸⁶ Santi Francesco (1986) "Osservazioni sul manoscritto 1001.."in *ATCA* 5, pp. 233-267.

¹⁸⁷ In particular, here I am referring to Bonner's Introduction to the anastatic reprint of the Zezner edition, 1996 and to Lohr's articles on the *Logica brevis* of 1972.

There are many questions posed by these two texts. The first one is that about their datation and provenience: when can we date these text back to? And where do they come from? Do the *Nove Introductiones* and the *Loyca Discipuli* have a common origin despite the clear difference that emerges from even a brief analysis of the philosophical content of the texts?

Another fundamental question that needs to be addressed is that of the purpose of these texts, both of which seem to come from the tradition of the Franciscan *studia* and to reveal a didactic and normalizing intent. To try to disentangle the mix of philosophical threads present in the text, I will provide a detailed analysis both of the text of the *Nove Introductiones* and of the text that we now conventionally call *Loyca Discipuli*¹⁸⁸.

The analysis of the *Nove Introductiones* will be carried out starting from the *incipit*, the doctrines professed, and then considering its structure and how it has changed in the different redactions of it that we can find, under different titles, throughout the history of Pseudo Lullian logic.

I. The *Nove Introductiones* between Lullian and Scholastic Logic.

- a. The beginning of the text: Incipit, Invocation to God and definition of the Object and Principles of Logic.

The text of the *Nove Introductiones* begins with an invocation to God's goodness and truth that clearly marks it as belonging to the Lullian tradition. From the very beginning the author calls upon two of the Lullian *dignitates* (or God's attributes) as the principles from which he draws in his introductory exposition of the logical doctrine necessary to

¹⁸⁸ The analysis of the text of *Loyca Discipuli* will be presented in Chapter Five.

become a good Lullian scholar. The Munich manuscript adds a short invocation and title to the text, which is absent in the version offered by ms. Riccardiana 1001: “*In nomine bonitatis optime veritatis quam verissime Incipiunt Nove et compendiose Introductiones logice*¹⁸⁹”. The title itself of the *Nove Introductiones* qualifies this text as a school-text, an introduction to logic, to be more specific a new, short, summarized (and ‘normalized’) introduction to logic: namely a new, revised handbook for Lullian logic¹⁹⁰.

The need for a new and shortened, abbreviated version of longer work is a constant in all the Lullian tradition, starting with Lull’s *Ars brevis*, to Le Myésier’s *Breviculum* (and the *Summula sive Introductio in logicalibus*), as we have seen. Alongside the need for brevity, we find in the *Nove Introductiones* also a clear ‘normalizing’ intent: one of the purposes of this text is that of making Lullian logic more ‘palatable’ to a scholastic audience and easier to understand for a beginning scholars. A clear aim of the text seems to be that to reconcile Lull’s logic with that of Peter of Spain. Such a ‘normalizing’ intent is typical of the beginning of the Lullian tradition and will continue to characterize Lullian scholarship throughout the centuries, culminating with the work of Bernard of Lavinheta.

Before investigating the possible origins and times of composition of this work, I would like to give a very close look at its structure and contents. The *Nove Introductiones* has been almost completely neglected by scholarship (more attracted to the less traditionally lullian *Loyca discipuli*).

¹⁸⁹ Ms. Munich 10542, f. 42r. [cfr. Appendix One]

¹⁹⁰ I have adopted the title “Nove et compendiose Introductiones” as it is the one that graphically appears in the manuscript. I have kept the medieval spelling *nove*, instead of normalizing the title as it appears in the Ramon Lull database, which reports “Novae et compendiosae Introductiones Logicae”. For the idea of a ‘normalization’ of Lullian doctrines inside the context of the early Lullian schools see also in the present work, chapter three: The Threads of Lullism.

The actual incipit of the *Nove Introductiones* brings the reader in *medias res*, there is no introduction and the text starts with a definition of logic.

*Logica est ars et scientia cum qua verum et falsum ratiocinando cognoscitur et unum ab altero discernuntur verum eligendo et falsum dimittendo*¹⁹¹.

This definition of logic seems to be an attempt to mediate between the typical Lullian definition of logic and the traditional scholastic definitions of logic, from Petrus Hispanus onward.

Here the attention to the use of terms reveals a very precise terminological awareness. The word ‘*Ars*’ refers to the Lullian Art but also to the technical aspects of logical reasoning, while the term ‘*scientia*’ acknowledges the status of logic as a well-established discipline within the scholastic curriculum. The Lullian artist who also considered himself a scholar had to receive a basic training in logic in order to be able to dispute at the same level with the master logicians coming out of the faculty of Art in the universities of the time, which mainly offered instruction in the Aristotelian logic. Lull himself had stressed the importance of logical training and had proposed ways to deepen and at the same time simplify the study of logic through the use of his art. It is actually probable that this definition came directly from Lull’s *Introductoria artis demonstrativae*, in which the *doctor illuminatus* had clearly said “*Logica enim dicitur Scientia, et dicitur Ars*”¹⁹²

The *Nove Introductiones* defines the object of logic as the ability to discern truth from falsehood by means of reason, thus allowing the scholar to choose truth and dismiss

¹⁹¹ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One.

¹⁹² *Introductoria Artis demonstrativae*, MOG III, pag 56.

falsity. Surprisingly, Petrus Hispanus' *Tractatus* does not provide a definition for logic, and the word '*logica*' appears seldom during the course of the whole treatise. Petrus prefers to refer to the art of logic as *dialectica* and defines it in the opening lines of the *Tractatus* as

*Dialectica est ars ad omnium methodorum principia viam habens. Et ideo in acquisitione scientiarum dialectica debet esse prior*¹⁹³.

In this passage, according to Petrus, the study of dialectics needs to be antecedent to the pursuit of any other knowledge, because dialectics is seen as an art, which offers a way to arrive to the principles of every other method. The unknown Lullist author of the *Nove Introductiones* seems to have assimilated the lesson of the *Tractatus*, since he continues his introduction remarking the place of logic as a part of the philosophical sciences and stressing the need to consider logic as a particular science with its own specific principles.

*Sed quantum logica est philosophie membrum ob hoc est particularis scientia particularia habens principia que subiciuntur alicui utilitati secundum quod ratio et natura hoc insinuant*¹⁹⁴.

Moreover, the principles of logic need to be clarified before proceeding with the explanation of the logical doctrines. At this point the author introduces the concept of universal, that the scholar has to learn in order to prepare himself for the study of logic, together with a distinction between the ten transcendent principles and the nine relative principles (*decem transcendentia et novem instrumentalia principia*). It is interesting to note that here the principles of the Lullian Art are considered as the principles that stand

¹⁹³ Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus*, ed. L.M. De Rijk, 1972, p. 1.

¹⁹⁴ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One.

before logic and whose knowledge needs to be mastered before moving on with the acquisition of the strictly logical mechanisms.

The ten transcendent principles briefly described are: *ens*, being; *bonum*, good; *magnum*, great; *durans*, lasting; *potens*, mighty; *intelligibile*, understandable; *amabile*, lovable; *virtuosum*, virtuous; *verum*, true; and *delectabile*; likable. These principles are posed as the most universal and general, and they can subsume the whole of reality, both spatially and temporally, as they include everything past, present and future. Following closely Lull's teachings in the *Liber de Venatione Substantiae Accidentis et Compositi*¹⁹⁵, the text proceeds to show how the ten principles can be applied to each other to form other universal and true sentences, showing how the principles are not only equivalent but interchangeable between themselves. From a contemporary perspective, this might seem tautological, but it represents only the first part of the logical system proposed by the *Nove Introductiones*. It is interesting to note that the *Nove Introductiones* also presents some terminological innovations and probably 'confusions' with respect to the authentic Lullian logical tradition. The principles of the art are called normally '*principia*', but are also referred to once as '*dignitates*¹⁹⁶'. Moreover, it is definitely striking the use of the term '*universalis*' and the definition of some principles as '*transcendens*'. A detailed analysis of the whole terminology applied here would require a much more in dept study of this text, which is beyond the scope of the current dissertation, but which is now possible thanks to the edition of the text offered in Appendix One.

¹⁹⁵ Raymundus Lullus, *Liber De Venatione Substantiae, Accidentis et Compositi*, ROL 22.

¹⁹⁶ See edition offered in Appendix One, pp. 271 and 283 and endnotes ix and xi.

The second universal is necessary to break the chain of analogies between the ten transcendent principles and bring change and difference into this system: the second set of principles, nine, here called instrumental principles, are a key element for the logician, as they allow the construction of arguments. Once again in this section our author is following very closely Lull's logical writings in the third period, as the 9 principles can be inscribed in three triangles: *concordantia –differentia –contrarietas*; *principium –medium –finis*; and *maioritas –equalitas –minoritas*. Through this triangular structure the logician can rationally understand how transcendence operates in reality, and how accidents separate themselves from the universals and come to life.

The conditions of the nine principles, which in Lull's logic formed the basis for the understanding of the whole structure of reality, here are reduced to a mere formality, to a logical structure whose main area of applicability is discourse. From the very beginning of the text the Lullian art is used and presented as a logic, a theory of demonstration, and its main aim is to distinguish true and false reasoning.

*Tam vera et necessaria atque infallibilia sunt principia supradicta, que sunt instrumentalia vocata, quod vigore ipsorum potest logicus solve sophismata, insolubilia, paralogismos et alia similia*¹⁹⁷

The third universal is constituted by the ten rules, or questions, and it is through some of these categories that the schoolmaster re-introduced a certain degree of realism in this system. The questions consider the total spectrum of reality: possibility, entity, materiality, formality, quantity, quality, time, space, modality and the so-called 'instrumentality', which concerns the instruments through which things can exist and act. Such rules can be applied both to concepts and to things; namely to first and second intentions. Therefore the task of the true logician is to find harmony between things and

¹⁹⁷ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One.

concepts: “*Et ideo logicus debet concordare intentiones secundas cum primis, sequendo conditiones primarum in secundis*¹⁹⁸”.

This definition of the logician’s job stems directly from a definition of logic as a science, which deals with more than just second intentions, concepts, but “*de secundi intentionibus iunctis primis*”, of the union between things and concepts: since this union has to take into account first the conditions of possibility of existence of things, one cannot deny that there is a degree of realism which informs the rhetorical strategies that will be explained later on.

The anonymous schoolmaster continues stating that in this ‘*opusculo*’, or short work, he will proceed mainly according to the rule of entity (*quidditate*) and instrumentality (*instrumentale*): his aim is to provide the reader with a way to achieve correct definitions and to reach clarity. Once again, there is a strong stress put on the need for brevity: this is a typical sign of the school tradition, and when he says “*breviter intendendo prosequi auxilio et specie bonitatis optime veritatis*¹⁹⁹”, using God’s attributes in a typically Lullian way, it reminds especially of texts coming out of the Lullian school in Valencia.

The whole section on the ten rules seems to be dependent on an authentic Lullian source: it follows almost *verbatim*, though sometimes shortening parts of it, the chapter “*De secunda parte, quae est de regulis*” of the *Liber de venatione substantiae, accidentis et compositi*, written by Lull in Montpellier in 1308²⁰⁰.

Moreover, the next introductory section, which describes the way in which the text will proceed, is also inspired by the *Liber de venatione*: it integrates and summarizes the core

¹⁹⁸ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One.

¹⁹⁹ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One.

²⁰⁰ *Liber De Venatione Substantiae, Accidentis et Compositi*, ROL 22.

ideas of the book. It also speculates more on the content of the two opening paragraphs found at the beginning of the second and third distinctions of the book, which deal with the searching for substance, accident and quantity through principles: “*De venatione substantiae et accidentis per principia*”, and “*De venatione quantitatis per principia*”²⁰¹. The author of the *Nove Introductiones*, though, only provides his readers with the five specific principles for logic, which he identifies in: the term, the proposition, the probabilities, the categories and the argument.

i) The term.

The treatment of the term is carried out in a manner that merges a more clearly scholastic and Aristotelian topic with a structure, which can definitely be identified as Lullian. The definition of term is given under the heading ‘*terminus quid*’; then the text presents the ‘*terminus differentia*’, which contains the explanation of the difference between a “*cathegorematicus*” term, or bearing meaning in itself, and a “*syncathegorematicus*” one, namely one whose main purpose is to modify the meaning of another term. It follows a discussion on all the various aspects of the term, which resembles the way in which a Lullian wheel could be ‘evacuated’. Here the author is combining two principles: the special logical principle, the ‘term’, with the nine instrumental principles illustrated before.

The Lullian influences in this passage emerge also from the use of clearly Lullian terminology in the examples offered to clarify positions and functions of the various speech parts, such as:

²⁰¹ *Liber De Venatione Substantiae, Accidentis et Compositi*, ROL 22.

*exemplum quod sit subiectum vel predicatum dicendo sic “bonitas est magnitudo” in hac propositione, bonitas est subiectum et magnitudo predicatum*²⁰²

The treatment of the term in itself and its division though, resembles closely that of Peter of Spain in the *Summule Logicales*, without being a *verbatim* quote from it²⁰³.

From a first glance analysis it immediately shows that the text is a compilation of different sources. The author of the *Nove Introductiones* seems to be creating its own original text, based on the merging of two logical traditions, the Lullian and the Aristotelian. He picks and chooses what to insert and how to exemplify each concept, according to which formulation seemed the most efficient to him. The *Nove Introductiones* are mainly a textbook, a tool for teaching, and the didactic purpose of the text influences the way each topic is treated. The original Lullian structures are preserved only when they represent efficient mnemonic tools, like the division of the treatment of term according to each instrumental principle; or when they offer a clearer system of exemplification, as with all the examples that use Lullian *dignitates*, namely the absolute principles intended as God’s attributes. In doing so, the text successfully carried out a strategy for the ‘normalization’ of Lullian logic: the elements preserved are only those that could facilitate learning (and not those that could result disturbing to the reader).

In addition, when the scholastic tradition offered a stronger tool for teaching, the author always adds it to its treatment of the subject, thus creating a real blend of Lullian and scholastic elements: this emerges clearly in the exposition of the second principle of logic, the proposition.

²⁰² See edition offered in Appendix One.

²⁰³ Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus*, ed. L.M. De Rijk, 1972.

ii) The proposition

In the treatment of the proposition, the *Nove Introductiones* do not follow precisely the structure of the *Summule Logicales*: the very definition of proposition seems to derive directly both from Boethius' *De differentiis topicis*, and from Lull's *Logica Nova*, as we can see.

<u>Boethius De Differentiis topicis (Pat. Lat. 64)</u>	<u>Raymundus Lullus, Logica Nova (ROL 23)</u>	<u>Nove Introductiones</u>
Propositio est oratio uerum falsumque significans.	Propositio est materia syllogismi, de pluribus veris dictionibus constituta.	Propositio est oratio de pluribus veris dictionibus constituta, veritatem vel falsitatem significans

Thus, this definition integrates the one given by Lull in the *Logica Nova*, which basically reduces the proposition to a part of the syllogistic structure, with the attention to truth/falsehood and to signification typical of the scholastic tradition found in the *Summule*.

Moreover, in the section on the categoric and ypothetic proposition, the text inserts parts that are completely different from Peter's *Summulae*, and for which I was not able to find an immediate referent in any authentic Lullian text: therefore here our schoolmaster is either using some unknown (yet) source, or being completely original, or more probably blending his sources so well that it becomes impossible to trace back the originals. It is this aspect of mixture of texts, of a blend of traditions, that makes the


Nove Introductiones so interesting, as it allows the modern reader to penetrate the mind of a teacher of logic, probably working inside a monastery.

As I have anticipated, the main aim underlying the composition of the *Nove Introductiones* appears to be simplicity and efficacy: in the further treatment of the proposition, under the heading ‘*Propositio contrarietas*’, the author inserts the famous figure representing the square of the opposites propositions: to present a visible aid to distinguish between contraries, subcontraries, contraddictory and subaltern kinds of propositions. The use of this figure was common in the school tradition, and the same figure can be found in Peter’s *Summule*²⁰⁴; on the other hand Lull never used such a figure in any of his logical works, and its presence in the *Nove Introductiones* reinforces the miscellaneous character of this work, which summarizes the main teachings of logic in use in the schools of the time. Moreover, the presence of this figure confirms the ‘normalizing’ aim behind the *Nove Introductiones*, as a ‘normal’ student of logic would expect to find such a figure in his textbook.

In the representation of this figure there is a major difference between the manuscripts, as the ms. Riccardiana 1001 reports the figure exactly as it is known in the logical tradition, with the conventional examples inscribed into it: “*Omnis homo currit, Nullum homo currit*”, etc. Instead, the ms. Munich, BSB, lat. 10452, offers an identical figure but the examples contained in it are completely different and clearly show a Lullian background: “*Omnis bonitas est magna, Nulla bonitas est magna*”, etc.

²⁰⁴ Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus*, ed. L.M. De Rijk, 1972, p. 6; Petrus Hispanus, *Trattato di Logica. Summule Logicales*, ed. and transl. Ponzio A., Bompiani, Milano 2004, pp. 14-15.

Here is a schematic representation of the figure offered in the text, as it appears in ms. Riccardiana 1001²⁰⁵:



It is interesting to note that in the whole text of the *Nove Introductiones* the only figures that appear are those used in the tradition of the schools of logic: the figures of the Lullian Art are completely absent. Such an evident absence, definitely reflects the need to give a ‘normalized’ account of Lullian logic, one which would not look too different and alarming to the students, even in its graphic form. Consequently, the acquisition of a basic knowledge of the Lullian Art was supposed to happen in a separate time, as it is shown by the fact that in the ms. Riccardiana 1001 the text of the *Nove Introductiones* is followed by the reproduction of the figures of the *Ars Brevis* and by the text of the authentic Lullian *Ars Brevis*. In the ms. Munich, BSB, lat. 10542, the


²⁰⁵ The figure appears in ms. Firenze, Riccardiana 1001 f. 20v. and in ms. Munich, BSB, lat. 10542, f. 45v. Reproduction offered in Appendix Five.

separation of the two moments, the learning of the *Ars* and the learning of logic is even more clear, as the manuscript presents only texts that deal with logical problems: the authentic lullian *Liber de novis fallaciis* and the *Nove Introductiones*. Clearly, in such a context, the learning of the Lullian Art was intended to happen in a separate, distinguished moment, from a separate book, in a different manuscript.

A few paragraphs after the representation of the square of logical opposition, the ms. Riccardiana 1001 gives further confirmation of the use of this text inside a school context. After the treatment of contradiction, there are four lines, added at the bottom of the page by a different hand: these verses were of common usage in the schools, as a mnemonic device to remember different ways of performing conversions between different kinds of propositions. Our text was used to learn logic, and therefore it was important to provide it with further notes helping the students to remember important passages.

In the course of the exposition of the section on proposition, the *Nove Introductiones* offers two more figures representing squares of logical opposition between propositions: one deals with the use of syncategorematic parts of discourse (like *omnis*, every) together with negations, while the other deals with modal propositions and the concepts of possibility, impossibility, contingency and necessity. I report here a schematic representation of the first figure²⁰⁶:

²⁰⁶ In ms. Firenze, Riccardiana 1001, the figure appears at f. 21v. Reproduction offered in Appendix Five.




Unfortunately, I have not found trace of the first figure, which could be an original elaboration of the author, or could come from an unknown treatise of logic: in the treatment of the *aequipollentie* it seems very close to William of Sherwood’s *Introductiones in Logicam*²⁰⁷. It is even more interesting to note that this first figure is also absent from ms. Munich, BSB, lat. 10542, and therefore it seems linked to the context of the ms. Riccardiana 1001. The second figure is also present, with the exact same examples offered, in the *Summule Logicales*; and in this part the very structure of the *Nove Introductiones* resembles that of Peter’s text, as it treats first the hypothetical proposition, and then the modal propositions, talking about their equipollences, their contradictions and then ends with the figurative representation²⁰⁸.

²⁰⁷William of Sherwood (1983), “Introductiones in logicam” ed. C. Lohr, in *Traditio* 39, pp. 219-299.

²⁰⁸Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus*, ed. L.M. De Rijk, 1972, pp. 8-16; Petrus Hispanus, *Trattato di Logica. Summule Logicales*, ed. and transl. Ponzio A., Bompiani, Milano 2004, pp. 20-37.

Here is a schema of the second figure²⁰⁹:



In explaining how to treat modal propositions, the author pays attention to clarify grammatical concepts such as that of copula and that of predicate. Moreover, he distinguishes between two senses of each sentence: the divisive sense and the compound sense; such division is absent in the *Summule* and in Lull and it seems to point towards an early influence of Ockham’s *Summa Logicae*²¹⁰. In fact, it was Ockham that introduced the distinction between divisive and compound sense, in his discussion on modal propositions: such a distinction is similar to that between the ‘de dicto’/ ‘de re’ meaning of a modal sentence, though the two do not completely overlap²¹¹.

²⁰⁹ In ms. Firenze, Riccardiana 1001, the figure appears at f. 22r, while in ms. Munich, BSB, lat. 10542 at f. 47v. Reproduction offered in Appendix Five.

²¹⁰ Santi Francesco (1986) “Osservazioni sul manoscritto 1001..” in *ATCA* 5, pp. 262-263.

²¹¹ For further information on this topic see also the article from G. Priest and S. Read (1981) “Ockham’s Rejection of Ampliation”. In *Mind, New Series*, Vol. 90, pp. 274-279. In particular when they say “In general, in a composite interpretation, necessity (necessary truth) is predicated of a sentence, whereas in a divisive interpretation, necessity is attached to a predicate and the compound predicate is asserted of the subject. The distinction is close to that between de dicto and de re modalities. However, one should note that a composite interpretation is not quite what is currently called a dedicto modality. For in the composite

What is interesting to note here is the fact that the author of the *Nove Introductiones* was already aware of this distinction, which helps date the text to at least the late 1330ies, since the *Summa Logicae* was finished around 1327, and probably circulated among Franciscan Italian circles shortly thereafter.

The use of Ockham in the *Nove Introductiones* is still reduced to a minimum, which probably means that the author was not completely familiar with the logical innovations present in the *Summa Logicae*: it will be the very need to come to terms with the new Ockhamistic point of view, the nominalistic approach, that will push the anonymous author of the *Loyca discipuli* to write his introduction to the *Nove Introductiones*. Probably already a few years after their composition, the *Nove Introductiones* were not felt as ‘new’ anymore and needed to be integrated with an updated introduction which would enable the student of logic, and the future preacher, to participate in the current debates and to win logical arguments with the master logicians coming out of the universities of the time²¹².

The text of the *Nove Introductiones* then continues its account of modal propositions by quoting *verbatim* parts of an authentic Lullian text: the *Liber de possibili et impossibili*, dated Paris 1310, to which the reader is also explicitly advised to refer for further instruction on the topic. The author enthusiastically describes the Lullian art as scientific, “*artem scientificam seu artificiosam scientiam*”, and as the way to really understand possibility, impossibility, necessity and contingency. In this account, Lull

case, the modal operator is a predicate of sentence names, whereas in the (modern) de dicto case the modal operator is a unary sentence connective”. p. 275. See also Ockham’s *Summa Logicae*, ed Boehner, II, cap 9, p. 273 lines 12-14/ 20-21 “propositio modalis primo modo dicta semper est distinguenda secundum compositionem et divisionem. In sensu compositionis semper denotatur quod talis modus verificetur de propositione illius dicti... Sed in sensu divisionis talis propositionis semper aequipollet propositioni acceptae cum modo, sine tali dicto...”

²¹² Such desire to write updated versions of handbook for logic in the 14th c. is attested in all the scholastic tradition. Cfr. Pinborg, Jan (1984), *Logica e Semantica nel Medioevo*, pp. 133-154.

himself becomes an almost legendary figure, whose name already shows in its etymology the destiny of its bearer: “*illius sacri doctoris radii lucentis in mundo*”, Raimundo, he who brings a ray of light in the world, according to the common medieval principle that ‘*nomina sunt consequentia rerum*’ or more properly said “*nisi enim nomen scieris, cognitio rerum perit*”²¹³. The identification of this Raimundo with Lull is then ensured by the reference to his geographical origin: “*philosopho magno cathalano*”.

The passage immediately following is entirely taken from the *Liber de possibili et impossibili*²¹⁴: it blends four lines from the introduction (lines 11-14), with three lines from the paragraph “*De divisione huius libri*” (lines 21-23) and then it quotes *verbatim* the first three paragraphs of the first distinction (covering the lines 36-45), before referring to the direct source for further examples.

iii) The predicables

After this explanation, the text goes on to tackle the problem of the third principle of logic, namely the predicables, and it provides definitions for: *genus*, *species*, *differentia*, *proprietas* and *accidens*. The treatment of predicables again blends a Lullian and a scholastic approach, and follows closely the exposition of the *Summule Logicales*. The predicable in general is defined as “*ens seu universale, seu de pluribus dicibile*”, summarizing what Peter of Spain said “*dicitur predicabile quod de pluribus predicatur*” and a few lines below “*‘predicabile’ proprie sumptum et ‘universale’ idem sunt*”²¹⁵.

²¹³ *Sancti Isidori Hispalensis Episcopi Etymologiarum Libri XX*, ed. Migne, vol 82, [cap. VII- 0082B]

²¹⁴ Raymundus Lullus, *Liber de possibili et impossibili*, ROL 6.

²¹⁵ Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus*, ed. L.M. De Rijk, 1972, p. 17; Petrus Hispanus, *Trattato di Logica. Summule Logicales*, ed. and transl. Ponzio A., Bompiani, Milano 2004, pp. 38-39.

The specific treatments of genus, species, difference, propriety and accident appear to be the result of an effort to summarize all the divisions present both in the lullian and in the scholastic tradition: the various predicables are presented as if in a combinatory device, which is a clearly Lullian trait, but the various divisions seems to follow more closely Peter's explanation.

The importance of the combinatory device to gain a broader and more complete understanding of the topic is clearly stated in the text at the end of the definition of genus: "*Causa combinationis predictae est, ut cum instrumentalibus principiis genus investigetur et cognoscatur, quod iter est introducentis facere*". The logician should use the division provided by the text together with the instrumental principles of the Lullian Art to deepen his knowledge of the predicables. In a coherent manner, the examples offered in the text come both from a scholastic and Lullian background. The scholastic part comes from Peter of Spain's *Summule*²¹⁶, and though I have not been able to exactly identify the Lullian text from which this part depends, the lullian import is made apparent by the use of the *principia*, such as: "*Species universalis ... Habet in se specialem entitatem bonitatem et cetera*".

The author of the *Nove Introductiones* continues his exposition with an analysis of the *predicamenta*, or categories: in this section is again evident the compound character of this text, which mixes Lullian and scholastic elements, probably in an effort to normalize and put to didactic use those features of the Lullian tradition that were most alien to a scholar of the time. The ten *predicamenta* are: substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, habit, time, space. Each of them is treated as if part of a

²¹⁶ Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus*, ed. L.M. De Rijk, 1972, pp. 17-25; Petrus Hispanus, *Trattato di Logica. Summule Logicales*, ed. and transl. Ponzio A., Bompiani, Milano 2004, II, *De predicabilibus*, pp. 38-59.

combinatory device (like a Lullian wheel), exactly like we have seen for the predicables, and of each we only have the definition according to the first combination with a question: namely, *substantia quid; quantitas quid; qualitas quid*, etc. This is the same mechanism Lull himself used to define the predicamenta in the *Logica Nova*, and the author of the *Nove Introductiones* seems to be following this account, mainly shortening and simplifying it. Taking the definition of *substantia* as an example, one can compare the treatment of this topic in the two texts. The text of the *Nove Introductiones* begins:

*“Substantia quid. **Substantia est ens per se existens, habet in se formam, materiam et coniunctionem; vel aliqua quibus forma et materia et coniunctio simulantur, que sunt substantie essentialia et naturalia, sine quibus ista substantia esse non posset. In tanto quod substantia per formam est substantiva, id est substantialiter activa, et per materiam substantiabilis, id est substantialiter passibilis vel agibilis, et per coniunctionem habet substantiare**”²¹⁷*

The *Logica Nova* instead has:

Lines 20-21. “Substantia quid est?. 1. Substantia est ens, quod per se existit. ...”
Lines 34-35 “2. Habet vero substantia in se naturaliter et primarie formam et materiam et coniunctionem, quae sunt de sua essentia. Per formam est substantiva, per materiam est substantiabilis, per coniunctionem habet substantiale substantiare”²¹⁸

It is interesting to note not only the way in which the *Nove Introductiones* depend from the *Logica Nova*, which parts of the lullian text have been subsumed in the new textbook and which have been left out, but also the fact that the author of the *Introductiones* here makes a conscious effort to use one of the most typically Lullian innovation: the correlative structure. Basically substance is defined, in an almost circular manner, as *substantiva-substantiare-substantiabilis*: what has the active power of making substance, what can become a substance and the action that gives substance, in an


²¹⁷ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix 1.

²¹⁸ Raymundus Lullus, *Logica Nova*, ROL 23, p. 57.

analogous way to the definition of man as “*homo est ens homificans*”, found in the *Ars Generalis Ultima*²¹⁹.

At this point the text inserts another figure: the *arbor porphyrianus*, which represents the various subdivisions of substance. The *Summule Logicales* presented this figure at the end of the section on the predicables, while the *Logica Nova* contains the *arbor porphyrianus* as the first part of the *arbor naturalis et logicalis* (the tree itself, without the questions which form the roots of the tree): I believe that in a way the presence of the *arbor porphyrianus* here is a perfect example of the syncretic attitude of the author of the *Nove Introductiones*²²⁰.

In explaining the various *predicamenta*, or categories, the text shows more clearly than in other section its Lullian imprint. In talking about relation it uses again two explicitly Lullian features: the *demonstratio per aequiparantiam* and the repeated use of the correlative structure.



²¹⁹ Raymundus Lullus, *Ars Generalis Ultima*, ROL 14, p. 237.

²²⁰ Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus*, ed. L.M. De Rijk, 1972, p. 20, and section III, *De predicamentis*, pp. 26-42; Petrus Hispanus, *Trattato di Logica. Summule Logicales*, ed. and transl. Ponzio A., Bompiani, Milano 2004, III, *De predicamentis*, pp. 60-95 and also pp. 46-47, which contains the figure of the *arbor porphyrianus*. In ms. Firenze, Riccardiana 1001, the figure appears at f. 23r, while in ms. Munich, BSB, lat. 10542 at f. 49r. Reproductions offered in Appendix Five.

“Et sic habet tres species, quarum prima est secundum equalitatem et dicitur equiparantia, et est quando aliqua equalia necessario se respiciunt, sicut inter calefactivum caleficabile caleficare, intellectivum intellegibile intelligere²²¹”.

The part on the categories ends with a note reminding the student to pay attention to the difference between substance and accidents, and between substantial and accidental qualities: it appears from these few lines that the aim of the author of the *Nove Introductiones* is not only to instruct a future logician, but to lay the basis for a full education in philosophy, which would include natural and moral philosophy, and, eventually, arrive to the study of theology.

b. Elements of Theory of Demonstration in the *Nove Introductiones*.

The fifth and last section of the *Nove Introductiones* occupies more than half of the text; it concerns the various manners of carrying an argument, and it stresses the importance for a logician (or for a preacher) to be able to create well formulated arguments to prove a point. The text uses the general term “*argumentatio*” to indicate the fifth logical principle, which is then divided into the four specific ways of solving such an argument: namely, *probatio*, which includes all sorts of demonstrations and the most powerful tool for the logician, the syllogism; induction, entimema, and example. This part is again in part dependent on Peter’s *Summule*, V, *De Argumento*, combined with more typically Lullian concepts, which appear to be directly dependent on the *Logica Nova*.

The first section deals with the problems posed by the so-called “*probatio*”, proof, and it includes the whole Lullian theory of demonstration, since “*probatio*” is defined as “*probatio est argumentum in quo veritas est apprensus*”. This definition is a *verbatim*

²²¹ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix 1.

quote from *Logica Nova* V, 10, line 196²²², and even the rest of the paragraph seems to be a rewording and a shortening of the paragraph “*De probatione*” in the authentic Lullian text; on the other hand Peter’s *Summule* do not offer an equivalent definition for the whole system of proving an argument.

Moreover, the structure of the *Nove Introductiones* here does not resemble that of the *Summule Logicales*, but it seems to be an original elaboration which blends Lull’s teaching with those of Peter of Spain. The *Nove Introductiones* qualifies the first way of proving an argument as demonstration, and then proceeds to describe the three main kinds of demonstration to be used by the logician: the two typical scholastic demonstrations ‘*propter quid*’ or *a priori*, the ‘*demonstratio quia*’, or *a posteriori*, and the originally Lullian ‘*demonstratio per aequiparantiam*’. Here the treatment of demonstration is longer and more accurate than in the section ‘*De demonstratione*’ in the *Logica Nova*, and the text seems to be influenced by Lull’s exposition of his theory of demonstration in the *Ars demonstrativa*²²³, even if the order of presenting the three demonstrations is different, as the authentic Lullian text present the *demonstratio per aequiparantiam* as the first species of demonstration and not the third. There has to be an additional source used in the elaboration of this passage, which has typical scholastic wording, especially in the definition of demonstration.

The *Summule Logicales* do not offer any definition for the term “*demonstratio*”: here the wording of the *Nove Introductiones* seems to be dependent on Thomas Aquinas exposition of Aristotle’s *Posterior analytics* or an analogous text. The similarity emerges clearly seeing the two texts in parallel:

²²²Raymundus Lullus, *Logica Nova*, ROL 23, pp. 107-108 and pp. 112-114.

²²³ Raymundus Lullus, *Ars demonstrativa*, MOG III, p. 93-4.

Nove Introductiones

“Demonstratio est aliquid ignoti per aliquid notum vel alicuius minus noti per aliquid magis notum cognitio, seu intellectui manifestatio²²⁴”

Thomae de Aquino Expositio libri Posteriorum Analyticorum (Lectio IV)

“Vel dicendum quod in omni demonstratione, oportet quod procedatur ex his, quae sunt notiora quoad nos, non tamen singularibus, sed universalibus. Non enim aliquid potest fieri nobis notum, nisi per id quod est magis notum nobis”²²⁵

Nevertheless, the fundamentally Lullian character of the theory of demonstration exposed here emerges from the use of examples, which involve the Lullian *principia*, and from the presence and emphasis given to the *demonstratio per aequiparantiam*, which represent the strongest way of argumentation and it is mainly applicable to God, the perfect subject, in which there is no discordance and in which there is a perfect equivalence between all the absolute principles or *dignitates*.

Demonstration is the first step to create a true science, and the main tool to carry out a demonstration is the syllogism, therefore the *Nove Introductiones* follows with an exposition of the syllogistic way of argumentation.

i) Correct Forms of Reasoning: The Syllogism and Its Figures.

The fourth book of the *Summule Logicales* provides an explanation of the syllogism, but the text of the *Nove Introductiones* does not seem to be directly dependent

²²⁴ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One.

²²⁵ *Thomae de Aquino Expositio libri Posteriorum Analyticorum* (Lectio IV), edito Leonina, [79493] Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 1 l. 4 n.

on it²²⁶. On the other hand, in this section the debt to the Lullian tradition is even clearer, since the exposition of the syllogism is carried out posing the accent on the importance of the middle term, and on the ways to find it and use it correctly. The ideas exposed in this section are very akin to those expressed in the *Liber de venatione substantiae, accidentis et compositi*, especially to its *distinctio VII*, the *De venatione medii*, even if the *Nove Introductiones* does not depend *verbatim* on it²²⁷. It instructs the logician to search for the middle term by analyzing it through the relative principles: *differentia, concordantia, contrarietas, principium, finis, maioritas, minoritas* and *equalitas*.

Moreover, the structure of the exposition of the syllogism resembles closely that of Lull's *Logica Nova*, V, 11: the text uses a combinatory structure, examining the syllogism through the use of the ten general questions. The definition of syllogism, for example, is given in the section *Sillogismus quid*, and it quotes *verbatim* that of the *Logica Nova*.

<i>Nove Introductiones</i>	Raimundus Lullus <i>Logica Nova</i>
<p>Sillogismus quid. Sillogismus est argumentum ex tribus veris et necessariis propositionibus constitutus. Dicitur sillogismus argumentum, eo quia argumentum est suum genus; argumentum enim potest esse verum vel falsum, sillogismus est qui semper est verus.</p>	<p>De Syllogismo Syllogismus est argumentum, ex tribus ueris et necessariis propositionibus constitutum. Dicimus autem quod syllogismus est argumentum, eo quod argumentum est suum genus. Cuius ratio est, quia argumentum enim potest esse uerum vel falsum, sillogismus es qui semper est uerus.</p>

²²⁶ Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus*, ed. L.M. De Rijk, 1972, *IV De syllogismis*, pp. 43-54; Petrus Hispanus, *Trattato di Logica. Summule Logicales*, ed. and transl. Ponzio A., Bompiani, Milano 2004, *IV De syllogismis*, pp. 96-125.

²²⁷ Raymundus Lullus, *Liber De Venatione Substantiae, Accidentis et Compositi*, ROL 22, pp. 83-91.

The *Logica Nova*, though, offered a more complete definition of syllogism in the section “*Syllogismus quid est?*”²²⁸, which appears to be the source for the rest of this paragraph.

The author of the *Nove Introductiones*, in fact, goes on explaining explicitly what Lull implicitly says by referring the reader to a specific rule of his art; and further in the definition it repeats this operation, which seems akin to a gloss.

<i>Nove Introductiones</i> ²²⁹ :	<i>Logica Nova</i> ²³⁰ :
Sillogismus habet in se tres propositiones, scilicet maiorem, minorem et conclusionem, que sunt eius essentielles partes...	Syllogismus de quid est? 2. Syllogismus habet duas propositiones et unam conclusionem, sibi coessentialia. Vt per secundam speciem regulam...

And the text keeps reproducing and explaining all the four points, which form the section on ‘Syllogismus quid’ in the *Logica Nova*:

<i>Nove Introductiones</i> :	<i>Logica Nova</i> :
Sillogismus est in anima mentalis conceptus cum tribus propositionibus veritatem indicans, in ore est vocalis ratiocinatio, in scripto scripta Sillogismus habet in subiecto cui est habitus veram et necessariam indicantiam, propter quam verum et falsum cognoscuntur...	3. Syllogismus est in anima conceptione, in ore pronuntiatione, ueritatem indicans demonstratiue... 4. Syllogismus habet in subiecto ueram et necessariam indicantiam, per quam necessarie uerum et falsum cognoscitur...

After that, the author of the *Nove Introductiones* then refers to the various other questions, directing the reader to proceed with the explanation of the rules in a similar fashion: « *Sillogismus de quo est, vade ad tertiam regulam et suas species. Sillogismus quare est, vade ad quartam ...* ». This way of proceeding is very common in works of the

²²⁸ Raymundus Lullus, *Logica Nova*, ROL 23, V, *De Syllogismo*, p. 109.

²²⁹ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One.

²³⁰ Raymundus Lullus, *Logica Nova*, ROL 23, V, *De Syllogismo*, pp. 96-112.

Pseudo Lullian tradition, and we can observe it in other works, not only of logic but also of mnemotechnic such as the *Liber ad memoriam confirmandam*²³¹.

Before the section on the figures of the syllogism, the author of the *Nove Introductiones* poses a short paragraph on the nine general subjects: such a section is typical of the texts of the Lullian *Ars*, and a similarly titled section can be found both in the *Ars generalis ultima* and in the *Ars brevis*²³². The nine subjects were one of the devices introduced by Lull at the beginning of the so-called ternary phase of his art: they allowed the artist to gain knowledge of the whole human wisdom and to create, using them, a ladder of being, through which the intellect could ascend and descend between different levels of reality. The text of the *Nove Introductiones* summarizes the already shortened version of the ‘novem subiectis’ present in the *Ars brevis*²³³, reducing them to little more than a list: God, the angel, the heavens (or sky), man. The fifth subject is more interesting since it shows a clear philosophical misunderstanding on the part of our author: in the Lullian tradition the fifth subject is normally the imaginative faculty, or ‘*imaginativa*’, whereas our text has “*irrationabile*”, which makes no real sense as it is not a faculty of the soul. The sixth subject is the ‘*vegetabile*’, which should probably be identified with the vegetative faculty that constitutes the seventh subject in the *Ars brevis*; while the seventh subject in the *Nove Introductiones* is the “*elementatus*”, which corresponds to the elementative faculty that is posed as the eighth subject in the *Ars brevis*. The last subject in the *Nove Introductiones* is the “*artificium*”, which, according to

²³¹ Pseudo Raymundus Lullus *Liber ad memoriam confirmandam*, ed. C. Lohr and A. Madre, “Primo enim: ‘quid’ habet tres species, quas hic propter earum prolixitatem ponere non curo; sed vade ad quintum subiectum...” p. 120.

²³² Raymundus Lullus, *Ars Generalis Ultima*, ROL 14, pp. 189-315. Raymundus Lullus, *Ars Brevis*, ROL 12.

²³³ Raymundus Lullus, *Ars Brevis*, ROL 12, pp. 222-230.

the text, refers to the “*moralitates*” and which corresponds in the *Ars brevis* to the “*instrumentativa*”, the faculty that includes the ability to judge and act morally. It is interesting to note how the author of the *Nove Introductiones* always seems to reduce the philosophical import and materialize all the nine subjects, as if to stress the need for a practical application of the logical theories.

Finally, the *Nove Introductiones* explains how to form the figures of the syllogism: in this section is again apparent the influence of the *Summule Logicales*, as the terminology applied, both in the explanation and in the examples, is that of the scholastic tradition and not that of the Lullian art. For example, the definition of figure of a syllogism seems to be directly dependent on the *Summule*.

<i>Nove Introductiones:</i>	<i>Summule Logicales:</i>
“Figura, pro ut hic sumitur, est debita terminorum in premissis ordinatio in subicendo vel predicando; que sunt tres ²³⁴ ”	“Figura est ordinatio trium terminorum secundum subiectione et predicationem. Hec autem ordinatio fit tripliciter ... ²³⁵ ”

The exposition of the three figures subsequently follows the normal scholastic rules: the propositions are defined using alphabetic letters, according to the standard code of the schools and the numerous examples offered do not include any that uses specific Lullian terminology.

²³⁴ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One.

²³⁵ Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus*, ed. L.M. De Rijk, 1972, p. 44; Petrus Hispanus, *Trattato di Logica. Summule Logicales*, ed. and transl. Ponzio A., Bompiani, Milano 2004, p. 98.

The second species of argument is induction, which represents a form of arguing inferior to the well-formed syllogism. The *Nove Introductiones* here seem once again to be integrating the scholastic with the Lullian tradition, as induction is characterized mainly through the use of examples, which make ample use of Lullian terminology. The examples offered in this section are particularly interesting as they point out to specific application in the sphere of theology and tackle important problems such as the resurrection of Christ and of the virginity of Mary.

The *Nove Introductiones* reserves the same sort of treatment to the third and fourth species of argumentation, namely to the enthymeme and the example: both are explained integrating the typical scholastic definition with examples taken from a Lullian background.

The exposition of the argument continues with a brief analysis of the “*loci*”, the places of the argument. The author of the *Nove Introductiones* chooses to limit himself to the main three loci: the “*locus a maiori*”, the “*locus ab equali*”, and the “*locus a minori*”. The text seems to integrate and shorten the treatment of the “*loci*” found both in Peter of Spain’s *Summule Logicales* and in Lull’s *Logica Nova*, mixing a traditional scholastic account of the places of argument with examples taken from the Lullian repertoire, as it has been the rule for most of this handbook for logic²³⁶.

The following section gives a definition of antecedent and consequent, namely of what comes before and what comes after in a demonstration: though the language used seems mostly of Lullian background, I have not been able to identify the exact Lullian referent behind this paragraph. Nevertheless, the main purpose of this section clearly is

²³⁶ Raymundus Lullus, *Logica Nova*, ROL 23, pp. 102-104; and Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus*, ed. L.M. De Rijk, 1972, *V De locis*, pp. 55-78; Petrus Hispanus, *Trattato di Logica. Summule Logicales*, ed. and transl. Ponzio A., Bompiani, Milano 2004, *V De locis*, pp. 126-185.

to reaffirm the realist import of whatever the logician is able to prove by means of syllogism or in general by logical excellence. The text stresses that it exists a natural and a real antecedent and consequent, not only a logical one, and that the rules used to investigate logic are well grounded in nature and reality: “*iste regule sunt multum in natura et realitate fundate*”²³⁷.

ii) Incorrect Forms of Reasoning: Paralogism and Fallacies

The last species of argument addressed by the *Nove Introductiones* is the paralogism, or fallacious reasoning. This section seems to depend on *Logica Nova*, V, 13, *De Paralogismo*: the definition of paralogismus is quoted *verbatim*, “*Paralogismus est argumentatio indicans esse uerum, quod falsum est*”²³⁸. The *Nove Introductiones* reads: “*Paralogismus est argumentatio indicans esse uerum quod falsum est et e contrario. Et dicitur paralogismus quasi apparens sillogismus*”²³⁹, though the Lullian definition is integrated with a curious etymology of the word paralogismus which seems taken from Thomas Aquinas’ *Commentary on Posterior Analytics*: “*sed paralogismus, idest apparens syllogismus*”²⁴⁰.

The main reason behind the formation of fallacious reasoning, or paralogism, is a mistaken treatment of the middle term, what the text calls ‘*diversitas medii*’, and the various kinds of fallacies can be organized according to which sort of mistake happens in the treatment of the middle term. The two main groups of fallacies are the six fallacies

²³⁷ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One.

²³⁸ Raymundus Lullus, *Logica Nova*, ROL 23, p. 112.

²³⁹ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One.

²⁴⁰ *Thomae de Aquino Expositio libri Posteriorum Analyticorum* (Lectio IV), edito Leonina, [79647] Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 1 l. 22 n. 2.

“*in dictione*” and the seven fallacies “*extra dictionem*”. In the treatment of the fallacies “*in dictione*” the *Nove Introductiones* follows the scheme proposed by the *Logica Nova*, as the first one proposed is the “*fallacia equivocationis*”, followed by the “*fallacia amphibolie*”, then by the “*fallacia compositionis*”, the “*fallacia divisionis*”, the “*fallacia accentus*”, and by the “*fallacia figure dictionis*”. The *Summule Logicales* presents this same scheme, though the treatment of each fallacy is longer and more accurate. The text of the *Nove Introductiones* appears to be closer to the Lullian model than to the scholastic one, since the analysis of each fallacy is shorter, though the examples offered do not use specific Lullian terminology, but seem instead to be directly taken from the scholastic tradition.

The same principle applies to the fallacies “*extra dictionem*”, which are exposed following the guidelines of the *Logica Nova*. After a short introduction, in which it explains the differences between the fallacies “*in dictione*” and “*extra dictionem*”, the text lists the seven fallacies, that will be described in the next paragraphs. The wording of the introduction mirrors closely that offered by *Logica Nova* V, 14, b²⁴¹, while it is fairly different from that present in the *Summule Logicales*. The order in which the fallacies are introduced is also identical to that of *Logica Nova*, though it was the canonical scheme for the exposition of this topic, and Peter’s *Summule* follow a similar scheme. Recently A. Fidora and G. Wyllie have shown that Thomas Aquinas treatise *De Fallaciis* should be considered a source for Lull’s *Logica Nova*, and therefore for all the pseudo Lullian logical treatises influenced by the *Logica Nova*²⁴².

²⁴¹ Raymundus Lullus, *Logica Nova*, ROL 23, p. 120, lines 838-850.

²⁴² In their article A. Fidora and G. Wyllie do not mention explicitly the *Nove Introductiones*, though they refer to the *Logica Parva*, which is part of the same tradition. For further information on this topic, I

The *Nove Introductiones* explains first the “*fallacia accidentis*”, followed by the “*fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter*”, then the “*fallacia ignorantia elenchi*”, the “*fallacia petitionis principii*”, the “*fallacia consequentiis*”, the “*fallacia secundum non causam ut causam*” and in the end the “*fallacia secundum plures interrogationes ut una*”. It is interesting to note here that, though the author of the *Nove Introductiones* is clearly a Lullian scholar, he does not include in his list the most specific Lullian fallacy, the “*fallacia contradictionis*” also known as the “*fallacia Raimundi*”, which Lull added to the treatment of the thirteen fallacies in the *Logica Nova* and to which he dedicated a specific book, the *Liber de novis fallaciis*. Nevertheless, the language used in the closure of the section on the fallacies bears the clear marks of the Lullian tradition, as the author refers the reader to the principles and the rules of the *ars* to deepen their knowledge and ability to solve sophisms, and states that he has chosen not to explain them more in detail only for brevity’s sake: “*que explicare non curo, ne hoc opus ultra debitum prolongetur*”²⁴³.

C. The Closure of the Text: Methods of Arguing and Explicit

After the treatment of the fallacies, the *Nove Introductiones* introduces a section that addresses the problem of how a logician should behave during a dispute, “*De modo disputandi*”. This passage starts with a definition of dispute, of “*disputatio*”: although the *Summule Logicales* offered a similar section on the definition of dispute right before the treatment of the fallacies, the language and the content of this paragraph are evidently different. Moreover, the terminology and the concepts used clearly betray a Lullian

redirect the reader to Fidora Alexander and Wyllie Guilherme (2008-09) “Ramon Llull i el tractat *De fallaciis* del pseudo-Tomás d’Aquino”, forthcoming in *Enrahonar. Quaderns de Filosofia*.

²⁴³ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One.

origin, the Lullian source for this passage is probably to be identified with the *Proverbs de Ramon* n. 248, which offers a very similar definition of “*disputatio*”. The dispute is defined here, as in the *Proverbs*, in terms of a ‘spiritual contrariety’, manifested through speech, which brings two intellects against each other. The desire to give a set of rules for an intellectual dispute is another feature that betrays the didactical purpose of this text, and the way in which the unknown author of the *Nove Introductiones* formulates such rules is one of his most original contributions²⁴⁴.

As a good schoolmaster, the author here gives instructions to his readers about how to conduct a dispute. The first precept concerns the internal disposition of the participants: it is necessary to have a free mind “*intellectus liber*²⁴⁵”, the intention to discover truth and to distinguish it from falsehood. The true victory for the logician is not to simply win the dispute; it is to arrive to the truth. The second advice consists in reminding the reader to apply the notions reviewed till now in the book and therefore to use the techniques of demonstration acquired so far, while the third stresses the need for brevity while conducting a dispute. Then the author focuses again on the mental state of the two participants in the dispute, pointing out that there needs to be an intellectual friendship between them, “*amicitia*”, to avoid pointless arguing, “*que refrenet particularem contrarietatem*”; moreover there should not be any ire, because anger can obfuscate judgment, “*intellectum obfuscat*”, and both words and gestures during the

²⁴⁴ Cfr. Bonner A. Ripoll and Perelló M. I. (2002), *Diccionari de definicions lul·lianes. Dictionary of Lullian Definitions*, Universitat de Barcelona and Universitat de les Illes Balears, Xisco Arts Gràfique, Palma (Illes Balears), p. 147: “Disputatio est spiritualis contrarietas quae per verba manifestat conceptionem quam unus intellectus habet contra aliud. [Prov] III.27-ProvRam 248”. This definition is taken from the *Proverbs the Ramon*, n. 248. I am indebt for this identification to Anthony Bonner, who kindly took the time to help me revise this chapter.

²⁴⁵ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One.

argument should be polite, “*modestia, curialitate et alacritate*²⁴⁶”. The final four warnings concern the matter of the dispute: the importance of coherence, not to change the terms of discussion in the middle of the argument, of assuming a set of commune principles and of following the consequences of such principle.

To conclude, the author cautions the future logician against the temptation of simply point out the logical fallacies in the opponent’s reasoning: it is fundamental to explain carefully the sources of error and to proceed to show how the correct reasoning should have followed from the right combination between the principles and the rules.

After this section, the author includes a short paragraph on logic, as logic is the first discipline that needs to be studied and forms the basis for acquiring any other knowledge. Logic becomes here the subject of a set of questions, and it is investigated using the rules of the Lullian art: “*Questio est utrum ordine doctrine addiscendi quamcumque aliam artem logica precedere debeat*²⁴⁷”. The author of the *Nove Introductiones* seems to be following an authentic Lullian model here, as almost all the works of Ramon Lull on the Art or on Logic end with a section on the questions, “*de quaestionibus*”, but I was not able to identify the exact source as the treatment offered here is too short, and it can basically be reduced to a list of the ten questions to be resolved to learn further about logic: “*In quarum solutionibus maxime de logica et de hiis que ad eam pertinent pandetur notitia*²⁴⁸”.

The text of the *Nove Introductiones* ends with a sort of long explicit, an explanatory paragraph entitled “*De hiis que ad huius operis notitiam preexhiguntur*²⁴⁹”,

²⁴⁶ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One.

²⁴⁷ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One.

²⁴⁸ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One.

²⁴⁹ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One.

in which the author gives additional advice to his reader, the young, “*iuvenem*”, about the preliminary knowledge necessary to understand his “*novum compendium*” for logic; such preexistent knowledge should consist mainly of the principle and the rules of the Lullian Art, therefore this lines serve the author as an excuse to openly declare his admiration for Ramon Lull’s teachings. Ramon Lull is defined here as “*sancto homini et christianissimo*”, who has received his art in a direct revelation from Christ. The author interprets again Lull’s own name as a sign of his destiny, as a “*nomen omen*” (as we have seen earlier in the text, p. 168 and note 213) and for the second time he gives an original and creative etymology for it, which interprets the name “*Raymundus*” as basically meaning ray of light for the world: “*qui Raymundus nomine dictus, Lulii cognomine dignus: et bene Raymundus Lulii, qui vere radius lucis mundi*²⁵⁰”.

This last section is of particular interest for the scholarship because it contains a few indications that can help give a date and a location to this text, besides offering a few hints about the identity of its author. In fact, the text continues: “*quem etiam in partibus nostris aliqui magnum philosophum catalanum appellant*”. This phrase clearly indicates that the author is not Catalan, therefore does not belong to the Lullian schools of Valencia or Barcellona, since he feels the need to specify that even where he comes from (‘in partibus nostris’) Lull is known as a great Catalan philosopher. But where does the author of the *Nove Introductiones* come from? Probably he was from Genoa, Italy, as later in this section he states :

“*Tanta enim sapientie virtus in ipsa arte consistit, quod supra quamcumque aliam hucusque inventam presertim elevat intellectum, de cuius virtute per Dei gratiam in partibus Ytalicis, ut in nobili civitate Ianuensi aliisque quibusdam, minimella fuit aliquibus notitia propalata*²⁵¹”

²⁵⁰ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One.

²⁵¹ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One.

Even if he does not explicitly declare to be an Italian from Genoa, the fact that he mentions “partibus Ytalicis”, and then specifies the city of Genoa seems to point in the direction of an Italian, Genoese origin of this text. Francesco Santi²⁵² and Josep Perarnau²⁵³ had already pointed out the very probably Italian origin of this text, which emerges also from the language and the examples used by the author: whenever it does not report a traditional example for a topic, he tends to use Italian names, or Italian places, as we can see: “*sicut Petrus, Guillelmus, Maria, Catherina*” and “*ut "ianuenses contra pisanos pugnare malum est, ergo venetos contra napoletanos pugnare malum est*”²⁵⁴.

Another piece of evidence in favor of an Italian origin of this text comes from the colophon of ms. Riccardiana 1001, at the *folio* 361 v, in which the copyist declares, with a closing note: his name, Nicolai Mucklenwalt; his provenience, Prussia; and the addresses of his work, “*ad fratrum heremitarum sancti augustini donatum*”, also specifying the monastery “*Ieronimi in monasterio suo proprio Sancte Iustine ... Vicem gerens dominus Bertramus royles...*” Also on f. 166v there is a note reporting his name and the date in which that section of the manuscript was concluded: “*Per manus fratris Nicolai Muckenwalt de Prussia ordinis sancti Augustini, ab incarnatione domini M°CCCCXVII°, XX die mensis aprilis in monasterio Sancti Ieronimi de Cervaria...*”

Therefore, we learn that the ms. Riccardiana 1001 was written in and for the monastery of Benedictines friars at San Geronimo della Cervara, which formed a part of the dioceses of Chiavari, and which would later, in 1461, become part of the famous

²⁵² Perarnau J. (1983), “Consideracions diacronique entorn del manuscrits luls lians medieval de la Bayerische Staatsbibliothek”, pp. 152-4.

²⁵³ Santi Francesco (1986) “Osservazioni sul manoscritto 1001..”, pp. 233-267.

²⁵⁴ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One.

congregation of Santa Giustina²⁵⁵. There was prior Bertrame de' Correnti, who is recorded in the *Annali di Santa Margherita Ligure*²⁵⁶ as a very active figure, under-prior in 1414, prior from 1419 to 1425, and who clearly is the same *dominus Bertramus* named in our manuscript. In the same period, we find numerous members of the Spinola family involved in the direction of the monastery at the Cervara, thus making it very easy to draw a connecting line between the supposed Genoese centre of Lullian studies that was to be built around the library of Perceval Spinosa and this Ligurian monastery: unfortunately, I could not find any closer link between the two than the very evidence in ms. Riccardiana 1001.

The presence of the text of the *Nove Introductiones* in the mss. Munich, BSB, lat. 10542 and Firenze, Riccardiana 1001 constitutes one of the few indication of the existence and survival of a Lullian school in Italy during the period between the death of Lull and the rebirth of an Italian Lullian tradition, due to the emigration of Catalan Lullian scholars like Joan Bolons and Pere Dagui in the 15th c.²⁵⁷. In particular, the composition of ms. Firenze, Riccardiana 1001, which combines the *Nove Introductiones* with its 'Ockhamizing' introduction, the *Loyca discipuli*, and which clearly belonged to an Italian intellectual environment, seems to strenghten the evidence in favor of an Italian origin of the *Nove Introductiones*, at least in the form of the text presented in this edition²⁵⁸.

²⁵⁵Pistarino Geo (1979), *Italia Benedettina II- Liguria Monastica*, Pubblicazioni del Centro Storico Benedettino Italiano, Cesena, Badia di Santa Maria del Monte, pp. 89-91. Cantoni Alzati G. (1982) *La Biblioteca di S. Giustina di Padova: libri e cultura presso i benedettini padovani in età umanistica*. Antenore, Padova.

²⁵⁶ Attilio Regolo Scarsella (1914) *Annali di Santa Margherita Ligure*, Forni ed., Bologna, pp. 47-49.

²⁵⁷ M. Romano (2008) "I *Canti* di Bartolomeo Gentile da Fallamonica" talks about "punti di luce", p. 279.

²⁵⁸ I refer here to the critical edition of the text offered in Appendix One.

From a philosophical and logical point of view, the text of *Nove Introductiones* appears to be still very influenced by the traditional *Summule Logicales* of Peter of Spain and by Ramon Lull's *Logica Nova*, even if, as it has been noted in the analysis of the text, in a few passages we can already detect the penetration of Ockhamistic ideas and distinctions.

At the very end of the *Nove Introductiones* the author qualifies himself as a disciple of Lull: in the short section “*De fine*”, he humbly declares to be ‘small in science and even smaller in manners’, in a sort of ‘*captatio benevolentiae*’, which ends in a typically Lullian *explicit*, which includes the dedication of his work to the love of God.

“Ego vero artis philosophorum philosophi iam dicti discipulus, licet ad huiusmodi nomen indignum exprimi fore rear, et hoc quia in scientia parvulus et in moribus minimus hoc operi principium, medium et finem dedi, virtute et gratia illius qui est bonitas optima veritasque verissima. Ad cuius honorem factum est et propter ipsum addisci debet, ut principia fini respondeant. In laude, cognitione et dilectione domini Dei, a quo omne bonum et verum procedit. Et ad quem est tamquam ad suum ultimum finem reducendum. Deo gratia²⁵⁹”.

²⁵⁹ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One.

Chapter Five. The *Loyca discipuli magistri Raymondi Lulli*:

An Ockhamistic Introduction to the *Nove Introductiones*

I. Textual history and title of the *Loyca Discipuli*: a copyist error?

The history of the *Loyca discipuli magistri Raymondi Lulli* is intricate and mysterious: even the very title under which the work has been known to scholarship appears to be a purely conventional choice, and probably is the result of a chain of errors in the manuscript tradition. The other text present in the ms. Riccardiana 1001 is indeed what has been conventionally called by scholarship the *Loyca discipuli magistri Raymondi Lulli* and, in the physical appearance, the text of the *Loyca discipuli* comes before the *Nove Introductiones* and it occupies the *folia* 14r- 18r.

The *Nove Introductiones* ends with the definition of the author of the text as a disciple of Lull: “*Ego vero artis philosophorum philosophi iam dicti discipulus*”. It is interesting to note how this internal definition of himself given by the author has become the title not only of the whole text, but also, in particular, the title of the text that came before the *Nove Introductiones* in the ms. Riccardiana 1001, which is now conventionally called the *Loyca discipuli*.

I believe that this is due to a simple copyist mistake: the copyist of the ms. Riccardiana 1001 made two huge, connected, errors, which ended up heavily influencing the history of these texts. On the one hand he misunderstood the actual *Loyca discipuli* and the *Nove Introductiones* as being a single text, as it is shown by the fact that on f. 18v there is no real point where it is signaled when one text ends and the other starts. On the

other, he took the definition that the author of the *Nove Introductiones* gave of himself at the end of that text and put it as the title of the first text, on top of the actual f. 14r, “*Incipit Loyca discipuli magistri Raymundi Lulli*”. The text that is now conventionally called *Loyca discipuli* was meant to be a further introduction to the *Nove Introductiones*: its intent is to provide an updated logical introduction to the use of certain terms, based on the diffusion of Ockham’s logic and therefore the text has very little Lullian character, as we will see shortly. What scholarship now refers as the *Loyca discipuli* is a compound text, clearly of Italian origin, and its very composition and circulation can testify for the vitality of the Italian Lullian tradition, especially in the field of logic.

Moreover, the presence in ms. Riccardiana 1001 of the two texts of the *Nove Introductiones* and of the *Loyca discipuli*, presented without a clear distinction between the two, provides the evidence for beginning to draw a distinction between different phases of the textual tradition of such texts.

As we have already seen, the *Nove Introductiones* is the older text, and functions almost as an Ur-text for the whole Lullian logical tradition. In an initial phase the *Nove Introductiones* must have circulated by themselves, inside manuscripts in which they were reproduced next to authentic Lullian logical texts, as it is the case of the ms. Munich, BSB, lat. 10542. In a second phase, the *Nove Introductiones* and its later Introduction, the actual *Loyca discipuli*, probably circulated together but as two separate works: we have no extant witness of such a moment, but it is highly feasible that the copyist of ms. Riccardiana 1001 was looking at one exemplar of that sort when writing his copy. The third phase is that represented by the ms. Riccardiana 1001: the *Nove Introductiones* and its introduction are reproduced together, without a clear distinction

between the two and the two texts are united under the title *Loyca discipuli*. The two texts circulated in this form among Italian Lullian schools during the 15th c.: a 15th. C. Lullian manuscript, now in Terni, at f. 4v, the copyist refers in a marginal note to the *Loyca discipuli*, thus witnessing the circulation of such a work. We will explore more in detail the contents of the note found in ms. Terni, Comunale 61, at the end of this chapter, after having analyzed the philosophical content of the text that scholarship conventionally calls *Loyca discipuli*.

The only studies that deal with the history and the philosophical import of this text are those of Francesco Santi, though in very recent times the *Loyca* is attracting more and more interest, thanks to the current research carried out on the early stages of Lullism in Italy²⁶⁰.

I hope that the edition of the text offered in the appendix will open up many possibilities for further scholarship, since the *Loyca discipuli* testifies a clear convergence of Lullism and Ockhamism, as we will analyze more in detail below. I will start analyzing the text from its internal subdivisions. The structure of the text is quite simple, as it can be observed in the following scheme.

²⁶⁰Santi Francesco (1986) "Osservazioni sul manoscritto 1001.." in *ATCA* 5, pp. 233-267; Santi Francesco (1988), "La fortuna de Ramon Llull a les regions meridionals de l'Imperi al segle XIV. Esbós sobre les perspectives de recerca", *Ateneu. Revista de Cultura* 14, pp. 13-16. Santi Francesco (1990) "Episodis del lul·lisme genovès a les acaballes del segle XIV: la confluència amb l'ockhamisme", *Del frau a l'erudició. Aportacions a la història del lul·lisme dels segles XIV al XVIII*. "Randa" 27, pp. 57-69. And the separate researches of G. Pomaro and M. Romano: Romano Marta MM, "I Canti di Bartolomeo Gentile da Fallamonica (1450-1510/20). Poesia, scienza e studio di Lullo" in *Pan* 24, 2008, pp. 273-299 Romano Marta M.M. (2007), "Il primo lullismo in Italia: tradizione manoscritta e contesto della *Lectura* de Joan Bolons" in *Studia Lulliana* 47, 2007, pp. 71-115. Pomaro, Gabriella (2005), "«Licet ipse fuerit, qui fecit omnia»: il Cusano e gli autografi lulliani", *Ramon Lull und Nikolaus von Kues: eine Begegnung im Zeichen der Toleranz. Raimondo Lullo et Niccolò Cusano: un incontro nel segno della tolleranza*, ed. Ermenegildo Bidese, Alexander Fidora i Paul Renner, "Instrumenta Patristica et Mediaevalia. Subsidia Lulliana" 2, Turnhout, Brepols, 2005, pp. 175-204.

B. The structure of the *Loyca Discipuli*.

I. Introduction <f. 14r>

II. First thematic unit: [The term] <ff.14r-16r>

- a. *distinctio* one: written, oral and mental terms
- b. *distinctio* two: categorematic and syncategorematic terms
- c. *distinctio* three: abstract and concretionary terms
- d. *distinctio* four: absolute and connotative terms
- e. *distinctio* five: terms of first and second position
- f. *distinctio* six: terms of first and second imposition
- g. *distinctio* seven: terms of first and second intention
- h. *distinctio* eight: terms that have multiple meanings:
 - a. Univocal, equivocal, analogical, denominative and synonym terms
- i. *distinctio* nine: Singular and Universal terms (short version)

III. Terminorum utilium Second thematic unit [Key Logical Problems] <ff.16r-18r>

- a. Transcendent
 - i. *Ens –unum –verum –bonum –res –aliud*
- b. non-transcendent :
 - i. The five Predicable terms:
 - a. *Genus – Species –Differentia –Proprium –Accidens*
 - ii. Singular and Universal terms
 - iii. The ten *Predicamenta* or Categories

The text of the *Loyca discipuli* opens with a relatively short introduction, in which the unknown author of the book declares his intentions. It is a very interesting passage

and it deserves to be analyzed in detail, since it reveals many characteristics both of the text and of its anonymous author.

The very first line, which follows the *incipit*, is a direct quotation from Aristotle: we will encounter such a technique all throughout the text, which is full from direct Aristotelian quotes. The author explicitly declares the place from which the first citation comes from: the *De sophisticis elenchis*, which could have been available to him in Boethius' translation²⁶¹. From the beginning, the reader is thrown *in medias res*: the author's intention is to provide a guide for the correct logical use of names, nouns, *vocabula*, namely terms. In the ms. Riccardiana 1001, the purpose of this little book, or *opusculum*, is to function as an introduction for the handbook for logic, which will follow it in the manuscript, the *Nove Introductiones*. The anonymous author states that he has written this short text at the pressing requests of many: "*idcirco plerisque studiosissime diligenterque rogatus, ut vocabula logice in unam summulam declararem*²⁶²"; from this we can suppose that he was a school teacher, some kind of master of logic, who has been asked by his students and fellow colleagues, and probably fellow monks and superiors, to put into paper part of his teachings. The intention and reason behind the writing of the text is openly didactic and introductory: "*ad instructionem iuvenum cupientium in logica erudiri, ut in ea facilius possint introduci*²⁶³". Moreover, the author declares also the methodology used to write the booklet, "*quod est rosa de spinis colita*" and gives a short overview of its contents: "*continens expositionem; discursionem ac declaracionem in*

²⁶¹ Boethius translator Aristotelis - De sophisticis elenchis Clavis : 06.1, cap. : 1, p. : 6, linea : 9 (Bekker : 165a) "*Quemadmodum igitur illic qui non sunt prompti numeros ferre a scientibus expelluntur, eodem modo et in orationibus qui nominum virtutis sunt ignari paralogizantur et ipsi disputantes et alios audientes.*" Quotation taken from the Aristoteles Latinus Database, ed. Brepolis. Online edition, web address: <http://clt.brepolis.net.lib-proxy.nd.edu/ald/>

²⁶² Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix Two.

²⁶³ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix Two.

*multis saltem quoad nominibus multorum vocabulorum in logica magis usitatis attingendo*²⁶⁴.

Therefore, there clearly appears the miscellaneous and composite character of the text, which almost declares its belonging to the very common medieval genre of the philosophical *florilegia*, or anthologies, namely collections of quotations, taken from the original texts like flowers, or roses, from the bushes.

The content is that of the medieval logical theory of terms, which comes right before the more general treatment of logic offered by the *Nove Introductiones* to avoid the risk of teaching things that were already superseded by the current logical debates. Naturally, our author does not explicitly say that, but he is very clear in stating his intention to try to remove every possibility of error, “*errandi occasio*”, and his desire to provide a guide to the most used meanings of the terms currently used in logic, “*ea in illo sensu et significatione quibus magis frequenter utuntur logici vertiones scribendo, memendo, mandabo*²⁶⁵”, which clearly betrays a distrust for the way in which such topics will be treated in the other text, the *Nove Introductiones*. This brief introduction gives us another clue about the origin of the author of the text: the author says ‘mandabo’, using the verb ‘mandare’ which in medieval latin can mean both to entrust, to consign, but could also assume the same meaning of ‘mittere’, to send²⁶⁶. Therefore there is a possibility that original text had not been written in the same place as the *Nove Introductiones*: I believe that the author of the *Loyca discipuli* might not be Italian, or if

²⁶⁴ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix Two.

²⁶⁵ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix Two.

²⁶⁶ See Du Cange, *Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis*, ed. 1883-1887, Tomus Quintus, p. 210 and Niermeyer, *Mediae Latinitatis Lexicon Minor*, Brill 2002, p. 829-830.

he was Italian, then he was an Italian living far away from Genoa and the monastery at the Cervara²⁶⁷.

Finally, the introduction closes with another methodological and stylistic remark: the author, who has already warned the reader about the smallness '*parvitatem*' of his intellect, notifies again his audience about how he will proceed with 'a material and rude style', "*stilo grosso et materiali*", to be understandable to everyone, even to those newer to logic. He also declares how he will adhere to Aristotle, as if his own booklet was only a commentary on the Aristotelian logical theories.

It is interesting to note how the author of this text falls into many contradictions: he is qualified as a disciple of Ramon Lull, yet the figure of the *doctor illuminatus* is almost completely absent from his text.

As I have anticipated at the beginning of this chapter, I believe that the titling found in the incipit '*Incipit Loyca discipuli magistri Raymondi Lulli*' is a later title given to this text thanks to the mistake of the zealot yet lazy (and probably ignorant) copyist of the ms. Riccardiana 1001, who did not realize he was copying two texts. Such a mistake is evident by the fact that in the f. 18r, where the *Loyca discipuli* ends and the *Nove Introductiones* begins; there is no sense of closure and opening.

There is no explicit offered for the *Loyca discipuli*, and no incipit given for the *Nove Introductiones*. The two texts seem to collapse and merge one into the other: the error is so easy to make that, till Francesco Santi's research, even in modern catalogues it was considered to be all one text. As I have begun to explain above, it is clear then that our copyist, thinking that the *Loyca* and the *Nove Introductiones* was all one and the same text, took the qualification that the author of the *Nove Introductiones* gives about himself

²⁶⁷ See also Santi Francesco (1986) "Osservazioni sul manoscritto 1001.." in *ATCA* 5, pp. 256-257.

in the last paragraph, the explicit of the text, “*Ego vero artis philosophorum philosophiam dicti discipulus*²⁶⁸” and applied it to the whole text.

The philosopher in question is that “*Raymundus nomine dictus, Lulii cognomine dignus*²⁶⁹”, hence the fact that the copyist added at the beginning of what he thought to be the whole logical text the titling “*Incipit Loyca discipuli magistri Raymondi Lulli*²⁷⁰”, which then became the labor under which the text entered the Lullian tradition.

Another contradiction of the author of the *Loyca discipuli* is that he declares to be following Aristotle, and throughout the text he openly quotes only established authors, *auctoritates*, though the name of the main source for this brief introduction to an introduction to logic is never openly mentioned. Both the content and the style of the *Loyca discipuli* are, in fact, deeply indebted to William of Ockham’s *Summa Logicae*²⁷¹, as it had already been noted by F. Santi, and as we will examine more in detail while explaining the structure of the text.

i) The Qualities of the Term.

After this introductory moment, the first two *folia*, from 14r to the end of 16r, consist in a long analysis of the qualities of the term. This section is not titled or otherwise marked in the text, as the copyist of ms. Riccardiana 1001 seems to almost always omit chapter titles; nevertheless, I believe that it forms a coherent unity in the

²⁶⁸ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One

²⁶⁹ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One

²⁷⁰ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix Two

²⁷¹ William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974. Santi Francesco (1986) “Osservazioni sul manoscritto 1001..” in *ATCA* 5, pp. 251-267.

text, both from the point of view of the logical content and of the philosophical source used by the author.

The treatment of the term is first divided into nine distinctions, which explore the problem of various kinds of terms from different viewpoints. At first the term is divided according to its mean of expression: written, oral or mental; secondly according to its function inside a phrase, if ‘categorematici’, namely those that have a precise meaning or ‘syncategorematici’, namely those terms which take meaning only in conjunction with a another word, and modify the signification of categorematic terms.

The section on the term begins with a paragraph whose content and wording follows closely that of the opening of Ockham’s *Summa Logicae, De divisionibus Terminorum*, Cap. 1. *De definitione terminis*. If we consider the two text in parallel, it emerges clearly how heavily the *Loyca discipuli* is dependent on the original text of Ockham: not only the content are the same, but also the vocabulary used is the same and the very structure of the paragraph, as it is noticeable at a first glance:

Loyca Discipuli

Cum omnes logice auctores asserant logicam esse discursum que fit ex propositionibus propositiones autem ex terminis componuntur, ideo predicendum est de terminis cuiuslibet eorum spectantibus seriatim. Est autem sciendum prout terminus hic sumitur [...]

Prima distinctio est quod terminus sua divisione est triplex: quidam est terminus scriptus, quidam prolatus, et quidam

Summa Logicae

Omnes logicae tractatores intendunt astruere quod argumenta ex propositionibus et propositiones ex terminis componuntur. Unde terminus aliud non est quam pars propinqua propositionis. [... quote from Aristotle's *Anal. Priora...*]

Sed quamvis omnis terminus pars sit propositionis, vel esse possit, non omnes termini tamen eiusdem sunt naturae; et ideo ad perfectam notitiam terminorum

conceptus seu mentalis. Terminus scriptus est pars propositionis scripte in aliquo corpore (aut in cera, papiro, vel pergamino, vel alibi), qui oculo corporali videtur et videri potest. Terminus prolatus est pars propositionis ab ore hominis prolato, qui auditur aure corporali vel audiri potest. Sed terminus conceptus seu mentalis est intentio seu passio anime, aliquid naturaliter significans, nata esse pars propositionis mentalis ad modum terminus quo scriptus est pars propositionis scripte et ad modum quo terminus prolative est pars propositionis prolatae.²⁷²

habendam.[...]

Est autem sciendum quod [sicut secundum Boethium, in I Perihermeneias, triplex est oratio ...] sic triplex est terminus, scilicet scriptus, prolatus et conceptus.

Terminus scriptus est pars propositionis descriptus in aliquo corpore, quae oculo corporali videtur vel videri potest.

Terminus prolatus est pars propositionis ab ore prolatae et natae audiri aure corporali. Terminus conceptus est intentio seu passio anime aliquid naturaliter significans vel consignificans, nata esse pars propositionis mentalis, et pro eadem nata supponere.²⁷³

As it is apparent, the *Loyca* depends almost *verbatim* on the *Summa Logicae*: though this is not a philosophically striking passage, what is noteworthy here is how the author follows the structure of Ockham's text while simplifying it. He takes out most of the quotes from ancient philosophers and summarizes other passages, but he reports word by word the simpler explicatory parts. As we will observe such process of summary and simplification will be constant throughout the whole *Loyca discipuli*. In fact, the second division of the term mirrors closely the treatment of categorematic and syncategorematic terms offered by Ockham at the beginning of chapter four of the *Summa Logicae*: the author of the *Loyca discipuli* quotes again *verbatim* pieces of Ockham's text.

²⁷² Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix Two.

²⁷³ William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, Cap I., p.7.

Loyca Discipuli

Secunda distinctio terminorum est hec quod quidam sunt termini cathegorematici et quidam sunt sincathegorematici. Termini cathegorematici sunt illi qui finitam et certam habent significationem, sicut hoc nomen “homo”, qui significat “omnes homines”, et iste terminus “animal”, qui significat “omnia animalia”, et sic de aliis. Termini autem sincathegorematici sunt per oppositionem, scilicet illi qui non habent certam nec finitam significationem, nec significant aliquas res distinctas a rebus significatis per terminos cathegorematicos; et ideo isti termini sunt sincathegorematici: “omnis”, “nullus, preter, solus, tantum, quantum, huiusmodi”. Unde, sicut cifra in algorismo posita per se nichil significat, sed addita alteri signo dat significare, ita sincathegorematicus terminus proprie loquendo nihil significat, addito autem alteri termino facit ipsum significare aliquid...²⁷⁴

Summa Logicae

Adhuc aliter dividitur terminus, ..., quia terminorum quidam sunt cathegorematici, quidam syncathegorematici. Termini cathegorematici finitam et certam habent significationem, sicut hoc nomen “homo”, qui significat “omnes homines”, et iste terminus “animal”, qui significat “omnia animalia”, et hoc nomen "albedo" omnes albedines. Terminus autem syncathegorematici, cuiusmodi sunt tales "omnis", "nullus", "aliquis", "totus", praeter, tantum, inquantum, et huiusmodi, non habent finitam significationem et certam, nec significant aliquas res distinctas a rebus significatis per cathegoremata, immo sicut in algorismo cifra per se posita nihil significat, sed addita alteri figurae facit eam significare, ita syncathegorema proprie loquendo nihil significat, sed magis additum alteri facit ipsum aliquid significare.²⁷⁵..

Ockham’s own text here draws on earlier discussions on the topic of syncathegorematic terms, such as those found in Priscianus’ *Institutiones Grammaticae* and on William of Sherwood treatise on *Syncathegoremata*, but it is evident that the *Loyca* is following almost to the letter the text of the *Summa Logicae*. The author of the *Loyca* though elaborates originally using the material taken from Ockham: for example, in the

²⁷⁴ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix Two.

²⁷⁵ William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, Cap IV, p. 15.

second distinction on syncategorematic terms he quotes directly the Aristotelian source for the passage on the term “*omnis*”, the *Peri Hermeneias*, while the text of the *Summa Logicae* cited only Boethius’ commentary on that same book²⁷⁶. Overall, the main change present in the *Loyca discipuli* is the shortening and the condensing of the analysis offered in the *Summa*: entire parts are omitted, like the whole chapter two and three or the chapters from six to ten; every chapter is summarized and reduced to a few lines, and the author inserts a few original ideas.

Following the same model, the third distinction of the *Loyca* specifies the different qualities of abstract and concrete terms, and resembles closely chapter five of the *Summa Logicae*, while the fourth deals with absolute and connotative terms and mirrors *Summa Logicae* chapter ten, *De divisione nominum in mere absoluta et connotativa*²⁷⁷. Concrete and abstract terms are subdivided in five classes: the discussion on the first species follows exactly the text of the *Summa Logicae*, chapter V (lines 14-21), whereas the treatment of the other species summarizes the rest of Ockham’s argument and at times seems to be mixing up different subdivisions and misunderstanding them.

Loyca discipuli

Secunda species nominum concretorum
et abstractorum est e contrario, scilicet
quando abstractum supponit pro subiecto
accidentis vel forme [...]

Summa Logicae

Prima est quando abstractum supponit
pro accidente vel forma [...]

²⁷⁶ Priscianus, *Institutiones gramaticae*, II, c.4, n 15, ed. A. Krehl I, 66 [Prisciani Caesariensis grammatici Opera. Lipsiae, in libraria Weidmannia, 1819-20.]; William of Sherwood, “Syncaategoremata”, ed. J.R. O’Donnell, in *Medieval Studies* III, 1941, pp. 48-93; Boethius, *Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos*, PL 64 764D; Boethius translator Aristotelis - *Peri hermeneias* [uel *De Interpretatione*] *Clavis* : 02.1, cap. : 10, p. 20, line 5 (Bekker : 20a), from the *Aristoteles Latinus Database*.

²⁷⁷ William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, Cap X, p. 35.

Tertia species talium terminorum est quando concretum supponit pro toto et abstractum pro parte, sicut est in hiis: “anima/animatum”: homo enim est animatus et anima non est animata [...] ²⁷⁸

Secunda differentia talium nominum est quando concretum supponit pro parte et abstracto pro toto vel e converso, , sicut in istis: “anima –animatum”; homo enim est animatus et non anima [...] ²⁷⁹

We can observe a similar process of summary and simplification of Ockham’s text, in the distinction on absolute and connotative terms, which depends on chapter ten of the *Summa*, but shortens it. It reports only the moments in which Ockham gives a definition of the signification of the terms or when it proposes ulterior subdivisions, for example the one between the signification ‘*in recto*’ and ‘*in obliquo*’, but it proposes original examples and it omits all the final discussion on the examples offered by the authentic Ockhamistic text.

Loyca discipuli

Termini absoluti sunt illi qui non significant aliud principaliter et aliud secundarie, sed quidquid significant eque primo per illud nomen significatur, sicut sunt isti termini: “homo, animal, asinus, arbor, ignis”, et talia quecque primo significant illa pro quibus supponunt omnia illa de quibus predicatur. Unde etiam nomina necessario non habent diffinitionem exprimentem quid nominis, in qua aliquid ponitur in recto, ut dicendo “homo est animal rationale vel est substantia animata sensibilis” et

Summa Logicae

Nomina mere absoluta sunt illa quae non significant aliquid principaliter et aliud vel idem secundario, sed quidquid significantur per illud nomen, aequo primo significatur, sicut patet de hoc nomine ‘animal’ qui non significet nisi boves, asinos et homines, et sic de aliis animalibus, et non significant unum primum et aliud secundario, ita quod oporteat aliquid significari in recto et aliquid in oblique, nec in definitione exprimente quid nominis oportet ponere talia distincta in diversis casibus vel

²⁷⁸ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix Two.

²⁷⁹ William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, Cap V, p. 16-18.

quandocumque totum ponitur in obliquo,
ut “homo est ex anima et ex corpore
constitutus”²⁸⁰

aliquod verbo adiectivum.
Immo, proprie loquendo talia nomina
non habent definitionem exprimentem
quid nominis, quia proprie loquendo
unius nominis habentis definitionem
exprimentem quid nominis est una
definitio explicans quid nominis [...] ²⁸¹

Afterwards the text of the *Loyca discipuli* tackles more complex grammatical and logical issues. The fifth distinction treats the problem of the difference between terms of first and second position, stating that the terms of first position are the primary ones, while those of second position are the derivative ones, like the noun ‘*amator*’, lover, which is derived from the verb ‘*amo*’, to love. This distinction is not present in Ockham’s text and forms an original addition of the author to the scheme of the division of the term in the *Summa Logicae*.

On the other hand, the sixth division deals with the difference between terms of first and second imposition, and is basically a very short summary of chapter eleven of the *Summa Logicae*²⁸². It merely says that the terms of first imposition are those signifying real things, or ‘*res extra animam*’, while the terms of second imposition are those signifying concepts, or mental realities, namely things “*existentes in anima et in opere rationis*”. It is interesting to note how it is exactly here that the author of the *Loyca* feels the need to declare that this distinction is the one generally accepted by scholars, “*ut ponit communis scola*²⁸³”: he always needs to recur to an *auctoritas*.

The seventh division tackles the difference between terms of first and second

²⁸⁰ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix Two.

²⁸¹ William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, Cap X, p. 35-36.

²⁸² William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, Cap XI, p. 38-41.

²⁸³ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix Two.

intention. Here, the analysis of the concept of intention is relatively long and accurate, especially in comparison with other issues analyzed before: I believe that is because of the fundamental importance for a logician to have completely understood the difference between the two kinds of intention, since the terms of second intention form the very object of logic. This discussion depends on the way the *Summa Logicae* addresses the issue at the end of chapter eleven and in chapter twelve, summarizing and reporting *verbatim* short definitions from the text²⁸⁴. It is noteworthy that at the beginning of *Summa Logicae*, chapter twelve, we found an expression which our author had already taken and used in his introduction “*et ignorantia significationum vocabolorum multis est errandi occasio*²⁸⁵”: this is another proof of the composite nature of this text, and of the techniques used by its anonymous author to compose it.

In explaining the *ens rationis*, the text quotes Aristotle’s *De Anima* and Peter of Spain *Summule Logicales*, though the first quote is derivative: he took his Aristotle’s quote from Boethius’ commentary on the *Peri Hermeneias*, which quotes the *De Anima*²⁸⁶. The quote from Peter of Spain is harder to trace, but I think comes from *Summule Logicales* III, 2, in which it is addressed the problem of the existence of form inside matter²⁸⁷.

The eighth distinction explores the difference between terms that have multiple meanings: univocal, equivocal, analogical, denominative and synonym. This section is also comparatively long, since I believe the author wanted to stress the need for a logician

²⁸⁴ William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, Cap XI-XII, p. 40-44.

²⁸⁵ William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, Cap XII, p. 41.

²⁸⁶ Boethius *In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Duo. Editio Prima, Seu Minora Commentaria*. Ed. Migne, PL 64, 414c.

²⁸⁷ Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus*, ed. L.M. De Rijk, 1972, pp. 27-30; Petrus Hispanus, *Trattato di Logica. Summule Logicales*, ed. and transl. Ponzio A., Bompiani, Milano 2004, III, 2, pp. 62-65.

of having internalized the differences between all these kinds of terms, in order to then be able to use them correctly in a dispute. For this section the *Loyca discipuli* depends on chapter thirteen of the *Summa Logicae*, though it adds completely the parts on the analogical and synonymous terms.²⁸⁸

In general, this part seems more original, as the text also quotes Boethius' *De divisione*²⁸⁹ on the topic of the multiple signification of the word 'canis', and such a quote is not present in Ockham's text. In this section we also found a quote from Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, chapter 7, on the ontological status of accidents, which Ockham cites in *Summa Logicae* chapter thirty-eight, *De ente*²⁹⁰. Moreover, the author openly declares that he will write a special treaty dedicated only to this topic, for which he gives a provisory title: *De gradibus analogice equivocationis seu unilogie et equilogie*.

Unfortunately, so far I have found no trace that this additional text has ever been written by our anonymous author, as this tentative title does not appear in any of the catalogues and databases I have consulted.

Since this division is one of the more original of the text, it contains also some of the most interesting examples, which might give us some clues about a possible origin of its author. In talking about denomination coming from a place, the text offers two examples, which point to two cities in southern France: Mende in Lozere and Toulouse. Though this is far from being conclusive evidence, it seems possible that the author of the *Loyca* came from the southern regions of France.

²⁸⁸ William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, Cap XIII, p. 44-47.

²⁸⁹ Boethius' *De divisione* [PL 64 877d], "Vocis autem in significationes proprias divisio fit, quoties una vox multa significans aperitur, et ejus pluralitas significationis ostenditur, ut cum dico canis quod est nomen, et hunc quadrupedem latrabilemque designat, et coelestem qui ad Orionis pedem morbidum micat. Est quoque alius marinus canis, qui in immoderatam corporis magnitudinem crescens, caeruleus appellatur"

²⁹⁰ William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, Cap XXXVIII, p. 107.

Finally the ninth and last subdivision of the terms clarifies the difference between singular and universal terms, though it proposes a very brief account of the issue, which does not enter into the problems of the ‘*quaestio de universalibus*’. The author of the *Loyca discipuli* seems here to want to follow the scheme of the *Summa Logicae*, which continues with a treatment of singular and universal terms on chapter fourteen, *De hoc communi ‘universale’ et de ‘singulari’ opposito sibi*, without wanting to engage in the whole dept of the dispute on the ontological status of the universals²⁹¹.

With this it ends the first thematic unit of the text: but the *Loyca discipuli* offers also another section on the term, titled ‘*terminorum utilium*’, on the most useful terms. This paragraph explains the difference between transcendent and non-transcendent terms; the transcendent terms are six: being, one, truth, good, thing, and other.

The non-transcendent terms include every other term aside from the six described above, and this section is further divided into predicable and non-predicable terms.

ii) The predicables

The section on ‘predicables’ analyzes in detail the uses of the predicable terms genus, species, and difference, then it proceeds to analyze more briefly the qualities of proper and of accident. Having offered such an explanation allows the author of the *Loyca* to then face the problem of individuals and universals and of the quality of their existence. The argument includes also a treatment of the ten *predicamenta*, or categories, which is mainly carried out through a system of quotations from Aristotle. Even if it is theoretically a part of the section on the term, this whole discussion forms the second

²⁹¹ William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, Cap XIV, pp. 47-49.

thematic unity of the *Loyca*, further articulated in a part on the five predicable terms, one on the nature of individuals and universals, and one on the *predicamenta*, or categories. It occupies the remaining two *folia* from the bottom of 16r to the end of the text, at the beginning of 18r.

The distinction between transcendent and non-transcendent terms seems to be independent from Ockham's *Summa Logicae*, both in terms of content and of structure. The discussion of the transcendent term 'ens', being, though, is influenced by Ockham's account of it in chapter thirty-eight of the *Summa Logicae*²⁹². The 'ens' is divided in: 'ens realis' and 'ens rationis'; in positive, privative and negative; finite and infinite; 'per se' or 'per accidens'; 'in actu' and 'in potentia'. In the discussion about the potentiality of being, the author quotes Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, book nine, chapter one: this is interesting as Ockham does not quote this passage, therefore it must come to him from a different source. At a closer reading, the text declares explicitly its source: "*et sic maius est ens in potentia, ut per Philosophum nono Metaphysice, capitulo primo; et cum ente in potentia loquitur philosophus in plerisque locis, ut patet inspicienti dicta eius*²⁹³". I believe that this citation comes from the text of the *Dicta Aristotelis*, or the *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, a medieval anthology, collecting famous quotes from various Aristotelian works²⁹⁴: the sentences from 218 to 235 come from *Metaphysics*, book nine, and mostly deal with the concepts of *actus* and *potentia*.

The last division of being is into true and false, and with this the reader is reintroduced from the realm of ontology, to which this section on *ens* seemed to allude, to

²⁹² William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, Cap XXXVIII, pp. 106-108.

²⁹³ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix Two.

²⁹⁴ Cfr. J. Hamesse, *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval. Étude bistorique et édition critique*, Louvain-Paris 1974, especially pp. 133-135.

that of logic proper. In fact, the section on the non-transcendent terms leads to a discussion on one of the main topic in logic: the five predicable terms.

The first predicable to be introduced is genus: from here the author of the *Loyca* appears to be following closely again the scheme of Ockham's *Summa Logicae*, which addresses genus in chapter twenty, *De genere*²⁹⁵. The definition of genus offered is *verbatim* the same as in Ockham: “*genus, qui predicatur de pluribus differentibus proprie in eo quod quid*²⁹⁶”, though it derives from the Aristotelic tradition²⁹⁷; and the text shows a similar concern towards the non-existence of genera outside of the soul “*primo est intelligendum quod genus non est aliqua res extra animam existens*”. The author of the *Loyca* declares also that this position is the only one compatible with the teachings of Aristotle, and again points the reader to the *Dicta Aristotelis* for further instruction. The whole part on genus is heavily dependent on chapter twenty of the *Summa Logicae*, and entire paragraphs are reported word by word, like the one on predication: “*Unde, sicut quando profero istam propositionem “homo est animal” vox predicatur de voce, non pro voce*²⁹⁸”. Genus is then divided in *generalissimus* and *subalternus*: the ten most general genera correspond to the ten *predicamenta*, or categories, while subaltern genus is that which is less comprehensive than the general genus and more than the most specific species.

The concept of species is in turn divided in two: most general and subaltern (*generalissima* and *subalterna*). This section depends on chapter twenty-one and twenty-

²⁹⁵ William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, Cap XX, pp. 67-69.

²⁹⁶ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix Two and William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, Cap XX. p. 67.

²⁹⁷ Aristotle, *Topica*, I, c.5 (102a 31-32); Porphyrius, *Isagoge*, cap. *De genere*. [versio Boethii, ed. L. Minio Paluella, Aristoteles Latinus I, 6-7, Bruges Paris 1966]

²⁹⁸ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix Two and William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, Cap XX. p. 68.

two of the *Summa Logicae*, though shortening and simplifying them²⁹⁹. The following discussion on difference mirrors closely the treatment of the same topic in *Summa Logicae* chapter twenty three, *De differentia*, both in the structure and in the content: it also presents long *verbatim* quotes from Ockham's text (the longest one reproduces from line 46 to line 58 of *Summa Logicae* XXIII) and it offers the same quotations from Aquinas' *Summa theologie* and Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, book seven, found in Ockham³⁰⁰.

After the treatment of *differentia*, the text addresses briefly the problem of the fourth predicable, the *proprium*. This topic is the subject of chapter twenty four of the *Summa Logicae*³⁰¹, but the *Loyca discipuli* gives a slightly different account. This is one of the few point in which the author of the *Loyca* reveals some Lullian philosophical background: in fact, the text stresses the materiality of the *proprium* and it clearly shows the correspondence with the Lullian correlative structure, as it points out that most of the 'proper' terms present an ending in *-bilis*: "*Terminus qui est proprium est terminus magis frequenter terminatus in -bilis, ut risibile in -ibile quod in quantum proprium materie*³⁰²".

Then the author touches cursorily on last of the predicables, the accident. This section follows loosely chapter twenty-five of the *Summa Logicae*, *De Accidente*³⁰³, although it is much shorter and simplified: "*Termini autem qui faciunt predicabile de*

²⁹⁹ William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, Cap XXI-XXII, pp. 69- 74.

³⁰⁰ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix Two and William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, Cap XXIII, pp. 74-78, in particular the quote from p. 75; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q 76 a 1, which refers to Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, book VIII. [1043a 2-19]

³⁰¹ William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, Cap XXIV, pp. 78-81.

³⁰² Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix Two.

³⁰³ William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, Cap XXV, pp. 81-84.

accidente sunt nomina adiectiva, que non significant substantiam”³⁰⁴; basically here the author of the *Loyca* reduces the accident to its grammatical equivalent, the adjective.

The discussion on the predicable terms merges, without a clear sense of closure, into a relatively long explanation of the distinction between singular and universal terms, which broadens the brief summary given previously in the ninth distinction of the term. Here the author of the *Loyca discipuli* seems to stop following the structure of the *Summa Logicae* and to go back to a summary of the account offered by Ockham’s text in chapters fifteen and following (especially seventeen and eighteen), combining it with Ockham’s account of substance in the section on the categories, chapters forty and following³⁰⁵.

Singular terms are described as individual, while universals are communal: here it emerges again the Nominalism of the text. Universals are not things that exist outside of the soul; only individuals can exist outside of the soul. To justify this position the author, following Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, chapter forty-one, quotes Aristotle on the matter of the individual, in *Categories*, book one, chapter five, *De substantia*³⁰⁶.

After this brief account of universal, communal, singular and individual terms, the text starts exposing one of the most important topic in logic: the ten *predicamenta*, or categories. The only moment when there is a sense of division between sections here is when the author remarks here his didactic intent:

“Advertendum denique ad huiusmodi complementum, ne iuvenes in malis principiis informetur, quod decem predicamenta non sunt nisi termini ordinati secundum superius et

³⁰⁴ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix Two.

³⁰⁵ William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, Cap XV- XLIV, pp. 35-132.

³⁰⁶ William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, Cap XLI, p. 115; and Boethius translator Aristotelis - *Categoriae [uel Praedicamenta] Clavis* : 01.1, titulus capituli, p. : 7, linea : 10 “De substantia”.

inferius, et non sunt res extra animam existentes, sicut aliqui fabulant, nisi acciperentur termini scripti vel prolati; et hoc potest probari multipliciter, et esse de intentione Aristotelis”.³⁰⁷

This passage testifies not only the author’s concern for learning and his adherence to nominalism, but also his way of constructing an argument: at first offering a proof, further proving it recurring to an *auctoritas*, normally Aristotle. This is, clearly, the typical scholastic method, and it is the same applied by Ockham. For this section, the *Loyca discipuli* follows again very closely the elucidation offered by Ockham’s *Summa Logicae* in chapter forty, *De Predicamentis*, and especially in chapter forty-one, *De Predicamento substantiae*, and following³⁰⁸.

The text of the *Loyca discipuli* explains the category of substance in relative detail, supporting its interpretation with various quotes from Aristotle’s *Categories*, book one, which include: chapter two, chapter four, chapter five, seven and following. He also offers various quotes from the *Topics*, the *Sophisticis Elenchis*, the *Metaphysics* and the *Auctoritates Aristotelis*³⁰⁹. In particular it is interesting how he follows Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, chapter forty-one, *De numero predicamentorum*, in quoting both Aristotle’s and John of Damascus, *Damascenus*, in what he calls his *Logica*, namely his *Dialectica*, chapter 32, that Ockham cited in the translation of Robert Grossetest³¹⁰. This last section on the categories is heavily influenced by Ockham’s text. Here the author follows not

³⁰⁷ Cfr. Edition offered in Appendix Two.

³⁰⁸ William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, Cap XL- XLIV, pp. 111-132.

³⁰⁹ Boethius translator Aristotelis - Categoriae [uel Praedicamenta]; Boethius translator Aristotelis - De sophisticis elenchis; Boethius translator Aristotelis – Topica; nonymus saec. XII uel XIII translator Aristotelis - Metaphysica: libri I - X; XII - XIV (siue translatio 'media'), from the Aristoteles Latinus Databases; *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse.

³¹⁰ In Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, there are many references to Damascenus, *Dialectica*, in Grosseteste’s translation (ed. Calligan, St Bonaventure, 1953), this quotation seems to come from William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Bohener, 1974, Cap. XLI, p. 115, which in turn refers to Damascenus, *Dialectica*, cap. 32 and to Aristotle, *Categories*, cap. 4.

only the various philosophical definitions, but also the style, the very way of writing, the word choices proposed by Ockham: for examples he uses derogative terms to talk about the philosophical opponents such as “*cavillatio*”, “*puerilis*”, and “*latrantes*”, all terms also used by Ockham in this text.

The text of the *Loyca discipuli* ends abruptly, without an explicit, and almost without an ending: it interrupts the discussion on the real being, on the *ens reale* and simply says: “*et hoc sufficit*³¹¹”, and this will be enough. Such a brief closure was probably one of the causes of that copyist’s miscomprehension illustrated earlier: it was easy to think that the beginning of the *Nove Introductiones* was simply another section of the *Loyca discipuli*. Furthermore, the *Loyca discipuli* was indeed written to function as a preface, as an introduction to the *Nove Introductiones*, therefore the two texts were meant to be read one after the other, and the content of the *Loyca* matches that of the *Nove Introductiones*, integrating it with the newest doctrines coming directly from Ockham’s *Summa Logicae*, and repeating the same topics only when there was something new to be said about them (as it is evident in the section on the predicable terms).

- iii) An episode of Italian Lullism: the marginal note in ms. Terni, Biblioteca Comunale, 61.

An indication of the importance of the *Loyca discipuli* inside the tradition of Italian Lullism comes from a marginal note in a manuscript containing the authentic

³¹¹ Ms. Riccardiana 1001, f. 18r; cfr Edition offered in Appendix Two.

Lullian *Ars compendiosa Dei*, the ms. Terni, Biblioteca Comunale, 61³¹². The note appears at the bottom of *folio* 4v of the manuscript, and it is written by the same hand of the copyist of the whole *Ars compendiosa*. Francesco Santi was the first Lullian scholar to signal the existence of this marginal gloss, referring to the *Loyca Discipuli*, and to point out how the discovery of such a textual link could help reconstruct the history of a group of Italian intellectuals, clearly interested in Lullism already in the late 14th c. At a closer analysis, the reference to the *Loyca discipuli* in the Terni manuscript results even more interesting. The whole text of the note reads:

“Hic nota quod infrascripta 3a distinctio et XI distinctio et quasi omnes distinctiones huius artis per equiparantiam quia dignitas probatur per dignitatem et e converso; et dignitas per actum et actus per actum. Et ideo videas Tractatum demonstrationis per equiparantiam inventum per magistrum Raimundum et eciam videas in Loyca discipuli Raimundi Lulli terminos demonstratione per quod et per quia et per equiparantiam.”³¹³

This comment is inserted in the text of the *Ars compendiosa Dei* under the explanation of the third distinction, which deals with how to investigate God using the principles and the rules of the Lullian Art. The copyist was a friar, a certain Benedictum Rochensem, probably a Lullist himself, who left his name at the end of the text, on *folio* 84v; he felt the need on the bottom of *folio* 4v to specify how to then create a demonstration using the material of the distinctions explained above. He clarifies that such distinctions need to be treated as material for a Lullian ‘*demonstratio per aequiparantiam*’, and for a better explanation of such mode of demonstration he redirects his readers to the authentic

³¹² Raymundus Lullus, *Ars Compendiosa Dei*, ROL XIII, CCCM 39, 1985. On the ms. 61, see also: Catalogo di manoscritti filosofici nelle biblioteche italiane, V, Cesena, Cremona, Lucca, S. Daniele del Friuli, Teramo, Terni, Trapani, Udine, ed. Olschki, Firenze, 1985, p. 237; Mazzoli Corrado (1993), *Tra i gioielli dell’Umbria. Catalogo di manoscritti (sec. XIII-XV) della Biblioteca Comunale di Terni*, Vecchiarelli Editore, Roma, pp. 61-62. Boccali G. (1990), “Il codice 226 della biblioteca Comunale di Terni” *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 83, pp. 307-316.

³¹³ Ms. Terni, Biblioteca Comunale, 61, f. 4v. I am indebted to Anthony Bonner and the staff working on the Ramon Lull Database for correcting and improving my initial transcription of this marginal note.

Lullian *Liber de demonstratione per aequiparantiam*³¹⁴ and to the text of the *Loyca discipuli magistri Raymundi Lulli*, which he clearly knew well, since he specifies even the places where the students should go read.

What is really striking about such marginal note is that in the text of the *Loyca discipuli* as we know it there is no such section on the *demonstratio per aequiparantiam*. The distinction on the *demonstratio per aequiparantiam* is instead a part of the text of the *Nove Introductiones*, thus proving my point that the real *Loyca discipuli* was the *Nove Introductiones*, and that the later introduction to the text of the *Nove Introductiones*, now known as the *Loyca discipuli*, only got this name due to an error of the copyist of the ms. Riccardiana 1001.

To conclude, I would like to note that, as we have seen, the *Loyca discipuli magistri Raymundi Lulli* shows very little Lullian character and does not explain any specific Lullian doctrine: more than an exposition of Lullian logic it certainly is a summary of Ockamistic logic. Yet, I consider this compound text a very important witness of a merging between Lullism and Ockhamism that probably happened inside many Italian Franciscan schools in the second half of the 14th c. The very existence and content of a manuscript such as the Riccardiana 1001 shows that in Italy, in the late 14th c. and beginning of 15th c., there was an interest towards Lullian doctrines, Lullian logic included. Moreover, the mere fact that such scholars, interested in Lull, felt the need to ask for a new introduction to the introduction to Lullian Logic, is already revealing of the coexistence inside the same school of two traditions, which probably tended to converge and became one, as more and more ‘lullists’ wanted to be up-to-date with the new Nominalist trend, spread in Italy after the diffusion of William of Ockham’s texts.

³¹⁴ Raymundus Lullus, *Liber de Demonstratione per Aequiparantiam*, ROL 9.

Conclusion

This study, focused on texts here integrally edited for the first time, sheds new light on the first century of Italian Lullism as well as on the origin of late Medieval pseudo-Lullian treatises on logic. It demonstrates that the tradition of Lullian logic from its very beginning was interwoven with that of the Franciscan schools, confirming that Lullian scholars were also linked to Franciscan environments –as the same Ramon Llull had been- and often worked in the context of the Franciscan *studia*. The anonymous authors of both texts analyzed, the *Nove Introductiones* and the *Loyca discipuli*, were part of such an intermixed intellectual scene.

From the analysis of the contents of each work, it has become evident that there is a clear didactic and ‘normalizing’ intention behind both texts, which clearly points to a school tradition, not necessarily Lullian in its primary philosophical influence. The *Nove Introductiones* as we know it was probably the product of an Italian Franciscan school. Yet it is possible that it was a re-adaptation of a school-text already used in the Catalan schools, introduced by some Lullian master into Italy during his travels: Perarnau had already hinted at this conclusion, that as yet has not been confirmed by documentary evidence³¹⁵. Indeed, the *Nove Introductions* appears to be a text coming from the

³¹⁵ Specifically see also Perarnau i Espelt, Josep (1986) *Els manuscrits lul·lians medievals de la «Bayerische Staatsbibliothek» de Munic. II.* pp. 135-138; and Perarnau J. (1983), “Consideracions diacronique”, pp. 152-4.

tradition of the early Lullian school: its logic is still very close to that of Lull's, so much that the Lullian paternity of the text has been argued by scholars even recently³¹⁶.

Perarnau had based his hypothesis of an Italian provenience for the actual text on the language of the *Nove Introductiones*. In fact, its Latin seems to be heavily influenced by Italian, the examples use Italian names and locations, and in the closure of the texts the author explicitly mentions Italy and in particular the city of Genoa: thus we can confirm Perarnau's suggestion, even stressing the very probable Ligurian origins of the text.

The *Nove Introductiones* is a complex text, probably the result of many levels of re-elaboration and simplification of Lull's doctrines. The first redactions of it can probably be dated as early as the 1330's, although Perarnau suggests an even earlier date. The text presents quotations from Peter of Spain, mixed with direct quotations from Lull's own work. It is clearly a school text of logic that tries to present the main Lullian doctrines, such as the *demonstratio per aequiparantiam*, together with the principal scholastic teachings, mainly taken from Peter of Spain, but there are also a few hints at a first, early influence of Ockham's *Summa Logicae*. The references to Ockham's text help date the *Nove Introductiones*, as the *Summa Logicae* only began to circulate after 1327³¹⁷, therefore positing a *terminus post quem* for the composition of the *Nove Introductiones*. From the analysis of the language and of the philosophical doctrines present in the *Nove Introductiones*, I believe that the text can be dated with a certain degree of security to the

³¹⁶ In particular, D'Ors argues in favour of that in Angel D'Ors (1996), "Raimundo Lulio, Nicolas de Paz y la 'Logica Parva'", in *Documenti e Studi* 7 pp. 115-130. His conclusions have been refuted by Bonner in Bonner A. (1998B), "Rassenyà", *SL* 38, pp. 154-156.

³¹⁷ Courtenay William J. (1982), "The Early Stages in the Introduction of Oxford Logic into Italy", in *English logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th centuries : acts of the 5th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Rome, 10-14 November 1980*. ed. A: Maierù, Bibliopolis, Napoli 1982. pp. 13-32.

years between 1330 and 1350, and its author was probably an Italian, or even a Genoese Franciscan friar.

For its early date of composition, its length, and the detailed logical explanations present in it, the *Nove Introductiones*, as they have been preserved in ms. Munich, BSB, lat. 10542 and in ms. Firenze, Riccardiana 1001, seem to have functioned as the Ur-text for many later re-elaboration of Lullian logic. Due to the relevance of contents and the diffusion of this basic handbook for logic, one would be inclined to hypothesize a link with the Lullian school of Valencia but as of now there is no way to prove such a fascinating hypothesis. As already stated, it is still not clear, and given the current status of the manuscript tradition, impossible to determine, if there was an earlier text, an unknown Ur-text, that functioned as the model for the *Nove Introductiones*.

The second text analyzed in this study is now conventionally called by scholars the *Loyca discipuli Raymundi Lulli*. This work constitutes a sort of introduction and correction of the *Nove Introductiones*, in which the author “updates” the account of logic given in the *Nove Introductiones* and offers students the most recent developments of the discipline of logic, namely those coming out of William of Ockham’s *Summa Logicae*.

The second half of the 14th c. saw the widespread diffusion both of Ockham’s logical doctrines and of the Ockamistic texts inside Italian Franciscan convents³¹⁸. After this initial diffusion, the combination of logical doctrines present in the *Nove Introductiones*, mainly taken from Lull and Peter of Spain, was probably felt as outdated

³¹⁸ Courtenay William J. (1982), “The Early Stages in the Introduction of Oxford Logic into Italy”, pp. 13-32.

and could not be taught to students unless somewhat ‘modernized’. The author of the *Loyca discipuli* responded to this need for a modernization of the earlier text.

Corrections and renovations of a text were a common practice inside monastic schools. The author of the *Nove Introductiones* himself had asked for corrections to be made to his text in case his work was felt to be mistaken or had become deficient or out of date. There is a close link between the request of a ‘brotherly correction’ in the *Nove Introductiones* and the sort of update of terministic logic offered by the author of the *Loyca discipuli*. The author of the *Nove Introductiones* had explicitly declared as much in the colophon of the text: he asks that the short book would be received amicably, that it would be used in the instruction of the youth, and that it would be emended if needed.

“Hoc brevem opusculum amicabiliter recipiant et cum eo et suis puerilibus quousque aliud isto utilius elucidetur, novellos iuvenes introducant. Item petit ex requisitione bonitatis et cetera quod in defectibus, si qui sint, eum fraternaliter corrigant ac sui intellectus ignorantie illos impendant³¹⁹”.

The author of the *Loyca discipuli* has done exactly what his predecessor had asked: both texts share the same concern for the education of the youth. The text of the *Loyca* explicitly states that the corrections offered were made to prevent problems and lateness in the process of discovering the truth: “Quorum etiam iuvenum studio me cogit caritas deservire, ne per ignorantiam significationis terminorum a veritatis inquisitione et culmine scienti retardarentur³²⁰”.

The author of the *Loyca discipuli* was probably not Italian. Textual evidence suggests that he was originally from the regions of southern France, but it is still not clear if he was simply sending the text to the monastic community at La Cervara, in Liguria,

³¹⁹ See the edition of the text offered in Appendix 1.

³²⁰ See the edition of the text offered in Appendix 2.

not far from Genoa, or if he was actually working there: both explanations are possible based on the scarce information gathered from the text and the manuscript evidence³²¹.

Moreover, the very composition of the ms. Firenze, Riccardiana 1001 and the errors that it presents suggest a sequence of phases in the history of the textual tradition of the two pseudo-Lullian logical texts now known as *Nove Introductiones* and *Loyca discipuli*. The text of the *Nove Introductiones* is older, and it represents an early moment in the tradition of Lullian logic. It integrates the most peculiar Lullian logical doctrines with the most standard doctrines of scholastic logic, directly taken from Petrus Hispanus' *Summulae Logicales*. In the initial period this text probably circulated alone, as is demonstrated by the fact that in the ms. Munich, BSB, lat. 10542 we find the sole text of the *Nove Introductiones*. After such a phase, there must have been a period in which the *Nove Introductiones* circulated together with its modernizing and Ockhamistic introduction, the text now known as the *Loyca discipuli*: in this phase the two texts were still separate. The next phase of the textual tradition, the one witnessed by ms. Riccardiana 1001, shows a moment in which the two texts not only circulated together but were almost assimilated and considered as one: the *Loyca discipuli*.

The *Loyca discipuli* as it appears in ms. Riccardiana 1001, therefore, is an important witness to the vitality of the Lullian logical school in Italy in the first decades of 15th c. , as the manuscript was composed in an Italian monastery, in Liguria, at the monastery of the Cervara, in the years between 1417 and 1427. The marginal note found at f.4v of a later 15th c. ms., Terni 61, constitutes further proof of the unified circulation of the *Nove Introductiones* and its introduction under the title of *Loyca discipuli*, as it

³²¹ In particular, the problem is that of the meaning of the Medieval Latin verb 'mandare', see the discussion of it presented earlier in Chapter Five.

refers to a section of the *Nove Introductiones* with the title of *Loyca discipuli*.

Unfortunately, the dating of Terni's manuscript is to the first decades of 15th c., therefore it is impossible to know if the physical referent of the marginal note was the ms Riccardiana 1001 or another ms unknown to us³²². What manuscript had our scribe of the Terni manuscript seen and which version of the *Loyca discipuli* was he quoting? Clearly he is referring to a passage in the *Nove Introductiones*, since he is talking about the *demonstratio per aequiparantiam*, but it cannot be determined if he was referring to the sole *Nove Introductiones* as being called *Loyca discipuli*, or if he was reading ms. Riccardiana 1001 or a copy of it, which regarded the Ockhamistic introduction and the *Nove Introductiones* as one text under the heading *Loyca discipuli*.

The same reasoning applies to the interesting reference to a *Logica del dexeble* found in the catalogue of Bartolomeu Bols. The catalogue was redacted in 1439, and unfortunately does not specify much about the book besides that it was written on paper and covered by parchment: "libre scrit en paper, cubert de pergami, ab corandells"³²³. Therefore, it is impossible to determine which version of the text we are dealing with at the moment. This *Logica del dexeble* could be a Catalan version of the *Nove Introductiones*, it could be a Catalan version of the union of the *Loyca discipuli* and the *Nove Introductiones*, or it could be the Latin version of the *Nove Introductiones* or of the *Loyca discipuli* plus the *Nove Introductiones*, simply listed under a Catalan translation of the title. Still, to shed more light on the problem of a possible Catalan version of the text

³²²This dating, which contradicts that attested in the Catalogue of Terni's library, is the most recent one given by Gabriella Pomaro, who is currently analyzing the ms. Terni, Biblioteca Comunale, 61. Dr. Pomaro was so kind to share with me the results of her ongoing research.

³²³ The quotation is taken from the Ramon Lull Database, page: <http://orbita.bib.ub.es/ramon/cat1.asp?BOLS>

would require further research in Catalan libraries and archives, in the hopes of uncovering evidence of a Catalan circulation of the text, and in which form (simply the *Nove Introductiones* or together with the Ockhamistic introduction).

The composition of ms. Munich, BSB, lat. 10542, however, witnesses the autonomous circulation of the text of the *Nove Introductiones* still in the early 15th c.. It is without doubt that the *Nove Introductiones*, or a still unknown earlier but similar version of it, functioned as a model and as an Ur-text for basic later traditions of Lullian logic: the *Logica Parva* and the *Logica Brevis et Nova*.

The first appearance of the *Logica Parva* can be traced to the ms. Salamanca, BU, 2465. Unfortunately, the dating of this manuscript is also not precise, but if one were to consider correct the date offered by the catalogues, we could place it in the late 14th c.³²⁴. The late 14th c. dating would attest to a reworking of the text of the *Nove Introductiones*, probably within a Spanish context, and would be contemporary to that of the author of the Ockhamistic introduction now known as *Loyca discipuli*. Therefore, the text of the *Nove Introductiones* was clearly considered interesting and worthy of study both in Spain and in Italy at the beginning of the 15th c., i.e. at the very start of the period when Catalan masters travelled to Italy to teach the Lullian art, and Italian scholars reached Catalonia attracted by the legacy of Ramon Llull's doctrine and saintly life.

The text of the *Logica Parva* is very close to that of the *Nove Introductiones*. Besides the manuscript in Salamanca, though, all the other extant copies of it are influenced by the 1512 edition provided by Nicholas de Pax and Alonso de Proaza, who claimed to have discovered an original Lullian manuscript and to be offering it to the

³²⁴ See the description of the manuscript in Lilao Franca O. and Castrillo Gonzales C. (2002), *Catálogo*, pp. 835-836.

public. Such an authoritative claim probably contributed to the fortune of this text, which was still reprinted in this version in 1744.

The other major text of the pseudo-Lullian logical tradition is the *Logica Brevis et Nova*, whose first traces we find in manuscripts of the 15th c. and in an edition dated 1480. Thus, it can be safely inferred that the *Logica Brevis et Nova* is a much later version of the text, shortened, further simplified and condensed. I have suggested that a very young Bernhard of Lavinheta could be the author of such a work of philosophical compilation and summary, but even if he were not the author of the text, Lavinheta's work definitely functioned as a springboard for the later fortune of this text. In fact, he published the *Logica Brevis et Nova* separately twice, in 1516 and in 1518, and then he included it in his *Explanatio* of 1523, the first major Lullian encyclopedia of the Renaissance.

It is due to its inclusion in the *Explanatio*, and in the same version of it offered in the *Explanatio*, that the *Logica Brevis et Nova* was then included in the famous Lazarus Zetzner anthologies of Lullian works³²⁵. The large diffusion and circulation of the Zetzner anthology in the late Renaissance allowed the *Logica Brevis et Nova* to be read by scholars, and to function as a real first approach, a real basic handbook for Lullian logic. In this version the basic doctrines of Lullian logic, developed in Spanish and Italian schools between the late 14th and early 15th centuries, became part of the intellectual baggage of learned men in the 16th c. and beyond, and influenced scholars such as Descartes and Leibniz.

³²⁵ See also Bonner A. (1996) Introduction to the reprint of the Zetzner edition of Strasburg 1651.

Appendix 1

Nove et compendiose Introductiones logice

First critical edition

CRITERIA OF THE EDITION

There are only two witnesses of the text of the *Nove et Compendiose Introductiones*:

- FIRENZE, *Biblioteca Riccardiana*, 1001, ff. 18r-32r;
- MÜNICH, *Bayerische Staatsbibliothek*, lat. 10542, ff. 42r-64r.

Both extant manuscripts, described in chapter 3 (see pp. 109-113; and pp. 116-117), can be dated to the first half of 15th c.

I have started from a complete transcription of the text in F; then collated it with the text as it appears in M, using both manuscripts to check each other and I have adopted the text from M whenever there was a need to fill in a lacuna present in F. I have signaled in the critical apparatus every time that the two manuscripts present a different reading, and I have reported each choice I made. Normally, when the two texts were not in accord, I have accepted in the text the variant offered by M, as it appeared to be the most reliable text.

The edition presents only a few major problems: common lacunas to both manuscripts, which have been filled by conjectures (signaled by square parentheses []) and a few expunctions (signaled by angle brackets < >). A common error (apparatus n. 156) and

two *cruces* in the final part of the text (apparatus nn. 329, 372) demonstrate that the two manuscripts derive from an already corrupted archetype.

The apparatus signals each textual choice made (with the exceptions of titles, see below); in addition, it signals every time there are: word(s) erased in each manuscript; marginal notes; marginal additions or corrections to the text.

I have normalized the Latin whenever the *lectio* used was clearly recognizable (i.e. *falsa*, for *falssa*), but I have not corrected the different spelling conventions typical of Medieval Latin (ie. *Nove*, for *Novae*).

I have followed the subdivisions of the text present in both manuscripts, signaled only by section headings in F, by rubricated titles and section headings in M; titles have been accepted in the text, their omission in F is not recorded in the apparatus.

Both manuscripts have drawings representing the square of syllogism (F f. 20v, duplicated in the inferior margin of f. 21v with more detailed writings: “Omnis homo currit. Nullus homo non currit; Non quidam homo non currit”; “Nullus homo currit. Omnis homo non currit. Non quidam homo currit”; “Quidam homo currit. Non omnis homo non currit. Non nullus homo currit”; “Quidam homo non currit. Non omnis homo currit. Non nullus homo non currit”; M f. 45v, with different writings: “Omnis bonitas est magna”; “Nulla bonitas est magna”; “Quedam bonitas est magna”; “Quedam bonitas non est magna”); the square of modal propositions (F f. 22r, M f. 47v); the tree of Porphyry (F f. 23r; M f. 49r). See figures inserted in the text at pp. 19, 26, 33, and Appendix V.

/F f. 18r / M f. 42r/

In nomine bonitatis optime veritatis quam verissime Incipiunt Nove et Compendiose
introductiones logice³²⁶

Logica est ars et scientia cum qua³²⁷ verum et falsum ratiocinando cognoscuntur³²⁸
et unum ab altero discernuntur verum eligendo et falsum dimittendo. Sed quoniam³²⁹
logica est philosophie membrum ob hoc est particularis scientia particularia habens
principia que subiciuntur alicui utilitati, secundum quod ratio et natura hoc insinuant.
Ideo, antequam de ipsa specificè tractetur, premitenda sunt quedam universalia non
modicum ipsi logice ceterisque scientiis necessaria, quibus aliquantulum cognitis facilius
et³³⁰ brevior atque clarior erit logicalis notitia introducibilis intellectui³³¹. Et iam
intellectus per notitiam ipsorum universalium habebit maiorem habitudinem³³² et
dispositionem ad alias quascumque facultates tam naturales quam morales seu et
sermocinales. Item ad tanta et talia se extendit virtus ipsorum, quod oriente dubio in
logicali³³³ disciplina cuius certitudo³³⁴ fortassis propter aliquid impedimentum non
possit³³⁵ reperiri, sicut est propter contrarias et diversas opiniones auctorum vel
disputantium, procul dubio illius rei ambigue certa veritas atque certitudo vera

³²⁶ In nomine ... logice] *om.* F

³²⁷ Qua] quo F

³²⁸ cognoscuntur] cognoscitur F

³²⁹ Quantum] quando F

³³⁰ et] *om.* M

³³¹ intellectui] intellectum F

³³² habitudinem] habitudinem *scr. et corr. in marg.* haltitudinem M

³³³ logicali] logici F

³³⁴ certitudo] fortitudo F

³³⁵ possit] posset F

pandetur³³⁶ illis, qui dicendis universalibus vere atque realiter sciuntur. Que dividitur in tres partes, scilicet in decem transcendentia et³³⁷ novem instrumentalia principia et in bis quinque³³⁸ questiones seu regulas que sunt primum universale.

De decem transcendentibus

Decem transcendentia sunt: ens, bonum, magnum, durans, potens, intelligibile, amabile, virtuosum, verum, et delectabile. Hec decem principia sunt communissima, generalissima, universalissima et suprema. Dicuntur communissima quia nihil est eis communius, generalissima quia nihil generalius, universalissima³³⁹ quia nihil universalius, suprema quia nihil superius. Per has quattuor proprietates dicuntur transcendentia. Transcendent namque alia principia in communitate, generalitate, universalitate, et superioritate; in dictis principiis includitur omne quod est, fuit, et erit secundum presens, preteritum, et futurum et quod in eis non includitur nihil est. Et si aliquid sit eis equale in quattuor proprietatibus antedictis, est ad ea reducibile tamquam transcendens. Cuius transcendentia cognosci poterit si ad illud applicetur aliquid³⁴⁰ predicamentorum decem per universalem probationem predicatione unius de altero³⁴¹. Et si applicatum paciatur predicationem, ipsum erit transcendens, aliter vero³⁴² minime ut sic: “Omne aliquid est ens, bonum, magnum et cetera; omnis res est ens et cetera; omnis differens est ens et cetera; omnis concordans est ens et cetera;

³³⁶ pandetur] pendetur F

³³⁷ et] in *add.* M

³³⁸ quinque] membris quinque F

³³⁹ universalissima] universalia F

³⁴⁰ aliquid] aliud F

³⁴¹ altero] alteri F

³⁴² vero] inveniet *add. et del.* F

omnis equale est ens et cetera,” solvatur et subiectum³⁴³ in prima trium universaliter³⁴⁴ dicendo sic³⁴⁵: “Omne ens et cetera est aliquid³⁴⁶; omne ens et cetera est res; omne ens et cetera est differens et cetera; omne ens et cetera est concordans; omne ens et cetera est equale” Et quia principia hic applicata, patiuntur universalem predicationem factam cum transcendentibus explicatis, ideo cognoscit ea esse transcendentia. Et per talem experientiam possent alia similia applicari.

/M f. 42v/ De novem instrumentalibus principiis que sunt secundum universale
Novem instrumentalia principia sunt: differentia, concordantia, contrarietas, principium, medium, finis, maioritas, equalitas, minoritas. Et dicuntur instrumentalia, quia cum ipsis agit logicus objective in hiis que considerat sub habitu logicali, et sic de aliis artibus suo modo intelligatur. Sicut cum differentia in transcendentibus attingit quod alia est ratio entis quam ens quia entitas, et alia quam bonum quia bonitas, et alia quam magnum quia magnitudo, et alia quam durans quia duratio, et sic de potestate, intellectu, voluntate, virtute, veritate et delectatione. Hoc tamen³⁴⁷ intelligendum est³⁴⁸ de ente quod simpliciter et absolute per se non existit, scilicet creato. Etiam cognoscitur quod unum ens differt ab alio ente et unum bonum ab alio bono et cetera.
Et cum concordantia attingit logicus quod bonitas et entitas concordant³⁴⁹ et cetera transcendentia³⁵⁰, et ideo verum est quod ens est bonum, et bonum est ens et cetera,

³⁴³ subiectum] sub *corr. in marg.* F

³⁴⁴ universaliter] utiliter F

³⁴⁵ Sic] *om.* F

³⁴⁶ aliquid] *spatium rel. unius verbi* F

³⁴⁷ tamen] cum F

³⁴⁸ est] *om.* F

³⁴⁹ concordant] concordans F

et quia sunt equalia ideo omne ens est bonum et omne bonum est ens et cetera. Etiam cum³⁵¹ concordantia attingit quod ens concordat enti et bonum bono et cetera. Cum contrarietate attingit quod ens contrariatur nihilo, et bonum malo, et magnum parvo, durans principiatio³⁵², potens impossibili, intellegibile ignorabili, amabile odiabili, virtuosum vitioso, verum falso, delectabile penoso. Et³⁵³ cognoscit quod ens contrariatur malo per bonum, et bonum nihilo per ens, et cetera. Item cum contrarietate cognoscit quod ens aliquod alicui enti contrariatur et e contrario, non ratione qua ens sed alio et alia et aliquid³⁵⁴ bonum alteri bono non /F f. 18v/ qua bonum sed alia et cetera: clarum est in elementis et suis compositis . Cum principio cognoscit logicus quod ens unum principiatur aliud ens, et sic de bono et cetera. Cum medio attingit quod unum ens est alteri medium, et sic de bono et cetera. Cum fine attingit quod unum ens est finis alterius, et sic de bono et cetera. Cum maiori- tate attingit quoddam ens³⁵⁵ esse maius altero, et sic de bonitate³⁵⁶ et cetera. Cum equalitate cognoscit ens quoddam alteri esse equale, et sic de bono³⁵⁷. Sed cum minoritate invenit aliquid³⁵⁸ ens esse minus alio ente, et ceteris transcendentibus suo modo.

Conditiones aliquae instrumentalium principiorum

³⁵⁰ transcendentia] transcendencia M

³⁵¹ cum] *om.* F

³⁵² principiatio] parvo F, privato M

³⁵³ et] etiam M

³⁵⁴ aliquid] aliud F

³⁵⁵ ens] *om.* M

³⁵⁶ bonitate] bono M

³⁵⁷ bono] et cetera *add.* M

³⁵⁸ Aliquid] aliud F

Cum differentia³⁵⁹ **scit**³⁶⁰ logicus distinguere, diversificare, dividere, discernere, multiplicare, clarificare, et confusionem³⁶¹ remove et similia.

Cum concordantia scit logicus concordare, unire, convenire, participare, communicare et alia.

Cum contrarietate sunt oppositiones³⁶², contradictiones, repugnantie, resistentie, controversie, instantie, sive obiectiones³⁶³ et similia.

Cum principio inchoat, anteponit, probat, premitit, et secundum efficiens, formale, materiale, et finale, et predicamenta³⁶⁴ et similia.

Cum medio coniungit, disiungit, continuat, discontinuat, et mensurat et alia.

Cum fine perficit, terminat, privat, consequens ponit et concludit et alia.

Cum maioritate considerat communitates, universalitates, generalitates, et superioritates, et similia.

Cum equalitate considerat equiparantias, proportionones, conversiones et alia.

Cum minoritate considerat specialitates, particularitates, singularitates, individuationes, inferioritates, et alia istis similia³⁶⁵.

Tam vera et necessaria /M f. 43r/ atque infallibilia sunt principia supradicta, que sunt instrumentalia vocata, quod vigore ipsorum potest logicus solvere sophismata, insolubilia, paralogismos et alia similia. Item cum ipsis cognoscit bonum verum sillogismum, inductionem et exemplum et consequentias³⁶⁶ alias quia argumentationis species, ut patebit; ut, cum tanta virtus existat in ipsis et

³⁵⁹ differentia] *om. et add. in marg.* F

³⁶⁰ scit] facit F

³⁶¹ dividere discernere multiplicare clarificare et confusionem] *om.* F

³⁶² oppositiones] operationes M

³⁶³ obiectiones] ob igitur causas F

³⁶⁴ predicamenta] problemata F

³⁶⁵ similia] *om.* M

³⁶⁶ consequentias] quecumque F

incomparabiliter maxima, que alium requirit locum aliamque materiam, valde erit piger et accidiosus logicus, qui diligentissime laborare non intenditur de eis habere noticia.

De tertio universali quod est decem regule sive questiones

Tertium universale est decem regule sive questionesⁱ, in quibus omnis et extra quibus nullum et hoc est propter sui maximam generalitatem, et sunt hee: possibilitas, quidditas, materialitas, formalitas, quantitas, qualitas, tempus, locus, modus, instrumentum. Ad possibilitatem convenit dubitatio, affirmatio, negatio, verum et falsum, possibilis et impossibilis, contingens, necessarium. Et circa ista concessio contingit, ideo queritur utrum³⁶⁷.

Secunda regula est de quidditate et per istam inquiri logicus rem quattuor modis: primo esse rei diffinite. Secundo essentialia rei. Tertio secundum id quod una res est in alia re. Quarto secundum quod res una habet in alia aliquid³⁶⁸. Et per hoc querit quid est in se, quid habet in se, quid est in alio, quid habet in alio.

Tertia regula est de materialitate et per istam inquiri rem tribus modis. Primo esse primitivum sive numerum rei. Secundo compositionem seu dependentiam. Tertio subieccionem³⁶⁹, seu possessionem, vel etiam dominium; et propter hoc querit de quo, ex quo, et cuius.

³⁶⁷ Utrum] utroque M

³⁶⁸ aliquid] aliud F

³⁶⁹ subieccionem] sub rectionem F

Quarta regula est de formalitate sive de existentia et per istam inquiri rem duobus modis. Primo modo per causas quibus est. Secundo modo per finem propter quem³⁷⁰ est, idcirco petit quare est.

Quinta regula est de quantitate et per istam considerat rem duobus modis. Primo est lineata et secundum esse totale rei et hoc continue. Secundo modo penes partes et hoc discrete, et idcirco querit quanta est.

Sexta regula est de qualitate et per istam investigat rem duobus modis. Primo secundum proprias proprietates. Secundo secundum appropriatas seu ab alio communicatas, et pro tanto querit qualis est.

Septima regula est de tempore et per istam interrogat rem preteritam presentem et futuram, et propter hoc querit quando est.

Octava regula est de loco, et per istam considerat rem esse hic vel ibi, intra vel extra, idcirco querit ubi est.

Nona regula est quomodo; per hanc consideratur modum essendi rei in se et in alio et modum agendi, idcirco querit quo modo³⁷¹ est.

Decima regula et ultima³⁷² est de instrumento et per hanc considerat instrumenta naturalia seu artificialia, cum quibus res existit in se vel in alio, et agit in se vel in alio; et propter hoc rationabiliter querit cum quo est, vel etiam cum quo agit id quod agit.

De duplici modo tractandi regulas

³⁷⁰ quam] quod M

³⁷¹ modo] om. F

³⁷² ultima] decima et ultima regula M

Iste regule decem supradicte duobus modis possunt tractari: primo in entibus realibus; secundo in terminis vel³⁷³ secundis intentionibus sine primis intentionibus. /M f. 43v/ Et ideo logicus debet concordare intentiones secundas cum primis / F f. 19r/ sequendo conditiones primarum in secundis et non e contrario. Cum sit hoc quod³⁷⁴ veritas communicat propositioni ex parte rei per illam propositionem significate, ut hoc propositio “bonitas est differens” vera est, quia veritas realis hoc verificat et, nisi veritas realis hoc verificaret, propositio dicta non esset vera, quia realis veritas hoc non poneret in veroⁱⁱ.

Et pro tanto dicitur logica de secundis intentionibus iunctis primis. Quid est hoc dictum viris sapientibus, nisi quod logica tractat de quibusdam intentionibus que consequuntur esse rei intelligibile, ut³⁷⁵ de genere specie et sic de aliis? Et de hiis que considerat³⁷⁶ in actu rationis, ut de syllogismo, consequentia et talibus? Logica enim considerat res secundum esse quod habent in anima, et hoc ita quod modus essendi et intelligendi sibi invicem correspondant et concordanter se habeant, prout possibile, sicut aliter semper consequetur³⁷⁷ modus essendi.

De modo procedendi

In hoc opusculo duobus modis maxime proceditur, verum secundum regulam quidditatis et secundum instrumentale; primum, scilicet differentiam, per quidditatem diffinitive, per differentiam divisive. Per diffinitionem cognoscetur rei entitas, per

³⁷³ vel] *om.* F

³⁷⁴ quod] *add. in marg.* M

³⁷⁵ ut] et F

³⁷⁶ considerat] consistunt M

³⁷⁷ consequetur] sequetur M

differentiam removebitur confusio et ponetur claritas. Et sicut sic³⁷⁸ dabitur doctrina explicite per differentiam et quidditatem, sic poterit haberi modus et via explicandi alia instrumentalia principia et regulas alias³⁷⁹. Cum sit verum quod cuique convenit³⁸⁰ differentia etiam concordantia et cetera, et cuique quidditas etiam materialitas et cetera, et cui quidditas et differentia et cetera, et cui differentia etiam quidditas et cetera. Salvo tamen iure³⁸¹ prime cause et quorundam aliorum suorum³⁸² subditorum, quorum³⁸³ principiorum et regularum explicatio dimittitur causa brevitatis opusculi; et quia est valde facilis habentibus notitiam de predictis regulis et principiis, veruntamen difficile ea ignorantibus, cuius ratio est quia ignoratis principiis non potest de ipsa fieri scientia³⁸⁴, que consistit per verum intelligere.

De introducentis doctrina

Posito universali, tamquam priori, sequitur particulare, tamquam posterius, et sic lector declaret cum tribus universalibus antedictis suam lectionem et maxime cum³⁸⁵ instrumentalibus principiis et regulis, quoniam, ut mihi possibilis fuerit, breviter intendendo prosequi auxilio et spe bonitatis³⁸⁶ optime veritatis, quia verissime ad propositum accedendum isto modo.

De principibus specialibus logice

³⁷⁸ sic] *om.* F

³⁷⁹ alias] *add. in marg.* M

³⁸⁰ convenit] querit F

³⁸¹ iure] vire F

³⁸² suorum] *om.* F

³⁸³ quorum] duorum F

³⁸⁴ de ... scientia] reportat de scientia prima fieri F

³⁸⁵ cum] tamen F

³⁸⁶ Bonitatis] et causa *add. in marg.* F

Principia specialia logice sunt quinque, scilicet terminus, propositio, pr[edica]bilia³⁸⁷, predicamenta, argumentatio; subiectum est ratiocinatio, sed finis veri et falsi inventio.

Terminus quid

Terminus est dictio significativa ex qua propositio constituitur, habet in se sillabam vel sillabas que sunt eius partes essentielles. Est subiectum et predicatum in propositione, pars subiecti et predicati, copula vel signum et similia. Habet in propositione suum esse vel virtutem seu proprietatem, vel partes suas, et habet maiorem virtutem in propositione quam extra, sicut pars que maiorem entitatem habet in toto quam extra et similia.

Terminus differentia

Terminus differentia³⁸⁸ est duplex: cathegorematicus, sincathegorematicus. Cathegorematicus est ille qui potest esse subiectum vel predicatum in propositione vel partem subiecti vel predicati, ut bonitas vel magnitudo et cetera; exemplum quod sit subiectum vel predicatum³⁸⁹ dicendo sic “bonitas est magnitudo”; in hac propositione bonitas est subiectum et magnitudo predicatum. Patet³⁹⁰ quod sit pars dicendo sic: “bonitas durationis est magna in potestate” Quare logicus multum debet esse cautus in hiis maxime / M f.44r/ in sillogismis, ne decipiatur per additionem seu remotionem partis subiecti vel predicatis. Est autem subiectum terminus ante copulam, de quo termino³⁹¹ prius copulam dicitur sive affirmative sive negative sive affirmative sive negative. Predicatum est terminus prius copulam dictus de termino

³⁸⁷ pre[dica]bilia] probabilia F

³⁸⁸ differentia] *om.* M

³⁸⁹ predicatum] dido *scr. et del.* F

³⁹⁰ patet] sed M

³⁹¹ termino] terminus M

ante copulam stante affirmative sive negative³⁹². Copulativa vero est prima <prima>, secunda vel tertia, singularis vel pluralis, individua seu imperativa et cetera, explicita vel implicita huius verbi sum, es, fui. Explicita, ut bonitas est magna. Implicita, ut bonitas bonificat magnitudinem, natura bonificat id est bonificans³⁹³. Cathegoricus duplex: communis, discretus sive singularisⁱⁱⁱ; communis est ille qui ex sui impositione aptus natus³⁹⁴ est de pluribus predicari, ut bonitas, magnitudo et cetera de omnibus bonitatibus, magnitudinibus et cetera. Discretus sive singularis est ille qui ex sui impositione de uno solo predicari³⁹⁵ potest, ut sunt termini significantes individua specierum sicut Petrus, Guillelmus, Maria, Catherina et cetera . Cathegorematicus abstractus, concretus: abstractus est terminus significans essentiam vel proprietatem ut humanitas, petreytas, igneytas, risibilitas, latrabilitas et cetera . Concretus est terminus significans substantiam³⁹⁶ vel subiectum, ut homo, Petrus, ignis, rationale, visibile et cetera . Communis univocus³⁹⁷, equivocus, denominativus; univocus est ille qui predicatur de pluribus sub uno nomine et una diffinitione, ut bonitas et cetera generalia. Equivocus est ille qui /F f. 19v/ predicatur de pluribus sub eodem nomine et diversa diffinitione, ut canis, taurus, aries, leo, virgo, cancer, scorpius, sagitarius³⁹⁸ et cetera³⁹⁹. Denominativus sive connotativus est terminus significans subiectum, connotans aliquam qualitatem ipsi inherentem, ut bonum, magnum, durans, potens, et cetera; etiam calidum, frigidum et cetera; album, nigrum et cetera; gramaticus, loycus et cetera. Sincathegorematicus est ille terminus qui, significative sumptus, non potest

³⁹² predicatum ...negative] *om.* F

³⁹³ bonificans] bonificatum F

³⁹⁴ natus] *om.* M

³⁹⁵ predicari] *om.* F

³⁹⁶ Substantiam] substantiam substantia *scr. et corr.* F

³⁹⁷ univocus] uni *add. in marg.* F

³⁹⁸ taurus... sagitarius] *om.* F

³⁹⁹ ut ... cetera] *add. in marg.* M

esse pars principalis in propositione, et est duplex: universale signum et particulare, et aliquando etiam alia ut adverbium, coniunctio et cetera. Universale signum est terminus qui ex sui significatione significat quamdam comprehensibilitatem que de nihilo predicatur⁴⁰⁰ nec de qua aliquid dicitur, sicut sunt: omnis, nullus, quilibet, nemo, uterque, neutri, ubique, quocumque, et cetera hiis similia. Particulare signum est terminus qui ex sui significatione quamdam particularitatem de qua nihil predicatur et que de nihilo dicitur, sicut sunt quidam, alter, alius, reliquus, aliquis, aliquando, alicubi, et cetera hiis similia. Et quilibet istorum est in differentia, quia vel est intellectualis sive mentalis aut sermocinalis; et si sermocinalis, aut vocalis aut scriptus.

Terminus concordantia

Subiectum predicatum in propositione una, copula cum subiecto et predicato, et e contrario; superius cum suo inferiori, ens bonum et cetera differentia concordantia et cetera et alia similia.

Terminus contrarietas

Omnis nullus, omnis quidam, omnis⁴⁰¹ quidam non, nullus quidam, nullus quidam non, quidam quidam non, uterque neuter, alter alter non, relinquitur relinquitur non, quilibet nemo, quilibet quilibet⁴⁰² nemo, quilibet aliquis, quilibet aliquis non nemo⁴⁰³, nemo aliquis non, quocumque numquam aliquando⁴⁰⁴, aliquando⁴⁰⁵ non, ubicumque, nunquam alicubi, alicubi non. Per differentiam et contrarietatem sunt quattuor

⁴⁰⁰ predicatur] *om. F, add. in marg. M*

⁴⁰¹ omnis] *om. F, add. in marg. M*

⁴⁰² quilibet] *add. in marg. M*

⁴⁰³ nemo] *add. in marg. M*

⁴⁰⁴ aliquando] *aliquem F*

⁴⁰⁵ aliquando] *aliquo F*

oppositiones in terminis: prima in relativis, ut pater et filius et cetera; [secunda] in positivis et privativis⁴⁰⁶, ut auditus surditas et cetera; tertia in contradictoris, ut esse non esse, bonum non bonum; quarta in contrariis, ut album nigrum, /M f.44v/ ens nihil, bonum malum, clarum confusum et cetera hiis similia⁴⁰⁷.

Terminus principium

Subiectum et predicatum et copulam ad propositionem antecedens ad⁴⁰⁸ consequens, superius ad⁴⁰⁹ inferius et e contrario. Ideo terminus est principium in logica quia ad alia se habet et cetera similia.

Terminus medium

Copula inter subiectum et predicatum vel inter hominem et substantiam, ens ad bonum et magnum et cetera et alia que coniungunt[ur] continuant et cetera.

Terminus finis

Consequens antecedentis, inferius superioris, bonum bonitatis et omne concretus sue⁴¹⁰ essentie et similia.

Terminus maioritas

Omne commune, omne universale, omne generale, omne superius, et quanto plus tanto maius et cetera.

Terminus equalitas

Ens bonum et cetera transcendentia, proprium cum suo subiecto, ut risibile homo et cetera; et hoc equalitate measure, scilicet secundum proportionem communem vel superius cum speciali vel inferiori et cetera.

⁴⁰⁶ privativis] *add. in marg.* M

⁴⁰⁷ Per ... similia] *om.* F

⁴⁰⁸ ad] et F

⁴⁰⁹ ad] quod F

⁴¹⁰ sue] sive F

Terminus minoritas

Discretus vel singularis, particularis, inferior, individuum et cetera et hoc de priori principio.

De secundo principio: propositio quid

Propositio est oratio de pluribus veris dictionibus constituta, veritatem vel falsitatem significans^{iv}, vel propositio est oratio constituta ex terminis veritatis vel falsitatis significantia, habet in se terminos vel dictiones significantes per quos propositio verum et falsum habet significare⁴¹¹. Est in anima mentalis, in voce vocalis, in scripto scripta; in sillogismo maior vel minor vel e contrario, in consequentia antecedens vel consequens et similia; habet partes suas in anima, in voce vel in scripto: in anima mentalis, in voce vocalis, in scripto scriptas, in sillogismo sillogisticas et similia.

Propositio differentia

Propositio vera,⁴¹² falsa. Propositio vera⁴¹³ est illa cuius subiectum et predicatum omnimode et simpliciter se habent uti ipsa denotat, ut hec: “aliqua bonitas non est eternitas”, vera est eo quia creata bonitas non est eternitas, nam ex quo creata est incepta et nova est. Propositio falsa est cuius subiectum et predicatum non omnimode et simpliciter se habent uti ipsa denotat, ut “homo est animal rationale”. Et non sine causa dico⁴¹⁴ omnimode et simpliciter, quantum possibile est⁴¹⁵ quod subiectum et

⁴¹¹ habet in se terminos ... significare] *om.* F

⁴¹² vera] vel *add.* F

⁴¹³ Propositio vera] *om.* F

⁴¹⁴ dico] dictio (?) F

⁴¹⁵ est] *add. in marg.* M

predicatum se habeant⁴¹⁶ in aliquo et secundum quid,⁴¹⁷ uti ipsa propositio denotabit, sed non sufficit hoc immo quod omnimode et simpliciter se habeant; vel uti in propositione falsa dicta⁴¹⁸ patet. Etiam in ipsa denotatur quod homo est animal et est rationale, licet subiectum et predicatum se habeant secundum quid et in⁴¹⁹ aliquo, quia, ut homo est animal non tamen⁴²⁰ omnimode et simpliciter, quia non ut⁴²¹ rationale quod exigitur ad illius veritatem, et pro tanto remanet falsa, et sic de aliis suo modo potest dici.

Propositio differentia⁴²². Propositio categorica ypotetica.

Categorica est oratio una perfectam⁴²³ rationem demonstrans, habet in se subiectum et predicatum et copulam principales partes sui^v. Est in anima, voce vel scripto, significans veritatem vel falsitatem unius solius predicati de uno solo subiecto, ideo dicitur de simplici inherentia, immediate enim predicatum simplex suo simplici subiecto habet in anima unum simplex subiectum, unum simplex predicatum, unam simplicem copulam, mentales in voce illas habet vocales, in scripto scriptas; habet etiam in illis significationem simplicis veritatis vel falsitatis ut “bonitas est magna, sua magnitudo est durans” et cetera⁴²⁴.

De multiplicatione terminorum in propositione categorica

⁴¹⁶ se habeant] *om.* F

⁴¹⁷ quid] que F

⁴¹⁸ dicta] differentia F

⁴¹⁹ in] nihil F

⁴²⁰ tamen] tum F

⁴²¹ ut] *om.* F

⁴²² Propositio differentia] *add. in marg.* M

⁴²³ perfectam] per scientiam F

⁴²⁴ vel falsitatis ... et cetera] *om.* F, *add. in marg.* M

Dico tamen subiectum vel predicatum simplex quod est unum et non plura.

Verumtamen possunt poni plures termini tam a parte subiecti quam a parte predicati.

Et pro tanto, amice, nota notabile bonum et verum quod sit per differentiam et concordantiam speciebus aliquarum regularum⁴²⁵ / M f.45r/ insimul⁴²⁶ mixtis, scilicet quod a parte subiecti vel predicati potens ponere plures terminos diversificando quinque modis. Primo modo in recto⁴²⁷, ut “bonitas magna est durans⁴²⁸ et⁴²⁹ potens”. Secundo addere genitivum, ut “bonitas magnitudinis durans est potens”. Tertio in dativo, ut “bonitas magnitudini concordans est pravitati contrarians”. Quarto in accusativo, ut /F f. 20r/ “bonitas⁴³⁰ magnitudinem bonificans est amabilis”. Quinto in ablativo cum in, ut in bonitate, vel cum, de vel ex, ut ex bonitate vel de bonitate; vel cum a, ut cum a bonitate; vel cum,⁴³¹ ut cum bonitate; vel sine aliqua habitudine explicita, ut magnitudo bonitate est bona et duratione durans. Et sic videas hanc diversitatem que stat per diversas regulas et per diversarum regularum species. Et sic poteris carissime diversificare a parte subiecti et predicati ad placitum⁴³². Et non solum diversificando, concordando et concordare diversificando unam speciem, ymmo duas unam post⁴³³ aliam, ymmo tres, ymmo quattuor, ymmo omne superius expressas, de quibus omnibus caritatis intuitu et verbi gratia dabo exemplum in una propositione categorica dicendo sic: “bonitas magnitudinis durationi concordans

⁴²⁵ regularum] vel falsificatis ut bonitas est magna sua magnitudo est durans *add. in marg.* M

⁴²⁶ similis] simul M

⁴²⁷ recto] ratio M

⁴²⁸ durans] est *scr. et del.* F

⁴²⁹ et] *add. in marg. et corr. in* est F

⁴³⁰ bonitas] magnitudinis *scr. et del.* F

⁴³¹ cum] bonitate est bona *scr. et del.* F

⁴³² placitum] principium F

⁴³³ post] prius M

potestatem bonificans est intellegibilis in voluntate ex se virtutem diligente cum veritate verificante gloriam differentia inconfusam”.

Categorica⁴³⁴ differentia

Universalis particularis, indefinita, singularis. Universalis est illa cuius subiectum est terminus communis signo universali iunctus, ut “omnis maioritas⁴³⁵ est maior; nulla magnitudo est minoritas”. Particularis est illa cuius subiectum est terminus communis particulari signo additus, ut “quedam bonitas est magnitudo; quedam magnitudo non est eterna”. Indefinita est illa cuius subiectum existens terminus communis signo universali vel particulari non est adiunctus, ut “virtus est vera” et cetera. Singularis est⁴³⁶ illa cuius subiectum est terminus discretus vel singularis aut etiam communis per pronomen differentiativum singularizatus⁴³⁷ de primo: “deus est bonitas; magnitudo, eternitas; Sortes est durans”. De secundo ista: “bonitas est substantialis, tu homo es bonus, ego bonus sum magnus, ista bonitas est maior, hec concordantia in equalitate minoritatis est maior” et cetera. Categorica duplex: affirmativa negativa. Affirmativa est illa cuius predicatum subiecto attribuitur⁴³⁸ vel alicui⁴³⁹ videtur. De primo: “omnis bonitas creata est minor”. De secundo: “omnis bonitas spiritualis est substantialis” et cetera. Negativa est cum predicatum a subiecto removetur vel removeri videtur: de primo, ut “bonitas Petri non est eius magnitudo”. De secundo: “ens non est verum” et cetera. Categorica duplex: de disiuncto extremo et de

⁴³⁴ Categorica] cathacorica M

⁴³⁵ maioritas] materias F

⁴³⁶ est] vera *scr. et del.* F

⁴³⁷ singularizatus] singulaizatus F

⁴³⁸ attribuntur] arbum *add. in marg.* F

⁴³⁹ alicui] *scr. et del.* F

copulato. De disiuncto extremo est illa in subiecto cuius vel predicato ponitur coniunctio disiunctiva, ut “virtus lapidis vel anime est intellectualis vel spiritualis”.

De copulato extremo est illa in subiecto cuius vel predicato ponitur copulativa coniunctio, ut “intellectus et voluntas sunt in angelo potentie intellectuales et incorruptibiles”.

Logicus dicit tres petitiones, scilicet que, quanta, qualis⁴⁴⁰. Cum querit que, petit an sit cathgorica vel ypothetica. Cum dicit quanta, querit an sit universalis vel particularis vel indefinita⁴⁴¹ vel singularis. Cum dicit qualis, petit an sit affirmativa vel negativa.

Propositio concordantia

Maior et minor in conclusione et omnes tres in syllogismo. Propositio que est antecedens est⁴⁴² illa que est universalis. Universalis cum sua particulari, indefinita vel singulari et cetera. Item categorice concordant tribus modis⁴⁴³, scilicet in quantum propositiones tante vel tales. Secundo in similitudine subiecti vel predicati. Tertio utroque modo, scilicet in simili subiecto et predicato. Et iste concordant duobus modis,⁴⁴⁴ scilicet eodem modo sive ordine, et diverso. Eodem modo et ordine est, quando id quod est subiectum in una et predicatum est⁴⁴⁵ in alia, ut “bonitas est differens, bonitas non est differens”. / M f.45v Diverso modo seu ordine est quando id,⁴⁴⁶ quod est subiectum in una, est in altera predicatum et e contrario, ut “bonitas

⁴⁴⁰ que, quanta, qualis] que, qualis, quanta M

⁴⁴¹ Indefinita] indistincta M

⁴⁴² est] cum M

⁴⁴³ tribus modis] tripliciter M

⁴⁴⁴ duobus modis] dupliciter M

⁴⁴⁵ est] et M

⁴⁴⁶ Id] est *scr. et del.* F

est⁴⁴⁷ magna, magnitudo est bona”. Ex⁴⁴⁸ concordantia utriusque termini existentis in diversitate ordinis in propositionibus oritur duplex conversio in logica. Una est dicta simplex et alia per accidens. Simplex conversio est mutatio subiecti in predicatum et e contrario, remanente in utraque eadem quantitate et qualitate. Et per istam convertuntur negativa universalis et particularis affirmativa⁴⁴⁹: de prima, ut “nullum ens est malum” convertitur “nullum malum est ens”; de secunda, “quedam potestas est⁴⁵⁰ sapientia” convertitur “quedam sapientia est potestas”.

Conversio per accidens est mutatio subiecti in predicatum et e contrario,⁴⁵¹ remanente in utraque eadem qualitate sed variante⁴⁵² quantitate, et per istam convertitur universalis affirmativa et negativa. De prima, ut “omnis bonitas est differens” convertitur “quedam differens est bonitas”. De secunda, ut “nullus intellectus est sensualis” convertitur “quoddam sensuale non est intellectus”. Sed extra animam est alius modus conversionis, qui expectat ad altiorem artistam quam sit logicus. Et iste per differentiam est duplex: unus est quando aliqua concretive convertitur, stante differentia in proprietatibus sive abstractis, quibus res est id quod est, vel talis qualis est, et dicitur respectiva vel secundum quid, sicut dicendo: “ens est bonum et e contrario, bonum est magnum et e contrario, proprietas qua bonum est, scilicet bonitas differens est ab esse sine proprietate qua est ens, scilicet ab entitate”. Item sunt ab illa qua est magnum scilicet a⁴⁵³ magnitudine, et sic de ceteris. Item, licet homo sit risibilis et risibile sit homo, essentia qua homo est homo est humanitas, que

⁴⁴⁷ est] magnitudo *scr. et del.* F

⁴⁴⁸ Ex] et F

⁴⁴⁹ particularis affirmativa] affirmativa particularis M

⁴⁵⁰ est] substantia *scr. et del.* F

⁴⁵¹ contrario] n *scr. et del.* F


⁴⁵² variante] variata M

⁴⁵³ a] *om.* F

valde differt a proprietate qua est risibile, que est risibilitas. Talis enim conversio non potest fieri nisi in re finita / F f. 20v/ et incepta. Secundus modus est altior et est tunc quando una ratio sive proprietas idem est esse numero et natura cum ratione [sive proprietate de qua predicatur vel que de illa predicatur]⁴⁵⁴, sine aliqua diversitate essentie et esse, abstracti et concreti; et hec est absoluta sive simplex. Et hec solum convenit enti, cuius esse nec est alicuius totius pars, nec suum esse de partibus est constitutum, in quo omne quod in ipso essentialiter est, idem quod ipsemet est, cum omni claritate et sine aliqua sui confusione. Tale quidem ens infinitum est sine termino eternum, etiam⁴⁵⁵ sine tempore cuius esse nunquam incepit esse nec desinere potest esse. Et pro tanto sufficit ad esse principium omni alteri esse, ex quo nunquam incipit esse. Et sufficit ad esse finem complementum et perfectionem omni rei deducte in esse, quia non potest desinere esse et hec est sublimior conversio que valeat cogitari.

Propositio contrarietas

Ex propositionibus utroque termino et eodem ordine concordantibus format logicus per contrarietatem cum differentia, concordantia et maioriata hanc figuram quadrangularem. Cum differentia format propositiones et oppositiones ad



⁴⁵⁴ sive... predicatur] om. F

⁴⁵⁵ etiam] om. F

invicem differentes; cum concordantia, quia concordant aut utroque termino et eodem ordine; cum contrarietate, quia quedam opponuntur aliis in quantitate vel⁴⁵⁶ qualitate, [veritate vel falsitate. Cum maiori, quia alique sunt in differentia cum]⁴⁵⁷ maiori concordantia, ut subalterne; alique vero cum maiori contrarietate / M f.46r/ , ut contradictorie. Sunt autem universalis affirmativa et negativa contrarie, universalis affirmativa et particularis, universalis negativa et particularis subalterne, universalis affirmativa et particularis negativa contradictorie, et universalis negativa et particularis affirmativa similiter, sed particularis affirmativa et negativa subcontrarie, posito tamen quod concordent utroque termino et eodem ordine, ut patet in figura. Et sic potest dici de indefinitis et singularibus, que ad particulares debent reduci, affirmativa ad affirmativam et negativa ad negativam.

De contradictione

Contradictio est affirmatio et cuius contradictoria negatio eodem modo de eodem, ut “omnis bonitas est magna, quedam bonitas non est magna et cetera”. Vel contradictio est affirmatio seu negatio eodem modo de duabus immediate contrariis vel duorum immediate contrariorum vel disparatorum de eodem predicato, ut “infinite bonum est et infinite malum est vel infinite bonum non est et infinite malum non est”, unde per hoc dicitur. Eodem modo quattuor diverse conditiones significantur, que ad contradictionem veram exiguntur, quarum una deficiente vel pluribus non potest esse contradictio. Prima conditio est quod fiat ad idem. Secunda secundum idem. Tertia similiter. Quarta in⁴⁵⁸ eodem tempore. Per differentiam tres sunt species contradictionis et non plures. Prima est, quando affirmatio et negatio de eodem dicuntur eodem modo,

⁴⁵⁶ vel] et F

⁴⁵⁷ veritate ... cum] om. F

⁴⁵⁸ in] de F

ut “bonitas est magna et non magna et cetera”. Secunda est, quando affirmatio duorum contrariorum vel disparatorum eodem modo de eodem⁴⁵⁹ dicitur, ut “bonitas est magna et parva vel est ens et nihil”, similiter “magnitudo est bona et mala, virtuosa et vitiosa, vera et falsa, clara et confusa”. De disparatis, ut “Sortes est homo et asinus, bos et capra et cetera”. Vel etiam ista secunda species est quando affirmatio fit negatio et cetera⁴⁶⁰ penitus contrariorum, ut “infinitum bonum est et infinitum malum est; summa virtus est⁴⁶¹, <est> summum vitium est; immensa veritas est, immensa falsitas est; et cetera”. Tertia species est quando fit negatio eodem modo de⁴⁶² duobus penitus contrariis, ut “summa bonitas non est, summa malicia non est; summa virtus non est, summum vitium non est; bonum non est, malum non est; clarum non est, confusum non est; et cetera”. Et sic sunt tres: prima est affirmativa et negativa; secunda est affirmativa tantum; tertia negativa. Verumtamen contradictio est quidam mentis conceptus⁴⁶³ qui extra animam est impossibilis.⁴⁶⁴ /F f. 21r/

De octo propositionibus in quibus apparet esse contradictio

Ex hiis que dicta sunt cognoscit logicus octo propositiones in quibus videtur esse contradictio, tamen non est, secundum quod ei est revelatum lumine differentie.

Prima est formata ex terminis equivocis, ut “canis est animal et non est animal et cetera”. Secunda per mutationem subiecti vel predicati, ut “vinum est prohibitum ad

⁴⁵⁹ de eodem] *om.* F

⁴⁶⁰ negatio et cetera] ipsorum M

⁴⁶¹ infinitus... est] *om.* F

⁴⁶² de] et F

⁴⁶³ Conceptus] qui extra animam est impossibilis *add. infra* F

⁴⁶⁴ Impossibilis] fEcI simpliciter convertitur EvA per acci. AstO per cOntra sic fit conversio tota. Asserit A, negat E sed universaliter ambe. Asserit I, negat O, sed particulariter ambe *add. alia manu* F

bibendum, non est prohibitum ad bibendum vinum”: ex quo videtur sequi⁴⁶⁵ vinum esse prohibitum et non prohibitum. Similiter, “promitto tibi denarium⁴⁶⁶ et denarium non tibi promitto”, et cetera. Tertia secundum totum et partem, ut “corpus hominis est albus et non albus, corvus est niger et non niger, et cetera”. Quarta est secundum actum et potentiam, ut “vinum inebriat et non inebriat, sardina dat sitim et non dat sitim”. Quinta est in terminis relativis, ut “Sortes est pater et non est pater, niger et non niger”. Sexta est de loco, ut “Sortes est viator, Sortes est non viator, elementatum corpus est corruptibile et non corruptibile”. Septima est de habitu, ut “Sortes est sciens, Sortes est non sciens, philosophus non philosophus, gramaticus et non gramaticus,” et cetera⁴⁶⁷. Octava est de tempore, ut “rex venit hodie et non venit hodie, Sortes vidit me heri⁴⁶⁸ et Sortes non vidit me heri”. Prima⁴⁶⁹ patet per differentiam in significatione canis, ut alterius equivoci; affirmativa enim stat pro cane latrabili et pisce marino. Negativa autem pro sydere celesti et cetera. Secunda patet per differentiam in situ terminorum vel ordine, nam per diversam situationem /M f. 46v/ diversificatur acceptio termini vel secundum differentiam in principio efficiente: nam prima affirmativa stat secundum Machometum prohibente, negativa autem secundum deum verum Iehsum non illud prohibente. Tertia solvitur per differentiam inter totum et partem, nam affirmativa est vera secundum quid, negativa autem simpliciter. Quarta patet per differentiam temporis in potentia et actu, ideo affirmativa est vera secundum unum nunc, negativa secundum aliud nunc. Quinta patet per differentiam in relatione relativi, ideo prima affirmativa est vera secundum

⁴⁶⁵ sequi] *om.* F

⁴⁶⁶ denarium] *del.* F

⁴⁶⁷ cetera] *om.* F

⁴⁶⁸ heri] *erit* F

⁴⁶⁹ Prima] *sua scr. et del.* F

unum modum paternitatis vel filiationis, negativa vero secundum alium. Sexta patet per differentiam in loco, ideo affirmativa est vera secundum unum locum naturalem, negativa autem est⁴⁷⁰ vera secundum locum celestem. Septima patet per differentiam in habitu, ideo affirmativa est vera secundum unum habitum, negativa autem secundum alium, ut secundum gramaticam vel logicam, philosophiam naturalem vel moralem, gramaticam positivam et speculativam. Octava per differentiam in tempore, ideo affirmativa est vera secundum unum tempus, negativa vero secundum aliud, ut sic loquar. Tempus enim inalterabile est, ideo per differentiam in tempore vel temporis similitudine inveniuntur in die multe hore; et sic aliquid est verum secundum unam partem diei affirmative, cuius oppositum est verum negative in alia parte diei.

Propositio principium

Quedam propositiones sunt principia ad alias, sicut universales ad suas subalternas in sillogismo; maior et minor ad conclusionem in entimematica propositione sumpta ad festinatam conclusionem; in inductione plures singulares ad unam universalem; in omni consequentia propositio que est antecedens ad illam que est consequens, due cathgorice ad unam ypotheticam et similia.

Propositio medium

Propositio una est medium alteri, ut minor inter maiorem et conclusionem in sillogismo. Omnes propositiones formate de subalternis sunt media inter propositiones formatas ex specialissimis et generalissimis.

Propositio finis

⁴⁷⁰ est] *del.* F

Quedam propositiones sunt aliarum⁴⁷¹ fines, ut conclusio premissarum, propositio que est consequens propositionis que est antecedens, ypothetica cathegoricarum, propositiones specialium seu individuorum propositionum generalium seu communium. Nam sicut universalia principia sunt propter particularia, sic etiam propositiones universalium principiorum sunt propter propositiones particularium et cetera.⁴⁷²

Propositio maioritas

Propositionum alia maior est alia, et hoc quia de generalibus principiis hedificate sunt, ut ista propositio “bonitas est magna” maior est quam ista “bonitas substantialis est magna”. Similiter universales quam particulares, indefinite vel singulares, et dicuntur maiores a maioritate generalitatis vel ambitus, etiam est maior in sillogismo illa in qua existit maior extremitas. Alio modo dicuntur propositiones maiores, scilicet quando formantur ex terminis significantibus res maiores, et sic sunt universaliores⁴⁷³ aliis et magis necessarie quedam aliis, sicut iste que sunt ex vegetabilibus magis⁴⁷⁴ quam ille que⁴⁷⁵ sunt ex elementatis, et sic similiter de aliis ascendendo usque ad primam causam. Quantum scilicet ex reali veritate est propositio vera, ideo ex maiori veritate reali magis⁴⁷⁶ vera et magis necessaria, quia quedam propositiones significant maiores veritates quam alie, et sic intelligitur de maiori falsitate suo modo et per oppositum ad veritatem.

Propositio equalitas

⁴⁷¹ aliarum] *om.* F

⁴⁷² et cetera] *om.* F

⁴⁷³ universaliores] veriores M

⁴⁷⁴ magis] necesse quidam aliis sicut iste *add. et del.* F

⁴⁷⁵ que] *om.* F

⁴⁷⁶ magis] *om.* M

In propositionibus existit equalitas et hoc, quia quedam sunt aliis equales in generalitate vel in aliquo alio, sicut in propositionibus transcendentium /F f. 21v/ quarum una est generalior alia, sicut “ens est bonum est magnum, et cetera”. Et propter hoc quando fit sillogismus ex terminis equalibus, potest inde fieri de maiori minor et de minori conclusio et e contrario, et de conclusione maior et e contrario, sicut dicendo “omne animal est substantia sensata”, “omne sentiens est animal”, ergo “omne sentiens est substantia sensata”. Similiter in sillogismo constituto ex terminis superioribus et⁴⁷⁷ inferioribus⁴⁷⁸ est equalitas proportionativa, ex eo quia ex partibus maioribus et minoribus est ipse constitutus, sicut sunt homo, animal, substantia et cetera. / M f.47r/ Similiter in propositionibus finitis ex principiis alicuius individui, ut “bonitas Petri est magna, duratio Petri est potens”, similiter de uno individuo ad aliud, ut “virtus Christi est infinita, virtus Marie virginis sanctissime⁴⁷⁹ est magna,” et cetera⁴⁸⁰. Item de diffinitione ad diffinitum et e contrario potest considerari equalitas in propositionibus finitis de ipsis, et sic de proprietate ad suum subiectum et cetera, ut risibile homo, latrabile canis.

In figura oppositionum fit a logico per accidens triplex equivalentia⁴⁸¹. Prima est quando signo universali negatio postponitur et⁴⁸² tunc tantum valet⁴⁸³ sicut sua contraria, ut “omnis bonitas non est magna” equivalet huic “nulla bonitas est magna”, et e contrario, “nulla bonitas non est magna” equivalet huic “omnis bonitas non est magna”. Secunda est quando signo universali vel particulari preponitur negatio, quia

⁴⁷⁷ superioribus et] *om.* F

⁴⁷⁸ inferioribus] et etiam inferioribus *add.* F

⁴⁷⁹ Sanctissime] *con. ex virginissime* F, M

⁴⁸⁰ cetera] *om.* F

⁴⁸¹ equivalentia] *conversio* F

⁴⁸² et] *quia* M

⁴⁸³ valet] *verum* F

tunc tantum valet sicut sua contraddictoria, ut “non omnis bonitas est magna”
equivalet isti “aliqua bonitas non est magna”, similiter ista “non⁴⁸⁴ nulla bonitas est
virtus” equivalet isti “aliqua bonitas est virtus”. Tertia equivalentia est quando signo
negatio preponitur et postponitur que tunc tantum valet sicut sua subalterna, ut “non
omnis bonitas non est minor” est equivalens isti “quedam bonitas est minor”.
Similiter “non nulla bonitas non est intellectualis” equivalet isti “aliqua bonitas non
est intellectualis” et sic dictum est de istis quattuor signis que sunt: omnis, nullus,
quidam, quidam non. Sic intelligas, frater mi, posse dici in ceteris figuris expressis
capitulo de termino, paragrafo de contrarietate; veruntamen semper est necessaria
negatio in ista equipollentia.

Propositio minoritas

Propositiones quidam sunt aliis minores et sunt tot minores et in illo⁴⁸⁵ quot maiores
et in hoc⁴⁸⁶ in quo, quia relative se habent; et sic per maioritatem quarundam
propositionum potest aliarum minoritas faciliter cognosci.

Propositio ypothetica quidem

Propositio ypothetica est oratio, in qua due cathgorice per coniunctionem ad invicem
uniuntur. Habet in se duas cathgoricas vel plures, et coniunctio in medio illarum est
in anima intellectualis seu mentalis, in voce vocalis, in scripto scripta, duplicis
veritatis vel falsitatis significantia. Habet in anima suas partes mentales, in voce
vocales, in scripto scriptas duplicem veritatem vel falsitatem denotans.

Ypothetica differentia

Copulativa. Disiunctiva. Conditionalis. Rationalis. Temporalis et localis.

⁴⁸⁴ non] om. F

⁴⁸⁵ illo] primo F

⁴⁸⁶ hoc] secundo F

Copulativa est ypothetica cuius cathegorice per coniunctionem copulativam⁴⁸⁷ coniunguntur, ut “bonitas est magna et magnitudo est bona”. Disiunctiva est ypothetica cuius cathegorice per coniunctionem disiunctivam coniunguntur, ut “minoritas est infinita vel aliqua virtus est gloria”. Conditionalis est ypothetica cuius cathegorice coniunguntur per hanc⁴⁸⁸ coniunctionem si, ut “si bonitas est magna magnitudo est durans⁴⁸⁹.” Rationalis est ypothetica cuius cathegorice per rationale coniunctionem uniuntur, ut “omnis virtus est vera ergo veritas est concordans”. Temporalis, ut “bonitas est magna quando virtus est in duratione”. Localis, ut “duratio est in potestate ubi bonitas est magna”. Tunc copulativa est vera cum eius cathegorice sunt vere, et tunc est falsa cum⁴⁹⁰ aliqua suarum cathegoricarum vel ambe sunt false, ut ad eius veritatem convenit veritatem utriusque partis⁴⁹¹ verificare, sed ad eius falsitatem sufficit aliquam eius partem esse falsam. Ad veritatem disiunctive sufficit alteram eius partem veram esse vel ambas, sed non ita decenter, cum ipsa de se duo actus requirat, scilicet coniungere et disiungere, quoniam sicut bonitati magnitudine convenit bonificare et magnificare sic suo modo coniunctioni disiunctive competit coniungere et disiungere et pro tanto dicitur non ita decenter; ad eius falsitatem exigit ambas eius cathegoricarum / M f.47v/ esse falsas. De veritate et falsitate conditionalis et rationalis hic non loquitur, eo quia sunt argumentales et in hoc aliud habent locum.


⁴⁸⁷copulativam] cathegoricam F

⁴⁸⁸ hanc] conditionem *add. et del.* F

⁴⁸⁹durans] *add. in marg.* F

⁴⁹⁰ cum] quando F

⁴⁹¹ utriusque partis] utramque partem M



De possibili et impossibili, contingenti et necessario

Possibile est ens quod actu non est sed potest esse, ut hominem esse conditione carpentarium et cetera. Impossibile est ens quod actu non est nec poterit esse, ut hominem esse lapidem et eum non esse animal. Necessarium est quod nulla ratione aliter esse potest ut bonitatem esse et eam esse in duratione⁴⁹² et cetera. Contingens est ens actu per possibilitatem existens, ut aliquem vocari Sortem; et dicitur contingens eo quia non est necessarium. Possibile duplex: quoddam per causam, aliud per infinitam potestatem. Per causam, sicut ignem comburere lignum et lignum comburi, unde sequitur quod, antequam comburatur, combustio est possibilis ab igne active in ligno passive /F f. 22r/ et cetera. Per infinitam potestatem, sicut deum facere ad suum placitum de mundo et de omni quod est in eo, et ista potestas est effectus divine potestatis: omne enim quod in ipso deo est, necessitas et purus actus est. In

⁴⁹² in duratione] animal F

creaturis aliquid est possibile vel impossibile in uno tempore, quod est possibile vel impossibile in alio, et sic de loco. Exemplum primi, dum Petrus non intelligit impossibile est in tali nunc eum intelligere sed in alio tempore possibile est. Exemplum secundi, cum Steffanus⁴⁹³ est Pisis impossibile est quod sit Rome et cetera. Impossibile est duplex: quoddam est per contradictionem, ut bonitatem esse et non esse. Aliud per defectum cause, ut aliud esse bonum sine bonitate, magnum sine magnitudine, ignem esse calidum sine caliditate, intellectum intelligere sine potestate et cetera. Est autem alius modus impossibilitatis⁴⁹⁴ qui consistit per perfectionem maximam, sicut deus qui est perfectissimum bonum necessarium et infinitum, propter quod impossibile est ipsum facere malum nec peccatum nec in eo defectum, contingentiam atque bone⁴⁹⁵ operationis cessationem existere.

De propositionibus formari possibilibus ex antedictis terminis

Ex antedictis terminis consuevit logicus facere quandam figuram de quattuor angulis constitutam iuvantibus differentia, contrarietate et equalitate, sine quibus ipsa est penitus impossibilis. Iuvat enim differentia cum qua sunt quattuor et cum ipsa unum ab altero distinguntur, scilicet necessarium ab impossibili et impossibile a possibili non sive contingentia⁴⁹⁶ non, et possibile non sive contingens non a possibili sive contingentia, et etiam unam oppositionem⁴⁹⁷ ab alia iuvat contrarietas. Et de hiis quattuor facit oppositiones

⁴⁹³steffanus] stephanus M


⁴⁹⁴impossibilitatis] impotentis F

⁴⁹⁵bone] op omnis *add. et del.* F

⁴⁹⁶contingenti] non *add. et del.* F

⁴⁹⁷oppositionem] propositionem F

quattuor scilicet: contraria, contradictoria, subalterna, et subcontraria. Et per hoc dicit
necesse impossibile contrariari, necesse et possibile non contradici, necesse et possibile
subalternari, possibile et
possibile non subcontrariari,
et cetera suo modo. Iuvat
etiam equalitas ut in hiis
possit equivalentias facere,
negatione tamen mediante,
scilicet eam preponendo vel
postponendo, preponendo et
postponendo; et potest sequi
in hoc [ordo prehabite figure,
ut in]⁴⁹⁸ hac sensualiter apparet.



Differentia in situ istorum terminorum / M f.48r/

Per differentiam sciendum est quod isti quattuor termini possunt tripliciter⁴⁹⁹ situari in propositione.

Primo in principio, ut: “est necesse bonitatem esse”. Secundo in medio, ut: “bonitatem est esse necesse”⁵⁰⁰. Tertio in fine, ut: “bonitatem esse est necesse”. Unde propter hoc caute se debet habere in hiis logicus, scilicet an talis terminus sit in principio, medio aut fine, quoniam in tali diversitate sic sensus propositionis diversificationi et ab aliquibus sophisticis causatur deceptio.

⁴⁹⁸ ordo...in] om. F
⁴⁹⁹ tripliciter] tibi F
⁵⁰⁰ est... necesse] necesse est esse M

De compositione et divisione harum propositionum

Ex hac ergo differentia principii, medii, et finis sunt iste propositiones duplices; quedam enim sunt divise seu in diviso sensu, alie composite seu in composito sensu. Ille dicuntur composite seu in sensu composito, in quibus terminus aliquis antedictorum existit a parte principii vel a parte finis simpliciter. Dico “simpliciter” quando terminus iste terminus existit ante actum sumptum cum infinitivo, existente copula inter illum terminum et actum cum infinitivo sumptum, ut “necesse est bonitatem esse”, ita quod “necesse” sit subiectum et copula et antedictus cum infinitivo sint predicatum. A parte finis simpliciter est quando terminus ille predicatur et antedictus cum infinitivo subiciuntur, ut “bonitatem esse est necesse”. In ista propositione “bonitatem esse” subicitur, “est” dicitur copula, et “necesse” predicatur, et sic de aliis suo modo. Breviter ex hiis habetur quod, quando modus preponitur vel postponitur toti, dictio est certe composita sive in sensu composito. Sed quando⁵⁰¹ terminus ille existit in medio, hoc est inter antedictum et infinitivum, tunc est divise sive in sensu diviso, eo quia intus scinditur illo modo uno existente a parte subiecti, alio vero a parte predicati, ut “bonitatem necesse esse magnam” et cetera.

De harum veritate et falsitate propositionum

Ad veritatem propositionis composite exigitur quod terminus ille verificetur⁵⁰² de propositione indicativa correspondenti illi dictioni ut: “bonitatem esse magnam est necesse” convenit quod hec sit vera: “bonitas est magna est necessaria”. Ad veritatem

⁵⁰¹ quando] cum F

⁵⁰² verificetur] versificetur F

propositionis divise sufficit quod modus verificetur⁵⁰³ de propositione composita ex pronomine demonstrante illud, pro quo stat subiectum propositionis correspondentis dictionis, scilicet actionis, et infinitivo predicato stante in propria forma, ut dicendo “calidum possibile est esse frigidum”, sufficit ad eius veritatem quod “hoc istud est frigidum est possibile” sit vera, pronomine demonstrante significatum subiecti propositionis prius date. Sed si consideres que dicta sunt realiter de possibili et cetera, ascendens altius⁵⁰⁴ quam illi qui in aliquibus huius propositionibus fine vacuo quasi et nullius valoris /F f. 22v/ se delectant, cum dicitur hec propositio “calidum possibile est esse frigidum”: quid significat, nisi quod istud subiectum quidem⁵⁰⁵, quod in isto tempore vel nunc est calidum, possibile est quod in alio tempore sive nunc sit frigidum? Similiter de ista “album possibile est esse nigrum”. Et magis sequaris conditiones principiorum naturalium, que sunt vera et realia, quam dicta aliqua oppositionata logicalia, que sunt volatilia, ventosa et voluntaria.

De triplici propositionum differentia

Omnis propositio est necessaria aut contingens aut impossibilis. Necessaria quia predicatum existit in tanta concordantia cum subiecto quin ab eo nullo modo possit privari, ut “deus est bonus”, “homo est animal”. Contingens, quia predicatum⁵⁰⁶ inest subiecto a contingentia, ita quod subiectum aliquando fuit vel potuit vel⁵⁰⁷ poterit esse sine predicato, ut “homo est iustus, scolarius, cerdo et cetera”. Verumtamen ad omnem

⁵⁰³ verificetur] versificetur F

⁵⁰⁴ altius] *om.* F

⁵⁰⁵ quidem] *om.* F

⁵⁰⁶ predicatum] predicatum *add. in marg.* F

⁵⁰⁷ Potuit vel] *om.* F

contingentem sequitur aliqua necessaria, ut “hic homo est luxuriosus⁵⁰⁸” est contingens, sed “hic luxuriosus est peccator” est necessaria, ut per se patet. Impossibile est quia predicatum per nullam⁵⁰⁹ potestatem possit subiecto concordare, hoc est de eo vere affirmando predicari, ut “homo est lapis” et cetera. Et⁵¹⁰ propter hoc sunt tres materies, scilicet naturalis, contingens et remota, hoc dico in propositionibus.

Tamen⁵¹¹ vero, carissime qui possibilitates et impossibilitates, contingentias et necessitates entium /M f.48v/ vis cognoscere, recurre⁵¹² ad artem scientificam seu artificiosam scientiam illius sacri doctoris radii lucentis in mundo^{vi} nempe sancti spiritus eloquentia decorati, in cuius artis seu scientie generalitate hec et alia quam plurima, que⁵¹³ verbo explicari non possent, deteguntur. Et audi verba quibus altiora de hac materia nondum forte audivisti.

Sciendum est⁵¹⁴ quod necessitas est genus possibilitatis et impossibilitatis, quoniam quod est possibile, necesse est possibile, et sic de impossibili, aliter implicaretur contradictio⁵¹⁵. Unde hic loquor de possibili⁵¹⁶ et impossibili in quantum sunt principia universalialia, sub quibus omnia principia possible et impossible continentur. Possible et impossible tres sunt species: prima species est que non est de esse rei nec pars eius, sed⁵¹⁷ sunt effectus cum quibus causa agit ad placitum. Secunda species est, quando possibile et impossible sunt partes subiecti in quo sunt, sub quibus potest agere, pati et

⁵⁰⁸ luxuriosus] luxuriosus luxuriosus *scr. et corr.* F

⁵⁰⁹ Nullam] veram F

⁵¹⁰ Et] *om.* F

⁵¹¹ Tamen] cum F

⁵¹² recurre] secure F

⁵¹³ plurima qua] plura que F

⁵¹⁴ est] *om.* F

⁵¹⁵ Conditiones] unde hic loquor de impossibili alter implicaretur conditio *add. et del.* F

⁵¹⁶ possibili] impossibili *scr. et corr.* F

⁵¹⁷ sed] sicut F

existere. Tertia species est quando possibile existit in subiecto et impossibile extra subiectum vel e contrario. Nulla species alia possibilis vel⁵¹⁸ impossibilis esse potest; harum autem specierum exempla in *libro de possibili et impossibili* altissime patent, qui a philosopho magno cathalano editus parisius invenitur^{vii}, et hoc de secundo principio.

De predicabilibus que sunt tertium logice principium. Predicabile quid

Predicabile est ens seu universale seu de pluribus dicibile.

Predicabile differentia⁵¹⁹, aliud genus, aliud species, differentia, proprietas, accidens.

Genus quidam est universale. Universale⁵²⁰, quod de pluribus speciebus differentibus predicatur, ut substantia, quantitas et cetera, habet in se generalem bonitatem, magnitudinem, durationem et cetera; et sic est bonum generale, magnum, durans et cetera, eo quia sua bonitas, magnitudo et cetera se habent ad omnes bonitates speciales, magnitudines et cetera, scilicet specierum subiectorum ipsi generi. Et in speciebus principium superius in ipsis diffusum, ipso existente in sua universalitate⁵²¹ uno et indistincto, habet in natura species multas, in speciebus multa individua.

Genus differentia

Genus aliud⁵²² naturale, logicale, generalissimum et subalternum, genus concordantie, genus contrarietatis, genus principii, genus finis, genus maioritatis, genus equalitatis, genus minoritatis. Causa combinationis predictae est, ut cum instrumentalibus principii genus investigetur et cognoscatur, quod iter est introducentis facere. /F f. 23r/

⁵¹⁸ Vel] et M

⁵¹⁹ differentia] om. F

⁵²⁰ universale] om. M

⁵²¹ universalitate] utilitate F

⁵²² genus aliud] om. M

Species quid

Species universalis generi est subiectum, quod de pluribus numero differentibus predicatur, ut homo, capra, pagelius, gallina, olivarius, marmor, et cetera. Habet in se specialem entitatem bonitatem et cetera⁵²³. Est in genere suum esse recipiens et in individua suum influens, et est eis subiectum influentie et refluentie. Habet in genere sua individua et in individuis habet suum finale complementum, suam quietem et terminum sui appetitus et cetera. Species differentia naturalis, logicalis, specialissima, subalterna. Species concordantia, species contrarietas, species principium, species medium, species finis, species maior, species equalitas, species minoritas. Causa combinationis ut supra.

Differentia quid

Differentia est universale, ratione cuius res differentes clare et inconfuse habent in se coessentialia distincta, clara et inconfusa, cum quibus alia distinguit, clarificat et ab eis confusionem removet. Et in alio principium distinctum, clarificatum et confusionis remotum, in genere generale et in specie speciali, in individuo individua, in homine humana, in leone leonina et cetera. Habet in ipsis actum distinguendi, clarificandi et confusionem removendi.

Proprietas quid

Proprietas est universale ratione cuius quodlibet ens consistit in suo proprio numero sive esse, sicut risibilitas et latrabilitas et cetera. Habet in se suam propriam conditionem, qua proprium scilicet subiectum specificatur in tali numero, sive esse, in quo est. Est in homine humana, in cane canina et cetera. Habet in subiecto suum esse, suum actum, suam bonitatem et cetera. / M f. 49r/ Proprietas differentia: sensualis,

⁵²³ et... cetera] *om.* F

intellectualis; proprietas concordantia, proprietas⁵²⁴ contrarietas, proprietas principium, proprietas medium, proprietas finis, proprietas maioritas, proprietas equalitas, proprietas minoritas. Causa combinationis, ut supra⁵²⁵.

Accidens quid

Accidens est universale quod per se existere non potest; habet in se ut genus etiam multas species, sicut color albedinem, nigredinem et cetera. Est in subiecto activum et passivum, sicut activa qualitas et passiva, et hoc ratione⁵²⁶ forme et materie substantie. Habet in subiecto, in quo est, suam existentiam et suam agentiam sive actum et omnes suas condiciones. Accidens differentia: quantitas, qualitas, relatio, actio, passio, habitus, situs, tempus, locus⁵²⁷. Accidens concordantia, accidens contrarietas, accidens principium, accidens medium, accidens finis, accidens maioritas, accidens equalitas, accidens minoritas. Causa combinationis, ut supra.

De predicamentis, que sunt quartum in logica principium

Predicamentum est generale ordinamentum, in quo omne quod est⁵²⁸ secundum suum modum est invenibile. Per differentiam sunt decem predicamenta⁵²⁹, scilicet substantia et novem generalia accidentia, stante differentia, ut quantitas, qualitas et cetera ut supra.

Substantia quid

⁵²⁴ proprietas] *om.* F

⁵²⁵ ut supra] et cetera F


⁵²⁶ Ratione] *om.* F

⁵²⁷ passio...locus] et cetera F

⁵²⁸ est] quia est *scr. et del.* F

⁵²⁹ sunt decem predicamenta] decem sunt predicamenta M

Substantia est ens per se existens, habet in se formam, materiam et coniunctionem; vel aliqua quibus forma et materia et coniunctio simulantur, que sunt substantie essentialia et naturalia, sine quibus ista substantia esse non posset. In tanto⁵³⁰ quod substantia per formam est substantiva, id est substantialiter activa, et per materiam substantiabilis, id est substantialiter⁵³¹ passibilis vel agibilis, et per coniunctionem habet substantiare, id est substantialiter agere. Substantia est in accidente quanta, qualis et cetera, et in



quantitate est finita et terminata, in tempore incepta et cetera. Hoc verum est de substantia simpliciter et absolute per se non existente. Substantia vero per se existens simpliciter et absolute, infinita est sine termino, sine mensura immensa, et absque tempore eterna, et sine aliquo accidente. Substantia habet in accidentibus suis dominium et posse, et quedam substantia in aliis, et una singularis in omnibus, et similiter omnis et cetera.

Corpus est substantia ex punctis, lineis et figuris plena. Corpus animatum est substantia ex potentia sensitiva et vegetativa informata. Animal est substantia animata sentiens.

Animal rationale est substantia⁵³² ex intellectu et voluntate et memoria consistens.

Homo est animal sensuale et intellectuale. Homo est substantia in qua rationalis anima et

⁵³⁰ tanto] aliqua verba add. et del. F

⁵³¹ quod... substantialiter] om. F

⁵³² substantia] animata sentiens add. et del. F

corpus ad invicem coniunguntur. Homo est illa creatura que cum pluribus creaturis participat quam aliqua alia creatura. Substantia, differentia, quid est. Substantia, concordantia, de quo est. Substantia, contrarietas, quare est. Substantia, principium, quanta est. Substantia, medium, qualis est. Substantia, finis, quando est. Substantia, maioritas, ubi est. Substantia, equalitas, quo modo est. Substantia, minoritas, cum quo est. Causa combinationis, ut in pluribus⁵³³. Substantia secunda est genera et species. Substantia prima est individuum, in quo genera et species quietem habent; habet in se hanc individuum formam et materiam et coniunctionem et hanc individuum quantitatem et qualitatem, et⁵³⁴ hanc individuum bonitatem, /F f. 23v/ magnitudinem, durationem, concordantiam⁵³⁵ et cetera; hanc individuum quidditatem, materialitatem et cetera; est in sua quantitate, qualitate et cetera dominans, et ipsa ad operationem deducens. Habet unum et individuum actionem sive potestatem sive dominium in alio. Individuum, differentia numero, specie. Individuum, concordantia. Individuum, contrarietas; et cetera ut supra. / M f.49v/

Notabile per differentiam in unitate

Quia omne ens consistit in suo specifico et proprio esse differens a quocumque alio, idcirco est in se unum numero et singulare sive individuum. Et stat ideo differentia in unitate octo modis, quorum primus est secundum genus, sicut unum. Secundus est quando species sunt eedem in genere, sicut homo et equus, qui sunt idem in animali. Tertius est quando species est una singulariter, sicut humana species, que non est nisi una. Quartus quando individua sunt eadem in specie, sicut duo vel plures homines, qui sunt idem in humana specie. Quintus in individuis speciei, in eo quod quodlibet est

⁵³³ pluribus] predicabilibus M

⁵³⁴ Hanc...et] om. F

⁵³⁵ durationem concordantiam] om. F

unum et idem in se ipso. Sextus est in individuis singularibus, que non habent similia, sicut unus sol, una luna, una fenix⁵³⁶. Septimus est in unitate que non est genus, nec species, nec individuum generis vel speciei, sicut est Deus. Octavus est in tribus individuis que sunt Deus, scilicet Pater, Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus, quorum unum non est reliquum⁵³⁷, et non sunt individua generis nec speciei, nec sunt genus nec species, cui omnis laus, gloria debetur, et reverentia.

Quantitas quid

Quantitas est accidens quo substantia est finita et limitata. Quantitas differentia: simplex, composita. Simplex: unitas, status; composita: continua, discreta. Continua linea, tempus, locus, soliditas et superficies. Sub linea continetur bicubitus, tricubitus et cetera. Sub tempore⁵³⁸ dies, septimana et cetera. Sub loco hic, ibi et cetera. Sub soliditate quadrangulus, triangulus et cetera. Superficies est supra⁵³⁹ triangulus, quadrangulus et plura alia. Discreta, ut numerus et oratio, scilicet quinque et decem et cetera. Oratio ut “homo est animal” et cetera. Cetera omnes dicuntur continue, quia ipsarum partes in aliquo termino communi concordando coniunguntur, ut lineales partes in puncto et cetera. Discreta dicitur, quia ipsius partes differentes sunt absque hoc quod in aliquo termino communi coniunguntur. Ea vero, que hic de continua quantitate dicta sunt intelligantur in sensualibus et cetera largo modo. Quantitas concordantia, quantitas contrarietas et cetera. Ut supra.

Qualitas quid

⁵³⁶ fenix] finis F

⁵³⁷ reliquum] aliud F

⁵³⁸ tempore] ipse F

⁵³⁹ supra] *scr. et corr. in marg.* circa M

Qualitas est accidens quo subiectum iudicatur quale sit. Qualitas differentia: qualitas propria et appropriata. Etiam per differentiam sunt quattuor species qualitatis, que ad duas primas generales reducuntur. Prima species habitus et dispositio. Secunda naturalis potentia et inpotentia. Tertio modo passio et passibilis qualitas. Quarta est forma seu figura. Habitus ut scientia et virtus; dispositio, ut sanitas et egritudo in subiecto sensato et siccitas in ligno et cetera; naturalis potentia, ut ignis ad calefaciendum; naturalis inpotentia, [ut] ignis ad frigificiendum et equus ad volandum et cetera; passibilis qualitas ut dulcedo, amaritudo et cetera, passio ut rubedo propter verecundiam, palledo propter timorem, meritum propter virtutem vel culpa propter vitium et cetera; forma, ut hic sumitur, est figura circa aliquid constans ut curvitas, rectitudo, gibositas, tortuositas, triangulatio, quadrangulatio, circulatio et cetera. Qualitas concordantia, qualitas contrarietas et cetera. Ut supra.

Relatio quid

Relatio est accidens respectivum pluralitatem necessariam indicans. Relatio differentia. Relatio per differentiam diversificatur in equalitate, maioriata, minoritate et non ultra. Et sic habet tres species, quarum prima est secundum equalitatem et dicitur equiparantia, et⁵⁴⁰ est quando aliqua equalia necessario se respiciunt, sicut inter calefactivum caleficabile caleficare, intellectivum intellegibile intelligere^{viii}, fratrem et fratrem, fratrem et sororem, socium et socium et cetera. Secunda est secundum maioriata et dicitur suppositionis, ut creator ad creaturam, socer ad generum, / M f.50r/ pater ad filium vel filiam, magister ad discipulum et cetera. Tertia est secundum minoritate et dicitur suppositionis, ut creatura, filiatio, gravitas, servitus et cetera. Est etiam relatio

⁵⁴⁰ et] quando *add.* F

duplex, scilicet dualis et ternalis: ternalis attenditur inter tres necessario se conspicientes, dualitas inter duos. Verumtamen ternalis est maior et necessarior quam dualis; etiam illa que attenditur inter equalia magis quam illa que existit inter maius et minus. Relatio concordantia. Relatio contrarietas et cetera. Ut supra.⁵⁴¹

Actio quid

Actio est accidens cum quo agens accidentaliter agit in passo accidentaliter. Actio differentia: animati in animatum ut domini in servum, magistri in discipulum et cetera. Animati in inanimatum ut fabri in clavum, ligatoris in libro, scribentis in scripto et cetera; et e contrario, scilicet inanimati in animatum, ut ignis in animal calefactum vel combustum et cetera hiis similia. Tertia est inanimati simpliciter ut ignis in aerem, aer in aquam et cetera, Sol in ignem, Iupiter in aerem, Luna in aquam, Saturnus in terram. Actio concordantia, actio contrarietas et cetera; ut supra.

Passio quid

Passio est accidens cum quo⁵⁴² patiens accidentaliter patitur sub accidentali agente. Differentia est in passione relatione ad actionem et opposito modo. Passio concordantia. Passio contrarietas⁵⁴³. /F f. 24r/

Habitus quid

Habitus est accidens de quo subiectum habituatur. Habitus differentia: habitus intellectualis, sensualis, scientia, virtus, vitium et cetera. Sensuales cerdonia, pelliparia, carpentaria, caliditas in aere, humiditas in aqua et cetera; albedo in nive, nigredo in atramento et cetera hiis similia. Habitus concordantia, contrarietas; ut supra.

Situs quid

⁵⁴¹ ut supra] *om.* F

⁵⁴² quo] *passio add. et del.* F

⁵⁴³ contrarietas] *causam habitus est accidens add. in marg. inf.* F

Situs est accidens quo quedam entia⁵⁴⁴ in aliis situantur. Situs differentia: intellectualis, sensualis et uterque. Intellectualis: voluntas in⁵⁴⁵ memoria et intellectu et e contrario; sensualis: cessio, erectio, statio et acubitus, vel sensualis quia quedam partes sensuales sunt in aliis naturaliter vel artificialiter, uterque ut anima in corpore et e contrario, et ambe in homine et e contrario. Sed⁵⁴⁶ etiam est intrinsecus et extrinsecus. Intrinsecus est naturalis, sicut partes in parte vel partibus seu toto. Extrinsecus est non naturalis, sicut domus in vico, vicus in civitate et similia. Situs concordantia, situs contrarietas et cetera; ut supra.

Tempus quid

Tempus est accidens in quo entia creata sunt incepta et nova. Tempus differentia: instans, successio. Instans: nunc sive presentarius punctus; successio: hora, dies, septimana, mensis et cetera. Et omnia ista transeunt, ut nunc tempus. Tempus⁵⁴⁷ concordantia, tempus contrarietas, et etiam ut supra.

Locus quid

Locus est accidens per quod unum corpus est⁵⁴⁸ collocabile sive collocatum in alio et una pars corporis in alia. Locus differentia: locus proprius, appropriatus. Locus proprius est naturalis inseparabilis a subiecto, ut proprius locus vini. Appropriatus est ille quem habet in amphora et contentum in continente, naturalis pars in parte, pars in toto, / M f.50v/ habitus in habituato et alia similia. Locus concordantia, locus⁵⁴⁹ contrarietas et cetera ut supra.

⁵⁴⁴ entia] etiam F

⁵⁴⁵ in] et F

⁵⁴⁶ sed] *om.* M

⁵⁴⁷ tempus] *om.* M

⁵⁴⁸ unum corpus est] unum est corpus F

⁵⁴⁹ locus] qualitas *add. et del.* F

Sciendum tamen quod non omnis actio, passio, relatio et qualitas sunt accidentia; nec decet, ymmo est incomparabiliter magis necessarium esse actionem, passionem, relationem et cetera⁵⁵⁰ qualitates substantiales quam accidentales, ut patere potest naturali philosopho investiganti et speculanti et etiam morali in quibusdam revelatur. Et sic habetur finis quattuor partium⁵⁵¹.

Sequitur quintum et ultimum logice principium secundum huius operis compendium, quod est argumentatio

Argumentatio est totalis oratio⁵⁵² ex premissis sive⁵⁵³ antecedente et consequente sive conclusione composita, vel est explicatio argumenti ex principio et perficiente fine aggregata. Dico principium premissas vel⁵⁵⁴ antecedens, sed dico finem perficientem conclusionem vel consequens, cum conclusione finis et complemento premissarum, quia in ipsa quiescunt. Vel argumentatio est oratio explicans argumentum. Argumentum autem est oratio de re dubia certitudinem faciens vel est sermonum aggregatio ex quibus sermones alii procedunt, ut “bonitas est ergo aliquid est”. Est autem argumentationis⁵⁵⁵ quoddam genus in ratione tantum cuius per differentiam sunt quattuor species: prima est sillogismus; secunda inductio; tertia entimema; quarta exemplum, de quibus tractabitur dei gratia mediante suo loco.

Quattuor in argumentatione sunt consideranda, scilicet interrogatio, enuntiatio, probatio⁵⁵⁶ et conclusio. Interrogatio dicitur secundum quod sub dubitatione proponitur,

⁵⁵⁰ cetera] *om.* M

⁵⁵¹ quattuor partium] quarti principii M

⁵⁵² oratio] ratio ratio F

⁵⁵³ sive] scilicet F

⁵⁵⁴ vel] animas *add. et del.* F

⁵⁵⁵ argumentatione] argumentatio F

⁵⁵⁶ probatio] propositio M

ut dicendo utrum omne bonum sit differens et cetera. Enuntiatio dicitur secundum quod significat simpliciter aliquid esse vel non esse, ut “bonitas est magna” vel “bonitas non est magna”⁵⁵⁷ et cetera. Probatio dicitur⁵⁵⁸ secundum quod alterius probationem sumitur ut hec, “omnis bonitas est magna”, ad istam, “sensualis bonitas est magna”, et cetera. Sed conclusio dicitur secundum quod ex alia vel aliis probatur seu probata est, sicut hec “virtus est vera”⁵⁵⁹, ex hiis⁵⁶⁰, “omne bonum est verum”, “virtus est bona”, ergo sequitur conclusio prius data, scilicet “virtus est vera”. Unde hec que nunc dicta sunt premittuntur, quia multum ad dicenda valent et inter alia ad fallaciam secundum plures interrogationes.

De probatione

Probatio est argumentum in quo veritas est apparens. Que per differentiam tribus modis fieri potest. Primo demonstrative, et hoc per propositiones simpliciter necessarias, ut “omne bonum est magnum, omne magnum est ens, ergo omne bonum est ens”, et hoc in quacumque specie argumentationis. Secundo, quando fit per aliquam premissarum necessariam et aliam non, ut “omnis carpentarius est mechanicus, quidam homo est carpentarius et cetera”. Similiter, “omnis luxuriosus est peccator, aliquis homo est luxuriosus, ergo et cetera”. Et dicuntur non necessarie quia aliter se possunt habere, ita quod homo non est necessitate coactus quod sit carpentarius, quia potest esse / M f.51r/ in alia arte⁵⁶¹ mechanica vel etiam liberali, nec quod sit luxuriosus quia potest esse castus,

⁵⁵⁷ Magna] *duo verba add. et del.* F

⁵⁵⁸ dicitur] *om.* F

⁵⁵⁹ Vera] *tria verba add. et del.* F

⁵⁶⁰ hiis] *hoc* M

⁵⁶¹ arte] *om.* F

prudens et fortis ; et⁵⁶² sunt propositiones tales necessarie seu contingentes. Sed alia premissa est necessaria quantum ex quo⁵⁶³ carpentarius est, necessarium est quod sit necesse⁵⁶⁴ , et ex quo luxuriosus est, necessarium est quod sit peccator, ita quod aliter non potest esse, stante subiecti constantia; et sic sunt tales propositiones necessarie.

Tertio modo quando fit probatio per propositiones non necessarias sicut per auctoritates, sicut⁵⁶⁵ in iure per textum vel per testes; et talem propositionem possibile est esse veram aut non veram, et quia se potest habere ad utramque partem, dicitur non necessaria. Per primum modum fiunt sillogismi demonstrativi, /F f. 24v/ per secundum mixti, per ultimum vero dialectici sive opinativi⁵⁶⁶.

De demonstratione quid

Demonstratio est alicuius ignoti per aliquid⁵⁶⁷ notum vel alicuius minus noti per aliquid magis notum cognitio, seu intellectui manifestatio. Cuius tres sunt species: prima est per quid, secunda per quia, tertia est per equiparantiam. Demonstratio per quid est, quando effectus demonstratur per causam vel inferius seu posterius⁵⁶⁸ per superius sive prius. Et potest fieri tribus modis. Primus est, cum causa demonstrat simpliciter effectum suum, ut per bonitatem bonum et per magnitudinem magnum et per bonitatem et veritatem bonum et verum, et per animam et corpus hominem et cetera. Per prius, sicut per animal demonstratur hominem esse substantia, quia animal est supra hominem et substantia supra animal et sic de ceteris. De secundo est, cum causa demonstrans effectum suum

⁵⁶² et] ut F

⁵⁶³ quo] *om.* F

⁵⁶⁴ necesse] *om.* M

⁵⁶⁵ sicut] aut M

⁵⁶⁶ opinativi] De demonstratione quid *add. rubr.* M

⁵⁶⁷ alicuius ignoti per] *om.* F

⁵⁶⁸ posterius] *unum verbum add. et del.* F, per *add. in marg.* F

demonstrat ipsum esse⁵⁶⁹ causam alterius effectus, ut bonitas et magnitudo constituentes formam et materiam demonstrant eas esse causam suppositi. Tertius, cum causa demonstrat effectum suum esse effectum alterius cause, ut bonitas demonstrans bonum est effectum magnitudinis, durationis et cetera transcendentium, et hoc in quantum est magnum, durans et cetera. Similiter ignis demonstrans suppositum igneum demonstrat eum esse effectum terre et aliorum elementorum, ut terreum et cetera⁵⁷⁰.

De demonstratione quia

Demonstratio per quia est quando per effectum causa demonstratur, vel etiam quando per inferius seu posterius demonstratur superius vel prius. Et potest⁵⁷¹ fieri tribus modis: primo simpliciter de effectu ad causam, ut “quia bonum est bonitas est”, “quia⁵⁷² calidum est ergo⁵⁷³ caliditas est”, “scientia est ergo intellectus est”, “homo est ergo rationabilis anima et corpus sunt”. Ita quod effectus potest demonstrare suam⁵⁷⁴ causam efficientem⁵⁷⁵, formalem, materialem et etiam finalem. Efficientem, ut “bona operatio est ergo bonificans est”; formalem, “ergo bonitas est”; materialem, “ergo bonificatum est”; finalem, “ergo bonus finis est” et cetera istis similia. Secundo, quando effectus probat causam suam esse effectum alterius cause, ut ymago seu figura vel quecumque res artificiata demonstrans ymaginationes; unde / M f.51v/ educta est esse effectum talis artificis. Tertio, quando effectus demonstrat causam suam esse causam alterius

⁵⁶⁹ esse] rem F

⁵⁷⁰ cetera] De demonstratione quia *add. rubr.* M

⁵⁷¹ potest] posterius F

⁵⁷² quia] *om.* F

⁵⁷³ ergo] *om.* F

⁵⁷⁴ suam] *om.* F

⁵⁷⁵ efficientem] ut bona operatio est ergo bonificans est *add. et del.* F

effectus, ut bonum demonstrans bonitatem suam esse causam magni, et magnum
magnitudinem suam esse causam boni, et alia suo modo.

De demonstratione per equiparantiam

Demonstratio per equiparantiam est quando per aliquid equale notum equale ignotum
demonstratur vel equale minus notus per equale magis notum, et fit tribus modis⁵⁷⁶.

Primo modo, quando potentia demonstratur per potentiam vel actus per actum. Primo
fit⁵⁷⁷ “infinita bonitas est ergo infinita duratio est” et cetera⁵⁷⁸; secundo “infinite
intelligere est ergo infinite amare est” et cetera. Secundo modo, quando per
equalitatem potentiarum probatur equalitas actuum, ut sic “immensa sapientia et
voluntas sunt, ergo infinite scire et infinite amare sunt” et cetera⁵⁷⁹. Tertio modo,
quando per equalitatem actuum demonstratur equalitas dignitatum^{ix} ut sic, “eternum
intelligere et amare sunt, ergo eternus intellectus et amor sunt” et cetera. Per
demonstrationem equiparantie potest etiam demonstrari per actum agens et passum seu
productum, et e contrario, scilicet per agentem passum et actum et per passum actum et
agens ut sic: “ubi est intelligere eternum et infinite sunt intelligens et intellectus eterni
et infiniti; in prima causa est intelligere eternus et infinitus⁵⁸⁰, ergo in prima causa sunt
intelligens et intellectus eterni et infiniti” et sic de ceteris suo modo rationibus. Et hec
demonstratio est potissima quam illa de quid vel quia, et illa de quid quam illa de quia.
Ista enim maxima et propriissime fit in Deo, in quo maius et minus sunt impossibilia. Sed
potest fieri secundum omne suas partes in istis inferioribus, in quolibet⁵⁸¹ suo modo. Et

⁵⁷⁶ tribus modis] tripliciter M

⁵⁷⁷ fit] sic M

⁵⁷⁸ cetera] de *add.* M

⁵⁷⁹ cetera] *unum verbum add. et del.* F

⁵⁸⁰ sunt... infinitus] *om.* F

⁵⁸¹ in quolibet] isto F

istas tres⁵⁸² species demonstrationis debet logicus sillogistice, inductive, entimematice et exemplariter praticare. / F f. 25r/

De sillogismo et principiis ad eum requisitis

Sillogismus est prima et perfectior argumentationis species, cuius prima principia sunt tria⁵⁸³, scilicet medium, maior extremitas et minor extremitas. Medium in sillogismo est ille terminus, per quem maior extremitas et minor coniungitur vel disiungitur in conclusionem, sicut per animal coniungitur homo et substantia, cum concluditur “homo est substantia”. Sed [per] animal disiunguntur homo et lapis, cum concluditur quod “homo non est lapis”. Medium autem debet bis ante conclusionem sumi, silicet semel in maiori premissa et semel in minori, sed non debet conclusionem ingredi. Maior extremitas est ille terminus, qui cum medio primam propositionem constituit, sed minor extremitas est ille terminus qui cum medio secundam propositionem constituit. Ex istis principiis tribus constituuntur tres propositiones in sillogismo, quarum prima dicitur maior, secunda minor, tertia conclusio.

De investigatione medii et ipsius inventionem. Medium differentia

Logicus, considerans⁵⁸⁴ conclusionem demonstrabilem, debet medium cum differentia investigare, distinguendo inter subiectum et predicatum et conditiones eorum. /M f. 52r/ Cum qua est ipsum medium inventibile. Item invenit quod medium est duplex, scilicet reale et intentionale.

Medium concordantia

Logicus debet cum concordantia medium investigare, ita quod, si conclusio est affirmativa, indiget medio utroque extremo concordanti, ut per medium concordans

⁵⁸² tres] *om.* F

⁵⁸³ sunt tria] tria sunt M

⁵⁸⁴ considerans] in *add.* F

maior extremitas et minor in conclusione possint inveniri, unde medium concordativum sive coniunctivum causat propositionem affirmativam.

Medium contrarietas

Logicus investigare debet medium ad conclusionem negativam cum contrarietate; nam, sicut medium concordativum causat conclusionem affirmativam, sic contrariativum medium sive disiunctivum causat negativam conclusionem. Verumtamen semper est necessarium quod sit concordans alteri extremo, aliter impossibile esset aliquam premissarum esse affirmativam; et pro tanto, quando medium est concordans uni extremo et ab altero disparatum, sequitur in premissis altera affirmativa et altera⁵⁸⁵ negativa.

Medium principium

Medium est inventibile sub forma principii quando⁵⁸⁶ aliquando logicus indiget medio habenti se tamquam efficiens aut formale, materiale vel finale, et hoc secundum quattuor causas; et aliquotiens indiget medio quod sit de genere quantitatis, qualitatis et cetera.

Medium finis

Cum fine debet logicus investigare medium [in] quantum medium ex ipsis extremis finis alteri eorum sub aliqua conditione, ut sub ratione perfectionis vel terminationis vel etiam privationis.

Medium maioritas

Cum maioritate debet logicus investigare an ad⁵⁸⁷ conclusionem demonstrabilem conveniat maius medium, scilicet, utrum debeat esse superius ad extremitates vel ad unam et non ad aliam; et indiget tunc medio maiori ad unam et minori ad aliam, vel

⁵⁸⁵ altera] alia M

⁵⁸⁶ quando] quantum M

⁵⁸⁷ ad] om. F

ambabus minori, quando conclusio constat ex superiori et inferiori, vel potest etiam aliquando alteri extremitatum coequari, ut “risibile homini” et cetera suo modo.

Medium equalitas

Medium invenitur cum equalitate; nam quando ita est⁵⁸⁸ quod extrema sunt equalia, ita quod unum non se habet in plus quam aliud, exigitur medium equale eis, et istud medium requiritur in demonstratione per⁵⁸⁹ equiparantiam, et in aliquibus non cogitur quod sit equale simpliciter. Veruntamen⁵⁹⁰ medium semper est equale extremis aut minus secundum proportionem.

Medium minoritas

Cum maioritas et minoritas sint relativa, ideo per inventionem medii secundum maioritatem est minus medium inventibile. Hec tria principia instrumentalia, que sunt maioritas, equalitas et minoritas, sunt necessaria ad tres species demonstrationis supradictas, /M f.52v/quoniam medium in demonstratione quid stat per maioritatem, in quia per minoritatem, in equiparantia per equalitatem. Et debet logicus valde diligenter considerare quantitatem conclusionis et qualitatem figure in qua et modum secundum quem sillogismum formare intendit.

Conditiones sillogismi inter alias sunt tres. Prima quod medium stet equaliter et indistinctive in utraque premissarum. Secunda quod maiori extremitati vel minori nihil sit additum inconvenienter. Tertia quod fiat in debita figura et modo ipsius.

Sillogismus quid

⁵⁸⁸ Est] praeponitur ita F

⁵⁸⁹ per] *om.* F

⁵⁹⁰ veruntamen] verumptum F

Sillogismus est argumentum⁵⁹¹ ex tribus veris et necessariis propositionibus constitutus.

/F f. 25v/ Dicitur sillogismus argumentum, eo quia argumentum est suum genus; argumentum enim potest esse verum vel falsum, sillogismus est⁵⁹² qui semper est verus. Vel sillogismus est duarum propositionum aggregatio, ex quibus per veras demonstrationes vera et necessaria conclusio producitur. Vel sillogismus est argumentatio in qua, premissis positis et concessis, necesse est conclusionem sequi per ea que posita sunt et concessa, ut “omne bonum est durans, quoddam magnum est ens bonum, ergo quoddam magnum est durans”. Sillogismus habet in se tres propositiones, scilicet maiorem, minorem et conclusionem, que sunt eius essentielles partes.

Sillogismus est in anima mentalis conceptus cum tribus propositionibus veritatem indicans, in ore est vocalis ratiocinatio, in scripto scripta et cetera. Est etiam in logica perfectior argumentatio que esse potest, eo quia est ex principio, medio et fine explicitis aggregata. Sillogismus habet in subiecto cui est habitus veram et necessariam indicantiam, propter quam verum et falsum cognoscuntur perfectius quam per aliquam aliam argumentationis speciem. Sillogismus de quo est, vade ad tertiam regulam et suas species^x. Sillogismus quare est, vade ad quartam. Sillogismus quantus est, vade ad quintam. Sillogismus qualis est, vade ad sextam. Sillogismus quando est, vade ad septimam⁵⁹³. Sillogismus ubi est, vade ad octavam.

Sillogismo quo modo sit

In principio logicus debet accipere tres terminos precise equales vel tres, quorum unus sit superior duobus et illi duo similiter sint unus sub alio. Vel etiam potest sumere tres,

⁵⁹¹ argumentum] *om.* F

⁵⁹² est] *om.* M

⁵⁹³ sillogismus...septimam] *om.* F

quorum duo sint equales et tertium sit illis inferior vel superior. Ex hiis patet quod terminus possunt tripliciter sumi. Primo secundum meram equalitatem, ut ens, bonum, magnum et cetera. Secundo modo secundum maioritatem et minoritatem et mediocritatem, ut substantia, anima, homo et cetera. Tertio modo secundum equalitatem et maioritatem et sub hiis minoritatem, ut “risibile homo fortis”, vel “animal sentiens homo” et cetera. Vel etiam possunt sumi secundum equalitatem et minoritatem et super hiis maioritatem, ut homo risibile animal, sentiens animal corpus et cetera. Ex hiis⁵⁹⁴ tribus terminis formande sunt premissae, /M f.53r/ scilicet maior et minus, ex quibus conclusio est inferenda, ita quod maior propositio sit composita ex medio et maiori extremitate, sed minor ex medio iterum sumpto et minori extremitate. Attenta tunc conditione figure et exigentia modi et tunc conclusio infertur, que est de maiori extremitate et minori, stante minori subiectum in conclusione et maiori predicatum. Verbi gratia, volo in prima figura et primo modo concludere per terminos equales, et accipio, gratia verbi vel exempli et doctrine, tres terminos transcendentis, scilicet ens, bonum, magnum. In terminis equalitatis talis est conditio, quod logicus potest facere de quocumque illorum medium, maiorem extremitatem vel minorem in quacumque figurarum et quocumque modo. Sed pro nunc sit medium bonum, maior extremitas magnum, sed minor ens ; et formo sic maiorem: "omne bonum est magnum"⁵⁹⁵; minorem "omne ens est bonum" ; conclusio "ergo omne ens est magnum". De aliis accipio differens, sensuale et lapis in eadem figura et modo dicendo sic: "omne sensuale est differens, omnis lapis est sensualis", "ergo omnis lapis est differens"⁵⁹⁶; et sic de aliis modis sumendi terminos. Unde per doctrinam hic traditam patet logico quos et quales

⁵⁹⁴ hiis] istis M

⁵⁹⁵ est magnum] *tria verba add. et del.* F

⁵⁹⁶ omnis...differens] *om.* F

debeat accipere terminos, quomodo etiam componere sciat premissas, scilicet maiorem, minorem et ex illis conclusionem inferre in quocumque predicamento scilicet substantie, quantitatis, qualitatis et cetera. Et patet quomodo in sillogismo pars est pars in parte, et partes in toto, et e contrario. Et quomodo sillogizando extramittitur sillogismus cum quo est, vade ad quartam regulam.

De multiplicatione extremitatum et mediorum

Verumtamen⁵⁹⁷ ad maiorem diversitatem in⁵⁹⁸ concordantia formandi premissas et conclusionem recordari debet logicus cuiusdam optimi notabilis positi in capitulo propositionis declarate per secundam regulam tertii universalis, ubi datur doctrina diversificandi subiectum et predicatum secundum diversas regulas et⁵⁹⁹ species diversas regularum. Quare dico quod logicus cognoscens universale ad placitum diversificare [potest] medium, maiorem extremitatem et minorem, ad unum finem concordando regulas diversas et regularum species; quem finem dico conclusionem non intentam, sicut per primam speciem secunde regule secundum diffinitum et suam diffinitionem, vel per secundam secundum essentialia, vel per tertiam secundum hoc quod ens est in alio, vel per quartam secundum hoc quod habet in alio. Item, per tertiam regulam et primam eius speciem secundum quodlibet ens est de se, vel per secundam secundum hoc ex quo est ens, vel per tertiam secundum hoc cuius est. Item, secundum quartam regulam et primam eius speciem scilicet secundum causas quibus ens est hoc quod est vel tale quale est, vel per secundam secundum finem ad quem se habet. Item, per sextam regulam et primam speciem eius secundum qualitates /M f.53v/ proprias et actus

⁵⁹⁷ verumtamen] verumptum F

⁵⁹⁸ in] et F

⁵⁹⁹ et] om. F, et regularum species diversas M

proprios, vel per secundam secundum qualitates appropriatas et actus appropriatos; et sic de regulis aliis suo modo, que omnes in istis existunt implicite secundum rectum vel obliquum tractando omnes species predictas. Amplius / F f. 26r/ dico quod logicus potest ponere maiorem extremitatem in una specie alicuius regule et minorem in alia; de medio autem non est sic, nam semper debet stare eodem modo in utraque premissarum. Item dico quod maior vel minor possunt esse de duabus vel pluribus speciebus eiusdem regule vel diversarum ut sic “omnis magnitudo durationis existens ex relativis immensis est primitiva; omnis bonitas habens in se essentielles relativos infinita in potestate et in eadem eterna habens actionem est magnitudo durationis existens ex relativis immensis, ergo omnis bonitas habens in se essentielles relativos infinita in potestate et in eadem eternam habens actionem est primitiva”. Iste sillogismus formatus est per secundam et tertiam regulam, vide partem quo modo.

De novem generalibus subiectis

Sciendum est quod omne quod est generaliter circa aliquid istorum novem subiectorum versatur: quorum primum est Deus, secundum est angelus, tertium est celum, quartum est homo, quintum est irrationabile, sextum vegetabile, septimum elementatum, octavum elementa, nonum artificium. Per primum omnium rerum causa prima designatur, per secundum substantia separata benigna et maligna, tertium de se ipsum et quartum similiter, per quintum bruta animalia tam volatilia quam terrestria etiam aquea, per sextum significantur plante, arbores et similia, per septimum metalla, lapides et cetera, per octavum elementale chaos⁶⁰⁰ et quattuor elementa, per nonum moralitates, artes liberales et mecanice et cetera. Unde sciendum quod omnis argumentatio stat in

⁶⁰⁰ lapides...chaos] *om.* F

triplici⁶⁰¹ differentia, quia vel est de universalibus simpliciter, vel de universalibus et subiectis, vel de subiectis tantum.

De tribus figuris sillogismorum

Figura, pro ut hic sumitur, est debita terminorum in premissis ordinatio in subicendo vel predicando; que sunt tres, scilicet prima, secunda, tertia; et quelibet variatur per suos modos. Modus est debita propositionum ordinatio in quantitate et qualitate.

De conditionibus generalibus

Quinque sunt conditiones generales ad figuras sillogismorum. Prima, quia in omni sillogismo aliqua premissarum sit universalis. Secunda, quia in omni sillogismo aliqua premissarum sit affirmativa. Tertia, quia si aliqua premissarum sit particularis et conclusio; sed non sequitur e contrario. Quarta, quod conclusione existente negativa aliqua premissarum sit negativa. Quinta, quod medium non ponitur in conclusione.

De prima figura

Prima figura est in qua quod est subiectum in premissa maiori est predicatum in minori, ut "omne bonum est amabile, Deus est bonus, ergo et cetera". Quattuor sunt modi secundum quos per hanc figuram /M f.54r/ sillogizatur. Sed suppono A esse universalem affirmativam, E negativam, I particularem affirmativam, O negativam; deinde dico sic, quod primus modus constat ex premissis A concludentibus A: "omne ens cuius virtus distat in eternitate ab octiositate habet ex natura sua actum infinitum eternum, sed omnis

⁶⁰¹ triplici] causa *add. et del.* F

substantia simplicissima est ens cuius virtus⁶⁰² distat in eternitate ab octiositate, ergo omnis substantia simplicissima habet ex natura sua actum infinitum et eternum". Secundus constat ex maiori premissa E, minori A, concludentibus E, ut sic "nulla substantia habens in se finitas proprietates est eterna in sua entitate, omnis separatus spiritus est substantia habens in se finitas proprietates, ergo nullus separatus spiritus est eternus in sua entitate". Tertius constat ex maiori A, minori I, concludentibus I, ut sic "omne compositus ex partibus est finitum in quantitate et tempore novum, primum mobile est compositum ex partibus, ergo primum mobile est finitum et quantitate et tempore novum". Quartus constat ex maiori E et minori I, concludentibus O ut sic, "nullum animal sentiens est substantia separata, quoddam intellegibile est animal sentiens, ergo quoddam intellegibile est substantia separata". Conditiones prime figure sunt tres: prima, quod in ipsa concluditur omne genus propositionis, scilicet universalis affirmativa et negativa et particularis affirmativa et negativa; secunda, quod medium sit subiectum in maiori et in minori predicatum, tertia, quod in eadem figura semper proceditur ex maiori universalis et minori affirmativa, ut per se et in se patet.

De secunda figura

Secunda figura est in qua id quod est predicatum in premissa maiori est etiam in minori, ut sic: "nullum intellectuale est sensibile, omne coloratum est sensibile, ergo et cetera". Huius figure sunt modi quattuor: primus constat ex maiori E et minori A concludentibus E, ut sic: "nullum inanimatum est sensatum, omnis leo est sensatus, ergo nullus leo est inanimatus". Secundus constat ex maiori A et minori E concludentibus E, ut sic: "omne vegetabile est digestibile, nulla stella est digestibilis, ergo nulla stella est vegetabilis".

⁶⁰² octiositate ... virtus] *add. in marg. alia manu* F

Tertius constat ex maiori E et minori I concludentibus O: "nullum in alienam speciem digestibile est metallum, quoddam ex quattuor elementis⁶⁰³ compositum est metallum, ergo quoddam ex quattuor elementis⁶⁰⁴ compositum non est digestibile". Quartus constat ex maiori A, minori O concludentibus O⁶⁰⁵, ut sic: "omne incorruptibile est in concordantia sine contrarietate, quoddam habens qualitates contrarias non est in concordantia sine contrarietate⁶⁰⁶, ergo quoddam⁶⁰⁷ habens qualitates contrarias non est incorruptibile". Conditiones huius figure sunt tres: prima, quod medium in utraque premissarum sit predicatum. Secunda, quod /F f. 26v/ maior sit universalis. Tertia, quod in eadem figura proceditur ex una affirmativa et alia negativa. / M f.54v/ Item quod affirmativa naturaliter non concluditur in eadem.

De tertia figura

Tertia figura est in qua id quod est subiectum in premissa maiori est subiectum in minori, ut sic "omne rationale mortale est intellectuale sensuale, omne rationale mortale est homo, ergo et cetera". Huius figure modi sunt sex: primus constat ex maiori et minori A concludentibus I, ut "omne lineatum est quantum, omne lineatum est corporale, ergo quoddam corporale est quantum". Secundus constat ex maiori E, minori A, concludentibus O, ut sic "nulla albedo est quantitas, omnis albedo est color, ergo quidam color non est quantitas". Tertius constat ex maiori I et minori A concludentibus I, ut sic: "quedam intellectualitas est sapientia, omnis intellectualitas est insensibilis, ergo

⁶⁰³ elementis] est metallum ergo quoddam metallum *add. in marg. inf.* F

⁶⁰⁴ metallum... elementis] *add. in marg. inf.* F

⁶⁰⁵ O] E F

⁶⁰⁶ contrarietate] quoddam habens qualitatem contrarias non est in concordantia sine contrarietate *add. in marg.* F

⁶⁰⁷ quoddam] omne F

quoddam insensibile est sapientia". Quartus constat ex maiori A minori I concludentibus I, ut sic: "omnis scientia acquisita est habitus intellectus, quedam scientia acquisita est theologia, ergo quedam theologia est habitus intellectus". Quintus constat ex maiori O et minori A concludentibus O, ut⁶⁰⁸ sic: "quoddam ens existens extra tempus potens in tempore non est mobile, omne ens existens extra tempus potens in tempore est immensum in bonitate, ergo quoddam immensum in bonitate non est mobile". Sextum constat ex maiori E et minori I concludentibus O: "nullum principium est maius in virtute illo quod est essenziale suo fini, quoddam principium est principians extra tempus in eternitate, ergo quoddam principians extra tempus in eternitate non est maius in virtute illo quod est essenziale suo fini". Conditiones huius figure sunt tres: prima, quod medium sit subiectum in utraque premissarum. Secunda quod semper minor sit affirmativa. Tertia, quod in eadem figura semper concluditur particularis, ut per se patet.

De inductione, que est secunda species argumentationis

Inductio est argumentatio inferioribus in qua proceditur sufficienter numeratis ad illarum immediatam universalem, ut sic "divina bonitas est infinita, divina eternitas est infinita et cetera, ergo omnes divine dignitates^{xi} sunt infinite". Ponitur sufficienter numeratis quia requiritur quod omnibus inferioribus conveniat illud quod in consequente intenditur concludi, quia si alicui inferiori non conveniret, falsum esset consequens illatum, cuius falsitas ex antecedente falso sequeretur, ut si vellet probari quod dominus Iesus est resurgendus et diceretur sic "Petrus est resurgendus, Guillelmus est resurgendus, Iohannes est resurgendus, et cetera sunt resurgendi, ergo omnis homo est resurgendus, ergo dominus Iesus", inferior in inductione non sufficienter numerata, [in]

⁶⁰⁸ ut] *scr. et del.* F

quantum quando dicitur “Petrus est resurgendus” verum, “Guillelmus⁶⁰⁹ est resurgendus” verum, “Iohannes⁶¹⁰ et cetera⁶¹¹ sunt resurgendi” falsum, quia non omnes ceteri, ut patet de domino Iesu Christo⁶¹² qui resuscitatus vivit et in eternum vivet. Sed si diceretur “Guada⁶¹³ pariens filium est violata, Martina filium pariens⁶¹⁴ est violata, similiter Berengaria et Sancia et cetera, ergo omnis /M f.55r/ mater pariens filium est violata”, quod est impossibile⁶¹⁵ et falsum, cuius falsitas oritur ex falsitate lata in antecedente per insufficientem numerationem, et sic de aliis suo modo et cetera. Ponitur immediata, quia si non argueretur ad universalem immediatam non esset inductio seu inductiva argumentatio, ut sic “Sortes est rationalis, Plato est rationalis, et cetera humane speciei, ergo omne animal est rationale”, non verum propter defectum conditionis predictae.

Inductio per differentiam potest fieri tribus modis. Primo, procedendo a singularibus ad suam universalem, ut sic “Sortes est obligatus legi evangelice, Homerus est obligatus legi evangelice⁶¹⁶, Moyses et cetera, ergo omnis homo est obligatus legi evangelice”.

Secundo, quando proceditur ab indefinitis vel singularibus particularibus ad universalem, ut sic “homo aliquo tempore fuit in archa Noe, capra, gallina et cetera, ergo omne animal aliquo tempore fuit in archa Noe⁶¹⁷”. Tertio, procedendo ab universalibus inferioribus ad universalem superiorem, ut sic: “omnis homo est per naturam bonus, omnis leo est per naturam bonus, omnis camellus et cetera, ergo omne animal est per

⁶⁰⁹ [Iohannes... Guillelmus] *om.* F

⁶¹⁰ [Iohannes] *om.* F

⁶¹¹ [cetera] ego dominus Iesu *add. et del.* F

⁶¹² [Christo] *om.* M

⁶¹³ [Guada] Bnda M

⁶¹⁴ [filium pariens] pariens filium M

⁶¹⁵ [est impossibile] impossibile est M

⁶¹⁶ [evangelice] *de add. in marg.* F

⁶¹⁷ [capra... Noe] *om.* F

natura bonum". Et sit inductio propter magnam concordantiam⁶¹⁸ existentem inter antecedens et consequens. Prima et tertia species sunt propria, secunda largo modo sumpta. Et posset inductio reduci ad sillogismum perfectum si necessarium esset, quod dimitto causa brevitatis et quia etiam non cogit ars logice.

De tertia specie argumentationis scilicet entimemate

Entimema est argumentatio in qua premissa maiori vel minori non explicita infertur immediate conclusio, vel est argumentatio in qua proceditur ab aliqua premissarum ad earum conclusionem. Id est quando non omnibus ante positis conclusio infertur festinata, /F f. 27r/ ut sic: "omne bonum est amabile, ergo magnitudo veritatis est amabilis". Dicitur non explicita maiori vel minori premissa, quia si explicaretur non esset entimema⁶¹⁹ sed potius perfectus sillogismus, de quo superius dictum est; sicut patet in entimemate predicto in quo implicite stat hec minor "magnitudo veritatis est ens bonum", et per istam esset sillogismus perfectus in tertio modo prime figure. Entimema potest generaliter tribus modis fieri. Primus est secundum processum prime figure, secundus per secundam, tertius per tertiam et hoc implicite. Sed particulariter potest fieri tot modis quot quilibet figura est variabilis, scilicet quattuor per primam et quattuor per secundam et per tertiam sex modis. Et in quolibet istorum potest duobus modis variari secundum quod in quolibet due sunt premissae, quarum quilibet potest esse antecens ad conclusionem festinam. Per primum prime, sic: "omne magnum in bonitate durat in potestate"; hic stat implicite hoc minor, scilicet "omne amabile in virtute est magnum in bonitate", que potest esse antecens ad /M f.55v/ eandem conclusionem, per quam

⁶¹⁸ concordantia] sumpta *add.* M

⁶¹⁹ entimema] praedicto *add. et del.* F

etiam perficitur sillogismus. Per primum secunde, sic: "nullum malum culpe est virtuosum, ergo nulla iusta punitio est malum culpe", hic stat implicite hoc minor, scilicet "omnis iusta punitio est virtuosa" que perficit sillogismum que est antecedens ad conclusionem predictam cum alterius subsidio, sicut e contrario. Per primum tertie, sic "omne verum habens virtutem in magnitudine distat a vitio et⁶²⁰ pravitate, ergo quoddam habens concordantiam distinctorum in equalitate distat a vitio et pravitate"; hic stat implicite hec minor, scilicet "omne verum habens virtutem in magnitudine habet concordantiam distinctorum in equalitate"; qua si ponatur perfectum constituit sillogismum. Per quintum eiusdem tertie figure, sic: "quedam contrarietas non est desiderabilis a voluntate iusta in maioritate, ergo quedam aliquarum repugnantia non est desiderabilis a voluntate iusta in maioritate", hic implicite stat hec minor, scilicet "omnis contrarietas est aliquorum repugnantia" que si adderetur perfectionis finem sillogismo preberet. Et per⁶²¹ exempla tradita in quattuor modis predictis potest diligens logicus formare entimemata et ea deducere ad perfectum sillogismum.

De exemplo quod est quarta specie argumentationis

Exemplum est argumentatio in qua ab uno particulari ad aliud proceditur per aliquid similitudine in eis repertum, ut "ianuenses contra pisanos pugnare malum est, ergo venetos contra napoletanos pugnare malum est". Similitudine repertum est "proximos contra proximos seu affines contra affines pugnare", quod quodlibet est malum. Et ista argumentatio fit per magnam similitudinem existentem inter unum et aliud. Similitudine repertum inter talia particularia est quoddam principium ex quo particulare sequi potest,

⁶²⁰ et] in F

⁶²¹ per] om. F

ut in exemplo predicto est hoc principium, scilicet proximos contra proximos pugnare est malum, ex quo sequitur quod ianuenses contra pisanos pugnare est malum, eo quia est proximos contra proximos pugnare, quod est malum. Et ideo, quando arguitur ab uno particulari ad aliud, oportet quod fiat per similitudinem in ipsis repertum quod simile est commune principium habens in se illa particularia; nam si non esset tale principium in illis particularibus, non esset exemplaris argumentatio, eo quia non fieret progressio per similitudinem, quod exigitur. Et sic patet quo modo exemplum potest reduci ad entimema faciliter et ab entimemate facilius ad sillogismum, ut exemplificatur per hoc exemplum: "homo est sensibilis, ergo leo est sensibilis", tenet argumentatio per similitudinem in eis repertum scilicet per animal. Et illud exemplum entimematur sic "omne animal est sensibile, ergo homo est sensibilis" deinde perficitur sic: "omne animal est /M f.56r/ sensibile, homo est animal, ergo homo est sensibilis" et sic de ceteris. Sed si dicatur sic "homo est sensibilis, ergo lapis est sensibilis", argumentatio non procedit, eo quia non fit per similitudinem in eis repertum, quoniam principium quo homo est sensibilis, scilicet animal, non reperitur in lapide. Unde hec argumentatio fit per differentiam quam habent particularia inter se, et per concordantiam quam habent in principio eis communi, in quo sibi invicem assimilantur. Predictum exemplum et sibi similia possunt bene reduci ad modum communem. Huius antecedentis argumentationis due sunt species, scilicet a simili et proportionem. /F f.27v/

De locis

Multi sunt loci secundum quos veritates argumentationis ratiocinari possent, qui omnes etiam si plures essent in regulis atque in modis⁶²² et instrumentalibus principiis implicantur, et faciliter inveniuntur tamquam in universalibus suis. In hoc tractatu vero solum tres explicare intendo, quia a tribus principiis instrumentalibus causantur, qui sunt locus a maiori, ab equali et a minori.

De loco a maiori

Locus a maiori est progressus a maiori ad minus sub aliqua determinata operatione, ut sic "Deus potest habere actum in bonitate infinita et eterna, ergo Deus potest habere actum in bonitate finita et terminata et nova"; est autem maius id in quo maior bonitas, magnitudo, duratio, potestas, sapientia, voluntas, virtus, veritas, gloria et cetera. In hoc loco de maiori utitur maxime hoc principio potestas, sicut "rex potest habere mille milites, ergo potest habere centum", "Deus potest mundum de nihilo producere, ergo potest eum in esse conservare". "Divina potestas potest accidens creare, ergo potest ei sustentationem in se ipso sine subiecto dare". "Dominus Iesu filius Dei potest habere patrem sine matre in celis, ergo potest habere matrem sine patre in terris". "Dominus Iesu potuit transire per corpus Virginis sine corporis lesione, ergo potuit intrare aulam ubi erant apostuli sine ianuarum fractione et cetera". Negative sic "rex non potest castrum expugnare, ergo nec miles", "ignis per naturam non potest totam aquam destruere, ergo nec medicus per artificium potest omnem egritudinem sanare", "Deus non vult⁶²³ malum, ergo nullus homo debet velle malum" et cetera. Huius loci conditio est quod maius et minus concordent in hoc in quo comparantur, et propter hoc non valet

⁶²² inmodis et] atque M

⁶²³ vult] non *scr. et del.* F

"angelus non potest generare angelum, ergo nec homo hominem": ratio est, quia angelus et homo non concordant in generatione.

De loco ab equali

Locus ab equali est progressus unius equalis ad sibi equale, ut sic "Deus est equaliter⁶²⁴ bonus et verus, ergo in ipso bonitas et veritas sunt equales". "Deus est equaliter intelligibilis et amabilis ab angelo, ergo angelus potest equaliter intelligere et amare deum". "Angelus equaliter intelligit et diligit Deum, ergo intellectus et voluntas in angelo sunt equales". /M f.56v/ "Agere et pati in supposito sunt equalia, ergo actio et passio coequantur", "actio et passio coequantur, ergo forma et materia coequantur". "Tantum patitur materia quantum forma agit, ergo suppositum est ex eis equaliter constitutum". "Tantum distat a malicia per bonitatem quantum a falsitate per veritatem, ergo tanta est in ente bonitas quanta falsitati⁶²⁵ veritas". "Ubi tanta est bonitas quanta sapientia tantum bonificare quantum scire" et cetera. Et similiter procedit iste locus negative, ut videri potest in se. Et similiter potest intelligi de equalitate proportionis, ut sic in pipere caliditas qui est in quarto gradu, siccitas in tertio, humiditas in secundo, frigiditas in primo, et per consequens calefacere in quarto gradu, desiccare in tertio, humidificare in secundo et frigidare in primo. Et consequenter, bonitas ignis in quarto⁶²⁶, bonitas terre in tertio et cetera; et per consequens bonificare ignis in quarto, bonificare terre in tertio et cetera⁶²⁷. Ita quod potest fieri processus a qualitate ad qualitatem et de

⁶²⁴ equaliter] *tria verba add. et del.* F

⁶²⁵ falsitati] *om.* F

⁶²⁶ et...quarto] *om.* F

⁶²⁷ et cetera] *om.* F

qualitate ad actum et de actu ad actum et de primis principiis inter se ad suos actus, ut dictum est sequendo species demonstrationis. Conditio huius loci est quod equalia in hoc concordent in quo equaliter comparantur, id est quod uterque conveniant.

De loco a minori

Locus a minori est progressus minoris ad maius, ut sic: "ens finitum potest agere bonum finitum, ergo ens infinitum potest agere bonum infinitum". Dicitur minus in quo minor bonitas et cetera, per oppositum ad maius. Et proceditur sic "bonum inceptum producit bonum in sua specie temporaliter, ergo bonum eternum producit bonum in sua essentia eternaliter". "Ex bono novo bonum novum, ergo ex eterno bono eternum bonum". "Si creatura agit per suam naturam, ergo Deus per suam". "Si creatura producit ex se bonum quantum, quia est quanta, ergo Deus producit ex se bonum inmensum, quia est immensus". "Si creatura producens ex sua natura non diversificatur in specie a bono in sua natura et ex sua natura producto, ergo Deus producens ex sua natura non diversificatur in essentia a bono in sua natura et ex sua natura producto". "Si bonum inceptum, finitum et mensuratum⁶²⁸ amat de sua bonitate finita incepta et mensurata producere bonum finitum et mensuratum ut de illa non sit octiosum, quanto plus incomparabiliter bonum infinitum eternum atque immensum diligit de sua bonitate et in sua bonitate infinita et eterna atque inmensa producere bonum infinitum et eternum atque inmensum ut de illa et in illa infinitate et eternitate atque inmensitate octiosum non existat". "Si natura per suam finitam et novam potestatem potest vinum et panem in carnem et sanguinem animalis successive trasmutare, multo plus deus per suam

⁶²⁸ mensuratum] appetit de sua bonitate [et in sua bonitate est *add. supra*] finita et mensurata producere bonum finitum et mensuratum *add. in marg.* F

infinitam sapientiam, potestatem immensam et voluntatem potest substantiam panis et vini in carnem et sanguinem corporis /F f. 28r/ domini nostri Iesu Christi instanti transmutare". Argumentatio tenet per locum de minori ad maiorem. /M f.57r/ "Si anima est ut recolat, intelligat et diligat entia sensuality, multo plus propter intellectualia; et si est ut cognoscat, amet et memoretur entia minora in bonitate virtute et cetera, melius propter maiora in bonitate virtute et cetera". "Si aer calefacit aquam, ignis calefacit aerem". Si ignis habet actum calefaciendi in alio, multo plus in se". "Si iudex potest hominem iudicare, et princeps". Huius loci conditio est quod minor et maior concordent in hoc, in quo argumentatione de uno ad aliud proceditur, scilicet hoc in quo comparantur. Et propter hoc non sequitur "aquila potest volare, ergo homo", cum sit potestate maioris; argumentatio non procedit per defectum conditionis predicte.

Hii tres loci predicti possunt dupliciter ratiocinari: primo, quando fit comparatio de subiecto ad subiectum, ut de maiori ad minus, vel de minori ad maius, vel de equali ad equale. Secundo, quando subiecti proprietas comparatur ad aliam, vel una ad diversos actus. De primo sic: "rex non potest habere equum, ergo nec miles potest"; de equali sic: "Sortes est rationalis, ergo Plato". De minori sic: "miles potest vincere hostes, ergo rex⁶²⁹ potest". De secundo sic: "rex potest⁶³⁰ habere centum milites, ergo potest habere decem". De equali: "divina bonitas est immensa, ergo eius virtus est immensa". De minori "homo non potest destruere decem hostes, ergo nec centum". Et sic patet quo modo per ipsos potest artista procedere affirmative et negative diversimode⁶³¹, ut clare videri potest inquirenti per supradicta exempla.⁶³²

⁶²⁹ rex] *om.* F

⁶³⁰ De...potest] *om.* F

⁶³¹ diversimode] diversificando F

⁶³² exempla] *om.* F

De antecedente et consequente

Antecedens est illud quod ponit in necessitate id quod post ipsum sequitur. Consequens est id quod necessitatem ante se ostendit. In rerum natura existunt reale et naturale antecedens et per consequens reale et naturale consequens, in quibus realiter et naturaliter realis et naturalis consequentia existit, que extra logicam et suam mentalem considerationem habet esse. Et hoc patet investiganti principium, medium et finem in rebus naturalibus; sed in hoc presenti opere logicaliter eam definire decet. Ideo dico quod consequentia est quedam antecedentis et consequentis rationalis aggregatio, in qua denotatur antecedentis prioritas et consequentis posterioritas, ut⁶³³ “bonitas est, ergo bonum est”. Dico prioritatem ratione principii efficientis, formalis, materialis et finalis. Cuius regule possunt esse plures; hic vero sufficiunt tredecim que questiones et regule poterint applicari regulantes, ad terminum veritatis et falsitatis ostendendum. Quare prima sit hoc, ex maiori antecedente maius consequens et e contrario. Secunda, omne appropriatus est consequens propri et e contrario. Tertia, omnis causa est antecedens causati et e contrario. Quarta, omne diffinitum est antecedens diffinitionis et e contrario. Quinta, omnis finis est antecedens differentie et e contrario. Sexta, omnis pluralitas est antecedens differentie et e contrario. Septima, ex nulla libertate sequitur consequentia coacta. Octava, ex maiori veritate maior affirmatio et ex maiori falsitate maior negatio. Nona, omnis negatio est consequentia /M f.57v/ affirmationis et nulla affirmatio est consequentia negationis. Decima, omnis consequentia, cuius antecedens cum opposito contradictorio consequenti in veritate non concordat, est bona et vera argumentatio. Undecima, omnis affirmatio predestinationis, facta sine affirmatione iustitie, producit

⁶³³ ut] bonum est *add. et del.* F

falsam negationem contra libertatem. Duodecima, omnis affirmatio iustitie, facta sine affirmatione sapientie, producit falsam negativam contra libertatem. Tertia decima⁶³⁴, omne consequens consequentis est consequens antecedentis per medium continuum procedendo et e contrario.

Prime partis huius regule sit istud exemplum tamquam eius explanatio: "Petrus est, sequitur homo est", ad hominem rationalem et sic animal ad animale corpus animatum, deinde corpus et sic substantia, deinde forma et materia, et ultimo bonitas et magnitudo, differentia, concordantia et cetera, ultra quas nihil est. Quorum quodlibet habet proprietatem formalem et materialem, ex quibus sunt forma et materia que sunt principia essendi in creatis; et sic patet quomodo potest ad universale sumptum inter quid et nihil, medium nullum habet esse et sic sequitur "Sortes est, igitur stat per necessariam consequentiam, ergo bonitas magnitudo differentia concordantia et cetera sunt". Hec argumentatio procedit ab effectu ad causam seu a posteriori ad prius, et sic potest faciliter videri. De secunda parte huius regule dixi per medium continuum procedendo, nam quando discontinuatur non sequitur naturam regule, ut sic: "Sortes est homo, homo est animal, animal est genus, ergo Sortes est genus"⁶³⁵, non valet quoniam proceditur per medium discontinuatum sive a recta linea⁶³⁶ deviatum. Dictum est in aliquibus regularum et e contrario dat intelligere quod id, quod est antecedenti consequens per unum modum, potest per alium esse eius antecedens. Unde iste regule sunt multum in natura et realitate fundate et in ipsis magna sententia existit, ignorantibus et rudibus nec non presuntuosis latita, sanis autem intellectibus, veris atque bonis clarissime se⁶³⁷

⁶³⁴ tertia decima] terdecima M

⁶³⁵ ergo...genus] om. F

⁶³⁶ linea] add. in marg. M

⁶³⁷ se] seu F

demonstrans, ratione plantacionis quam supra vera et necessaria principia habent; sicut regula decima que fundatur super differentiam, concordantiam et contrarietatem cum aliis principiis instrumentalibus, extra que nihil entis seu rationis existere potest. Unde advertendum est quod omnis consequentia fundata est super aliquam speciem demonstrationis et, si necessarium fuerit, ad perfectum sillogismum reducenda, quoniam consequentie fere omnes sunt entimematice. Notandum autem est quod id quod in re est antecedens, in ratione nostra possumus facere antecedens et e contrario. Et huiusmodi ratio est, quia effectus per causam et causa per effectum mutuo se demonstrant; et hoc idem facere possumus in equalibus. Et hoc secundum propositum de quo tractatur, exigentia de qualibet regularum possit / F f. 28v/ faciliter exemplum preberi, quod obmitto ut vitetur prolixitas.

De paralogismis

Paralogismus est argumentatio indicans esse verum quod falsum est et e contrario^{xii}. Et dicitur paralogismus quasi apparens sillogismus, licet /M f.58r/ in rei veritate non sit, ut supra diffinitio sillogismi patet. Diversitas medii sive deviatio vel variatio est genus paralogismorum sive fallaciarum, concurrente aliqua concordantia, que sit causa apparentie paralogismi. Et hoc genus quod est medii diversitas habet duas species, scilicet in dictione et extra dictionem.

Diversitas medii in dictione⁶³⁸ sex modis generaliter fit, secundum quod fallacie in dictione sunt sex. Prima est equivocatio. Secunda amphibolia. Tertia compositio. Quarta divisio. Quinta accentus. Sexta figura dictionis. Quelibet autem istarum habet suos⁶³⁹

⁶³⁸ dictione] sunt XIX *add. et del.* F

⁶³⁹ suos] sex F

proprius modos. Et dicuntur in dictione, eo quia in dictione et per dictionem fit sophisticatio sive deceptio. Diversitas medii extra dictionem fit septem modis generaliter, secundum quod fallacie extra dictionem sunt septem: quarum prima est accidens. Secunda [secundum] quid et simpliciter. Tertia ignorantia elenchi. Quarta petitio principii. Quinta consequens. Sexta non causa ut causa. Septima plures⁶⁴⁰ interrogationes ut una, habente quelibet earum suos proprios modos. Et dicuntur extra dictionem, quia secundum eas fit paralogismus de sophisticis propositionibus; et sic sunt tredecim in numero in communi.

De fallaciis equivocationis

Fallacia equivocationis est deceptio proveniens ex eo, quod aliqua dictio⁶⁴¹ plura diversimode significat. Et habet tres modos secundum quos tripliciter potest fieri sophisticatio per hanc fallaciam. Primus est, quando aliqua dictio significat equaliter plura diversimode, sicut hec dictio 'canis' significat animal latrabile vivens in terra. Et formatur per istum modum paralogismus sic "omnis canis convenit latrabilitas, ergo pisci et stelle convenit latrabilitas". Maior potest simpliciter negari vel per differentiam distingui, peccat autem per diversitatem medii, quoniam in una propositione sumitur medium pro uno suorum significatorum, sed in altera pro alio. Secundus modus provenit ex eo quod dictio secundum prius et posterius diversa significat ut sic: "omne ridens habet os⁶⁴², quoddam pratum ridens, ergo quoddam pratum habet os", peccat per diversitatem medii, nam hoc verbum rideo de primario significato significat illum actum, qui inest homini ratione huius proprietatis que est risibilitas. Sed per posterius

⁶⁴⁰ plures] om. F

⁶⁴¹ dictio] dictus (dictionis ?) M

⁶⁴² os] ors M

sive per quandam transumptionem significat prati sive campi floritionem; ideo in una stat medium pro significato priori et in alia stat pro posteriori et hoc est medii diversitas et cetera. Tertius modus provenit ex diversa consignificatione dictionis, que attenditur secundum diversa accidentia, ut secundum tempus diversum et locum et cetera, ut sic: "quecumque surgebat stat, sedens surgebat, ergo et cetera", peccat per diversitatem medii diversificati in diversitate temporis presentis et preteriti imperfecti, respiciente medio, presens in una, in alia preteritum imperfectum. Similiter "quicumque sanabatur sanus est, ergo et cetera". Si artista bene speculetur, cum instrumentalibus principiis videre poterit clare ubi fundantur isti paralogismi et /M f. 58v/ ceteri aliarum fallaciarum, et ubi sumitur illarum sophisticatio. Et ideo coram naturali non poterit stare sophista, cum intellectus naturalis sit fixus in celo et in terra, id est in principiis immobilibus et necessariis atque naturalibus et extra naturam consideratis.

De fallacia amphibolie

Fallacia amphibolie est deceptio proveniens ex eo, quod eadem oratio una penitus plura significat, sicut enim equivocatio provenit ex eo quod⁶⁴³ eadem dictio penitus plura significat. Ita amphibolia provenit ex eo quod oratio eadem plura significat. Habet fallacia hec⁶⁴⁴ tres modos: quorum primus provenit ex eo quod eadem oratio plura significat, manente eadem constructione propter diversorum habitudinem constructorum, ut sic: "quidquid est Aristotelis⁶⁴⁵ possidetur ab Aristotele, quidam liber est Aristotelis ergo et cetera", peccat per diversitatem medii; nam hec oratio "liber Aristotelis" plura significat propter diversam habitudinem, potest enim habere respectum ut effectus ad

⁶⁴³ quod] oratio *add. et del.* M

⁶⁴⁴ fallacia hec] hec fallacia M

⁶⁴⁵ Aristotelis] Aristotilis M

causam efficientem, vel possessi ad possidentem, manente in eadem constructione, et sic causatur deceptio per diversitatem medii in diversitatem habitudinum. Talis vero deceptio cognoscitur in tertia specie tertie regule et in speciebus principii, scilicet⁶⁴⁶ efficientis et cetera, /F f. 29r/ quia in una premissarum respicit ille genitivus Aristotelis, ut effectus efficientem, in alia vero ut possessum possidentem, et diversificatur medium. Secundus modus provenit ex eo quod aliqua oratio aliud⁶⁴⁷ primarie aliud⁶⁴⁸ vero transumptive significat, sicut hec oratio “litus aratur terra scinditur”⁶⁴⁹ principaliter significat litoris sectionem, secundarie seu transumptive significat operis amissionem; et paralogizantur sic, “quandocumque litus aratur terra scinditur, sed quando indocilis docetur litus aratur ergo et cetera”, peccat per diversitatem medii; nam in prima stat pro proprio seu primario significato, secunda pro secundario seu transumptive et sic fit deceptio, qua manifestat sexta regula, que est de qualitate cum suis speciebus. Tertius modus provenit ex eo quod eadem oratio diversa significat propter diversam partium constructionem, nam una et eadem dictio potest construi transitive vel intransitive, sic dicendo “hoc pomum comedit animal” et similia. Similiter “hoc animal videt plumbum” et cetera. Et formatur sic paralogismus: “quicquid comedit animal hoc comedit”⁶⁵⁰, pomum comedit animal ergo et cetera”. Similiter “quidquid scit aliquis hoc scit”⁶⁵¹, pomerium scit aliquis, ergo et cetera” peccat per diversitatem medii et hoc in situ. Nam hec dictio “hoc” potest situari in †⁶⁵² vel in activo in maiori et sic est diversitas medii implicite. Similiter, “quoscumque volo inde convertere volo quod ipsi convertant inde”

⁶⁴⁶ scilicet] *om.* F

⁶⁴⁷ aliud] aliquid M

⁶⁴⁸ aliud] aliquid M

⁶⁴⁹ terra scinditur] *om.* M

⁶⁵⁰ comedit] animal comedit *add.* F

⁶⁵¹ hoc scit] *om.* F

⁶⁵² †] ultimo F, necessario M

et cetera; hec oratio duplex est: in sensu nam hec dictio “inde” potest poni in activo transitive vel intransitive. Hec fallacia magnam habet similitudinem cum supradicta, scilicet equivocacione. /M f. 59r/

De fallacia compositionis

Fallacia compositionis est deceptio proveniens ex potentiali multiplicitate alicuius orationis, cuius conditiones possunt diversimode componi ad invicem. Et in sensu composito est oratio falsa, in diviso autem vera. Huius fallacie duo sunt modi: primus venit ex eo quod aliquid dictum potest supponere alicui verbo pro se toto vel pro parte sui⁶⁵³, ut hic “quemcumque ambulare est possibile contingit quod ipse ambulet, sedentem ambulare est possibile, ergo contingit quod sedens ambulet”. Minor est duplex per differentiam, quia si hoc dictum “sedentem ambulare” pro se toto subicitur huic predicato quod est possibile, sic est unus sensus, et tunc est oratio falsa in illo sensu, nam significat duos actus oppositos, scilicet sedere et ambulare eidem subiecto in eodem tempore inesse, quod falsum est, sicut hec falsa “sedens ambulare est possibilis”. Si autem illud dictum stet pro parte sui, scilicet pro subiecto ipsius dicti, tunc est sensus talis, “sedens habet in se potentiam ambulandi” et in hoc sensu est vera. Unde ista et similes peccant per diversitatem medii, stante medio⁶⁵⁴ in una premissarum in sensu composito et in alia in sensu diviso, inter quos non modica existit differentia. Similiter de ista, “non scribentem scribere est possibile” et similibus. In hiis autem sic prudens artista se debet habere ne sophista per frequentem multiplicitem verborum pervertat contradictiones reales possibilis et impossibilis et cetera supra tractatis capitolo suo^{xiii}.

⁶⁵³ sui] ut hic *add. et del.* F

⁶⁵⁴ medio] *om.* F

Secundus autem modus compositionis provenit ex eo quod aliqua dictio in oratione posita potest esse determinatio diversorum, ut hic “quidquid vivit semper est, Sortes vivit, ergo Sortes semper est”. Minor est duplex per differentiam nam li “semper” potest determinare hoc verbum “vivit” et tunc est vera, vel determinat hoc verbum “est” et sic est falsa. Causatur autem deceptio per diversitatem medii in maioritate et minoritate. Medium namque equaliter debet esse in utraque premissarum nec de pluribus terminis in una quam in alia. Similiter, “scientiam quam scis nunc discere est possibile, ergo scientiam quam scis discere nunc est possibile”, hec dictio “nunc” potest determinare hoc verbum “scis” vel hoc⁶⁵⁵ verbum “discere”.

De fallacia divisionis

Fallacia divisionis est deceptio proveniens ex potentiali multiplicitate alicuius⁶⁵⁶ orationis, cuius dictiones ad invicem dividi possunt; et iste in sensu diviso sunt false, in composito autem vere. Hec fallacia duos habet modos. Primus provenit ex eo quod aliqua coniunctio potest coniungere terminos vel propositiones scilicet copulando vel disiungendo. Coniungere autem est actus communis ad copulare et disiungere, sicut coniunctio est communis ad copulativam, disiunctivam et cetera. Et ideo primus modus duplex fieri potest, /F f. 29v/ scilicet per copulativam et per⁶⁵⁷ disiunctivam. Et primo per copulativam sic, “quecumque sunt duo et tria sunt tria, sed quecumque sunt duo et tria sunt quinque, ergo quinque sunt tria”. Minor est duplex per differentiam : potest enim esse divisa, et est sensus quod quinque sunt duo /M f.59v/ et quinque sunt tria, et sic est copulativa; et potest esse composita, ita quod sit sensus quinque sunt duo et tria

⁶⁵⁵ hoc] *om.* F

⁶⁵⁶ alicuius] *rationis add. et del.* F

⁶⁵⁷ per] *om.* F

simul⁶⁵⁸, et sic est de predicato copulato, et tunc est copulativa terminorum similiter; maior est in differentia compositionis et divisionis. Peccat paralogismus per diversitatem medii, nam medium in una est divisum in propositione copulativa, in alia autem compositum de predicato copulato; similiter quinque sunt paria et imparia et cetera. Disiungendo⁶⁵⁹ sic, “omne animal est rationale vel irrationale sed non omne animal est rationale ergo omne animal est irrationale”, vel potest inferri “ergo omne animal est rationale vel omne animal est irrationale”. Maior stat in differentia, quia potest esse divisa, et est sensus “omne animal est rationale vel omne animal est irrationale” et sic est disiunctiva disiungens propositiones; vel potest esse composita et cetera, et tunc est sensus “omne animal est rationale vel irrationale”, et sic est de predicato disiuncto et est disiunctio terminorum. Peccat autem per diversitatem medii diversificati per compositionem vel disiunctionem, ut dictum est de alia suo modo. Secundus modus provenit ex eo quod aliquid casuale seu determinatio potest ordinari cum diversis, ut “hic quodcumque vides, hunc percussum oculo⁶⁶⁰; percussus ergo oculo percussum⁶⁶¹ est hic”. Minor est in differentia quia ille ablativus sive causale potest ordinari cum hoc verbo “vides” et tunc significat instrumentum potentie visive scilicet oculum, vel potest ordinari cum participio scilicet “percussus” et significat instrumentum percussiois. Secundum primam determinationem est composita et significat tantum “oculo vides illum qui est percussus”; secundum aliam determinationem est divisa et significat quod “tu vides percussum oculo”: peccat autem predictus paralogismus per diversitatem medii secundum compositionem et divisionem.

⁶⁵⁸ simul] *om.* F

⁶⁵⁹ Disiungendo] distingendo M

⁶⁶⁰ oculo] illo F

⁶⁶¹ ergo oculo percussum] *om.* F

Etiam, ille ablativus in una denotat instrumentum videndi, in alia instrumentum percutiendi, secundum quod diversimode ordinatur.

De fallacia accentus

Fallacia accentus est deceptio proveniens ex eo quod aliqua dictio diversimode pronunciata diversa significat. Accentus est triplex, scilicet acutus, gravis et circumflexus. Huius fallacie duo sunt modi principales, licet possant esse quattuor; sed in primo horum duarum intelliguntur tres illorum. Primus provenit ex eo quod aliqua dictio potest diverso accentu pronunciari, aliquando enim producitur in una et breviatur in alia, vel quando aliqua dictio potest produci et breviari. Item potest variari secundum asperum et leve. Exemplum horum sic: “quoscumque iustum est pendere, iustum est penam pati, sed bonos⁶⁶² viros iustum est pendere ergo et cetera”; hec dictio “pendere” potest esse secunde coniugationis et tunc est⁶⁶³ sua penultima longa et significat “pati penam suspensionis”, vel potest esse coniugationis tertie et tunc est brevis et significat /M f.60r/ “sententiare” sive “talem penam dare”: peccat autem per diversitatem medii in diverso accentu diversificati, ut per se patet. Similiter “omnis populus est gens et cetera”: prima huius dictionis “populus” potest esse brevis et tunc significat “gentem”, vel potest esse longa et tunc significat quemdam arborem. Item dicitur: “quidquid hamatur hamo capitur, vinum amatur ergo et cetera”: hic est variatio penes asperum et leve, nam cum hamatur scribitur cum h et est asperum sonum, tunc significat actum piscandi cum tali instrumento factum, sed cum scribitur sine h, tunc est levis et significat actum voluntatis. In omnibus est medii diversitas clare intuenti. Secundus modus

⁶⁶² bonos] duos F

⁶⁶³ est] de *add.* F

principalis provenit ex eo quod aliquid potest una dictio⁶⁶⁴ vel plures, ut hic: “tu es qui es, sed quies est requies, ergo et cetera”: “qui es” in prima est oratio composita ex qui et es, que est secunda persona huius verbi “sum es fui”, in minori vero est una dictio tertie declinationis cuius prima sillaba est longa, scilicet “quies quietis”, peccant in diversitate medii ut patet.

De fallacia figure dictionis

Fallacia figure dictionis est deceptio proveniens ex eo quod aliqua dictio similis est alteri dictioni et videtur eundem modum significandi habere, licet⁶⁶⁵ non habeat. Fallacia ista tres habet modos: primus provenit ex eo quod aliqua dictio significans masculinum sumitur ac si⁶⁶⁶ significaret femininum vel neutrum et e contrario ut sic: “omnis substantia colorata albedine est alba, vir est substantia colorata albedine, ergo vir est alba”. Similiter “omnis aqua est frigida, omne mare est aqua, ergo omne mare est frigida”. In primo sumitur masculinum ac si significaret femininum, in secundo sumitur neutrum ac si significaret femininum. Tales conclusiones causant vicium in gramaticam, ideo dicitur figura dictionis: peccat autem paralogismus per diversitatem medii implicite, nam in una respicit medium unus genus, in alia aliud, et sic intelligitur de numero ut hic: “omnes homines sunt albi, Sortes est homo, ergo Sortes est albi” et similia. / F f. 30r/ Secundus modus provenit ex eo quod aliqua dictio significans per modum⁶⁶⁷ unius predicati videtur significare per modum alterius, sicut hic: “quidquid [h]eri vidisti hodie

⁶⁶⁴ una dictio] dictio una M

⁶⁶⁵ licet] scilicet F

⁶⁶⁶ si] *om.* F

⁶⁶⁷ modum] *om.* M

vides, album [h]eri⁶⁶⁸ vidisti ergo” et cetera. Similiter: “quidquid emisti comedisti, crudum emisti” et cetera; peccat in diversitate medii, nam in una respicit rem unius predicati, tamen in alia rem alterius, et ista diversitas fit implicite. Tertius modus provenit ex eo quod aliqua dictio significans quale quid seu commune videtur significare hoc aliquid seu significare et hoc in eodem predicamento, ut hic “Sortes ab homine est alter, ipse autem⁶⁶⁹ est homo, ergo est alter a se ipso”; peccat in diversitate medii. In prima enim stat prout homo est commune, in secunda quia Sortes sumitur sub homine, videtur quod hoc nomen “homo” significat hoc aliquid, scilicet Sortes. Similiter si dicatur “Sortes differt a Sorte gramatico”⁶⁷⁰, /M f.60v/ Sortes significat hoc aliquid, sed Sortes gramaticus significat quale quid, esse enim quid est per suam essentiam non mutat suum esse per qualitatem sibi inherentem, ut vult sexta regula que est de qualitate. Arguitur autem per istum modum a termino stante in alia ubi creditur esse idem et est alius, eo quia differentia stat in situ; per istum modum fiunt paralogismi, cum arguitur a termino stante confuse ad eundem stante determinate, vel etiam quando arguitur a termino⁶⁷¹ confuso seu⁶⁷² determinato ad eundem confusum vel distributum et cetera.

De fallacia extra dictionem

Fallacia extra dictionem differt a fallaciis in dictione quoniam fallacie in dictione proveniunt ex apparentia vocis et causa falsitati existit⁶⁷³ in re, fallacie vero extra dictionem proveniunt ex rei apparentia et non existentia, que sunt septem. Prima est⁶⁷⁴

⁶⁶⁸ [h]eri] scilicet heri *add. in marg. et corr. alia manu* F

⁶⁶⁹ ipse autem] autem ipse F

⁶⁷⁰ gramatico] gramaticus F

⁶⁷¹ stante... termino] *om.* F

⁶⁷² seu] *om.* F

⁶⁷³ existit] *om.* F

⁶⁷⁴ est] *om.* F

accidentis. Secunda [secundum] quid et simpliciter. Tertia ignorantia elenchi. Quarta petitio principii. Quinta consequens. Sexta non causa ut causa. Septima plures interrogationes ut una.

De fallacia accidentis

Fallacia accidentis est deceptio proveniens ex eo quod aliquid significatur simpliciter in esse utriusque eorum que quilibet per accidens unum sunt. Huius fallacie tres sunt species sive⁶⁷⁵ modi. Primus provenit ex eo quia proceditur ab accidente ad subiectum vel e contrario, ut hic: “cognosco Sortem, sed Sortes est veniens, ergo cognosco venientem”; non valet quoniam Sortes⁶⁷⁶ et veniens sunt unum per accidens et non per se. Peccat autem paralogismus in diversitate medii, apparentia vero stat in concordantia illius accidentalis in quo concordant Sortes et Sortes, et ob hoc non sequitur quod quidquid est verum de uno sit verum et de alio. Secundus modus provenit ex eo quod id, quod accidit seu convenit superiori, includitur in inferiori vel e contrario, ut sic: “homo est animal, et animal est genus, ergo homo est genus”. Similiter “homo est species, homo est substantia, ergo substantia est species”: non valet⁶⁷⁷, quoniam superius et inferius sunt idem aliquo modo, non tantum simpliciter, quare peccant in deviatione medii a recta linea et cetera. Tertius modus provenit ex eo quod proceditur a specie ad proprium vel ab uno convertibili ad aliud, ut sic: “homo est risibilis, risibile est proprium, ergo homo est proprium”. Similiter “risibile est proprium⁶⁷⁸ homini, homo est species, ergo homo⁶⁷⁹ risibilis est species” non valet quoniam homo et species non sunt idem secundum

⁶⁷⁵ specie sive] *om.* M

⁶⁷⁶ Sortes] paralogismus *add. et del.* F

⁶⁷⁷ valet] *unum verbum add. et del.* F

⁶⁷⁸ proprium] *om.* F

⁶⁷⁹ homo] *om.* M

diffinitionem nec absolute; peccat enim in diversitate medii seu variatione ipsius. Est etiam unus alius modus huius fallacie accidentis, qui fit per differentiam actus naturalis et artificialis et formatur sic paralogismus: “omnis substantia est naturalis, turris est substantia, ergo turris est naturalis”: non valet quoniam turris in quantum est ex partibus naturalibus est naturalis substantia, sed in quantum partes sunt contiguae, non /M f. 61r/ continue nec mixte, sed artificialiter aggregate, est ipsa turris artificialis, et hec figura non est naturalis; et hoc in secunda secunde et tertie patere potest et in aliis suo modo.

De fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter

Fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter est deceptio proveniens ex eo quod dictum, quod est secundum quid, sumitur ac si esset dictum simpliciter. Simpliciter dictum est, quod nullo addito dicitur, ut “Sortes est albus” et cetera. Secundum quid est cum aliquo addito dicitur, ut “Sortes est albus secundum dentes” et cetera. In hac fallacia possunt esse modi quot contingit addere alicui determinationem ipsum determinantem. Sed communiter sunt quinque modi. Primus est quando determinatio addita habet oppositionem ad id cui additur, ut “Cesar est homo mortuus, ergo Cesar est homo” non valet, nam arguitur a privatione entis ad eius positionem, peccat autem per medium insufficiens. Secundus est quando determinatio addita pertinet ad /F f. 30v/ actum anime, ut hic: “chimera est animal opinabile, ergo chimera est animal”. Similiter “Cesar est in memoria hominum, ergo Cesar est”; similiter “tu habes felicitatem in voluntate, ergo tu habes felicitatem”; non valet propter defectum medii insufficientis. Tertius, quando determinatio addita significat aliquid in potentia, ut hic: “in ovo est potentialiter animal, ergo in ovo est animal”, non valet quia esse in potentia est in magna distantia ab

eodem in actu secundum naturam et deficit in defectu medii insufficientis, ut vult regula septima que est de⁶⁸⁰ tempore. Quartus est quando determinatio addita tangit partem, ut hic “etiops est albus dentem, ergo est albus”. Quintus est quando aliquid secundum se est conditionatum per unum modum et tamen secundum aliud est aliter conditionatum⁶⁸¹, ut “divitie in se sunt bone sed in ladrone sunt male, ideo non est verum ‘divitie sunt bone’⁶⁸², et fur vult divitias, ergo vult bonum”. Item “gladius in se est bonus, sed in homicida est malus” et cetera hiis similia, quorum sophismata clarissime patent cognoscenti claritatem instrumentalium principiorum et regularum et conspicienti sophismata cum lumine ipsorum.

De fallacia ignorantie elenchi

Fallacia ignorantie elenchi est deceptio proveniens ex eo quod non observantur ea que requiruntur ad definitionem elenchi. Elenchus autem est sillogismus contradictionis unius et eiusdem nominis et rei ad idem, secundum idem similiter et in eodem tempore, qui quandoque est unus sillogismus, quandoque duo. Unus quidem est, quando concludit contradictoriam alicuius propositionis prius date, sicut si detur “aliquid animal est incorruptibile” et procedatur sic “omne compositus ex contrariis est corruptibile”, “omne animal est compositum ex contrariis ergo omne animal est corruptibile”. Duo sillogismi constituunt elechum; et hoc, quando ex duobus sillogismis contradictorie⁶⁸³ concluditur, sicut si predicto sillogismo contra ponatur alicuius talis sillogismus, “nullum brutum est corruptibile, aliquot animal est brutum, ergo aliquod animal non est corruptibile”. Huius

⁶⁸⁰ de] septima *add.* M

⁶⁸¹ per... conditionatum] *om.* F

⁶⁸² sed...bone] *om.* F

⁶⁸³ contradictorie] contradiczione F

fallacie quattuor sunt modii. Primus peccat contra hanc /M f.61v/ particulam ad idem ut “hic duo sunt duplum ad unum et non sunt duplum ad tria, ergo sunt duplum et non sunt duplum” : deficit in diversitate medii secundum hanc conditionem ad idem. Secundus modus deficit secundum hanc particulam secundum idem, ut “si hoc est equale ad duplum secundum latitudinem et non secundum longitudinem, ergo est equale et non est equale” : peccat in diversitate medii secundum hanc conditionem secundum idem. Tertius modus deficit per hanc conditionem similiter ut sic: “celum movetur circulariter et non sursum ergo movetur et non movetur” : peccat in diversitate medii secundum hanc particulam similiter. Quartus modus deficit per hanc conditionem in eodem tempore, ut “domus ista est clausa in mane et non est⁶⁸⁴ in sero, ergo est clausa et non clausa” : peccat in diversitate medii secundum hanc particulam in eodem tempore. De contradictione vero locutum est capitulo⁶⁸⁵ de propositione paragrafo de contrarietate altissime et mirabiliter, Dei gratia, quod patet scientibus.

De fallacia petitionis principii

Fallacia petitionis principii est deceptio proveniens ex eo quod idem sumitur ad probationem sui ipsius sub alio vocabulo; principium dicitur ibi principale propositum de quo dubitatur. Hec fallacia quattuor modos habet. Primus est, quando diffinitum petitur seu ducitur ad probationem diffinitionis et e contrario, ut si debeat probari quod animal rationale mortale⁶⁸⁶ currit et dicatur sic, “homo currit, ergo animal rationale currit”⁶⁸⁷, hic nulla est probatio, quia simpliciter dubitatur de antecedente. Et similiter de

⁶⁸⁴ est] *om.* M

⁶⁸⁵ capitulo] capitulum F

⁶⁸⁶ mortale] *om.* F

⁶⁸⁷ et ... currit] *om.* F

isto modo intelliguntur descriptum et descriptio. Secundus est, quando universalis ducitur ad probationem particularis et e contrario, ut si debeat probari quod omnium contrariorum eadem est disciplina et assumatur ista “omnium oppositorum eadem est disciplina, ergo omnium contrariorum”; e contrario, quando omnia particularia ducuntur ad probationem universalis, ut si debeat probari quod omnium oppositorum eadem est disciplina, et assumatur ista: “omnium contrariorum eadem est disciplina et omnium privative oppositorum et relativorum, ergo omnium oppositorum eadem est disciplina”, hic petitur conclusio in premissis⁶⁸⁸, de quibus etiam dubitatur. Tertius modus est quando coniunctum petitur in divisis et quando divide probatur quod coniunctim⁶⁸⁹ probari debet; ut, si debeat probari quod medicina sit scientia sani et egri et si /F f. 31r/ dicatur “medicina est scientia sani et est scientia egri, ergo medicina est scientia sani et egri”, non valet quia proceditur divisive. Quartus est quando unum relativum petitur ad alterius probationem, ut si debeat probari quod Sortes sit pater Platonis et dicitur sic: “Plato est filium Sortis, ergo Sortes est pater Platonis”⁶⁹⁰, hic petitur sub aliis verbis quod deberet probari. Ista fallacia clara est.

De fallacia consequentis

Fallacia consequentis est deceptio proveniens ex eo⁶⁹¹ quod consequens omnino exti/M f.62r/matur idem esse antecedenti. Huius fallacie tres sunt modi. Primus provenit ex consecutione magis communis et minus communis vel e contrario, et hoc quando convertitur consequentia secundum locales habitudines, ut : “si homo est animal est,

⁶⁸⁸ premissis] in ipsis sed F

⁶⁸⁹ coniunctim] coniunctum F

⁶⁹⁰ et...Platonis] *om.* F

⁶⁹¹ eo] quod consequens *add. et del.* F

ergo si animal est homo est” et cetera, in omnibus hiis conceditur consequentia converti et non convertitur. Secundus modus est quando putatur consequentia aliqua converti propter circum[stant]ias⁶⁹² aliquas inherentes alicui, ut sic: “est adulter [comptus vel errabundus de nocte], ergo comptus vel errabundus de nocte est adulter” ; similiter, “si est latro errat de nocte, ergo si errat de nocte est latro”: hoc non convertitur. Tertius est quando proceditur ab una consequentia ad aliam in opposito; est autem duplex oppositionis consequentia, una est in opposito, altera vero in contrario; de prima sic: “si aliquid est generatum fuit principiatum, ergo si non est generatum non est principiatum. Sed anima non est generata, ergo anima non est principiata”. Similiter, “si aliquid est factum, est principiatum, ergo si non est factum non est principiatum. Sed mundus non est factus, ergo mundus non est principiatus”; iste consequentie non convertuntur in contrario quia, sicut ad antecedens sequitur consequens, ita ad oppositum antecedentis sequitur oppositum consequentis sive contrarium vel⁶⁹³ etiam contradictorium.

De fallacia secundum non causam ut causam

Fallacia secundum non causam ut causam est quando inter premissas, ex quibus sequitur conclusio, ponitur aliqua propositio que nihil ad conclusionem operatur, et sic non est causa. Causa dicitur hic quod est causa inferendo, secundum quod premissae sunt causa conclusionis. Causa apparens est in hac fallacia consequentia quam habet non causa ut causa, cum aliis propositionibus que sunt cause in terminis; et formatur paralogismus secundum hanc fallaciam hoc modo. Putas ne anima et vita sint idem, quo

⁶⁹² circumstantias] circumferentias F, M

⁶⁹³ vel] nihil F

dato procedatur sic: “anima et vita sunt idem, mors et vita⁶⁹⁴ sunt contraria; generatio et corruptio sunt contraria, sed mors est corruptio, ergo vita est generatio, ergo vivere est generari quod impossibile est; nam qui vivit non generatur sed iam genitum est, ergo sequitur quod principium fuit impossibile, sed anima et vita sunt [†]⁶⁹⁵, mors et vita sunt contraria quoniam non sunt [idem], sed opponuntur sicut privatio et habitus”; ex quo patet quod hec fallacia peccat contra rationem cause ut causa, et significatur in quarta regula que docet considerare causas.

Fallacia secundum plures interrogationes ut una

Fallacia secundum plures interrogationes ut una est deceptio proveniens ex eo quod ad interrogationem que est plures datur unica responsio, ex eo quod sub uno modo interrogandi proponitur. Ad hanc fallaciam⁶⁹⁶ concurrunt quattuor: scilicet enuntiatio, interrogatio, propositio et conclusio, de quibus superius est dictum. Modi huius fallacie sunt duo. Primus est quando interrogatio est plures, ex eo quia unum de pluribus in singulari predicatur vel e contrario, sicut hic: “putas ne homo, et asinus sicut⁶⁹⁷ homo, animal rationale”: si⁶⁹⁸ dicatur sic ‘procedatur’, ergo asinus est animal rationale, si dicatur ‘non procedatur’, ergo homo non est animal rationale. Deceptio predicta provenit ex eo quia ad talem interrogationem debent dari due /M f.62v/ responsiones et non una simpliciter, scilicet quod dicatur sic vel non, sed debet responderi “homo est animal rationale et asinus non est animal rationale”. Similiter, “tu es homo et asinus”, si dicatur

⁶⁹⁴ sint...vita] om. F

⁶⁹⁵ †] et debuit F M

⁶⁹⁶ fallaciam] falsam M

⁶⁹⁷ sicut] sint F

⁶⁹⁸ si] sicut *scr. et corr.* F

non, concluditur⁶⁹⁹ “ergo tu non es homo”; si dicatur sic⁷⁰⁰ “ergo tu es asinus”. Similiter hic: “putas ne /F f. 31v/ ethyops⁷⁰¹ est homo albus vel corpus⁷⁰² est <vel> nigrum” et cetera. Secundus modus est quando interrogatio est plures, ex eo quia plura subiciuntur vel predicantur in plurali numero sicut hic⁷⁰³ : “putas mel et fel sint dulcia”, si dicatur sic, ergo concluditur “fel est dulce”, si dicatur non, “mel non est dulce”; in omnibus hiis et sibi similibus patet quod non tantum est danda una responsio sed plures, cum fallacia proveniat secundum multa.

Dictum est de tredecim fallacis in quibus cadunt omnes deceptiones que fieri possunt, unde per illum modum, per quem in aliquibus locis applicatur differentia et alique species regularum, possunt alia instrumentalia principia suo modo applicari; et ratione sue altitudinis, necessitatis et veritatis alia quecumque sophismata manifestare, que explicare non curo, ne hoc⁷⁰⁴ opus ultra debitum prolongetur, et maxime cum illis, qui ipsum⁷⁰⁵ vere et realiter cognoscunt, via investigandi et inveniendi non sit nimis difficilis ymmo facilis.

De modo disputandi

Disputatio est contrarietas spiritualis que per verbum manifestat conceptionem quam habet unus intellectus contra alium. In principio oportet quod unusquisque disputantium habeat intensionem ad cognoscendum veritatem et falsitatem, concedendo vera cognita et falsa negando, et supponendo in principio partem utramque ut intellectus possit esse

⁶⁹⁹ concluditur] dicatur F

⁷⁰⁰ sic] ergo *add. in marg.* F

⁷⁰¹ ethyops] ethiops M

⁷⁰² corpus] corvus M

⁷⁰³ hic] *unum verbum add. et del.* F

⁷⁰⁴ hoc] *om.* M

⁷⁰⁵ ipsum] ipsam M

liber. Secundo modo,⁷⁰⁶ quod arguens procedat per quattuor species argumentationis ad placitum, fundando argumentum super aliquam speciem demonstrationis. Tertio modo⁷⁰⁷, quod in disputatione breviter⁷⁰⁸ proponatur et breviter respondeatur. Quarto, quod in disputatione communis⁷⁰⁹ sit⁷¹⁰ amicitia que refrenet particularem contrarietatem. Quinto, quod caveatur⁷¹¹ ab ira, que intellectum obfuscat ad percipiendam falsitatem vel veritatem, quoniam cum ira ligat suam deliberationem et libertatem. Sexto, quia verba et gesta et similia sint in magna proportione et modestia, curialitate et alacritate. Septimo, quod termini non mutantur, nam qui terminos mutat, fugit veritatem, et qui fugit devictus est. Octavo, quod sumantur aliqua principia utrique parti communia et per se nota, ad que fiat recursum tempore necessitatis. Nono, quod in disputatione oportet consentire principiis primis et sequi illorum consequentiam. Decimo et ultimo, quod si in argumento fuerit aliqua sophisticatio, respondens curialiter ipsum argumentum cum differentia distinguat et cum aliis instrumentalibus principiis, iuvantibus regularum speciebus quibus nihil effugere potest, non dicendo “peccatis per fallaciam” et similia. Sicut si quis diceret “omnis essentia divina est pater, filius est essentia divina, ergo filius /M f. 63r/ est pater”, respondetur “essentia divina est communis equalissime tribus divinis correlativis, ipsa existente in se una et indistincta simplicissima et cum quolibet illorum convertibili, verumtamen alio modo e proprietate communicatur patri et alio modo e proprietate filio et sic de spiritu sancto”. Unde nos in nostra responsione sumimus ipsam in una propositione contrahendo ad unum

⁷⁰⁶ modo] *om.* M

⁷⁰⁷ modo] *om.* M

⁷⁰⁸ breviter] probatur *add. et del.* F

⁷⁰⁹ communis] a, b *scr. supra* F

⁷¹⁰ communis sit] sit communis M

⁷¹¹ caveatur] teneatur F

correlativum, cui convenit una⁷¹² propria et proprissima proprietate, et in alia propositione contrahimus ipsam altius⁷¹³ correlativo, cui etiam ita bene convenit, sed alio modo et proprietate sibi propria et proprissima; ideo non mirum si falsa⁷¹⁴ producitur conclusio, cuius causa est medii diversitas.

Causa apparentie est consideratio ydemptitatis essentie et concordantie relativorum in unitate eiusdem. In prima enim propositione stat essentia pro uno et in secunda pro alio; et potest iste parallogismus considerari in primo modo equivocationis, cum sit hoc quod divina essentia essentialiter conveniat pluribus, scilicet divinis personis, sed tamen diversimode, ut patuit.

Si vero aliquis disputator per sophisticaciones incedere voluerit, seminando in suis argumentis fallacias, destruantur ei sophismata cum principiis instrumentalibus⁷¹⁵ et regularum speciebus, scilicet cum sua inexpugnabilitate, vigore et veritate, et ultimo remittere ipsam ad fallaciam seu fallacias quas in suis argumentis seminaverit. Sicut quando dicitur “quicumque sunt episcopi sunt homines, sed asini sunt episcopi, ergo asini sunt homines”. Parallogismus iste cognoscitur cum medio, differentia, concordantia et contrarietate, et cum tertia specie regule tertie et cum secunda sexte, in qua existit medii diversitas secundum terminos tres⁷¹⁶, que sunt numerus, casus et speciei regule mutatio. Et peccat penes fallaciam amphibolie; et quia fallacia omne bonum processum destruit, ideo argumentum nullius valoris existit nec etiam efficace, cum sit fine vacuum.

⁷¹² una] *om.* F

⁷¹³ altius] alterius F

⁷¹⁴ si fallacia] proceditur *add. et del.* F

⁷¹⁵ principiis instrumentalibus] *om.* M

⁷¹⁶ terminos tres] tria M

Sequitur questiones decem per quorum solutiones magna de logica habetur notitia

Questio est utrum ordine doctrine addiscendi quamcumque aliam artem logica precedere debeat. Logica quid est, logica⁷¹⁷ de quo est, logica⁷¹⁸ quare est, logica quanta est, logica quando est, logica ubi est, logica quo modo est, logica cum quo est. Istarum questionum solutiones patere possunt investiganti per decem regulas et suas species supradictas.

Considerando logica quid sit diffinitive, quid habet in se, quid est in alio, quid habet in alio et cetera. In quarum solutionibus maxime de logica et de hiis que ad eam pertinent pandetur notitia. /F f. 32r/

De hiis que ad huius operis notitiam preexhiguntur

Ad habendum de logica notitiam secundum huius novi compendii processum preexhiguntur iuvenem aliquam habere cognitionem de principiis et regulis in libri huius insertis principio, contentis autem in quadam arte mirabili quam nuper huic mundo tradidit gratia Iesu Christi, qui voluit eam in⁷¹⁹ sui benignissima largitate et caritate et immensitate /M f.63v/ infusivè cuidam sancto homini et christianissimo revelare, qui Raymundus nomine dictus, Lulii cognomine dignus: et bene Raymundus Lulii, qui vere radius lucis mundi^{xiv}, quem etiam in partibus nostris aliqui magnum philosophum catalanum⁷²⁰ appellant. Cuius ars, sapientie luce perfulgens, propter eius transcendentem generalitatem pre aliis omnibus, que per respectum ad ipsam particulares sunt, dignoscitur addiscenda.

⁷¹⁷ logica] *om.* F

⁷¹⁸ logica] *om.* F

⁷¹⁹ in] *ex* M

⁷²⁰ catalanum] *om.* F

De qua siquidem cum magnitudine veritatis potest dici quod ipsa est ars artium ad omnium methodorum principia viam habens propter tres singulares excellentias inter alias, quas in ipsa invenit intellectus. Prima est supremorum principiorum altitudo, super quibus ipsa ars fundatur, in quibus quicquid est comprehenditur. Secunda est suarum decem generalium questionum regularitas, in quibus omnis et extra quas nulla questio seu regula est possibilis inveniri. Tertia est principiorum et regularum artificiosa connexitas, scilicet principii cum principio et principiis et e contrario. Item regule cum regula et regulis, et e contrario, et insuper principiorum cum regulis et e contrario: ex quorum mutua et concordanti mixtione seu combinatione consurgit universale, in cuius speculatione humanus intellectus particulares veritates secundum sui possibilitatem poterit contemplari.

Unde requirit hoc opus quod, si logicus indigeat tractare de aliquo principiorum quinque predictorum, recurrat ad suam distinctionem et de illo ipso tractet secundum ea, que dicta sunt de eo. Si vero non invenerit id explicite, investiget illius principii condiciones cum instrumentalibus principiis et regulis. Si etiam contingeret aliquem terminum esse in propositione, de quo propter operis compendium notitia explicite non sit data, erubescere non debet iuvenis querere ab altero quid per nomen importeretur.

Ego enim solum curavi tractare de hiis, que logicam magis proprie et finaliter respiciunt. Item etiam, quia logica versatur circa intentiones secundas, que nequeunt perfecte cognosci primis ignoratis, in aliquibus passibus naturaliter et philosophice procedere volui.

Dico autem quod, quantam quis altiore notitiam super me de predicta arte habuerit, tanto altius et melius ac profundius me,⁷²¹ que hic scripsi, intelliget et videbit. Hoc idem dico de dictis aliorum, supposito quod tale particulare sciat ad artem iam dictam applicari; nam expertum est. Tanta enim sapientie virtus in ipsa arte consistit, quod supra quamcumque aliam hucusque inventam presertim elevat intellectum, de cuius virtute per Dei gratiam in partibus Ytalicis,⁷²² ut⁷²³ in nobili civitate Ianuensi aliisque quibusdam, minimella fuit aliquibus notitia propalata . Quidam autem, ex nimio caritatis ardore commotus, hunc brevem tractatum ad instructionem quorundam in logica compilavit. Quare humiliter supplicat dilectoribus bonitatis magnitudinis et cetera quos sensualiter non obiectat, ferventi animi desiderio sperat quod ipsi hoc brevem opusculum amicabiliter recipiant et cum eo et suis puerilibus quousque aliud /M f. 64r/ isto utilius elucidetur, novellos iuvenes introducant. Item petit ex requisitione bonitatis et cetera quod in defectibus, si qui sint, eum fraternaliter corrigant ac sui intellectus ignorantie illos impendant.

De fine

Ego vero artis philosophorum philosophi iam dicti discipulus, licet ad huiusmodi nomen indignum exprimi fore rear, et hoc quia in scientia parvulus et in moribus minimus hoc operi principium, medium et finem dedi, virtute et gratia illius qui est bonitas optima veritasque verissima. Ad cuius honorem factum est et propter ipsum addisci debet, ut principia fini respondeant. In laude, cognitione et dilectione domini

⁷²¹ me] inde F

⁷²² Ytalicis] Ytalie F

⁷²³ ut] et F

Dei, a quo omne bonum et verum procedit. Et ad quem est tamquam ad suum ultimum finem reducendum. Deo gratias⁷²⁴.

ⁱ Cfr. Raymundus Lullus, *Liber de Venatione Substantiae Accidentis et Compositi*, ROL 22.

ⁱⁱ Here the text seems to condense and summarize the *Liber de Venatione Substantiae Accidentis et Compositi*, expressing the main ideas in a simpler way.

ⁱⁱⁱ In this whole section it is clear a reference to Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus*, ed. LM De Rijk, 1972, p. 4, lines 4-124 and page 5 line 12.

^{iv} Here the text doesn't follow Petrus Hispanus, another source is used, cfr. Boethius, *De differentiis topicis*, Liber I, (1174C), Ed. J.-P. Migne, Patrologia Latina 64, Paris, 1847.

^v Totally different from Petrus Hispanus, definitely following a different source here, probably to be identified with William of Sherwood (1983), "Introductiones in logicam", ed. C. Lohr, in *Traditio* 39, pp. 219-299.

^{vi} To be noted the fake ethymology of Raymundus Lullus' name.

^{vii} Cfr. Raymundus Lullus, *Liber de Possibili et Impossibili*, ROL 6.

^{viii} To be noted the reference to the Lullian correlatives.

^{ix} To be noted in the text the use of the term '*dignitatum*', on the use of '*dignitates*' or '*absolute principles*', see Bonner, Anthony (2007), *The art and logic of Ramon Llull: a user's guide*, pp. 125-134.

^x This way of proceeding in the argument, namely by referring to the rules and the species of the rules, is typically lullian and of the so called para lullian earlier tradition; cfr. *Liber ad memoriam confirmandam*, in *Studia Lulliana* 36, 1996, pp. 99-121 edd. A. Madre and Ch. Lohr.

^{xi} To be noted in the text the use of the term '*dignitates*', on the use of '*dignitates*' or '*absolute principles*', see Bonner, Anthony (2007), *The art and logic of Ramon Llull: a user's guide*, pp. 125-134.

^{xii} This whole chapter on *Paralogismus* seems to be dependent on Raimundus Lullus, *Logica Nova*, V 13, ROL 23.

^{xiii} To be noted here the intertextual reference to the part on contradiction.

^{xiv} To be noted again the ethymology of Raimundus Lullus' name.

⁷²⁴ Deo gratias] *om.* M

Appendix 2

Loyca discipuli magistri Raymondi Lulli

Transcription from ms. Firenze, Riccardiana 1001

CRITERIA OF THE EDITION

Since there is only one manuscript extant that contains the text of the *Loyca discipuli magistri Raymondi Lulli*, FIRENZE, *Biblioteca Riccardiana*, 1001, ff. 14r-18r (XV c.; description in Chapter Three, pp. 109-113), this edition cannot be called properly a critical edition. Yet, since I have tried to reconstruct the text by conjecture whenever the manuscript presented corrupted words, or whenever it needed completing, it is not a diplomatic edition.

The author of the *Loyca discipuli* seems to follow closely the text of Ockham's *Summa Logicae* in many occasions. See, for instance, the following passages: p. 339: "Unde differentia, de qua nunc est sermo, semper exprimit partem rei et aliqua exprimit partem materialem et aliqua exprimit partem formalem, sicut ista differentia hominis, scilicet rationale, exprimit animam / William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, Chap. XXIII, p. 75; p. 339: "animam intellectivam/, que anima est de essentia hominis, et exprimit eam ad modum quo album exprimit hominem" / William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit.], Cap. XXIII, p. 75: albedinem/; hec etiam differentia, scilicet materiale, exprimit consimiliter et proportionaliter eodem modo materiam /Ockham add.: et eodem modo quod animatum animam. Et iam eodem modus est differentia". See also p. 345: "Hoc idem dicitur, Damascenus in *Loyca* sua capitulo 32°", cfr. William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit.], Cap. XLI, p. 115.

Therefore, when in doubt, I have resorted to looking at the philosophical model of the text, often finding support for my conjectures in Ockham's text. As a consequence, few *cruces* are left and the text is fully understandable.

All my conjectures and all my choices are signaled in the apparatus. The apparatus also signals: erased or deleted words, marginal notes or corrections; symbols present in the manuscript.

I have normalized the Latin whenever the *lectio* used was clearly recognizable (ie. *falsa*, for *falssa*), but I have not corrected the different spelling conventions typical of medieval Latin (ie. *hec*, for *haec*).

I have used [] to signal conjectural additions to fill textual lacunas, and < > to signal expunctions.

Whenever possible I have accepted the subdivisions and titles offered by the manuscript, but when there was no subdivision present, I have subdivided the text following its sense and its own logic.

/ f. 14r/

Incipit Loyca discipuli magistri Raymondi Lulii

Quoniam secundum philosophum primo elenchorum: “Qui virtutum nominum sunt ignari de facili paralogisantur et ipsi disputantes et alios audientes^{xv}”; ignorato enim quod dicitur per nomen, impossibile est fieri disciplinati; et ignorantia vocabulorum multis est errandi o[c]casio et via deviandi a tramite veritatis; idcirco plerisque studiosissime diligenterque rogatus, ut vocabula logice in unam summulam declararem⁷²⁵, qui ad hoc arbitrantur sufficere mei ingenii parvitatem, ad instructionem iuvenum cupientium in logica erudiri, ut in ea facilius possint introduci, quoddam opusculum quod est rosa de spinis colita, continens expositionem, discursionem⁷²⁶ ac declaracionem in multis saltem quoad nominibus multorum vocabulorum in logica magis usitatis attingendo, ea in illo sensu et significatione quibus magis frequenter utuntur logici vertiones scribendo, me monendo, mandabo, quorum etiam iuvenum studio me cogit caritas deservire, ne per ignorantiam significationis terminorum a veritatis inquisitione et culmine scientie retardarentur, procedendo stilo grosso et materiali, ut novi in logica melius intelligant vegiis, Aristoteli pro viribus adherendo.

Cum omnes logice auctores asserant logicam esse discursum que fit ex⁷²⁷ propositionibus, propositiones autem ex terminis conponuntur, ideo⁷²⁸ predicendum est de terminis cuiuslibet eorum spectantibus seriatim. Est autem sciendum prout terminus hic sumitur: et est omne illud quod est alterius pars orationis, sive sit pars declinabilis sive non, ut “homo”, “legit”, “hoc”, “heri” et “cras” et similia. Et appellatur terminus sic

⁷²⁵ declararem] declaratam *ms*

⁷²⁶ discursionem] *add. in marg. ms*

⁷²⁷ ex] positionibus *add. et del. ms*

⁷²⁸ ideo] procedendum est *add. et del. ms*

sumptus quomodo incomplexum et simplex quid; quia ex nullo alio componitur, ut propositio et similia que ex aliis componuntur, ut dictum est. Terminorum autem multe sunt distinctiones penes quas oportet distinguere et aliquantulum inmorari.

Prima distinctio est quod terminus sua divisione est triplex: quidam est terminus scriptus, quidam prolatus, et quidam conceptus seu mentalis^{xvi}. Terminus scriptus est pars propositionis scripte in aliquo corpore (aut in cera, papiro, vel pergamino, vel alibi), qui oculo corporali videtur et videri potest. Terminus prolatus est pars propositionis ab ore hominis prolato, qui auditur aure corporali vel audiri potest. Sed terminus conceptus seu mentalis est intentio seu passio anime, aliquid naturaliter significans, nata esse pars propositionis mentalis ad modum quo terminus⁷²⁹ scriptus est pars propositionis scripte et ad modum quo terminus prolatus est pars propositionis prolatae⁷³⁰.

Secunda distinctio terminorum est hec, quod quidam sunt termini cathegorematici et quidam sunt sincathegorematici. Termini cathegorematici sunt illi qui finitam et certam habent significationem, sicut hoc nomen “homo”, qui significat “omnes homines”, et iste terminus “animal”, qui significat “omnia animalia”, et sic de aliis^{xvii}. Termini autem sincathegorematici sunt per oppositionem, scilicet illi qui non habent certam nec finitam significationem, nec significant aliquas res distinctas a rebus significatis per terminos cathegorematicos; et ideo isti termini sunt sincathegorematici: omnis, nullus, preter, solus, tantum, quantum, huiusmodi. Unde, sicut cifra in algorismo posita per se nichil significat, sed addita alteri signo⁷³¹ dat significare, ita sincathegorematicus terminus proprie loquendo nihil significat, addito autem alteri termino facit ipsum significare aliquid, sive ipsum terminum pro aliquibus vel pro aliquo determinato facit supponere

⁷²⁹ quo terminus] terminus quo *ms*

⁷³⁰ quo ... prolata] *add. in marg. ms*

⁷³¹ signo] quod *add. et del. ms*

dispositive aliquid, circa terminum cathegoricum exercendo, dicente Aristotile in primo *Peri Hermeneias*^{xviii}, quod istud signum “omnis” nihil significat secundum quantitatem universaliter; verbi gratia⁷³², iste terminus “omnis” non habet significatum certum, sed additus “homini”, dicendo “omnis homo currit”, facit ipsum stare actualiter et discretive pro omnibus hominibus. Et sicut est de isto termino “omnis”, ita est intelligendum proportionaliter de aliis terminis sincathegorematicis, quamvis indistinctis: distinctiva officia determinant, ut inferius ostendetur.

Plane ergo et clare loquendo, illi termini qui sunt alicuius partis orationis indeclinabilis (ut sunt adverbium, coniunctio, prepositio, interiectio), ut nomina significantia dispositiones terminorum, vel sunt signa universalialia, ut “omnis” et “nullus”, vel particularia, ut “quidam” et “aliquid” et multa pronomina, ut sunt “meus, tuus, suus”, dicuntur termini sincathegorematici; ceteri vero termini partium declinabilium preter exceptos <que> termini cathegorematici appellantur⁷³³.

Tertia distinctio terminorum est quod aliqui sunt termini abstracti et aliqui concretivi; oportet autem scire quod concretum et abstractum consimile principium habent in voce, sed non modo simile terminantur, sicut patet in hiis^{xix}: “iustus/iustitia”, “fortis/fortitudo”, que a simili littera et sillaba incipiunt sed non desinunt in consimilem, sicut patet; unde semper vel frequenter abstractum plures habet sillabas quam concretum; et concretum in logica tantum significat, proprie loquendo, sicut adiectivum in gramatica; abstractum vero in logica idem est quod⁷³⁴ substratum in gramatica.

⁷³² verbi] *ms unum verbum deletum est*

⁷³³ termini cathegorematici appellantur] termini cathegorematicus appellatur *ms*

⁷³⁴ quod] quot *ms*

Nomina concretorum et abstractorum sunt pro nunc quinque species: prima est quando abstractum supponit seu stat pro accidente vel pro forma quacumque realiter inherente alicui subiecto; et concretum supponit seu stat pro subiecto eiusdem accidentis seu forme, cuiusmodi sunt: “albus” et “albedo”, “iustus” et “iustitia”; quando nam dicitur “homo est albus” vel “iustus”, li “albus” et li “iustus” supponunt seu stant pro homine, qui subiectum est albedinis et iustitie, et non pro albedine nec iustitia: albedo nam non est alba nec iustitia iusta.

Secunda species nominum concretorum et abstractorum est e contrario, scilicet quando abstractum supponit pro subiecto accidentis vel forme^{xx}, concretum autem supponit pro forma seu accidente inherente illi subiecto, ut sunt “ignis” et “igneus” et similia. Cum nam dicitur “color est igneus”, supponit pro colore, qui est accidens et non potest supponere pro igne, quia non dicitur proprie quod ignis est igneus.

Tertia species talium terminorum est quando concretum supponit pro toto et abstractum pro parte, sicut est in hiis: “anima/animatum”: homo enim est animatus et anima non est animata; et sic animatum supponit pro homine, qui est totum; patet tamen quoniam tale concretum supponere pro parte, ut dicendo “corpus est animatum”.

Quarta species talium terminorum est quando concretum et abstractum supponunt pro distinctis rebus, quarum neutra est pars nec subiectum alterius. Quod contingit fieri multipliciter: nam quandoque talia se habent sic causa et effectus, sicut dicimus “hoc opus est humanum”, et non dicimus quod hoc opus est homo; vel sic quandoque se habent sicut signum et significatum, sicut diximus quod differentia hominis, scilicet rationale, est essentialis homini et hoc est quia est signum alicuius partis anime

rationalis, que scilicet est de essentia hominis; et rationale nec aliqua differentia est aliqualiter essentie vel alicui, ut alias dicitur domino suffragante. Et quandoque se habent aliqua: sicut locus et locatum, ut dicimus quod iste est Xentonenis et non Xentonz.

Quinta species istorum / f. 14 v/ terminorum est quod quicquam subtrahatur [†] non supponunt enim pro multis simul sumptis et concreta pro uno solo supposito verificari possunt, sicut est de istis: “populus/popolaris”, “plebs/plebeius⁷³⁵”, nec tamen est plebs vel populus. Multis aliis modis possunt isti termini abstracti et concretivi variari, quos obmitto pro nunc hominibus studiosis.

Quarta divisio terminorum in generali est quibus scolastici frequenter utuntur, quod quidam sunt termini absoluti et quidam⁷³⁶ termini connotativi^{xxi}. Termini absoluti sunt illi qui non significant aliud principaliter et aliud secundarie, sed quidquid significant eque primo per illud nomen significatur, sicut sunt isti termini: “homo, animal, asinus, arbor, ignis”, et talia quecque primo significant illa pro quibus supponunt omnia illa de quibus predicantur.

Unde etiam nomina necessario non habent diffinitionem exprimentem quid nominis, in qua aliquid ponitur in recto, ut dicendo “homo est animal rationale vel est substantia animata sensibilis” et quandoque totum ponitur in obliquo⁷³⁷, ut “homo est ex anima et⁷³⁸ ex corpore constitutus”.

⁷³⁵ plebeius] plebebilis *ms*

⁷³⁶ quidam] vocati *add. et del. ms*

⁷³⁷ in obliquo] sed totum predicatur necessario *add. et del. ms*

⁷³⁸ et] unum verbum *add. et del. ms*

Terminus autem connotativus⁷³⁹ est ille qui significat aliquid primarie, instinctive et aliquid secundarie instinctive⁷⁴⁰, si tale nomen habet proprie diffinitionem exprimentem quid nominis; et frequenter oportet ponere unum illius diffinitionis in recto et alium in obliquo, sicut est de hoc nomine “album”, quia habet diffinitionem exprimentem quid nominis, in qua diffinitione dividendo ponitur in recto et aliter in obliquo^{xxii}; unde, si queratur quid est album, dicendum est quod album est aliquid informatum albedine, vel aliquid habens albedinem, et albedinem. Patet etiam quoniam poni verbum vel aliquid ei equivalens in diffinitione exprimente quid nominis talium terminorum, sicut, si queritur quod est causa, potest dici quod totum hoc ad cuius esse scilicet sequitur ad nichil potens aliquid producere. Huiusmodi autem sunt nomina connotativa, omnia nomina concreta supra dicendo in⁷⁴¹ prima specie divisionis tertie terminorum^{xxiii}.

Ex hiis sequitur quod termini qui sunt in predicato substantie sunt nomine absoluti nisi connotent aliquid officiale, aliter videtur concretorum, predicatorum⁷⁴² saltem in concreto dicuntur termini connotativi. Quot autem termini tunc sunt in predicato et non res significate, ut aliqui ymaginantur, inferius ostendetur.

Quinta divisio terminorum est quod quidam sunt termini prime positionis et quidam secunde positionis. Termini prime positionis sunt illi in quorum institutione non habetur aspectus ad alios precedentes a quibus orientur, ut sint termini primitivi ut: “ego, doceo, amo”. Termini vero secunde positionis sunt⁷⁴³ per oppositionem, silicet in quorum institutione habetur aspectus ad aliquas dictiones precedentes a quibus orientur, cuius modi sunt termini derivati ut: “amator, lectio”, et sic de aliis^{xxiv}.

⁷³⁹ connotativus] connotatus *add. in marg. ms*

⁷⁴⁰ secundarie] sit *add. et del. ms*

⁷⁴¹ in] qua *add. Et del. ms*

⁷⁴² Predicatorum] scilicet *add. et del. ms*

⁷⁴³ sunt] *in ms ms duas verba deleta sunt: sunt positionis scilicet*

Sexta divisio terminorum est quod quidam sunt termini prime impositionis et quidam secunde impositionis: termini prime impositionis sunt illi, ut ponit communis scola, qui significant res extra animam existentes independenter ab opere intellectus, cuiusmodi sunt: “hodie, lignum, arbor”, et huius similia. Termini autem secunde impositionis sunt per oppositionem, silicet illi qui non significant res existentes extra animam sed existentes in anima et in opere rationis, sicut sunt nomen, pronomen et cetera partes orationis.

Septima divisio terminorum est scilicet quod quidam sunt termini prime intentionis et quidam sunt secunde intentionis^{xxv}. Termini prime intentionis sunt illi qui significant res extra, distinguendo res contra signum, ut sunt “homo, animal, lapis”, qui sunt termini prime intentionis. Etiam si cum hoc significant signa sunt quoque termini prime intentionis, ut sunt isti termini: “ens, verum, bonum, unum,⁷⁴⁴ res et aliud”, qui significant hominem et bovem, que non sunt signa; sic accidendo signa etiam significant genus, species, que precise sunt talia signa.

Termini secunde intentionis^{xxvi} sunt illi qui precise impositi sunt ad significandum intentiones anime vel precise intentionis anime, que sunt signa ad plenum instituta vel consequentia talia signa. Isti enim termini secunde intentionis significant tales terminos prime intentionis, ut “genus” significat “animal” et “colorem”, “species” autem significat “hominem” et “asinum”; ita quod talia nullum habeant significatum nisi terminos prime intentionis. Sciendum autem quod ista divisio terminorum non multum differt a precedenti, ut patet cuiuslibet intuenti, quia logica est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis, teste Avicenna^{xxvii}, et in precedentibus dictum est quosdam terminos esse prime

⁷⁴⁴ unum] ens *add. et del. ms*

intentionis et quosdam secunde intentionis: ideo, ne per ignota procedamus⁷⁴⁵, quid est intentio prima et quid secunda intentio incidenter est videndum et quomodo ad invicem distinguantur.

Est autem sciendum quod intentio prima, ut ponitur communiter, est cognitio que habetur de aliqua re mediante proprietate propria: verbi gratia cognitio que habetur⁷⁴⁶ de animali mediante proprietate sibi propria, que est sentire, et cognitio que habetur de homine mediante proprietate propria, que est ridere. Dicitur intentio prima, ex qua intentione prima generis, tamquam ex una parte integrali, et ex conceptu differentie illius generis, tamquam ex alia parte integrali, ponunt nonnulli compositionem intentionem primam ipsemodo. Utrum autem hoc sit verum non hic: est precedentis speculationis.

Intentio vero secunda vocatur cognitio que habetur de aliqua re mediante proprietate communi, ut est cognitio que habetur de animali mediante ista proprietate, que est aptitudo ad predicandum de pluribus speciebus unitate et in quodcumque convenit cuilibet generi, et ideo data est communis; sentire autem non debetur nisi animali, et ideo dicta proprietas est propria et non communis; unde illa cogitatio que habetur ad eam aptitudine vocatur genus; cognitio etiam que habetur de homine mediante hoc, quod est esse aptum natum predicari de pluribus differentibus numero, vocatur intentio secunda, que species communi nomine appellatur.

Et consimiliter est dicendum de talibus intentionibus in aliis predicationibus et aliis, quod patere potest per predicta; unde hec opinio coincidit et redit, quia in idem, cum opinione quam credo veram, que ponit quod intentio prima est nomen /f. 15r/ mentale natum pro suo significato super omne quod est. Intentio prima hominis, que est predicti

⁷⁴⁵ procedimus] procedamus *ms*

⁷⁴⁶ habetur] mediate animali *add. et del. ms*

[ratio]nabilitas⁷⁴⁷, in [†] albedinem et sic de aliis. Intentio autem secunda est illa que est signum termini primi intentionis scilicet etiam cuiusdam sunt similes intentiones, ergo eius species, differentia et consimiles, sicut enim de omnibus hominibus predicatur; nam est intentio communis, que est homo, sic dicendo, “hic homo est homo”, “ille homo est homo”, et sic de aliis que dicitur intentio secunda.

Ita de aliis intentionibus, que supponunt et⁷⁴⁸ stant pro rebus aliquibus ut supponunt et stant pro se. Predicatur una intentio communis secunda sic dicendo: “homo est species”, “asinus est species”, “nichil est genus rationale”, “differentia est”, “homo est universale”, et sic de aliis. Ex quo patet quod intentio prima, secundum istum modum dicendi, nichil aliud est quam terminus mentalis prime intentionis; nec secunda intentio est aliud quam terminus conceptualis secunde intentionis, de quibus dictum est supra.

Dicendum tandem autem, gratia exempli predictorum, quod isti termini: intentio, conceptus, ymago, similitudo, species, ens rationis et passio anime, significant idem frequenter secundum essentiam; dicunt enim quod qualitatem existentem in anima subiective, que est signum, in anima significavit animam. Ex quibus quidam signis propositio mentalis componitur, ut vult Boetius in commento super libro *Pery Hermeneias*^{xxviii}, ut magis specialiter dicetur infra; ita quod quandoque aliquis profert propositionem vocalem, prius format interius propositionem mentalem, que nullius est ydiomatis, in tantum quod multi frequenter formant in terminis immediate propositiones conceptuales quas, propter defectum ydiomatis, non propter ineptitudinem imaginative, exprimere nesciunt proferendo. Differunt autem isti termini predicti quantum ad rationem; advertendum autem, scilicet quod isti termini: “intentio, conceptus, ens rationis

⁷⁴⁷ rationabilitas] nabilitas *ms*

⁷⁴⁸ et] *unum verbum add. et del. ms*

et passio anime” se tenent ex parte anime; sed dicitur “conceptus” ens continens obiectum; conceptus enim in concipiendo dictum esse dicitur autem intentio, in quantum aliquando intenditur intelligi, vel aliquando intellectum in se: intentio enim ab intendendo⁷⁴⁹ vel ab intelligendo formaliter est; vocatur vero ens rationis in quantum ponitur in esse per subiectum intellectus et abstractionis⁷⁵⁰, passio vero anime dicta est in quantum perficit [†] animarum, prout cognoscet representatum pati: enim inter ceteras significationes quas habet verum est quod perfici [†], ut dictum est in *De anima*^{xxix}. Alia vero tria vocabula communia: “similitudo, ymago, species” se tenent ex parte obiecti, seu rei cognite, priusquam inducant animam in cognitionem illius; sed dicitur similitudo, in quantum assimilatur proprie obiecto; ymago vero appellatur, prout habet talem figuram et talem propter figuram representative, sicut obiectum et res cognita; species autem dicitur, prout⁷⁵¹ inducit prima notitiam talis forme qualem habet obiectum: species enim non modo verum quod forma, ut ait Petrus^{xxx}.

Octava distinctio terminorum est scilicet quod quidam sunt termini univoci, quidam equivoci, alii analogici et alii denominativi, alii sinonimi seu multivoci seu diversivoci (quod idem est pro nunc)^{xxxi}. Terminus univocus est ille qui significat multa, de quibus predicatur, et habet unam diffinitionem cum ipso convertibilem, que de quolibet termino significative diviso⁷⁵² illa significat essentialiter principaliter, ut iste terminus “animal” qui significat “hominem” et etiam “leonem” et sic de aliis de quibus predicatur, dicendo “homo est animal”, “bos est animal”; cuius termini “animal” omnino cum ipso convertibilis, que est substantia animata sensibilis, “leo est substantia animata sensibilis”

⁷⁴⁹ intendendo] intendo *scr. et corr. in marg. ms*

⁷⁵⁰ abstractionis] assuntionis *ms*

⁷⁵¹ prout] reducit *add. et del. ms*

⁷⁵² diviso] divisum *ms*

predicatur et cetera de eisdem. Unde dicitur “homo est substantia animata sensibilis”, “leo est substantia animata sensibilis”, sicut “bos est animal” et “leo est animal”.

Terminus equivocus est ille qui significat multa et predicatur de quolibet termino divisum significative; ille tamen non habet unam diffinitionem cum ipso convertibilem, que de illis seorsum predicetur: cuiusmodi est iste terminus “canis” qui significat animal latrabile, pisces marinos, et celeste sidus; de quibus terminis predicatur quod piscis marinus est canis et alia duo similiter, puta animal latrabile, celeste sidus; nec habet unam divisionem adequatam⁷⁵³ diffinitionem que⁷⁵⁴ de ipsis sic predicetur, ymmo pro quolibet significato est alia et alia designans ut dicit Boetius^{xxxii}. Si dicatur quod “ens per se potens substare accidentibus” est diffinitio que predicatur de isto termino canis et de animali latrabili, de pisce marino, et celesti sidere, quia quodlibet eorum est ens per se potens substare accidentibus, igitur canis predicatur univoce de illis. Sed dicendo quod illa diffinitio quelibet “entis per se et cetera” non est omnino huius termini “canis”, sed substantie cum qua convertitur; et ideo canis non est univocum, videlicet illa diffinitio non convertitur cum eo, sed substantia est univoca.

Terminus nominis analogicus^{xxxiii} est ille qui significat plura, unum terminum per prius, reliquum vero per posterius: hoc est significat unum / f. 15 v/ quod habet ordinem et reductionem ad substantiam, ut patet in 7^o *Metaphysice*^{xxxiv} in principio, ubi dicitur quod accidentia non sunt entia nisi quia entis. Sanum est analogum, quia dicitur de sanitate animalis per prius, hec enim est principium passionis; et dicitur de sanitate urine per posterius, quia illa sanitas habet habitudinem ad sanitatem animalis; sanitas enim multotiens est analogice tantum, scilicet in animali subiective, in urina significative, in

⁷⁵³ adequatam] *unum verbum add. et del. ms*

⁷⁵⁴ diffinitionem que] *add. in marg. ms*

cibus effective, in potione proprietative, in dieta conservative, in diffinitione aeris sustentative et in medico perceptive; et secundum hoc analogice variatur; et consimile dicendum est de aliis terminis analogicis suo modo. De gradibus autem analogice univocationis, seu unilogie et equilogie, nihil dicam pro nunc causa brevitatis, quia alias de hoc intendo facere specialiolem tractatum^{xxxv}.

Termini autem sinonimi seu multivoci vel diversivoci, quod idem est, sunt illi qui significant eandem rem; verumtamen propter diversas proprietate iure repertas, aut propter aliqua alia accidentia, seu propter aliquod sincathegorematicum eadem res sortitur diversa nomina: cuiusmodi sunt ensis⁷⁵⁵, spata, mucro; Marcus, Tullius, Cicero⁷⁵⁶. Et dicuntur multivoci, quia una res vocatur per multas voces; verumtamen terminus equivocus secundum unam ethimologiam posset dici multivocus, quasi vocans hoc est significans multa. Diversivoci^{xxxvi} dicuntur quia una res vocatur diversis vocibus, ut dictum est.

Terminus vero denominativus est ille qui habet consimilem principium in abstracto, sed non consimilem finem, sive significet substantiam, ut ab anima “animatus”, a corpore “corporeus”, sive accidens, ut ab albedine “albus”. Notandum autem, quod denominatio fit a forma inherente realiter alicui, ut “albus” ab albedine; aliqua fit denominatio a materia, ut statua dicitur vitrea vel argentea; aliqua fit ab effectu, ut movens et agens dicuntur ratione moti vel acti; aliqua fit a loco, ut mimatentis dicitur qui est Mimathe et tholosanus qui est Tholose^{xxxvii}; aliqua fit ab actu, cuius aliud est obiectum et non subiectum: ut cum dicimus quod Petrus est amatus a Guillelmo vel laudatus; aliqua fit a parte, ut cum dicimus quod iste est inamatus vel capitatus.

⁷⁵⁵ ensis] *unum verbum add. et del. ms*

⁷⁵⁶ Cicero] *sincero ms*

Intendendum est quod isti termini etiam ab una parte scilicet mobile⁷⁵⁷ sumpta, concretum denominativa, significant frequenter in logica idem quod adiectivum in gramatica: ut “albus”, “niger”. Unde⁷⁵⁸ mobile dicitur quod movetur per tres articulos vel per tres determinationes; dicitur autem sumptum quia sumitur ab abstracto, loquendo realiter: album enim est album realiter per albedinem, sed dicitur concretum prout concernit illud in quo est; denominativum vero vocatur prout denominat subiectum in quo est illud, quod exprimit talem concretum; sed dicitur adiectivum, quia adiacet substantivo. Similiter ex alia parte isti termini subiectum principale simillimum et abstractum significant idem; sed dicitur subiectum prout significat per modum per se stantis; fixum vero dicitur in quantum non dependet ad aliud sed figitur in terminis suis; principale vero, quod est principium concreti realiter, ut dictum est; abstractum vero vocatur, quia abstracte vocaliter et grammaticae loquendi a concreto, ut a concreto huius nominis “albus/-a/-um, albi/-e” addita “-do” fit albedo et cetera de aliis; vel dicitur abstractum, quia abstrahit a modo inherenti et significat per modum precisi.

Nona distinctio terminorum est hec: quod aliqui sunt termini universales et alii sunt singulares.^{xxxviii} Terminus universalis est ille qui significat multa non equivoce et qui de pluribus predicatur, ut “homo, animal, albedo, linea” et consimiles; unde omnes illi termini dicuntur in loyca universales magis frequenter, qui dicuntur in gramatica “qui appellantur”.

Terminus singularis est ille qui multa non significat nec de pluribus predicatur, saltem univoce, ut pone [de] Guillelmo, Christo, [et] de aliis; ita quod illi termini clare

⁷⁵⁷ mobile] supponunt *add. et del. ms*

⁷⁵⁸ unde] un *add. et del. ms*

loquendo vocantur singulares in loyca, qui dicuntur nomina propria vel appropriata vel quibus ponunt ista pronomina demonstrativa “ego, cui, hic, iste”, in gramatica.

Terminorum Utilium

Terminorum Utilium alii sunt transcendentis et alii non transcendentis^{xxxix}.

Terminus transcendens est ille qui omnia que sunt significat et de omnibus terminis specialibus, ut supponit, personaliter predicat; et sunt sex termini transcendentis: scilicet ens, unum, verum, bonum, res et aliud. Et dicuntur transcendentis, quia omnia transcendent in gradu et in predicando, cum nihil habeant supra ipsamet sicut aliquid quod possit effingere rationes eorum et predicationem. Quidquid enim est, est ens et bonum, accipiendo bonum pro bonitate entis et non pro bonitate morum, nec artis, nec nature, nec forme. Quidquid est etiam [est] verum, loquendo de veritate, que est rei entitas; quidquid est etiam est res, et patet cuilibet; et consimiliter potest induci de aliis terminibus transcendentibus.

Oportet autem scire quod isti termini transcendentis multas habent distinctiones, de quarum aliquibus magis usitatis, que magis indigent declaratione descr[ib]endum⁷⁵⁹ est. Et una est distinctio, quod entium aliud est reale et aliud est ens rationis. Ens reale est id quod non dependet nec fit de anima, quod quinimmo habet esse, secluso omni opere intellectus: ut lapis, celi, homo, elementa, omnia animata, et sic de aliis discurrendo.

Ens autem rationis, ut tenet communis scola, est per oppositum quod subcessat intellectus opere circumscripto, et dependet ab opere rationis, ut sunt intentiones et omnia universalia: hoc autem probabitur alias; et universaliter omnia que sunt in anima subiective. Advertendum autem quod ex una parte ista sunt idem, scilicet ens rationis,

⁷⁵⁹ describendum] descendum *ms*

ens in anima subiective, ens intentionale et ens reale de “reor/-eris”, quod ponunt nonnulli. Sed dicitur “ens rationis”, quia ponitur in esse per intellectum rationalem in ratiocinando; dicitur autem “ens in anima subiective”, quia anima est subiectum, cui anime inheret formaliter; additur etiam “subiective” quia licet omnia entia sint in anima quodammodo, scilicet obiective, non tamen sunt subiective; vocatur vero “ens intentionale”, quia est intentio; sed dicitur “ens reale” de “reor/-ris”, quia rendo et arbitrando causatur. Et similiter minor predicta superius, scilicet conceptus, ymago, similitudo, species, passio anime equivalet istis: in significando sunt enim idem⁷⁶⁰ ens quod fit per opus intellectus, licet forte aliqua eorum causantur ab obiecto⁷⁶¹ et possunt esse subiective in potentiis anime sensitivis.

Similiter ex alia parte ista etiam /f. 16 r/ sunt eadem, scilicet ens extra animam, ens reale de “ratus-rata-ratum”, ens firmum; et eorum ethimologia potest patere cuilibet: ista namque significant illud ens quod habet esse secluso opere intellectus, ut dictum est.

Alia est distinctio entium, scilicet quod aliud est ens positivum, et aliud privativum, et aliud negativum. Ens positivum est illud formaliter quod habet aliquam entitatem, per quam ponitur extra nichil: ut homo, animal et similia. Ens autem privativum, prout nunc loquimur de ipso, est illud quod non habet entitatem⁷⁶² formaliter sed privativum⁷⁶³ habitum: ut cecitas, que privat visum, et surditas, que privat auditum. Sed ens negativum est illud, ut dicitur communiter, quod removet et negat ens positivum cui opponitur contradiccione, ut non homo, non animal, non lapis.

⁷⁶⁰ idem] *unum verbum add. et del. ms*

⁷⁶¹ obiecto] *obiectus ms*

⁷⁶² Entitatem] *entitate ms*

⁷⁶³ privativum] *privat ms*

Alia est distinctio⁷⁶⁴ entium, scilicet quod aliud est ens infinitum, aliud finitum: ens infinitum est ens inlimitatum, ut Deus; ens finitum est ens limitatum, ut creatura.

Alia est distinctio entium, quod aliud est ens per se et aliud per accidens: ens per se est illud quod est probatum vel est in predicto: ut substantia, quantitas, qualitas et species eorum. Ens per accidens est illud quod non est de esse alicuius nec de conceptu quidditatis ipsius, et est triplex: secundum quod aliquis potest accidere alicui termino, nam quandoque subiectum accedit accidenti⁷⁶⁵: et sic homo accedit albo; quandoque accidens accedit subiecto, et sic album accedit homini; et quandoque accidens accedit accidenti, ut album musico. Proprie tamen propter nos est sciendum quod ens per se dicitur tripliciter: quoddam est ens per se, quod non est natum inherere alicui, nec accidere per inherentiam nec per informationem, et sic sola individua de genere substantie dicuntur esse entia per se; aliud est ens per se quod⁷⁶⁶, licet non accedit alicui per inherentiam, sicut accidens accedit subiecto, accedit cui per informationem substantialem et sic sola forma substantialis de genere substantie est ens per se; tertio modo dicitur ens per se illud quod non componitur ex pluribus rebus diversorum generum, et sic quodlibet individuum cuiuslibet predicationis est ens per se. Ens autem per accidens est illud quod est compositum ex rebus diversorum generum, sicut album et musicum: album enim dicitur [propter] albedinem, que est qualitas, et subiectum quod est substantia vel quantitas, et sic de aliis; vel ens per accidens est quod accedit alicui, quod dictum est supra.

Alia est distinctio entium, scilicet quod aliud est ens in actu et aliud est ens in potentia. Intelligendum est quod aliud potest esse ens in potentia tripliciter: uno modo, quod non

⁷⁶⁴ distinctio] *unum verbum add. et del. ms*

⁷⁶⁵ accidenti] *accidendi ms*

⁷⁶⁶ quod] *libet add. et del. ms*

est actu in rerum natura tamen potest esse, et sic accipiendo ens in potentia; ens in actu, et ens in potentia dividunt ens cum nichil, sic unum potentia, sic esse ens in actu et ens in potentia; et sic dicimus ipsum esse ens in potentia; et vocatur ens in potentia non quod dicat aliquid possibilem, sed quia de tali termino significative sumpto potest ens cum hoc verbo potentialiter predicari: contingat enim vere dicere quod Antichristus potest esse ens. Alio modo dicitur ens esse in potentia, non quoniam sit actu in rerum natura, sed quia est in potentia ad diversas formas: et sic maius est ens in potentia, ut per Philosophum *Nono Metaphysice*, capitulo primo; et cum ente in potentia loquitur philosophus in plerisque locis, ut patet inspicienti dicta eius^{xl}. Secundo modo dicitur esse ens in potentia, quia potest aliquid producere et efficere: et sic forma est ens in potentia, et per oppositionem materia non est sic ens in potentia, quia materie non debetur agere sed pati, ut prius per convenientem idem substantialiter in rebus. Similiter ens in actu dicitur tripliciter per oppositionem ad tres modos predictos: uno modo de illo ente quod est actu in esse productum, et sic Sortes et Plato sunt entia in actu; secundo modo dicitur ens in actu de illo quod non est in potentia receptiva et subiectiva ad aliquas formas, ut sunt multe forme accidentales; tertio modo dicitur ens in actu per oppositionem ad tertium modum predictum, ut potest patere cuilibet.

Alia est distinctio entium, scilicet quod⁷⁶⁷ aliud est ens verum et aliud est ens falsum. Ens verum est affirmare quod est vel negare quod non est; ens falsum est affirmare quod non est et negare quod est. Si vero sunt alie⁷⁶⁸ distinctiones entium, has inquirent iuvenes studiosi.

⁷⁶⁷ quod] quot ad *ms*

⁷⁶⁸ alie] *add. in marg. ms*

Nunc restat dicere de alio membro predictae distinctionis principaliter, scilicet de terminis non transcendentibus, propter quod⁷⁶⁹ sciendum quod terminus non transcendens est omnis alius terminus a predictis terminis transcendentibus. Unde terminorum non transcendentium alii sunt⁷⁷⁰ predicabiles et alii sunt non predicabiles. Termini predicabiles sunt illi qui ponuntur in predicato in recta linea, ut genus et species vel aliter<e> ut differentie: ille terminus est genus, qui predicatur de pluribus differentibus proprie in eo quod quid univoce, et habet differentias formales extra suum conceptum existentes, ut animal et color et consimilia; unde primo est intelligendum quod genus non est aliqua res extra animam existens, de essentia illorum de quibus predicatur, sicut aliqui ymaginantur, dicentes hoc esse de intentione Aristotelis: qui si viderent dicta Philosophi, ut apparet, male⁷⁷¹ intellexerunt^{xli}. Hec enim entitas talis non potest dici in re extra animam. Tamen quia rei extra animam existenti non dicitur predicari, sed termino cum termino debeat modus subiacendi et modus predicandi, ut ponunt auctores antiqui gratia facilitatis, sed constat quod generi debetur predicari, ut clamat tota logica, ergo genus non est nisi terminus; et de hoc supersedeo causa brevitatis.

Genus ergo est quedam intentio anime, quod loco terminum conceptum predicatur⁷⁷² de pluribus remotibus differentibus speciebus, ut dictum est, sed pro rebus quas significat^{xlii}. Unde, sicut quando profero istam propositionem “homo est animal” vox predicatur de voce, non pro voce, quia ut sic predicatio esset; ideo, cum vox sit vox predicati, sicut est de intentione generis, quia non predicat pro se de illis de quibus predicat, sed pro re quam significat sic predicatam; nec quod predicatum conveniat

⁷⁶⁹ quod] quot *ms*

⁷⁷⁰ sunt] plurales et alii sunt non plurales *add. et del. ms*

⁷⁷¹ apparet, male] appareat naturale *ms*

⁷⁷² predicatur] predicabilis *ms*

realiter subiecto in esse reali, sed denotatur; illud quod importatur per subiectum est idem cum illo quod importatur per⁷⁷³ predicatum, per quod predicatum alia plura entis importantur; et hoc facit predicationem superiorem de inferiori, ut dicendo “homo est animal”. Genus autem est duplex: quoddam est generalissimum, aliud est subalternum. Genera generalissima sunt decem predicamenta^{xliii}, scilicet: substantia, [qualitas], quantitas, relatio, actio, passio, quando, ubi, situs, et habitus; de quibus hic nihil dicendum est. Genus subalternum est ille terminus, qui minus significat quam genera generalia et plus quam species specialissima, si sumatur abstractivae et existat in recta linea predicabili: ut animal significat minus quam substantia et plus quam homo. /f. 16v/

Species est duplex: quedam est species specialissima et alia subalterna^{xliv}. Species specialissima est nomen appellativum abstractivae sumptum, quod significat ea que significant nomina propria solum vel appropriata, ut homo qui⁷⁷⁴ significat Sortem et Platonem et singulum individuum⁷⁷⁵; et albedo, que significat hanc albedinem et illam et sic de singulis.

Species subalterna est idem quod genus subalternum, de quo dictum; et sicut dictum est de genere, quod intentio anime predicabilis de pluribus differentibus speciebus, que non est dicenda⁷⁷⁶ inferioribus, sic<ut> consimiliter est dicendum de specie specialissima, scilicet quod est intentio anime predicabilis de pluribus differentibus numero. Differunt autem, quia species est communis ad pauciora quam genus, ita quod genus est signum plurium et species pauciorum. Illi autem [sunt] termini adiectivi, qui

⁷⁷³ per] subiectum *add. et del. ms*

⁷⁷⁴ qui] que *ms*

⁷⁷⁵ individuum] individua *ms*

⁷⁷⁶ dicenda] decenda *ms*

dividunt genera differentie, ut corporeum et incorporeum qui dividunt substantiam, rationalem et irrationalem qui dividunt animal. Notandum etiam quod quemadmodum genus et species non sunt res extra animam existentes, ut dictum est, ita tenendum est de differentia.

Differentia enim non est aliud quam interventum speciei, per quod⁷⁷⁷ una specie distinguatur ab alia^{xlv}. Tunc eiusmodi differentia non est predicabile, sed esset materia vel forma vel compositum utriusque, que non predicantur, cum sint res extra animam existentes significative.

Sed differentia est quoddam predicabile, quod est proprium uni speciei ita quod non alteri, et vocatur differentia essentialis, non quia est de essentia rei, sed quia exprimit partem essentialem rei et nihil extrinsecum rei. Unde differentia, de qua nunc est sermo, semper exprimit partem rei et aliqua exprimit partem materialem et aliqua exprimit partem formalem, sicut ista differentia hominis, scilicet rationale, exprimit animam, que anima est de essentia hominis, et exprimit eam ad modum quo album exprimit hominem; hec etiam differentia, scilicet materiale, exprimit consimiliter et proportionaliter eodem modo materiam. Et ideo falsum est de vi vocis et de virtute sermonis quod multi moderni dicunt, quod omnis differentia simpliciter a forma^{xlvi}.

Differentia namque simpliciter a forma, ut animatum, et simpliciter a materia, ut materiale; quamvis autem differentia aliquando sumatur a forma et aliquando a materia, semper tamen differentia habet rationem forme quia, sicut in naturalibus forma supponit materiam, ita etiam in distinctionibus genus ponitur loco materie, differentia vero loco et ratione forme. Et vocatur differentia, quia est medium concludendi negativam propositionem, cuiuscumque alterius ab eo cuius est differentia: verbi gratia, rationale est

⁷⁷⁷ quot] quod *ms*

medium concludendi hominem non esse aliud ab eo, et negandi ipsum a quocumque alio, dicendo sic: “nullum rationale est asinus, omnis homo est rationale, ergo nullus homo est asinus”. Et ita consimiliter, formaliter est de omnibus aliis differentiis tenendum secundum opinionem Aristotelis^{xlvi} et commentatorem, si bene intelligantur, quamvis forte quemdam eiusdem oppositum credam dicere.

Terminus vero predicabilis est ille qui non ponitur in predicato, ut proprium et accidens^{xlvi}. Terminus qui est proprium est terminus magis frequenter terminatus in – bilis, ut risibile in –ibile quod, in quantum proprium materie, omni et soli et semper conversum ponitur de eo cuius est, et non iudicat eius esse; quando autem hec distinctio sic intelligenda et multa alia istis collateralia patebit suo loco^{xlix}.

Termini autem qui faciunt predicabile de accidente sunt nomina adiectiva, que non significant substantiam, ut “album, nigrum, coloratum”. Verba etiam faciunt principale de activitate, ut “currere” et “sedere” et consimilia. Advertendum etiam, gratia predictorum, quod ista vocabula: “universale, commune, predicabile, predicatum, predicamentum, quale, quid, substantia secunda, genus, et species”, propter quorum multiplicationem et significati ignorantiam iuvenes recurrunt, et per restrictionem veritatis, isti in quantum termini significant frequenter in loyca idem quod nomen appellativum in gramatica.

Differunt termini aliquantulum inter se quantum ad rationem vel penes connotata. Nam primo termini, scilicet universale, commune, predicabile, videntur esse synonyma et sunt communia⁷⁷⁸ magis⁷⁷⁹ quam alia: nam quidquid est predicamentum, accipiendo predicamentum proprie stricte. Quidquid est predicamentum materiale, quod secunda

⁷⁷⁸ communia] *add. in marg. ms*

⁷⁷⁹ magis] *unum verbum add. et del. ms*

substantia genus est species, quodlibet eorum est predicabile, commune et universale et non sequitur semper e contrario. Universale autem commune predicamentum accipiendo large, predicamentum et predicabile ad invicem convertuntur: nam quidquid est unum, est aliud; differunt enim quantum ad rationem, quia dicitur universale, in quantum unum versatur in pluribus per predicationem, ut iste terminus “animal”, qui est unus, versatur in asino de quo predicatur “dictus asinus est animal”; et ita est intelligendum de aliis universalibus. Sed dicitur commune, quia unum convenit multis, ut animal quod convenit homini: homo enim est animal; et convenit asino, quia asinus est animal; et sic de aliis. Dicitur autem predicabile, quia est aptum natum predicari de pluribus, ut iste terminus “color”, qui predicatur de albedine et nigredine. Sed vocatur predicamentum, pro ut dicitur de alio, seu ut habet rationem inherendi ad subiectum inter autem alios, scilicet eos qui sunt genus, species, predicatum, secunda substantia; isti duo, scilicet genus et species, quodammodo se habent in pluribus, tamen non in actu subsistendi, quoniam natura quidquid est rationale et substantia secunda; et quale quid est genus, et species, potest patere ex predictis.

Est etiam diligenter intelligendum quod isti termini “individuum” et “singulare” convertuntur apud logicam et quodlibet eorum potest accipi tripliciter natura et nomine; dicitur individuum vel singulare id, quod est una res numero et non plures, ut supponit per se: et ita est individuum, scilicet sic signum plurium¹. Alii dicunt individuum rem extra animam, que est una numero et non plures, neque est signum alicuius; et sic quelibet substantia singularis extra animam est individuum, ut Petrus, et ergo nullus; et de tali individuo loquitur Philosophus frequenter, specialiter in *Predicamentis*, capitulo de

substantia, ut patet ibi videnti^{li}. Tertio modo dicitur individuum signum proprium unius, quod predicatur de uno solo: et sic patet individuum.

Ad huc dicuntur⁷⁸⁰ substantie, quia aliud est nomen proprium alicuius, ut Sortes et Plato, aliud est pronomen demonstrativum cum adiectivo substantivo, ut dicendo “hic homo” demonstrando Sortem, unde supposita termini communis sunt duplicia sicut didici. In prima quedam sunt per se et quedam per accidens, verbi /f. 17r/ gratia, istius termini “album” supposita per se sunt hoc album et illud album, sed supposita per accidens sunt Sortes et Plato. Sciendum est ulterius quod isti termini<s>, “singulare, particulare, individuum, unum numero, hoc aliquid, prima substantia, et terminus discretus”, significant idem in logica quod nomen proprium in gramatica, vel illud cui possunt addi propria hec pronomina, “hic” et “iste”. Exemplum primi, ut “Petrus et Guillelmus”; exemplum secundi ut, “hec albedo et nigredo”. Distinguuntur autem isti termini ad invicem quantum ad rationem; quod patere potest, si inspiciatur ad eorum ethimologiam: quia dicitur “particulare” qui parva pars subiectiva universalis, cum non sit nisi unum individuum; particulare enim dictum est a particula; dicitur tamen “individuum”, quasi indivisum in se et indivisibile in plura individua talia, sicut predictum erat; sed dicitur “unum numero” quia est unum si computetur numerando^{lii}; vocatur autem “hoc aliquid”, quia est vel potest esse aliquid demonstratum; sed vocatur “prima substantia”, quia proprie et principaliter et maxime substat; dicitur vero “terminus discretus”, quia pauca significat: talis enim terminus discretus est terminatus et limitatus; sed dicitur “nomen proprium”, quia convenit uni soli saltem univoce . Notandum⁷⁸¹ etiam quod isti termini

⁷⁸⁰ dicuntur] sive *add. et del. ms*

⁷⁸¹ notandum] *noverandum ms*

“prima substantia” et “unum numero”, proprie loquendo, non dicuntur nisi [de] individuīs substantiīs, alii autem termini dicuntur de individuīs cuiuslibet predicati.

Ex predictis potest colligi quod alii sunt termini tantum superiores, et⁷⁸² alii sunt tantum inferiores, et alii sunt superiores et inferiores insimul. Termini tantum superiores sunt sex termini transcendentēs, de quibus dictum est supra; termini tantum inferiores sunt tantum individua. Termini vero medii inter istos sunt superiores et inferiores insimul, licet re vera diversimode.

Advertendum denique ad huiusmodi complementum, ne iuvenes in malis principiis informentur⁷⁸³, quod decem predicamenta⁷⁸⁴ non sunt nisi termini ordinati secundum superius et inferius, et non sunt res extra animam existentes, sicut aliqui fabulant, nisi acciperentur termini scripti vel prolati; et hoc potest probari multipliciter, et esse de intentione Aristotelis. Primo quidem igitur dicitur in predicamentis quod eorum qui sunt, nullam complexionem dicunt: singulum autem significat substantiam, aut quantitatem, aut qualitatem, aut ad aliud etc. Sed illud quod⁷⁸⁵ significat est vox vel terminus, quia res extra animam: ut lapis non significat sed significatur. Unde Philosophus vocat incomplexa “animal”, “bos” et similia.

Item dicit infra paulo post, singula igitur eorum, que predicta sunt, ipsa quidem secunda, se in nulla dicuntur affirmatione; horum autem ad se intentione, complexione, affirmatio fit. Hoc est quod nullum predicamentum nec unus terminus alicuius predicati de se facit propositionem affirmativam vel negativam, nisi cum aliis predicamentis, vel alio eorum, cum terminis seu terminus componatur seu convertatur. Cui consona quod

⁷⁸² et] inferiores *add. et del. ms*

⁷⁸³ informentur] informentur *ms*

⁷⁸⁴ predicamenta] sunt *add. et del.*

⁷⁸⁵ quod] quot *ms*

dicit *primo Topicorum*^{liii}: negatio autem opinatur nos dicere quod unumquisque eorum per se dictum propositio vel problema est, scilicet quantum ex hiis et ad hec problemata et propositiones; sed manifestum est quod propositio affirmativa vel negativa non habent esse et componi nisi ex terminis, ut evidenter, nisi contra ostendenti, ergo. Huiusmodi autem⁷⁸⁶ casum, scilicet quod aliquid predicatum de se non faciet enunciationem affirmativam vel negativam, Philosophus inde subdit dicens: “videtur enim omnis affirmatio aut esse vera aut esse falsa^{liv}”. Eorum autem, quod secundum complexionem nullam dicuntur, neque vera neque falsa, sicut “homo album est”. Propterea dicit idem Philosophum ubi supra, capitulo de substantia: “sicut videtur autem omnis substantia hoc aliquid significare^{lv,787}. Et in primis quidem substantiis individuale et verum est quoniam “hoc aliquid” significant, in secundis vero substantiis videtur quidem similiter sub appellationis signo “hoc aliquid” significare, quandoquidem dixerit “hominem” vel “animal” non tantum verum est, sed magis quale quid significat; neque tamen unum est, quod subiectum est quemadmodum prima substantia, sed de pluribus “homo” dicitur et “animal”. Sed illud quod significat est terminus vel vox, igitur sequitur quod prima substantia et secunda sunt termini: nescio enim quo modo Philosophus quantum ad hoc clarius posset loqui.

Et infert infra quod plus in genere quam in specie⁷⁸⁸ determinatio fit, hoc est quod per plura potest determinari genus quam species; et sequitur dicens: “Enim animal plus complectitur quam dicens hominem^{lvi}” ex quo patet quod, cum Aristoteles non dicat nec proferat nisi vocem vel terminum, nec aliquid complectatur seu contineat aliquid, nisi terminus vel vox, ut nunc loquamur de continentia, sequitur quot genus et species, que

⁷⁸⁶ autem] aut *ms*

⁷⁸⁷ significare] quando quid dixit *add. et del. ms*

⁷⁸⁸ in specie] ipse *ms*

sunt in predicato, non sunt nisi termini. Preterea dicit idem Philosophus ubi supra, capitulo de relatione, ad aliud “nec talia dicuntur quecumque hoc ipsum quod sunt”^{lvii} Aristoteles declaratur vel quomodolibet alter ad aliud; supra quo verbo dicunt expositores quod aliqua regula declaratur ad aliud sub habitudine generali⁷⁸⁹; quod innuitur per hoc quod dicitur Aristoteles. Alia vero regula declaratur ad aliud sub habitudine alterius casus, quod innuitur per hoc quod dicitur, vel quomodolibet alter ad aliud. Sed constat quod nihil dicitur ad aliud sub habitudine generali et aliorum casuum, nisi nomen vel termini: igitur sequitur intentum. Confirmatur istud per eundem Philosophum, qui dicit paulo post: “Secundum casum, aliquotiens differunt secundum locutionem”, et loquitur de regulis, et exemplificat “ut diciplina /f. 17v/ disciplinati disciplina disciplinantium”; sed evidenter est quod nihil differt secundum casum, nisi vox vel termini^{lviii}.

Preterea dicit idem Philosophus eodem libro, capitulo de qualitate, sic: “Qualia vero dicitur qui secundum hec denominantur ab alio, nisi terminus^{lix}”, ut patet per scientes gramaticam. Preterea dicit Philosophus in eodem capitulo sic: “Rarum vero et spissum, asper et leve putabuntur quandam qualitatem significare, sed aliena huiusmodi putabuntur esse, additione que circa qualitatem est”^{lx}, quendam enim positionem quodammodo videntur significare uterque per casum, cum igitur ista sit in predicato propositionis, et significat quod dictum est; sequitur quod predicatum est terminus cui debetur significare.

Preterea dicit idem Philosophus *Primo Thopicorum* quod predicata sunt in predicatis, sed predicata non sunt nisi termini, ut habetur ex eodem primo, si bene intelligatur^{lxi}: igitur.

Preterea dicit idem Philosophus in *Primo Elenchorum* quod nominibus utimur pro rebus, hoc est dictum quod unum nomen predicat de alio nomine non pro nomine, sed pro

⁷⁸⁹ Generali] *tria verba add. et del. ms*

re quam significat^{lxii}. Hoc idem dicitur, Damascenus in *Loyca* sua capitulo 32° in quantum oportet cognoscere quod sunt predicamenta, idest generalia, sub quibus refertur omnis vox similiter dicta^{lxiii}.

Item dicit Philosophus quod genus et species predicantur de individuis, et hoc insinuat tota logica, sed hoc non potest esse res extra animam, cum illa non sit genus nec species, ut dictum est et adhuc dicetur.

Preterea dicit Philosophus in 2° *Maiorum*, quod nomen ad aliquid additum⁷⁹⁰, quod suum intellectum illius, quod dicitur proferri, non predicatur et loquitur de titulo logicali, sed manifestum est quod nihil est nomen, nisi sit terminus^{lxiv}: igitur.

Preterea dicit Albertus^{lxv} quod predicativum est ordinatio predicabilium secundum sub, supra, et latere; sed predicabilia non sunt nisi termini, ut ostensum est supra; et patet de intencione Aristotelis, Boetii, Alberti et aliorum philosophorum predicamenta esse terminus essentie prime intentionis, si quis⁷⁹¹ sane inspiciat⁷⁹² dicta eorum in sensu in quo fiunt. Et ultra hoc predicta⁷⁹³ possunt conferri hac ratione, scilicet quod predicamenta non sunt nisi termini, ratio verisimilis est, quoniam quodlibet predicamentum predicatur de⁷⁹⁴ suis inferioribus, secundum quod insinuat tota logica dicendo: “homo est substantia”, “linea est quanta”.

Sed manifestum est quod illud quod subicitur et predicatur non est res extra animam existens, sed est terminus: patet, quia terminus est illud quod est aptum natum predicari et, si predicatur de pluribus, dicitur terminus communis. Terminus enim communis, ut ait magister Petrus Yspanus in sua *Summa*^{lxvi}, est qui est aptus natus de pluribus predicari; si

⁷⁹⁰ additus] ad *ms* add. in marginem

⁷⁹¹ quis] quit *ms*

⁷⁹² inspiciat] inspicias *ms*

⁷⁹³ predicta] ponunt add. et del. *ms*

⁷⁹⁴ de] *ms* add. in maginem

autem predicatur de uno solo⁷⁹⁵, dicitur terminus discretus, est enim terminus discretus qui predicatur de uno solo, ut patet per eundem.

Confirmatur ista ratio sic: quia modus predicandi et subiacendi sunt rationes formales termini, per quas distinguitur a parte et dictione, ut pars est, hoc patet per sincategoremam; cum igitur ratio formalis alicuius non debeat alteri rei ab ea cuius est, quia aliter⁷⁹⁶ non esset illius ratio formalis, sequitur igitur quod predicari et subici non debet nisi termino: quod est propositum. Et ista⁷⁹⁷ sufficiant pro nunc ad probandum istam conclusionem, scilicet quod predicamenta non sunt nisi termini.

Propter tamen cavillationem est intelligendum quod Philosophus frequenter loquitur de predicamentis ut supponunt personaliter et pro rebus quas significant, ut cum dicitur quod proprie proprium est substantie quod sit susceptibilis contrariorum; hoc enim non debet termino ut supponit per se, sed prout sumptus personaliter et significative. Similiter, cum dicit quod quantitas hic contrariarum; et sic in multis locis. Quoniam autem loquitur de ipsis predicamentis, ut predicari supponunt per se et simpliciter substantie, cum dicitur quod prima substantia significat “hoc aliquid”, secunda vero substantia significat “quale quid”, hoc enim scilicet significare non debet substantie extra animam existenti, sed debet tantum termino vel voci. Et propter hac removetur una obiectio⁷⁹⁸ puerilis quam aliqui latrantes⁷⁹⁹ adducunt, quod de facili solvitur per predicta.

Et si protulatur quod Petrus dicit quod decem predicamenta fieri decem rerum principia^{lxvii}, sed termini non sunt rerum principia, igitur predicamenta non sunt termini;

⁷⁹⁵ solo] *ms septem verba deleta sunt forsitan: ut patet per... confirmatur ista ratio*

⁷⁹⁶ aliter] alter *ms*

⁷⁹⁷ ista] istam *ms*

⁷⁹⁸ obiectio] abiectio *ms*

⁷⁹⁹ latrantes] latrantis *ms*

dicendum quod principium est duplex: causalitate et constitutive; exemplum primi, sicut quodlibet superius relatione⁸⁰⁰ suorum inferiorum; exemplum secundi, sicut quelibet causatur sive inter intrinsece sive extrinsece relatione⁸⁰¹ sui effectus. Unde primo modo predicamenta sunt principia, scilicet communitate et predicative, et hoc est medius personaliter, ut patet ibidem, si bene intelligitur. Et dico ultra, quod auctoritas false inducitur quantum ad unam partem, quia Petrus non dicit quod predicamenta sunt principia rerum, tamen dicit quod sunt principia et causans entium⁸⁰², ut apparet inspicienti.

Et si dicatur adhuc quod Philosophus dividit ens reale et ens rationis, et ens reale in decem predicamenta, sed divisum probatur de dividendibus, igitur predicamenta sunt entia realia: dicendum quod numquam clare in dictis Aristotelis inveni, nec in aliquo opere doctorum auctenticorum legi, scilicet quod ens reale dividitur in decem predicamenta. Unde, cum hoc reperi⁸⁰³ in quibusdam cartabellis aliquorum magistrorum⁸⁰⁴, de quorum dictis in omnibus fidem adhibeo, dico etiam quod hec ratio est contra eos, sicut est contra me; cum ipsi ponant intentiones esse in prima specie qualitatis, et cum qualitas sit ens reale, sequitur quod ens reale predicatur de ente rationis. Dico tamen pro me et pro ipsis quod hec divisio, scilicet quod ens dividitur in ens reale et ens rationis, non est simpliciter^{lxviii} per oppositionem, eo modo quod animal dividitur per rationale et irrationale; sed est divisio necesse in significatum, eo modo quod Philosophus in *Primo Priorum*^{lxix} dividit contingens, scilicet in contingens nature et in contingens rationis: contingens ad utrumque est possibile, et tamen maius est quod alterum

⁸⁰⁰ relatione] relationi *ms*

⁸⁰¹ relatione] relationi *ms*

⁸⁰² entium] ensium *ms*

⁸⁰³ reperi] reperiri *ms*

⁸⁰⁴ magistrorum] magistrarum *ms*

membrum istorum, scilicet possibile, predicatur de tribus. Hoc enim est vere⁸⁰⁵ contingens, natum est possibile⁸⁰⁶, et hoc similiter contingens rationis est possibile. Et idem /f.18r/ iudicium est de contingenti ad utrumlibet, scilicet quod est possibile. Quare sic potest esse in proposito, non potest autem faciliter dici, secundum quod illa dictio, “ens rationale dividitur in decem predicamenta”, est consimilis talis dictioni, “ens reale in decem predicamenta”: hoc est, quod ens reale seu ens extra animam importatur et significatur per hoc predicamentum quod est substantia, et per hoc predicamentum quod est qualitas et sic de aliis, et ita quodlibet predicamentum. Ens⁸⁰⁷ reale, ut supponit personaliter et significative, est aliud [quam] ens rationis, ut supponit per se simpliciter; de intentionibus verum est dicendum quod sunt entia realia, subjective sumendo, que⁸⁰⁸ et sunt in anima subjective, que est ens reale, vel sunt entia realia obiective, cum sumantur ab obiecto reali mediate vel immediate. Et hoc sufficit.

^{xv} Cfr. Boethius translator Aristotelis, *De sophisticis elenchis*, Ed. I. Bekker, Berolini, Reimer 1831-1870 [Bekker 165a], chapter I, p. 6: “Quemadmodum igitur illic qui non sunt prompti numeros ferre a scientibus expelluntur, eodem modo et in orationibus qui nominum virtutis sunt ignari paralogizantur et ipsi disputantes et alios audientes”.

^{xvi} Cfr. Boethius *In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Duo. Editio Prima, Seu Minora Commentaria*. Ed. J.-P. Migne, Patrologia Latina 64, Paris, 1847, chapter I *De Signis*, (col. 407 B), who is probably also the source for William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974, chapter I, p. 7.

^{xvii} Cfr. William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, [ed.cit], chapter IV, p. 15, also William of Sherwood, *Syntheticoremata*, in *Medieval Studies III*, 1941, p. 48-93; Boethius, *Introductio ad Syllogismos categoricos*, Ed. J.-P. Migne, Patrologia Latina 64, Paris, 1847 (col. 764D) and Priscianus, *Institutiones Grammaticae*, [Prisciani Caesariensis grammatici Opera]. Ed. A. Krehn, Lipsiae, in *libraria Weidmannia*, 1819-20, I 60.

⁸⁰⁵ vere] vera *ms*

⁸⁰⁶ possibile] genus *add. et del. ms*

⁸⁰⁷ ens] ent *ms*

⁸⁰⁸ que] qui *ms*

^{xviii} Boethius translator Aristotelis, *Peri hermeneias [uel De Interpretatione]*, Ed. I. Bekker, Berolini, Reimer 1831-1870, p. 20, line 5 (Bekker : 20a) “‘omnis' enim non universale significat, sed quoniam universaliter”.

^{xix} Cfr. William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit], chapter V, pp. 16-18.

^{xx} Here the text is original and does not seem to be following Ockham, *species III* almost seems opposite to Ockham.

^{xxi} Cfr. William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit], chapter X, pp. 35-38, and Priscianus, *Institutiones Grammaticae*, [ed. cit], II c6 n31 and Thomas Aquinas *Summa Theologica*, Ed. Commissio Leonina, Roma 1882, I, 41 a 5.

^{xxii} Here the text seems to follow *verbatim* William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit], chapter X, p. 36, condensing it and maybe misunderstanding it.

^{xxiii} Cfr. William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit], chapter X, p. 35. It seems to be making a summary of it, and to misunderstand it.

^{xxiv} Cfr. William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit], chapter XI, p. 38 and following. The fifth *distinctio* is an original addition, while the *distinctio* six is again along the lines of William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, chapter XI, even though synthesizing it originally. Confront also with Boethius, *In Categoriae Aristotelis*, Patrologia Latina 64, col. 169 and *In Librum De Interpretatione*, Patrologia Latina 64, col. 301 (chapter *De Nomine*) and Avicenna, *Logica*. Here the text is not repeating Ockham *verbatim*, it is more concise and adds a different note. The terms ‘*communis scola*’ and ‘*res extra animam existentis*’ are not present in Ockham.

^{xxv} The seventh *distinctio* reports the division present in William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit], chapter XI, p. 40, but in an autonomous manner, not dependent on the previous division. Ockham later in chapter XII explains the difference between the terms of first and second intention much more in detail.

^{xxvi} Cfr. William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit], chapter XII, p. 40.

^{xxvii} See Avicenna latinus, *Liber de Philosophia Prima (Metaphysica)*, vol. I, ed. S. Van Riet, Leiden and Louvain, Brill and Peeters, 1977, tract. I cap. 2, p. 10; also see William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit], chapter XII p.41, “errandi occasio incidenter videndum est”. Here the text seems to be reformulating Avicenna in an original manner.

^{xxviii} Quotation from Boethius, *In Liber de Interpretatione*, chapter *De Signis*, Patrologia Latina 64, col. 407, also cfr. 407-20.

^{xxix} Boethius, *In Liber de Interpretatione*, Patrologia Latina 64, 414c

^{xxx} Cfr. Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus*, ed. L.M. De Rijk, 1972, chapter III, 2, pp. 30-32.

^{xxxi} The eight *distinctio* follows William of Ockham *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit], chapter XIII, p.44, but treats the argument originally.

^{xxxii} Boethius, *De divisione*, Patrologia Latina 64, col. 877 d

^{xxxiii} The distinction about the term analogicus doesn’t appear to be in Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit], therefore could be original.

^{xxxiv} This quote comes from Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V, 7. “ergo secundum accidens dicta esse sic dicuntur aut eo quod eidem enti ambo insunt, aut quia enti illud inest, aut quia idem cui inest de quo id predicatur”. Either the author or the copyist mistook the paragraph number for the book number.

^{xxxv} It would be interesting to find this treatise “De gradibus analogice equivocationis seu unilogie et equilogie”, apparently of the same author as the *Loyca Discipuli*, but so far I could not find any trace of it, in catalogues or databases of manuscripts.

^{xxxvi} The parts on the terms *sinonimi*, *multivoci* and *diversivoci* do not seem to be dependent directly on Ockham.

^{xxxvii} To be noted that the names used in the examples come from Francophone area, which could point us in the direction of a French author.

^{xxxviii} The ninth *distinctio* is derived from William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit], chapter XIV, p. 47, but the formulations are original, maybe dependent on the previous paragraph.

^{xxxix} I could not find till now a correspondent in Ockham for this section. I suspect that here the text utilizes a different source, but it could also be an original elaboration.

^{xl} William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit], does not quote directly the Ninth book of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. Therefore this part is either original or dependent on another source, that can probably be identified with the *Dicta Aristotelis*, cfr. J. Hamesse [ed.], *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval. Étude historique et édition critique*, Louvain-Paris 1974.

^{xli} From here we find the text following Ockham again, cfr. William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit], chapter XX, p. 68. Another reference to the *Dicta Aristotelis*.

^{xlii} Here the text mirrors *verbatim* William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit], chapter XX, p.68 lines 3-5.

^{xliiii} This *distinctio* is not *verbatim* Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, it seems to be an elaboration from chapter XXI, which contains an analogous argument.

^{xliiv} The section on *Species* does not correspond exactly to Ockham, seems to be a sort of summary of *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit], chapter XXI, p. 70.

^{xliv} Here the text follows closely the structure of William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit], chapter XXIII *De differentia*, p. 74.

^{xlvi} The section from “Sed.. to ... ad formam” corresponds *verbatim* to William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit], chapter XXIII, p. 75-6, the following lines instead are a summary of it.

^{xlvii} Cfr. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, [ed. cit.], I, q. 76 a 1 and Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII 1043 a 2-19

^{xlviii} Here the text keeps following the structure of William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit], chapter XXIV, *De Proprio*, pp. 78-81 and XXV, *De Accidente*, pp. 81-4. Though the first two lines give a Lullian imprint, because the definition of *predicabile* is carried out through the use of the lullian correlatives, the majority of the text is still a summary of Ockham, and maybe of Peter of Spain.

^{xlix} To be noted here the cross-reference with the text of the *Nove Introductiones*, which comes in one of the few places in which the author makes explicit use of the lullian mechanism of correlatives (ending in –bilis, etc.)

^l Here and in the lines before the text seems to go back to earlier chapters of William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit], Chapter XIV, *De singulare et universale*, and chapter XV and following on *individuum, singulare, universale, commune, predicabili*.

^{li} Boethius translator Aristotelis - *Categoriae [uel Praedicamenta]*, Ed. I. Bekker, Berolini, Reimer 1831-1870, (Bekker : 1a), p. 7, line 10 “De substantia”.

^{lii} Cfr. William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit], chapter 40, *De predicamentis* p. 111 et following.

^{liii} Anonymus saec. XII translator Aristotelis – *Topica* Ed. I. Bekker, Berolini, Reimer 1831-1870, p. 197, line 17 (Bekker : 103b).

^{liv} Boethius translator Aristotelis, *Categoriae [uel Praedicamenta]*, [ed. cit], p. 7, (Bekker 1a): “Videtur enim omnis affirmatio vel falsa esse vel vera; eorum autem quae secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur neque verum quicquam neque falsum est, ut homo, album, currit.”

^{lv} Boethius translator Aristotelis, *Categoriae [uel Praedicamenta]*, [ed. cit], p. 7, (Bekker 1a).

^{lvi} Boethius translator Aristotelis, *Categoriae [uel Praedicamenta]*, [ed. cit], p. 11, line 11 (Bekker 6b): “Plus autem genere quam specie determinatio fit: dicens enim animal plus complectitur quam hominem”.

^{lvii} Boethius translator Aristotelis, *Categoriae [uel Praedicamenta]*, [ed. cit], p. 19 (Bekker 6b): “Inest autem et contrarietas in relatione, ut virus malitiae contrarium est, cum sit utrumque ad aliquid, et scientia in scientiae”.

^{lviii} Boethius translator Aristotelis secundum 'editionem uulgatam', *Categoriae [uel Praedicamenta]* (*editio composita [uulgata]*), Ed. I. Bekker, Berolini, Reimer 1831-1870, p. 59, line 14 (Bekker : 6b): “Omnia autem relativa ad convertentia dicuntur, ut servus domini servus dicitur et dominus servi dominus, et duplum dimidii duplum et dimidium dupli dimidium, et maius minore maius et minus maiore minus; similiter autem et in aliis; sed casu aliquotiens differt secundum locutionem, ut DISCIPLINA DISCIPLINATI dicitur DISCIPLINA et DISCIPLINATUM DISCIPLINA DISCIPLINATUM, et sensus SENSATI sensus et SENSATUM sensu SENSATUM”.

^{lix} Boethius translator Aristotelis, *Categoriae [uel Praedicamenta]*, [ed. cit] chap. 8, p. 27, (Bekker : 10a): “Qualitates ergo sunt haec quae dicta sunt, qualia vero quae secundum haec denominative dicuntur, vel quomodolibet ab his.”

^{lx} Boethius translator Aristotelis, *Categoriae [uel Praedicamenta]*, [ed. cit], chap. 8, p. 27: “Rarum vero et spissum vel asperum vel lene putabitur quidem qualitatem significare”

^{lxi} Anonymus saec. XII translator Aristotelis, *Topica*, [ed. cit], chap. 8, p. 197: “Necesse enim omne de aliquo predicatum aut converti cum re aut non. Et siquidem convertitur, terminus aut proprium est. Si enim significat quid est esse, terminus, si vero non significet, proprium; hoc enim erat proprium, conversim quidem predicatum, non significans vero quid est esse.”

^{lxii} Boethius translator Aristotelis, *De sophisticis elenchis*, [ed. cit], chapt. 1, p. 6, line 3 (Bekker : 165a):

“Nam quoniam non est ipsas res ferentes disputare, sed nominibus pro rebus utimur notis, quod accidit in nominibus in rebus quoque arbitramur accidere, velut in compostis ratiocinantibus”.

^{lxiii} In Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, there are many references to Damascenus, *Dialectica*, in Grosseteste’s translation: John of Damascus, *Dialectica* [version of Robert Grosseteste], edited by Owen A. Colligan. St. Bonaventure, N.Y., Franciscan Institute, 1953. This quotation seems to come from William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit], chapt. XLI, p.115, which refers to Damascenus, *Dialectica*, chapt. 32 and to Aristotle, *Categories*, cap. 4 .

^{lxiv} Iacobus Veneticus translator Aristotelis, *Analytica posteriora*, Ed. I. Bekker, Berolini, Reimer 1831-1870 [Bekker 71a], chapt 7, p. 79: “Amplius omnes rationes diffinitiones essent; esset enim utique nomen ponere cuilibet rationi, quare terminos utique disputemus omnes et Ilias diffinitio sit”

^{lxv} Here it seems that this Albert should be identified with Albert of Saxony, and the quotation seems to refer to his *Perutilis Logica*; cfr. Albertus de Saxonia, *Logica Albertucii sive Perutilis logica*, [reimpr. Venice 1522], Hildesheim -New York, Olms, 1974, f. 4v (*De predicato*).

^{lxvi} Cfr. Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus*, [ed. cit], I, 8, p. 4 .

^{lxvii} Cfr. Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus*, [ed. cit], II, 7 pp. 18- 19 and III, *De predicamentis*, pp. 26-42.

^{lxviii} Again the text follows almost *verbatim* William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, [ed. cit], chapter XL, p. 113.

^{lxix} Cfr. Boethius translator Aristotelis, *Analytica Priora (Recensio Florentina)*, Ed. I. Bekker, Berolini, Reimer 1831-1870. [Bekker 24a]

Appendix 3. The Structure of the Three Pseudo Lullian Handbooks for Logic: A Comparison.

I offer below a parallel of the scheme of the three Pseudo Lullian logical texts object of analysis. For the text of the *Nove Introductiones*, I have used the subdivisions taken from the edition offered in Appendix Two. Since as of yet there is no critical edition provided for the *Logica Parva* or the *Logica Brevis et Nova*, I have used the subdivisions taken from what I consider to be the most representative editions of the text. For the *Logica Parva* I have adopted the subdivisions from the 1512 edition by Alfonso de Proaza and Nicolas de Pax, as it appears in the anastatic edition published by C. Lohr in 1972. Finally for the *Logica Brevis et Nova*, I have used the text and subdivision from the 1598 edition by Lazarus Zetzner, which in turn drew on Lavinheta's edition in the *Explanatio* of 1523: I have used the text as it appears in the 1996 anastatic edition, edited by A. Bonner.

As it is apparent, I have grouped the subdivisions in several sections, and I have highlighted them in different colors, according to their logical/philosophical topic.

Here is the legend:

- Grey= Beginning section of the *Nove Introductiones*
- Yellow= On Term
- Light blue= On Proposition
- Green= On Predicables and *Predicamenta* (categories)
- Dark blue= On the Hypothetic Proposition

- Tourquoise= On Supposition, ampliation and restriction
- Red= On Argumentation
- Pink= On Fallacies
- Purple= On the Conditions for a dispute
- NO highlight= *explicit* [and a section “*de intentionibus*” in the *Logica Parva*, which does not correspond to anything]

<i>Nove Introductiones</i>	<i>Logica Parva (Dialecticae introductiones)</i>	<i>Logica Brevis et Nova</i>
Incipit: Logica est ars et scientia cum qua verum et falsum ratiocinando cognoscuntur et unum ab altero discernuntur verum eligendo et falsum dimittendo. Sed quantum logica est philosophie membrum ob hoc est particularis scientia particularia habens principia que subiciuntur alicui utilitati, secundum quod ratio et natura hoc insinuant.	Incipit: Logica est ars et scientia, cum qua verum et falsum ratiocinando cognoscuntur et unum ab altero discernitur, verum eligendo et falsum dimittendo. Cuius principia specifica sunt tria : scilicet terminus, propositio et argumentatio.	Incipit: Deus cum tua summa perfectione incipit logica brevis et nova, Logica est ars, qua verum et falsum ratiocinando cognoscuntur et argumentative discernuntur. In logica considerantur tria inter alia : scilicet terminus, propositio et argumentum.
... Principia specialia logice sunt quinque , scilicet terminus, propositio, predicabilia, predicamenta, argumentatio; subiectum est ratiocinatio...		
1. De decem transcendentibus	1. De radicibus arboris De termino	1. De terminis
2. De novem instrumentalibus principiis que sunt secundum universale	2. De intentionibus et impositionibus	2. De propositione
3. De tertio universali quod est decem regule sive questiones	3. De praedicabilibus	3. De oppositionibus
4. De duplici modo tractandi regular	4. De praedicamentis	4. De materia propositionis

5. De introducendis doctrina	5. Praedicamentum substantiae	5. De propositione hypothetica
6. De principiis specialibus logice	6. De quantitate	6. De suppositionibus
7. Terminus quid	7. De qualitate	7. De ampliationibus
8. Terminus differentia	8. De relatione	8. De restrictione
9. Terminus concordantia	9. De actione et passione	9. De predicabilibus et predicamenta
10. Terminus equalitas 11. Terminus minoritas	10. De situ	10. De argumento
12. De secundo principio: propositio quid 13. Propositio differentia	11. De habitu	11. De syllogismo
14. De multiplicatione exterminorum in propositione cathgorica	12. De tempore	12. De prima figura
15. Cathgorica differentia	13. De loco	13. De secunda figura
16. Propositio concordantia	14. Pars Secunda De trunco arboris scientiae logicalis De propositione	14. De tertia figura
17. Propositio contrarietas	15. De quantitate propositionis cathgoricae	15. De inductione
18. De contradictione	16. De qualitate propositionum	16. De enthymemate
19. De octo propositionibus in quibus apparet esse contradictio	17. De petitionibus	17. De exemplo
20. Propositio principium	18. De conversionibus	18. De locis et primo de loco a maiori
21. Propositio medium	19. De oppositionibus	19. De loco ad aequali
22. Propositio finis	20. De aequipollentiis	20. De loco a minori
23. Propositio maioritas	21. De propositione hypothetica	21. De consequentiis
24. Propositio equalitas	22. De aequivalentibus hypotheticis	22. De fallaciis
25. Propositio minoritas	23. De terminis modificativis	23. De disputatione
26. Propositio ypothetica quidem	24. De modalibus	24. De conditionibus disputationis
27. Ypothetica differentia	25. De triplici propositionum differentia	
28. De possibili et impossibili, contingenti et	26. Pars tertia de branchis arboris scientie	Explicit: ut infrenetur particularis

necessario	logicalis De suppositione	contrarietas, quam habent circa hoc, de quo disputant.
29. De propositionibus formari possibilibus ex antedictis terminis	27. De regulis suppositionum	It continues with the <i>De venatione medii</i>
30. Differentia in situ istorum terminorum	28. De ampliacionibus	
31. De compositione et divisione harum propositionum	29. De appellationibus	
32. De harum veritate et falsitate propositionum	30. Pars Quarta De floribus arboris logicalis De syllogismo	
33. De triplici propositionum differentia	31. De inductione	
34. De predicabilibus que sunt tertium logice principium. Predicabile quid	32. De enthymemate	
35. Genus differentia	33. De exemplo	
36. Species quid	34. De antecedente et consequente	
37. Differentia quid	35. De locis	
38. Proprietas quid	36. De regulis locorum	
39. Accidens quid	37. De demonstrationibus	
40. De predicamentis que sunt quartum in logicam principium	38. De demonstratione per quid	
41. Substantia quid	39. De demonstratione per quia	
42. Quantitas quid	40. De demonstratione per aequiparantiam	
43. Qualitas quid	41. Pars quinta De foliis arboris logicalis De parallogismo	
44. Relatio quid	42. De fallatia aequivocationis	
45. Actio quid	43. De fallatia amphibologiae	
46. Passio quid	44. De fallatia compositionis	
47. Habitus quid	45. De fallatia divisionis	
48. Situs quid	46. De fallatia accentus	
49. Tempus quid	47. De fallatia figure dictionis	

50. Locus quid	48. De fallatia extra dictionem	
51. Sequitur quintum et ultimum logice principium ... quod est argumentatio	49. De fallatia accidentis	
52. De probatione	50. De fallatia secundum quid ad simpliciter	
53. De demonstratione quid	51. De fallatia ignorantie elenchi	
54. De demonstratione quia	52. De fallatia petitionis principiis	
55. De demonstratione per equiparantiam	53. De fallatia consequentis	
56. De sillogismo et principiis ad eum requisitis	54. De fallatia secundum non causam ut causam	
57. De investigatione medii et ipsius inventione. Medium differentia	55. De fallatia secundum plures interrogationes ut unam	
58. Medium concordantia		
59. Medium contrarietas	Explicit: Haec arbor logicalis non habet in se ipsa fructuum, quia fructus logicae colligitur in scientiis altioribus ad quas logica ordinatur tamquam instrumentum ad opus	
60. Medium principium		
61. Medium finis		
62. Medium maioritas		
63. Medium equalitas		
64. Medium minoritas		
65. Sillogismus quid		
66. Sillogismus quo modo sit		
67. De multiplicatione extremitatum et mediorum		
68. De novem generalibus subiectis		
69. De tribus figuris sillogismorum		
70. De conditionibus generalibus		
71. De prima figura		

72. De secunda figura		
73. De tertia figura		
74. De inductione, qua est secunda species argumentationis		
75. De tertia specie argumentationis scilicet entimemate		
76. De exemplo quod est quarta specie argumentationis		
77. De lociis		
78. De loco a maiori		
79. De loco ab equali		
80. De loco a minori		
81. De antecedente et consequente		
82. De paralogismis		
83. De fallaciis equivocationis		
84. De fallacia amphibolie		
85. De fallacia compositionis		
86. De fallacia divisionis		
87. De fallacia accentus		
88. De fallacia figure dictionis		
89. De fallacia extra dictionem		
90. De fallacia accidentis		
91. De fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter		
92. De fallacia ignorantie elenchi		
93. De fallacia petitionis principii		
94. De fallacia consequentis		
95. De fallacia secundum non causam ut causam		
96. De fallacia secundum plures interrogationes ut una		
97. De modo disputandi		
98. Sequitur questiones decem per quorum solutiones magna de		

logica habetur notitia		
99. De hiis que ad huius operis notitiam preexhiguntur		
100. De fine		

Appendix Four. A Textual Comparison

What is offered below, is a visual comparison between the three main texts of the pseudo Lullian logical tradition. For the *Nove Introductiones*, I have used the text offered in Appendix One, while for the *Logica Parva* I used the text present in Lohr's anastatic edition of the edition Palma 1744 and for the *Logica Brevis et Nova*, I have used that of the 1996 reprint of the Strasbourg 1651 edition by Lazarus Zetzner.

I have chosen to take into consideration seven specific parts of the text, which give a fairly complete account of the relationship between the texts and which constitute a well rounded account of the most important textual subdivisions.

I have analyzed:

1. The Incipit and First part
2. The section On Proposition
3. The section on Hypothetical propositions
4. The section on On Praedicabilia et Praedicamenta.
5. The section on De demonstratione per aequiparantiam
6. The section on De Fallacia Accidentis
7. The End and Explicit

<p><i>Nove Introductiones</i> (cfr. Edition offered in Appendix One)</p>	<p>Logica Parva (ed. Ch. Lohr 1971, anastatic ed. from Palma 1744, from Valentia 1512)</p>	<p>Logica Brevis et Nova (ed Zetzner Strasbourg 1651, reprint Bonner 1996)</p>
<p>I) <u>Incipit and First part</u></p> <p>In nomine bonitatis optime veritatis quam verissime Incipiunt Nove et Compendiose introductiones logice</p> <p><i>Logica est ars et scientia cum qua verum et falsum ratiocinando cognoscuntur et unum ab altero discernuntur verum eligendo et falsum dimittendo.</i> Sed quoniam logica est philosophie membrum ob hoc est particularis scientia particularia habens principia que subiciuntur alicui utilitati, secundum quod ratio et natura hoc insinuant. Ideo, antequam de ipsa specificè tractetur...</p> <p>Principia specialia logice sunt <i>quinque</i>, scilicet terminus, propositio, predicabilia, predicamenta, argumentatio; subiectum est ratiocinatio, sed finis veri et falsi inventio.</p> <p>Terminus est dictio <i>significativa ex qua propositio constituitur</i>, habet in se sillabam vel sillabas que sunt eius partes essentielles. Est</p>	<p>I) <u>Incipit and First part</u></p> <p>Dialecticae Introductiones Illuminati Doctoris et Martyris beati Raymundi Lulli Tertii Ordinis Sancti Francisci. Gratia et illustratione Divina pullulat Arbor Scientiae Logicalis. Cuius fructus est verum et falsum cognoscere et unum ab altero discernere.</p> <p><i>Logica est ars et scientia, cum qua verum et falsum ratiocinando cognoscuntur et unum ab altero discernitur, verum eligendo et falsum dimittendo.</i></p> <p>Cuius principia specifica sunt <i>tria</i>: scilicet terminus, propositio et argumentatio. De radicibus arboribus de termino.</p> <p>1. <i>Terminus est dictio significativa, ex qua propositio constituitur.</i></p> <p>Est autem Terminus in propositione subiectum,</p>	<p>I) <u>Incipit and First part</u></p> <p>Dialectica seu Logica nova M. Raymundi Lulli, diligenter emendata; restituti iis quae olim fuerant sublata....</p> <p>Deus cum tua summa perfectione, incipit Logica brevis et nova, <i>Logica est ars, qua verum et falsum ratiocinando cognoscuntur et argumentative discernuntur.</i></p> <p>In logica considerantur <i>tria</i> inter alia: scilicet terminus, propositio et argumentatio.</p> <p><i>Terminus est dictio significativa, ex qua propositio constituitur, vel constitui potest: sicut bonitas, magnitudo et cet. Deus,</i></p>

<p>subiectum et predicatum in propositione, pars subiecti et predicati, copula vel signum et similia. Habet in propositione suum esse vel virtutem seu proprietatem, vel partes suas, et habet maiorem virtutem in propositione quam extra, sicut pars que maiorem entitatem habet in toto quam extra et similia.</p> <p>Terminus differentia est duplex: cathegorematicus, sincathegorematicus. Cathegorematicus est ille qui potest esse subiectum vel predicatum in propositione vel partem subiecti vel predicati, ut bonitas vel magnitudo et cetera; exemplum quod sit subiectum vel predicatum dicendo sic “bonitas est magnitudo” in hac propositione, bonitas est subiectum et magnitudo predicatum. Patet quod sit pars dicendo sic: “bonitas durationis est magna in potestate”. Quare logicus multum debet esse cautus in hiis maxime in sillogismis, ne decipiatur per additionem seu remotionem partis subiecti vel predicatis. Est autem subiectum terminus ante copulam, de quo terminus prius copulam datur sive affirmative sive negative. Predicatum est terminus prius copulam dictus de termino ante copula stante affirmative sive negative. Copulativa vero est prima,</p>	<p>predicatum, vel pars eorum, copula vel signum.</p> <p>Primo dividitur Terminus in Terminum Cathegorematicum et Syncathegorematicum.</p> <p>2. Cathegorematicus est qui significative et proprie sumptus potest esse subiectum, vel predicatum, vel pars eorum in propositione, ut Bonitas est magna, Bonitas Petri est in magnitudine ipsius.</p>	<p>Angelus, et cet. Iustitia, prudentia et cet. Avaritia, gula et cet.</p>
--	--	--

<p>secunda vel tertia, singularis vel pluralis, individua seu imperativa et cetera; explicita vel implicita in cuius verbi sum, es, fui. Explicita, ut bonitas est magna. Implicita, ut bonitas bonificat magnitudinem, natura bonificat id est bonificans.</p> <p>Cathegoricus duplex: communis, discretus sive singularis;</p> <p>communis est ille qui ex sui impositione aptus natus est de pluribus predicari, ut bonitas, magnitudo et cetera de omnibus bonitatibus, magnitudinibus et cetera.</p> <p>Discretus sive singularis est ille qui ex sui impositione de uno solo predicari potest, ut sunt termini significantes individua specierum sicut Petrus, Guillelmus, Maria, Catherina et cetera .</p> <p>Cathegorematicus abstractus, concretus: abstractus est terminus significans essentiam vel proprietatem ut humanitas petreytas, igneytas, risibilitas, latrabilitas et cetera .</p> <p>Concretus est terminus significans substantiam vel subiectum, ut homo, Petrus, ignis, rationale, visibile et cetera .</p>	<p>Terminus Cathegorematicus divitur(! Sic!) in communem et singularem.</p> <p>3. Communis est ille, qui ex unica sui impositione est aptus de pluribus praedicari: ut Bonitas de Bonitate Dei; Angeli. Homo de Raymundo, Nicolau etc. Communis dividitur in univucum, aequivocum, et denominativum.</p> <p>4. Univocus est qui praedicatur de pluribus sub uno nomine, et eadem ratione diffinitionis, sicut Bonitas, Magnitudo, Substantia Corpus, de suis inferioribus.</p> <p>5. Aequivocus est, qui praedicatur de multis sub uno nomine, et diversa ratione definitionis sicut Canis, Taurus, Aries, etc.</p> <p>6. Denominativus seu connotativus est qui significat subiectum connotando aliquam qualitatem ipsi inherentem, ut bonus, magnus, causa, Pater, Rex.</p> <p>7. Singularis, vel discretius est, qui ex unica sui impositione de</p>	<p>Terminus est duplex, scilicet communis et discretus.</p> <p>Communis est ille, qui significant vel significare potest multa sub una impositione: sicut homo, animal et similia.</p> <p>Discretus est ille qui significat vel significare potest unum sub una impositione: ut Iesus Christus, Maria et cet.</p>
--	---	---

<p>Communis univocus, equivocus, denominativus; univocus est ille qui predicatur de pluribus sub uno nomine et una diffinitione, ut bonitas et cetera generalia.</p> <p>Equivocus est ille qui predicatur de pluribus sub eodem nomine et diversa diffinitione, ut canis, taurus, aries, leo, virgo, cancer, scorpius, sagitarius et cetera.</p> <p>Denominativus sive connotativus est terminus significans subiectum, connotans aliquam qualitatem ipsi inherentem, ut bonum, magnum, durans, potens, et cetera; etiam calidum, frigidum et cetera; album, nigrum et cetera; gramaticus, loycus et cetera.</p> <p>Sincathegorematicus est ille terminus qui, significative sumptus, non potest esse pars principalis in propositione, et est duplex: universale signum et particulare, et aliquando etiam alia ut adverbium, coniunctio et cetera.</p> <p>Universale signum est terminus qui ex sui</p>	<p>uno solo predicari potest. Ut sunt termini significantes individua specierum, sicut Petrus. Tam terminus communis quam singularis dividitur in abstractum et concretum.</p> <p>8. Abstractus terminus est, qui significant essentiam vel proprietatem, non ut sunt in subiecto, sicut humanitas, risibilitas, petreietas, haecceitas.</p> <p>9. Concretus est qui significant substantia, vel subiectum, sicut homo, Petrus, risibile, ignis. Terminus Cathegorematicus in propositione modo est subiectum, modo praedicatum ideoque dicendum est quid sit subiectum, quid praedicatum.</p> <p>[...10, ...11, ...12...]</p> <p>13. Sycathegorematicus terminus est ille, qui significative, et proprie sumptus non potest esse pars principalis in propositione. Terminus Syncathegorematicus dividitur in universale signum, particulare signum, et partes orationis indeclinabiles.</p> <p>14. Universale signum est, sicut, omnis, nullus, quilibet,</p>	<p>Quidam termini dicuntur signa universalialia, et quaedam particularia.</p> <p>Signa universalialia affirmantia sunt, ut</p>
---	--	--

<p>significatione significat quamdam comprehensibilitatem que de nihilo predicatur nec de qua aliquid dicitur sicut sunt: omnis, nullus, quilibet, nemo, uterque, neutri, ubique, quocumque, et cetera hiis similia.</p> <p>Particulare signum est terminus qui ex sui significatione quamdam particularitatem de qua nihil predicatur et que de nihilo dicitur, sicut sunt quidam, alter, alius, reliquus, aliquis, aliquando, alicubi, et cetera hiis similia.</p>	<p>nemo, et cet. universaliter distribuentia, vel facientia stare copulative suum terminum communem sequentem pro omnibus suis significatis.</p> <p>15. Particulare signum est, sicut, quidam, alter, aliquis, aliquando, alicubi, et cet. Particulariter distribuentia, vel facientia stare disiunctive terminum suum communem sequentem pro suis significatis.</p> <p>[... 16..., 17..., 18..., 19 ..., 20...]</p>	<p>omnis, quilibet uterque, quocumque, ubicumque, semper. Negativa, nullus, nemo, neuter, numquam et cet.</p> <p>Signa particularia sunt, ut aliquis, quidem, alter, aliquando, alicubi et cet.</p>
<p>II) <u>On Proposition</u></p> <p>Propositio est oratio de pluribus veris dictionibus constituta, veritatem vel falsitatem significans, vel <i>propositio est oratio constituta ex terminis veritatis vel falsitatis significantia</i>, habet in se terminos vel dictiones</p>	<p>II) <u>On Proposition</u></p> <p>Pars Secunda De Trunco Arboris Scientiae Logicalis. (Capp. I - V pp. 11-14)</p> <p>Cap. I - De Propositione</p> <p>1. <i>Propositio est oratio constituta ex terminis veritatis, vel falsitatis significativa.</i> Habet in se terminos sive dictiones. Est in anima mentalis, in voce vocalis, in scripto scriptura, in syllogismo maior, vel</p>	<p>II) <u>On Proposition</u></p> <p><i>Propositio est oratio constituta ex terminis, significans aliquid esse vel non esse: ut bonitas est magna, avaritia non est bona.</i></p>

<p>significantes per quos propositio verum et falsum habet significare. Est in anima mentalis, in voce vocalis, in scripto scripta; in sillogismo maior vel minor vel e contrario, in consequentia antecedens vel consequens et similia; <i>habet partes suas in anima, in voce vel in scripto: in anima mentalis, in voce vocalis, in scripto scriptas in sillogismo sillogisticas et similia.</i> Propositio vera, falsa. Propositio vera est illa cuius subiectum et predicatum omnimode et simpliciter se habent uti ipsa denotat, ut hec: “aliqua bonitas non est eternitas”, vera est eo quia creata bonitas non est eternitas, nam ex quo creata est incepta et nova est. Propositio falsa est cuius subiectum et predicatum non omnimode et simpliciter se habent uti ipsa denotat, ut “homo est animal rationale”. [.....]</p> <p>Propositio categorica ypotetica. Categorica est oratio una perfectam rationem demonstrans, habet in se subiectum et predicatum et copulam principales partes sui. Est in anima, voce vel scripto, significans</p>	<p>minor, vel conclusio; in consequentia antecedens, vel consequens. <i>Habet partes suas mentales in anima, vocalis in voce, scriptas in scriptura, in sillogismo, syllogisticas.</i> Primum propositio dividitur in veram, et falsam.</p> <p>2. Vera est illa cuius subiectum, et praedicatum omnimode, et simpliciter se habent, ut ipsa denotat. Ut haec: aliqua Bonitas non est Aeternitas. Vera est, quia creata Bonitas non est Aeternitas; nam ex quo creatura est, incepta, et nova est.</p> <p>3. Falsa est illa cuius subiectum, et praedicatum non omnimode, et simpliciter se habent, uti ipsa denotat. Ut haec: homo est animal irrationale. Falsa est quia in quantum dicit irrationale, non se habet subiectum, et praedicatum, ut ipsa denotat.</p> <p>Item propositio est duplex scilicet categorica, et hypothetica.</p> <p>4. Categorica est oratio una perfectam rationem demonstrans. Habet in se subiectum, praedicatum, et copulam principales partes sui. Est in anima, voce, vel scripto significans</p>	<p>Propositio est duplex, scilicet vera et falsa. Propositio vera est illa, que significat sicut est, ut iustitia est virtus.</p> <p>Propositio falsa est, quae sicut ipsa significat non est, ut bonitas est mala; homo non est ens et cet.</p> <p>Propositio dicitur duobus modis: quaedam est categorica, alia est hypothetica. Propositio categorica est una oratio in qua est subiectum et praedicatum et copula: ut bonitas est amabilis, deus est aeternus, fides</p>
--	--	--

<p>veritatem vel falsitatem unius solius predicati de uno solo subiecto, ideo dicitur de simplici inherencia immediate enim predicatum simplex suo simplici subiecto habet in anima unum simplex subiectum, unum simplex predicatum, unam simplicem copulam, mentales in voce illas habet vocales, in scripto scriptas; habet etiam in illis significationem simplicis veritatis vel falsitatis ut “bonitas est magna, sua magnitudo est durans” et cetera . [....]</p> <p>Cathgorica differentia. Universalis particularis, indefinita, singularis.</p> <p>Universalis est illa cuius subiectum est terminus communis signo universali iunctus, ut “omnis maioritas est maior; nulla magnitudo est minoritas”. Particularis est illa cuius subiectum est terminus communis particulari signo additus, ut “quedam bonitas est magnitudo; quedam magnitudo non est eterna”. Indefinita est illa cuius subiectum existens terminus communis signo universali vel particulari non est adiunctus, ut “virtus est vera” et cetera. Singularis est illa cuius subiectum est terminus</p>	<p>veritatem, vel falsitatem unius solius praedicati de uno solo subiecto. Habet in anima unum simplex praedicatum, subiectum, et copulam mentales; in voce habet illas vocales; in scripto scriptas. Habet in ipsis simplicem veritatem, vel falsitatem.</p> <p>Cap. II – De quantitate propositionis cathgoricae quae est quadruplex</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Universalis cathgorica est illa, cuius subiectum est terminus communis coniunctus signo universali. Ut omnis maioritas est minor. Nulla maioritas est magnitudo. 2. Particularis est illa, cuius subiectum est terminus communis, additus signo particulari. Ut quedam bonitas est aeternitas. Quaedam magnitudo non est aeterna. 3. Indefinita est illa, cuius subiectum est terminus communis, nullo tamen signo universali, vel particulari adiunctus. Ut virtus est vera. Homo est animal. 	<p>est magna virtus, avaritia est mala.</p> <p>Propositio categorica est quadruplex: scilicet universalis, particularis, indefinita, et singularis. Universalis est illa cuius subiectum est terminus comunis, additus signo universali, ut omnis lapis est sensualis, omnis potestas est bona et cet. Propositio particularis est illa, cuius subiectum est terminus communis additus signo particulari: ut quedam bonitas est magnitudo; aliqua virtus est sensualis. Propositio indefinita est illa, cuius</p>
---	--	---

<p>discretus vel singularis aut etiam communis per pronomen differentiativum singularizatus de primo: “Deus est bonitas; magnitudo, eternitas; Sortes est durans”. De secundo ista: “bonitas est substantialis, tu homo es bonus, ego bonus sum magnus, ista bonitas est maior, hec concordantia in equalitate minoritatis est maior” et cetera.</p> <p>Categorica duplex: affirmativa negativa.</p> <p>Affirmativa est illa cuius predicatum subiecto attribuitur alicui videtur. De primo: “omnis bonitas creata est minor”. De secundo: “omnis bonitas spiritualis est substantialis” et cetera.</p> <p>Negativa est cum predicatum a subiecto removetur vel removeri videtur: de primo, ut “bonitas Petri non est eius magnitudo”. De secundo: “ens non est verum” et cetera.</p> <p>Categorica duplex: de disiuncto extremo et de copulato. De disiuncto extremo est illa in subiecto cuius vel predicato ponitur coniunctio disiunctiva, ut “virtus lapidis vel anime est intellectualis vel spiritualis”.</p>	<p>4. Singularis est illa, cuius subiectum est terminus singularis, vel discretus, aut certe communis, singularizatus tamen per pronomen demonstrativum primitivum. Ut Deus est Bonitas Magnitudo Aeternitas. Sortes est differens. Ista bonitas est sensualis. Tu homo es bonus. Ego sum peccator. Haec concordantia in aequalitate minoritatis est maior.</p> <p>Cap. III – De qualitate propositionum</p> <p>1. Affirmativa propositio est illa, cuius praedicatum subiecto attribuitur, vel attribui videtur. Ut, omnis bonitas creata est minor. Omnis bonitas est accidentalis.</p> <p>2. Negativa est illa, cuius praedicatum a subiecto removetur, vel removeri videtur. Ut bonitas Petri non est eius magnitudo. Ens non est verum.</p> <p>3. Propositio categorica est duplex, scilicet de disiuncto extremo, et de copulato extremo. De disiuncto extremo est illa in cuius subiecto, vel praedicato, vel</p>	<p>subiectum est terminus communis sine signo: ut bonitas est potens, homo est creatus et cet.</p> <p>Propositio singularis est illa cuius subiectum est terminus discretus, vel terminus communis iunctus pronomini demonstrative. Exemplum primi: Iesus Christus est Deus et homo, Bernardus est scholaris. Exemplum secundi: ut iste homo est theologus.</p> <p>Item, propositio categorica est duplex, scilicet affirmativa et negativa. Affirmativa est illa, cuius praedicatum subiecto attribuitur vel attribui videtur, ut homo est creatus, homo est rationalis.</p> <p>Negativa est illa, cuius praedicatum a subiecto removetur, vel removeri videtur: ut homo non est lapis, homo non est planta, et cet.</p> <p>{The part parallel to this is placed infra, just before the materia propositionis}</p> <p>[Extrema propositionis</p>
--	--	---

<p>De copulato extremo est illa in subiecto cuius vel predicato ponitur copulativa coniunctio, ut “intellectus et voluntas sunt in angelo potentie intellectuales et incorruptibiles”.</p>	<p>in utroque ponitur coniunctio disiunctiva. Ut virtus lapidis, vel animae est sensualis. Animal est rationale, vel irrationale. Corpus, vel anima sunt in quiete, vel labore dum vivimus.</p> <p>4. De copulato extremo est illa, in cuius subiecto, vel praedicato, vel utroque ponitur copulativa coniunctio. Ut intellectus, et voluntas sunt in angelo; memoria est in homine, et in angelo; virtus et vitium sunt in homine et in angelo.</p>	<p>categoricae sunt subiectum et praedicatum. Categorica est duplex: quaedam est de disiuncto extremo, alia de copulato extremo. Illa categorica est de disiuncto extremo in cuius subiecto vel praedicato ponitur disiunctiva coniunctio: ut bonitas vel magnitudo est per se magna et cet. Vel dicendo sic, homo est animal vel lapis. Illa categorica est de copulato extremo, in cuius subiecto vel praedicato est copulativa coniunctio ut bonitas et magnitudo sunt amabiles; vel dicendo sic, bonitas est magna et potens. Et aliquando est categorica de utroque; extremo disiuncto vel copulato: et aliquando de uno extremo disiuncto et altero copulato. Contradictio est affirmatio, et eius contradictorium negatio, ad idem, secundum idem, similiter et in eodem tempora praedicate.]</p> <p>{Then it keeps following the scheme of the others with the petitions}</p>
	<p>Cap. IV – De petitionibus</p>	

<p>Logicus dicit tres petitiones, scilicet que, quanta, qualis. Cum querit que, petit an sit cathégorica vel ypothetica. Cum dicit quanta, querit an sit universalis vel particularis vel indefinita vel singularis. Cum dicit qualis, petit an sit affirmativa vel negativa.</p>	<p>1. Logicus tribus modis quaerit de propositionibus. Interrogando enim, Quae sit aliqua propositio? quaeritur utrum sit cathégorica, an hypothetica? Interrogando, Qualis sit? quaeritur an sit affirmativa an negativa. Interrogando, Quanta sit? quaeritur si est universalis, an particularis, an indefinita, an singularis.</p>	<p>Logicus utitur tribus petitionibus in propositione, scilicet quae, qualis, quanta, per ly quae, queritus utrum propositio est cathégorica, an hypothetica. Per quanta petit si est universalis, particularis, indefinita, an singularis. Per qualis autem an est affirmativa an negativa.</p>
<p>III) <u>Hypothetical propositions</u></p> <p><i>Propositio ypothetica est oratio, in qua duae cathégorice per coniunctionem ad invicem uniuntur.</i> Habet in se duas cathégoricas vel plures, et coniunctio in medio illarum est in anima intellectualis seu mentalis, in voce vocalis, in scripto scripta, duplicis veritatis vel falsitatis significantia. Habet in anima suas partes mentales, in voce vocales, in scripto scriptas duplicem veritatem vel falsitatem denotans.</p> <p>Ypothetica differentia Copulativa. Disiunctiva. Conditionalis. Rationalis. Temporalis et localis. Copulativa est ypothetica cuius cathégorice per</p>	<p>III) <u>Hypothetical propositions</u></p> <p>1. <i>Propositio hypotetica est oratio, in qua duae cathégoricae, vel plures per aliquam coniunctionem indeclinabilem iuniuntur ad invicem.</i> Sex modi sunt Hypotheticae Propositionis, scilicet copulativa, disiunctiva, conditionalis, causalis, temporalis, localis et rationalis quamquam omnes possunt reduce ad tres primos modos.</p> <p>2. Copulativa est ypothetica cuius cathégoricae coniunguntur per coniunctionem copulativam, quales sunt istae, et, ac, atque. Et si est vera ipsa Propositio</p>	<p>III) <u>Hypothetical propositions</u></p> <p><i>Propositio hypotetica est oratio, in qua duae cathégoricae per coniunctionem ad invicem iuniuntur;</i> ut bonitas est magna et magnitudo est bona, et cet. Propositio hypothetica est septuples: copulativa, disiunctiva, conditionalis, rationalis, temporalis et localis. {sic. Says septuples but then quotes only 6}</p> <p>Copulativa est illa hypothetica in qua sunt</p>

<p>coniunctionem copulativam coniunguntur, ut “bonitas est magna et magnitudo est bona”.</p> <p>Disiunctiva est ypothetica cuius cathegorice per coniunctione disiunctiva coniunguntur, ut “minoritas est infinita vel aliqua virtus est gloria”.</p> <p>Conditionalis est ypothetica cuius cathegorice coniunguntur per hanc coniunctionem si, ut “si bonitas est magna magnitudo est durans.”</p> <p>Rationalis est ypothetica cuius cathegorice per rationale coniunctionem uniuntur, ut “omnis virtus est vera ergo veritas est concordans”.</p> <p>Temporalis, ut “bonitas est magna quando virtus est in duratione”.</p>	<p>Copulativa, oportet omnes eius cathegoricae esse veras; aliter, si una ex illis est falsa, tota Hypothetica est falsa.</p> <p>3. Disiunctiva est ypothetica cuius cathegoricae uniuntur per coniunctionem disiunctivam. Ad eius falsitatem requiritur, quod omnes suae cathegoricae sint falsae; aliter si una illarum est vera, tota disiunctiva est vera.</p> <p>4. Conditionalis est illa Hypothetica, cuius cathegorice coniunguntur per hanc coniunctionem si. Et ad eius veritatem requiritur, et sufficit, quod impossibile sit ita esse, ut per antecedens significatur. Ut, si omnes propositio est affirmativa, nulla est negativa. Si lapis intelligit, habet intellectum. Aliter est falsa si consequentia non est bona. Ut si homo est animal, homo dormit.</p> <p>5. Causalis est ypothetica habens in se duas cathegoricas, vel plures unitas per aliquam Causalem coniunctionem. Et ad veritatem causalis affermativa requiritur, quod sic esse, ut significantur per antecedens, sit causa sic essendi, ut per consequens significatur. Et ideo ista est vera. Quia Deus est omnipotens, Deus est creator. Aliter est falsa, sicut: quia Plato erat homo, erat doctus, quae falsa quantumcumque Plato fuerit doctus, quia potuit esse homo, et in doctus.</p> <p>[.... 6....]</p> <p>7. Temporalis est ypothetica, habens in se duas, vel plures cathegoricas unitas per aliquod adverbium temporale. Et ad eius</p>	<p>duae categoricae coniunctae per coniunctionem copulativam, ut bonitas est magna et differentia est concordans, et cet.</p> <p>Disiunctiva est illa ypothetica, in qua sunt duae categoricae coniunctae per coniunctionem disiunctivam, ut homo est animal vel leo est sensibilis, et cet.</p> <p>Conditionalis est illa ypothetica, in qua sunt duae categoricae coniunctae per hanc dictionem, si, ut si duratio est potens, potestas est durans, et cet.</p> <p>Rationalis est illa ypothetica, in qua sunt duae categoricae coniunctae per has coniunctiones igitur vel ergo: ut sapientia est amabilis, igitur bonitas est potens, et cet.</p> <p>Temporalis ypothetica est, in qua sunt duae categoricae coniunctae cum adverbio</p>
--	--	--

<p>Localis, ut “duratio est in potestate ubi bonitas est magna”.</p> <p>Tunc copulativa est vera cum eius cathogorice sunt vere, et tunc est falsa cum aliqua suarum cathogoricarum vel ambe sunt false, ut ad eius veritatem convenit veritatem utriusque partis verificare, sed ad eius falsitatem sufficit aliquam eius partem esse falsam.</p> <p>Ad veritatem disiunctive sufficit alteram eius partem veram esse vel ambas, sed non ita decenter; cum ipsa de se duo actus requirat, scilicet coniungere et disiungere, quoniam sicut bonitati magnitudine convenit bonificare et magnificare sic suo modo coniunctioni disiunctive competit coniungere et disiungere et pro tanto</p>	<p>veritatem, si sit de praeterito, vel de futuro, nec habeat aliquam partem universalem, nec adverbium denotans successionem, sed simultatem temporis requiritur quod ita fuerit, vel futurum sit in eodem tempore, sicut suae cathaegoricae significant. [...8..., ...9..., ...10..., ...11...]</p> <p>12. Localis est Hypothetica habens in se duas vel plures cathaegoricas unitas per aliquod adverbium locale. Et ad veritatem localis affirmativae, non habentis adverbium denotans motum, requiritur quod ita sit, vel fiat in eodem loco proprio, vel communi, sicut suae cathaegoricae significant. Ideo ista est vera Sortes est, ubi sedet. [...13...]</p> <p>14. Rationale est illa Hypothetica, in qua coniunguntur plures cathogoricae mediante coniunctione causali, et ad eius veritatem requiritur et sufficit, quod qualitercumque significetur esse, fuisse vel fore, per eius antecedens, secundum totalem complexionem, ita sit, fuerit, vel futurum sit, ut significatur per eius antecedens, secundum totalem complexionem, ut Deus est: ergo ens est. [...15...]</p> <p>16. Propositiones Hypotheticae, ut Hypotheticae sunt, non possunt opponi nisi contraddictoriae. In Hypoteticis [sic!] ad dandum contraddictoriam, sufficit</p>	<p>temporali, ut bonitas est magna, quando magnitudo est bona, et cet.</p> <p>Localis est illa hypothetica, in qua sunt duae categoricae coniunctae cum aliquo adverbio locali, ut virtus est, ubi iustitia est, et cet.</p> <p>Ad hoc quod copulativa sit vera requiritur quod ambae eius categoricae sint verae, sed quando aliqua categoricarum est falsa, tunc ipsa est falsa: ut dicendo homo est animal et homo est capra, et ideo dicitur copulativa pro una parte falsa, tota falsa.</p> <p>Ad hoc quod disiunctiva sit vera, sufficit aliquam suarum categoricarum esse veram: ut dicendo bonitas est virtuosa vel homo non est animal, et cet. Et ideo dicitur, disiunctiva una parte vera, tota vera. Sed ad</p>
--	---	---

<p>dicitur non ita decenter; ad eius falsitatem exigit ambas eius cathedricas esse falsas. De veritate et falsitate conditionalis et rationalis hic non loquitur, eo quia sunt argumentales et in hoc aliud habent locum.</p>	<p>praeponere negationem toti propositioni, vel ipsius formali. Praeterea contraddictoria unius copulativa est una disiunctiva composita ex partibus contraddicentibus partibus copulativae, et e converso.</p>	<p>hoc quod disunctiva sit falsa, oportet quod ambae suae categoricae sint falsae, ut dicendo homo est irrationalis, vel lapis est animal, et cet. Ad veritatem conditionalis requiritur quod antecedens nequeat stare sine consequenti, ut es homo, ergo tu es ens. Ad cuius cognitionem habendam consideretur, si oppositum consequentis repugnat antecedenti. Ad falsitate vero requiritur, quod antecedens possit stare sine consequente, quod etiam poterit videri, considerando quod oppositum consequentis non repugnat antecedenti, et cet.</p>
<p>IV) <u>On Praedicabilia et Praedicamenta</u></p> <p>De predicabilibus que sunt secundum logice principium: Predicabile quid Predicabile est ens seu universale seu de pluribus dicibile. Predicabile differentia, aliud genus, aliud species, differentia, proprietas, accidens. Genus quidam est universale. Universale, quod de pluribus speciebus differentibus predicatur, ut</p>	<p>IV) <u>On Praedicabilia et Praedicamenta</u> [Pars Prima] De Radicibus Arboris De Terminis</p> <p>Cap. IV - De praedicamentis [This section appears earlier in LP at p. 8-11]</p> <p>1. Praedicamentum est generale ordinamentum in quo omne quod est, secundum suum modum, et gradum est invenibile. Et iste terminus Praedicamentum praedicatur de decem sequentibus, scilicet, de substantia, quantitate etc.</p>	<p>IV) <u>On Praedicabilia et Praedicamenta</u></p> <p>De praedicamentis</p> <p>Quinque sunt praedicabilia, scilicet genus, species, differentia, proprium, et accidens. Genus est quod praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie. Species est ens quod praedicatur de pluribus differentibus numero. Differentia est ens per quod quaedam</p>

<p>substantia et novem generalia accidentia, stante differentia, ut quantitas, qualitas et cetera ut supra.</p> <p>Substantia quid</p> <p>Substantia est ens per se existens, habet in se formam, materiam et coniunctionem; vel aliqua quibus forma et materia et coniunctio simulantur, que sunt substantie essentialia et naturalia, sine quibus ista substantia esse non posset. In tanto quod substantia per formam est substantiva, id est substantialiter activa, et per materiam substantiabilis, id est substantialiter passibilis vel agibilis, et per coniunctionem habet substantiare, id est substantialiter agere.</p> <p>Substantia est in accidente quanta, qualis et cetera, et in quantitate est finita et terminata, in tempore incepta et cetera. Hoc verum est de substantia simpliciter et absolute per se non existente. Substantia vero per se existens simpliciter et absolute, inifinita est sine termino, sine mensura inmensa, et absque tempore eterna, et sine aliquo accidente.</p> <p>Substantia habet in accidentibus suis dominium et posse, et quedam substantia in aliis, et una singularis in omnibus, et similiter omnis et cetera.</p>	<p>sentiens Plato</p>	<p>rationale</p>	<p>Substantia est id cui proprie competit esse et existere per se</p>
---	---------------------------	------------------	---

<p>Corpus est substantia ex punctis, lineis et figuris plena.</p> <p>Corpus animatus est substantia ex potentia sensitiva et vegetativa informata.</p> <p>Animal est substantia animata sentiens.</p> <p>Animal rationale est substantia ex intellectu et voluntate et memoria consistens.</p> <p>Homo est animal sensuale et intellectuale.</p> <p>Homo est substantia in quam rationalis anima et corpus ad invicem coniunguntur.</p> <p>Homo est illa creatura que cum pluribus creaturis participat quam aliqua alia creatura.</p> <p>Substantia, differentia, quid est. Substantia, concordantia, de quo est. Substantia contrarietas quare est. Substantia, principium, quanta est. Substantia, medium, qualis est. Substantia, finis, quando est. Substantia, maioritas, ubi est. Substantia, equalitas, quo modo est. Substantia, minoritas, cum quo est. Causa combinationis, ut in pluribus. Substantia secunda est genera et species. Substantia prima est individuum, in quo genera et species quietem</p>		
--	--	--

<p>habent; habet in se hanc individuum formam et materiam et coniunctionem et hanc individuum quantitatem et qualitatem, et hanc individuum bonitatem, magnitudinem, durationem, concordiam et cetera [...] Notabile per differentiam in unitate [...] Quantitas quid Quantitas est accidens quo substantia est finita et limitata. Quantitas differentia: simplex, composita. Simplex: unitas, status; composita: continua, discreta. Continua linea, tempus, locus, soliditas et superficies. Sub linea continetur bicubitus, tricubitus et cetera. Sub tempore dies, septimana et cetera. Sub loco hic, ibi et cetera. Sub soliditate quadrangulus, triangulus et cetera. Superficies est supra triangulus, quadrangulus et plura alia. Discreta ut numerus et oratio scilicet quinque et decem et cetera. Oratio ut “homo est animal” et cetera. Cetera omnis dicuntur continue quia ipsarum partes in aliquo termino communi concordando coniunguntur, ut lineales partes in puncto et cetera. [...] Qualitas quid</p>	<p>De quantitate Quantitas est accidens, quo substantia est finita et limitata [it follows a scheme]</p> <p>De qualitate</p>	<p>Quantitas est ens mensurativum substantiae.</p>
---	--	--

<p>Qualitas est accidens quo subiectum iudicatur quale sit. Qualitas differentia: qualitas propria et appropriata. Etiam per differentiam sunt quattuor species qualitatis, que ad duas primas generales reducuntur. Prima species habitus et dispositio. Secunda naturalis potentia et inpotentia. Tertio modo passio et passibilis qualitas. Quarta est forma seu figura. [...]</p> <p>Relatio quid Relatio est accidens respectivum pluralitatem necessariam indicans. Relatio differentiam. Relatio per differentiam diversificatur in equalitate, maioriata, minoritate et non ultra. Et sic habet tres species quarum prima est secundum equalitatem et dicitur equiparantia, et est quando aliqua equalia necessario se respiciunt, sicut inter calefactivum caleficabile caleficare, intellectivum intellegibile intelligere, fratrem et fratrem, fratrem et sororem, socium et socium et cetera. Secunda est [...]</p> <p>Actio quid Actio est accidens cum quo agens accidentaliter agit in passio accidentaliter. Actio differentia: animati in animatum ut domini in servum, magistri in discipulum et cetera. Animati in inanimatum ut</p>	<p>7. Qualitas est accidens, quo indicatur quale fit subiectum [it follows a scheme]</p> <p>De relatione [8.] Relatio est accidens per quod aliquid est respectivum, et quod pluralitatem necessariam indicat. [it follows a scheme]</p> <p>De actione et passione 9. Actio est accidens cum quo agens accidentaliter agit in passo accidentali. [it follows a scheme]</p>	<p>Qualitas est ens secundum quam quales esse dicimur.</p> <p>Actio est actus secundum quem agere dicimur.</p>
--	--	--

<p>fabri in clavum, ligatoris in libro, scribentis in scripto et cetera; et e contrario, scilicet inanimati in animatum, ut ignis in animal calefactum vel combustum et cetera hiis similia. Tertia est [...]</p> <p>Passio quid Passio est accidens cum quo patiens accidentaliter patitur sub accidentali agente. Differentia est in passione relatione ad actionem et opposito modo. Passio concordantia. Passio contrarietas.</p> <p>Habitus quid Habitus est accidens de quo subiectum habituatur. Habitus differentia: habitus intellectualis, sensualis, scientia, virtus, vitium et cetera. Sensuales cerdonia, pelliparia carpentaria, caliditas in aere, humiditas in aqua et cetera; albedo in nive, nigredo in atramento et cetera hiis similia. Habitus concordantia, contrarietas; ut supra.</p> <p>Situs quid Situs est accidens quo quedam entia in aliis situantur. Situs differentia: intellectualis, sensualis et uterque. Intellectualis: voluntas in memoria et intellectus et e contrario; sensualis: cessio, erectio, statio et acubitus, vel sensualis quia quedam partes sensuales sunt in aliis naturaliter vel artificialiter, uterque ut anima in corpore et e</p>	<p>10. Passio est accidens cum quo patiens patitur sub accidentali agente. Et dicitur relativo modo ad actionem, et tot, ac easdem species habet, sicut actio, ut diximus.</p> <p>De situ 11. Situs est accidens quo quedam entia in aliis situantur. [it follows a scheme]</p> <p>De habitu 12. Habitus est accidens, quo subiectum habituatur. [it follows a scheme]</p>	<p>Passio est id secundum quod patimur.</p> <p>[sic. Puts Relatio after Passio]</p> <p>Relatio est id, quod unum refertur ad aliud.</p> <p>Situs est habitus rei situantis ad rem situatam.</p> <p>Quando est duratio, secundum permanentiam rei.</p> <p>Ubi est habitus rei ubificantis ad rem ubificantam.</p>
---	--	--

<p>contrario, et ambe in homine et e contrario. Sed etiam est intrinsecus et extrinsecus. [...]</p> <p>Tempus quid Tempus est accidens in quo entia creata sunt incepta et nova. Tempus differentia: instans, successio. Instans : nunc sive presentarius punctus; successio : hora, dies, septimana, mensis et cetera. [...]</p> <p>Locus quid Locus est accidens per quod unum corpus est collocabile sive collocatum in alio et una pars corporis in alia. Locus differentia : locus proprius, appropriatus. Locus proprius est naturalis inseparabilis a subiecto, ut proprius locus vini. Appropriatus est ille quem habet in amphora et contentum in continente, naturalis pars in parte, pars in toto, habitus in habituato et alia similia. Locus concordantia, locus contrarietas et cetera ut supra.</p> <p>Sciendum tamen quod non omnis actio, passio, relatio et qualitas sunt accidentia; nec decet, ymmo est incomparabiliter magis necessarium esse actionem, passionem, relationem et cetera qualitates substantiales quam accidentales, ut patere potest naturali philosopho investiganti et speculanti et</p>	<p>De tempore 13. Tempus est accidens, in quo entia creata sunt incepta, et nova.</p> <p>De loco 14. Locus est accidens per quod unum corpus est collocabile, sive collocatum in alio. Sicut una pars corporis in alia. [it follows a scheme]</p>	<p>Habitus est habitude rei habitantis ad rem habituatum.</p> <p>Predicamentum est ordinatione terminorum secundum sub et supra, ut patet in sequenti figura.</p> <p>[Pict.]</p> <p>Sicut facta ista arbor in praedicamento substantiae, ita potest fieri in aliis praedicamentis; propter hoc ut appareant ad sensum ea, quae sunt superiora et inferiora in quolibet praedicamento, ut per talem cognitionem melius possit homo rerum varietates inquirere.</p>
--	---	---

<p>etiam morali in quibusdam revelatur. Et sic habetur finis quattuor partium.</p>		
<p><u>V) De demonstratione per equiparantiam</u></p> <p><i>Demonstratio per equiparantiam est quando per aliquid aequale notum, aequale ignotum demonstratur vel aequale minus notum per aequale magis notum, et fit tribus modis.</i></p> <p>Primo modo, quando potentia demonstratur per potentiam vel actus per actum. Primo fit “infinita bonitas est ergo infinita duratio est” et cetera; secundo “infinitum intelligere est ergo infinitum amare est” et cetera. Secundo modo, quando per equalitatem potentiarum probatum equalitas actuum, ut sic “immensa sapientia et voluntas sunt, ergo infinitum scire et infinitum amare sunt” et cetera. Tertio modo, quando per equalitatem actuum demonstratur equalitas dignitatum ut sic, “eternum</p>	<p><u>V) De demonstratione per aequiparantiam</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Demonstratio per aequiparantiam est quando per aliquod aequale notum, aliud aequale ignotum demonstratur, vel aequale minus notum, per aequale maius notum. Aequalitas enim est in re, et inaequalitas in nostra cognitione, quae de rebus in se aequalibus potest esse inaequalia. Et fit demonstratio tribus modis.</i> 2. Primus, quando potentia demonstratur per potentiam, vel actus per actum. De primo sic: Infinita Bonitas est, ergo infinita Duratio est; de secundo sic: infinitum intelligere est, ergo infinitum amare est. 3. Secundus, quando per aequalitatem potentiarum probatum equalitas actuum, ut sic: Immensa Sapientia, et voluntas sunt, ergo infinitum scire, et infinitum amare sunt. 4. Tertio quando per aequalitatem actuum demonstratur, et dignitatum, ut sic: Aeternum intelligere, et amare sunt, ergo aeternus intellectus, et amor sunt. 	<p><u>V) De demonstratione per aequiparantiam</u></p> <p><i>Demonstratio per aequiparantiam est quando aliqui aequale ignotum vel aequale minus notum demonstratur per aequale magis notum, et hec est magis bona et magis necessaria probatio, quam duae praedictae, quoniam per ipsa altiora demonstratur.</i></p>

<p>intelligere et amare sunt, ergo eternus intellectus et amor sunt” et cetera.</p> <p>Per demonstrationem equiparantie potest etiam demonstrari per actum agens et passum seu productum, et e contrario, scilicet per agentem passum et actum et per passum actum et agens ut sic: “ubi est intelligere eternum et infinitum sunt intelligens et intellectus eterni et infiniti ; in prima causa est intelligere eternus et infinitus, ergo in prima causa sunt intelligens et intellectus eterni et infiniti” et sic de ceteris suo modo rationibus.</p> <p>Et hec demonstratio est potissima quam illa de quid vel quia, et illa de quid quam illa de quia. Ista enim maxima et propriissime fit in Deo, in quo maius et minus sunt impossibilia. Sed potet fieri secundum omne suas partes in istis inferioribus, in quolibet suo modo.</p> <p>Et istas tres species demonstrationis debet logicus sillogistice inductive, entimematice et exemplariter praticare.</p>	<p>Demonstratione aequiparantiae potest etiam demonstrari agens, passum seu productum per actum, et e converso, scilicet, per agens passum et actus, et per passum actus et agens. Ut ubi est intelligere aeternum, et infinitum, sunt intelligens et intellectus aeterni et infiniti, sed in prima causa est intelligere aeternum, et infinitum, ergo in prima causa sunt intelligens et intellectus aeterni et infiniti. Et de aliis rationibus suo modo.</p> <p>5. Et haec demonstratio est potior, quam illa de quid et de quia, et illa de quid quam illa de quia. Haec enim demonstratio per aequiparantiam maxime et propriissime fit in Deo, in quo maius et minus sunt impossibilia; sed potest fieri secundum suas tres specie in hiis inferioribus, in quolibet suo modo.</p> <p>6. Et istas tres species demonstrationis debet logicus syllogistice, enthimematice et exemplariter praticare, probando suum propositum uno trium modorum, vel duobus, vel omnibus, scilicet, per propositiones simpliciter necessarias, ut: Omne bonum est magnum, omne ens est bonum, ergo omne ens est magnum. Vel per aliquam necessariam et aliam non necessariam, ut: Omnis luxuriosus est peccator, Petrus est luxuriosus, ergo Petrus est</p>	
--	--	--

	<p>peccator. Vel per propositiones non necessarias simpliciter, sicut per authorities, aut in Jure per textus, vel testes. Haec autem probatio potest esse vera et non vera, quia potest se habere ad utrumlibet. Ideoque dicitur non necessaria.</p>	
<p><u>VI) De Fallacia Accidentis</u></p> <p>Fallacia accidentis est deceptio proveniens ex eo quod aliquid significatur simpliciter in esse utriusque eorum que quelibet per accidens unum sunt. Huius fallacie tres sunt species sive modi.</p> <p>Primus provenit ex eo quia proceditur ab accidente ad subiectum vel e contrario, ut hic: “cognosco Sortem, sed Sortes est veniens, ergo cognosco venientem”; non valet quoniam Sortes et veniens sunt unum per accidens et non per se.</p> <p>Peccat autem parallogismus in diversitate medi, apparentia vero stat in concordantia illius accidentalis in quo concordant Sortes et Sortes, et ob hoc non sequitur quod quidquid est verum de uno sit verum et de alio.</p> <p>Secundus modus provenit ex eo quod id, quod accidit</p>	<p><u>VI) De Fallacia Accidentis</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Fallacia Accidens est deceptio proveniens ex eo quod aliquid significatur simpliciter inesse utriusque eorum, qui aequaliter per accidens unum sunt. Huius fallaciae tres sunt modi. 2. Primus provenit ex eo quia proceditur ab accidente, ad subiectum, vel e contra, ut: Agnosco Sortem, sed Sortes est veniens, ergo agnosco venientem. Non valet quoniam Sortes et veniens sunt unum per accidens et non per se, et possum ego cognoscere Sortem, et nescire an veniat, et agnoscere quod aliquis veniat, nesciendo si est Sortes. Peccat parallogismus in diversitate medi, et apparentia stat in concordantia illius actus veniendi, in quo concordant Sortes et veniens. Ob hoc tamen non sequitur, quod quidquid est verum de uno, sit verum de alio. 3. Secundus provenit ex eo quod id quod accidit, seu 	<p><u>VI) De Fallacia Accidentis.</u></p> <p>Fallacia accidentis est deceptio, quae sit ex eo quod aliquid significatur simpliciter in esse utriusque eorum, quae aequaliter unum sunt. Ut sic: homo est animal, et animal est neutrius generis, ergo homo est neutrius generis. Non valet, quoniam homo et animal non sunt idem simpliciter.</p>

<p>seu convenit superiori, includitur in inferiori vel e contrario, ut sic: “homo est animal, et animal est genus, ergo homo est genus”. Similiter “homo est species, homo est substantia, ergo substantia est species”: non valet quoniam superius et inferius sunt idem aliquo modo, non tantum simpliciter, quare peccant in deviatione medii a recta linea et cetera.</p> <p>Tertius modus provenit ex eo quod proceditur a specie ad proprium vel ab uno convertibili ad aliud, ut sic: “homo est risibilis, risibile est proprium, ergo homo est proprium”. Similiter “risibile est proprium homini, homo est species, ergo homo risibilis est species” non valet quoniam homo et species non sunt idem secundum definitionem nec absolute; peccat enim in diversitate medii seu variatione ipsius. Est etiam unus alius modus huius fallacie accidentis, qui fit per differentiam actus naturalis et artificialis et formatur sic paralogismus: “omnis substantia est naturalis, turris est substantia, ergo turris est naturalis”: non valet quoniam turris in quantum est ex partibus naturalibus est naturalis</p>	<p>convenit superiori, concluditur esse in inferiori, vel e contra, ut: Homo est animal, animal est genus, ergo homo est genus. Similiter: Homo est species, Sortes est homo, ergo Sortes est species. Non valet, quoniam superius et inferius sunt idem aliquomodo, non tamen simpliciter, ita quod quidquid praedicatur de uno, et de altero. Peccant paralogismi in deviatione medii a recta linea praedicamentali. Et hic passus est notandus.</p> <p>4. Tertius provenit ex eo quod proceditur ab specie ad proprium, vel ab uno convertibili ad aliud, ut: Homo est risibilis, sed risibile est proprium, ergo homo est proprium. Similiter: Risibile est homo, homo est species, ergo risibile est species. Non valet, quoniam homo et risibile non sunt idem secundum definitionem, nec absolute. Peccat ergo in variatione medii.</p> <p>5. Est etiam alius modus huius Fallaciae, qui fit per differentiam actus naturalis ab artificiali, et formabitur sic paralogismus. Omnis substantia elementata est naturalis, turris est substantia elementata, ergo turris est naturalis. Non valet, quoniam turris secundum quod ex partibus naturalibus constat, est naturalis substantia; sed secundum quod eius partes</p>	
--	---	--

<p>substantia, sed in quantum partes sunt contiguae non continue nec mixte, sed artificialiter aggregate, est ipsa turris artificialis, et hec figura non est naturalis; et hoc in secunda secunde et tertie patere potest et in aliis suo modo.</p>	<p>sunt contiguae, et aggregatae per artem, et non contiguae per naturam, est ipsa turris artificialis, et sua figura non est naturalis. Et hoc in secunda specie secundae regulae et tertiae patere potest, et alia suo modo</p>	
<p>VII) End and Explicit</p> <p>Secundus modus est quando interrogatio est plures, ex eo quia plura subiciuntur vel predicantur in plurali numero sicut hic: “putas mel et fel sint dulcia”, si dicatur sic “ergo concluditur fel est dulce”, si dicatur non, “mel non est dulce”; in omnibus hiis et sibi similibus patet quod non tantum est danda una responsio sed plures, cum fallacia proveniat secundum multa.</p> <p>Dictum est de tredecim fallacis in quibus cadunt omnes deceptiones que fieri possunt, unde per illum modum, per quem in aliquibus locis applicatur differentia et aliqua species regularum, possunt alia instrumentalia principia suo modo applicari; et ratione sue altitudinis, necessarieratis et veritatis alia quecumque sophismata manifestare, que explicare non curo, ne hoc opus ultra debitum prolongetur et maxime, cum illis qui</p>	<p>VII) End and Explicit, p. 71</p> <p>(Cap. XV, De fallacia secundum plures interrogationes ut unam), p. 71</p> <p>... 4. Haec arbor logicalis non habet in se ipsa fructuum [sic], quia fructus logicae colligitur in scientiis altioribus ad quas logica ordinatur tanquam instrumentum ad opus.</p> <p>{Ends simply like this, with no colophon, or Explicit}</p>	<p>VII) End and Explicit.</p> <p>[...] Quia ad interrogationes plures debes dare varias responsiones.</p> <p>De disputatione</p> <p>Disputatio est contrarietas spiritualis, quae per verbum manifestat conceptionem, quam habet unus intellectus</p>

<p>ipsam vere et realiter cognoscunt, via investigandi et inveniendi non sit nimis difficilis ymmo facilis.</p> <p>De modo disputandi</p> <p>Disputatio est contrarietas spiritualis que per verbum manifestat conceptionem quam habet unus intellectus contra alium. In principio oportet quod unusquisque disputantium habeat intentionem ad cognoscendum veritatem et falsitatem, concedendo vera cognita et falsa negando, et supponendo in principio partem utramque ut intellectus possit esse liber.</p> <p>Secundo modo, quod arguens procedat per quattuor species argumentationis ad placitum, fundando argumentum super aliquam speciem demonstrationis.</p> <p>Tertio modo, quod in disputatione breviter proponatur et breviter respondeatur.</p> <p>Quarto, quod in disputatione communis sit amicitia que refrenet particularem contrarietatem.</p> <p>Quinto, quod caveatur ab ira, que intellectum obfuscat ad percipiendam falsitatem vel veritatem, quoniam cum ira ligat suam deliberationem et libertatem. Sexto, quia</p>		<p>contra alium.</p> <p>De conditionibus disputationis</p> <p>Disputans enim primo debet habere intentionem cognoscendi et amandi veritatem, et cognoscendi et odiendi falsitatem, et propter hoc verus disputator debet concedere vera cognita et falsa negare. Secundum quod supponatur in principio, quod utroque pars questionis sit possibilis, scilicet affirmativa vel negativa ut intellectus in investigationis sit liberus et non ligatus. Tertio quod arguens probet vel inprobet per aliqua specie argumentationis fundando argumentum super aliquam speciem demonstrationis.</p> <p>Quarto quod inter disputantes sit communis amicitia ut in frenetur particularis contrarietas quam habent circa hoc de quod disputant.</p>
---	--	--



<p>verba et gestis et similia sint in magna proportione et modestia curialitate et alacritate.</p> <p>Septimo, quod termini non mutantur, nam qui terminos mutat, fugit veritatem, et qui fugit devictus est.</p> <p>Octavo, quod sumantur aliqua principia utrique parti communia et per se nota, ad que fiat recursum tempore necessitatis. Nono, quod in disputatione oportet consentire principiis primis et sequi illorum consequentiam.</p> <p>Decimo et ultimo, quod si in argumento fuerit aliqua sophisticatio, respondens curialiter ipsum argumentum cum differentia distinguat et cum aliis instrumentalibus principiis, iuvantibus regularum speciebus, quibus nihil effugere potest, non dicendo “peccatis per fallaciam” et similia. Sicut si quis diceret “omnis essentia divina est pater, filius est essentia divina, ergo filius est pater”, responderetur “essentia divina est communis equalissime tribus divinis correlativis, ipsa existente in se una et indistincta simplicissima et cum quolibet illorum convertibili, verumtamen alio modo e proprietate communicatur patri et alio modo e proprietate filio et sic de spiritu sancto”. Unde</p>		
---	--	--

<p> nos in nostra responsione sumimus ipsam in una propositione contrahendo ad unum correlativum, cui convenit una propria et proprissima proprietate, et in alia propositione contrahimus ipsam altius correlativo, cui etiam ita bene convenit, sed alio modo et proprietate sibi propria et proprissima; ideo non mirum si falsa producitur conclusio, cuius causa est medii diversitas. Causa apparentie est consideratio ydemptitatis essentie et concordantie relativorum in unitate eiusdem. In prima enim propositione stat essentia pro uno et in secunda pro alio; et potest iste paralogismus considerari in primo modo equivocationis, cum sit hoc quod divina essentia essentialiter conveniat pluribus, scilicet divinis personis, sed tamen diversimode, ut patuit. Si vero aliquis disputator per sophisticaciones incedere voluerit, seminando in suis argumentis fallacias, destruantur ei sophismata cum principiis instrumentalibus et regularum speciebus, scilicet cum sua inexpugnabilitate, vigore et veritate, et ultimo remittere ipsam ad fallaciam seu fallacias quas in suis argumentis seminaverit. </p>		
---	--	--

<p>Sicut quando dicitur “quicumque sunt episcopi sunt homines, sed asini sunt episcopi ergo asini sunt homines”.</p> <p>Paralogismus iste cognoscitur cum medio, differentia, concordantia et contrarietate, et cum tertia specie regule tertie et cum secunda sexte, in qua existit medii diversitas secundum terminos tres, que sunt numerus, casus et speciei regule mutatio. Et peccat penes fallaciam amphibolie; et quia fallaciam omne bonum processum destruit, ideo argumentum nullius valoris existit nec etiam efficace, cum sit fine vacuum.</p> <p>Sequitur questiones decem per quorum solutiones magna de logica habetur notitia [...]</p> <p>De hiis que ad huius operis notitiam preexihiguntur [...]</p> <p>De fine Ego vero artis philosophorum philosophi iam dicti discipulus, licet ad huiusmodi nomen indignum exprimi fore rear, et hoc quia in scientia parvulus et in moribus minimus hoc operi principium, medium et finem dedi, virtute et gratia illius qui est bonitas optima veritasque verissima. Ad cuius honorem factum est</p>		
--	--	--

<p>et propter ipsum addisci debet, ut principia fini respondeant. In laude, cognitione et dilectione domini Dei, a quo omne bonum et verum procedit. Et ad quem est tamquam ad suum ultimum finem reducendum. Deo gratias.</p>		
--	--	--

Appendix Five: Iconographycal Apparatus




Pic. II
Scheme of the Figure A and T of the Lullian Art (*Ars Generalis Ultima*, ROL XIV)

FIGURA III

BC	CD	DE	EF	FG	GH	HI	IK
BD	CE	DF	EG	FH	GI	HK	
BE	CF	DG	EH	FI	GK		
BF	CG	DH	EI	FK			
BG	CH	DI	EK				
BH	CI	DK					
BI	CK						
BK							

FIGURA IV



Pic. I

Scheme of the III and IV Figure of the Lullian Art (*Ars generalis ultima*, ROL XIV)

Bibliography

A. Manuscript sources.

- *BERNKASTEL-KUES, *St. Nikolaus Hospital Library*, 82;
- CHIARI, *Biblioteca Morcelli*, 3;
- CITTÀ DEL VATICANO, *Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana*, lat. 10275;
- CITTÀ DEL VATICANO, *Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana*, lat. 11585;
- *CITTÀ DEL VATICANO, *Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana*, lat. 3069;
- *COPENHAGUEN, *Kongelige Bibliotek*, Ny kgl. Samling 640 8°;
- COPENHAGUEN, *Kongelige Bibliotek*, Thott. 105 4°;
- *FIRENZE, *Biblioteca Riccardiana*, 1001;
- *KARLSRUHE, *Badische Landesbibliothek*, St. Peter perg. 92;
- MADRID, *Biblioteca Nacional*, 131-132;
- MÜNICH, *Bayerische Staatsbibliothek*, lat. 10507;
- *MÜNICH, *Bayerische Staatsbibliothek*, lat. 10542;
- MÜNICH, *Bayerische Staatsbibliothek*, lat. 10561-10566;
- *MÜNICH, *Bayerische Staatsbibliothek*, lat. 4381;
- *PALMA, *Arxiu Diocesà*, Causa Pia Lul·liana 1;
- *PALMA, *Biblioteca Pública*, 1026;
- *PALMA, *Biblioteca Pública*, 1044;
- *PALMA, *Biblioteca Pública*, 1061;
- PALMA, *Biblioteca Pública*, 1082;
- PALMA, *Societat Arqueològica Lul·liana*, 1;

- PARIS, *Bibliothèque national de France*, lat. 15450;
- SALAMANCA, *Biblioteca Universitària*, 2311;
- *SALAMANCA, *Biblioteca Universitària*, 2465;
- *TERNI, *Biblioteca Comunale*, 61.

* Indicates the manuscript sources that I have examined personally.

B. Primary sources

1- Early printed editions.

- Pseudo- Raymundus Lullus, *Logica brevis et nova*, Venezia, Filippo di Pietro, 1480. [RD 2]
- Pseudo- Raymundus Lullus, *Logica abbreviata magistri Raymundi Lull*, ed. Gener Jaume, Barcelona, Pere Posa, 1489. [RD 11]
- Pseudo-Raymundus Lullus, *Logica abbreviata*, Valladolid, Pedro Giraldi and Miguel de Planes, 1497. [RD add. 2]
- Raymundus Lullus, *Logica abbreviata*, Sevilla, J. Cromberger, 1505-1510 (?) [RD add. 6]
- Raymundus Lullus, *Tractatus parvus de logica et de disputatione fidei et intellectus*, *Logica Abbreviata*, Barcelona, Carles Amorós, 1512. [RD 47]
- *Beati Raymundi Lulli Doctoris Illuminati, et Martyris Tertii Ordinis Sancti Francisci. Logica nova jam Valentiae impressa anno 1512*. Valencia, ed. Alfonso de Proaza, Jordi Costilla, 1512 [RD 48]

- Raymundus Lullius and Bernardus Lavinheta, *Dialectica seu logica nova venerabilis eremite Raymundi Lullii diligenter reposita: restitutis que nuper fuerant sublata. Et additis Tractatu de inuentione medii. Item tractatu de conuersione subiecti & predicati per Medium*, París, Josse Bade, 1516. [RD 60]
- Ramon Llull and Bernardus Lavinheta, *Dialectica seu logica noua Venerabilis Eremitae Raemundi Lulli diligenter reposita: restitutis quae nuper fuerant sublata. Et additis Tractatu de inuentione medii. Item Tractatu de conuersione subiecti & praedicari per Medium*, París, Josse Bade, 1518. [RD 68]
- Pseudo Raymundus Lullus, *Logicalia parua Illuminati Doctoris Raymundi Lulli*, Alcali, Arnau Guillem Brocar, 1518. [RD 69]
- Bernardus de Lavinheta, *Explanatio compendiosaque applicatio artis Raymundi Lulli*, Lyón, 1523. [RD 78]
- *D. Raymundi Lulli Logicae compendiolum per Antonium Belverium Lullianae doctrinae professorem commentariolis illustratum*, ed. Bellver Antoni, Mallorca, Gabriel Guasp, 1584. [RD 129]
- *Raymundi Lulli Opera ea quae ad ad inventam ab ipso Artem universalem*, Strasbourg, Llätzer Zetzner, 1598. [RD 144]
- *Raymundi Lullii Opera ea quae ad ad inventam ab ipso artem universalem*, Strasbourg, Llätzer Zetzner, 1609. [RD 162]
- Bernat de Lavinheta, *Opera omnia quibus tradidit Artis Raymundi Lullii compendiosam explicationem*, ed. Alsted Johann Heinrich, Colonia, Llätzer Zetzner, 1612 [RD 168]

- *Raymundi Lullii Opera ea quae ad adinventam ab ipso artem universalem* ,
Strasbourg: Llätzer Zetzner, 1617. [RD 180]
- *Raymundi Lulli Opera ea quae ad adinventam ab ipso artem universalem*,
Strasbourg: Llätzer Zetzner, 1651. [RD 233]
- *Beati Raymundi Lulli Doctoris Illuminati, et Martyris Tertii Ordinis Sancti
Francisci. Logica nova jam Valentiae impressa anno 1512. Et nunc Palmae cum
libris Logica parva, de Quinque Praedicabilibus & decem praedicamentis, et de
Natura*, Mallorca, Miquel Cerdà-Miquel Amorós, 1744. [RD 327]

2- Modern and Contemporary Editions and Reprints.

Albertus de Saxonia, *Logica Albertucii sive Perutilis logica*, [reimpr. Venezia, 1522],
Hildesheim -New York, Olms, 1974.

Alsted, Johann Heinrich, *Clavis artis Lullianae*, [reimpr. 1633, 1652], Hildesheim -New
York, Olms, 1983.

Anonymus saec. XII uel XIII translator Aristotelis, *Metaphysica: libri I - X; XII - XIV
(sive translatio 'media')*, Ed. I. Bekker, Berolini, Reimer 1831-1870 [Bekker 980a]

Anonymus saec. XII translator Aristotelis , *Topica*, Ed. I. Bekker, Berolini, Reimer 1831-
1870. [Bekker 100a]

Aristotle, *Opere I: Categorie, Dell'espressione, Primi Analitici, Secondi Analitici* Intr.
and transl. Gabriele Giannantoni, Laterza, Roma- Bari, 1988.

Avicenna latinus, *Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina*, vol. I, ed. S. Van
Riet, Leiden and Louvain, Brill and Peeters, 1977.

Bernardus de Lavinheta, *Explanatio compendiosaque applicatio Artis Raymundi Lulli*, ed. and intr. Erhard-Wolfram Platzeck, Hildesheim, Gerstenberg, 1977.

Boethius translator Aristotelis, *Analytica Priora (Recensio Florentina)*, Ed. I. Bekker, Berolini, Reimer 1831-1870. [Bekker 24a]

Boethius translator Aristotelis, *Categoriae [uel Praedicamenta]*, Ed. I. Bekker, Berolini, Reimer 1831-1870. [Bekker 1a]

Boethius translator Aristotelis secundum 'editionem uulgatam', *Categoriae [uel Praedicamenta] (editio composita [uulgata])*, Ed. I. Bekker, Berolini, Reimer 1831-1870. [Bekker 1a]

Boethius translator Aristotelis, *De sophisticis elenchis*, Ed. I. Bekker, Berolini, Reimer 1831-1870. [Bekker 164a]

Boethius translator Aristotelis, *Peri hermeneias [uel De Interpretatione]*, Ed. I. Bekker, Berolini, Reimer 1831-1870. [Bekker 20a]

Boethius translator Aristotelis, *Topica*, Ed. I. Bekker, Berolini, Reimer 1831-1870. [Bekker 100a]

Boethius, *Liber de divisione*, Ed. J.-P. Migne, Patrologia Latina 64 (cols. 875-892), Paris, 1847.

Boethius, *De differentiis topics*, Ed. J.-P. Migne, Patrologia Latina 64 (cols. 1173-1216), Paris, 1847.

Boethius, *In cathedrias Aristotelis*, Ed. J.-P. Migne, Patrologia Latina 64 (cols. 159-294), Paris, 1847.

Boethius, *In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Duo. Editio Prima, Seu Minora Commentaria*. Ed. J.-P. Migne, Patrologia Latina 64 (cols. 293-392), Paris, 1847.

Boethius, *In librum de Interpretatione Libri sex. Editio Secunda seu Majora Commentaria*, Ed. J.-P. Migne, Patrologia Latina 64 (cols. 393-638), Paris, 1847.

Boethius, *Introductio ad Syllogismos catheticos*, Ed. J.-P. Migne, Patrologia Latina 64 (cols. 761-794), Paris, 1847.

Eimerich Nicholaus, *Dialogus contra lullistas*, ed. Jaume de Puig i Oliver in "El *Dialogus contra lullistas* de Nicolau Eimeric. Edició i estudi" in *ATCA* 19, Barcelona, 2000.

Eimerich, Nicholaus, *Manuale dell'inquisitore: A.D. 1376*, Ed. and transl. Rino Cammilleri, Piemme, Casale Monferrato (Alessandria), 1998.

Iacobus Veneticus translator Aristotelis, *Analytica posteriora*, Ed. I. Bekker, Berolini, Reimer 1831-1870. [Bekker 71a]

Isidore of Seville, *Sancti Isidori Hispalensis Episcopi Etymologiarum Libri XX*, Ed. J.-P. Migne, Patrologia Latina 82 (cols. 73-728), Paris, 1850.

John of Damascus, *Dialectica* [version of Robert Grosseteste], edited by Owen A. Colligan. St. Bonaventure, N.Y., Franciscan Institute, 1953.

Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval. Étude historique et édition critique, ed. Hamesse J., Louvain, Paris, 1974.

Lull, Ramon, *Die neue Logik : Logica nova*. Edited by Charles Lohr, transl. Vittorio Hösle und Walburga Büchel, intr. Vittorio Hösle, Hamburg, F. Meiner, 1985.

Nova Edició de les Obres de Ramon Llull (=NEORL) directed by Anthony Bonner, Palma de Maiorca 1991- .

Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus. Called afterwards Summule Logicales*, Ed. L.M. De Rijk, Van Gorcum, Assen, 1972.

Petrus Hispanus, *Trattato di Logica. Summule Logicales*, ed. and transl. Ponzio A., Bompiani, Milano 2004.

Porphyrius, *Isagoge*, [versio Boethii], ed. L. Minio Paluello, *Aristoteles Latinus I*, 6-7, Bruges Paris, 1966.

Priscianus, *Institutiones Grammaticae*, [Prisciani Caesariensis grammatici Opera]. Ed. A. Krehn, Lipsiae, in libraria Weidmannia, 1819-20.

Pseudo-Raimundus Lullus, "Liber Ad Memoriam Confirmandam", Ed. A. Madre and Ch. Lohr in *Studia Lulliana* 36, 1996, pp. 99-121.

Pseudo- Thomas Aquinas, "Opusculum XXXV, De Fallaciis ad quosdam nobiles artistas", in *Thomae Aquinati, Doctoris Angelici ordinis praedicatorum Opera Omnia secundum impressionem Petri Fiaccadori Parmae 1852-1873 Photolithographice reimpressa*, tomus XVI, p. 377- 387, Musurgia, New York 1950. [Edit. Rom. XXXIX]

Raimundi Lulli Opera Latina (=ROL) edited by F. Stegmüller and others, Vol. 1- 5 Palma de Maiorca, 1959-67; Vol. 6 and following are inside the "Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis", Ed. Brepols, Turnhout 1975-.

Raimundus Lullus Opera latina: Supplementum Lullianum I Breviculum seu electorium parvum Thomae Migerii (Le Myésier). Ed. C. Lohr, T. Pindl-Büchel and W. Büchel. Brepols 1990, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis (CCCM-PB 77).

Raimundi Lulli Opera Omnia (=MOG) edited by I. Salzinger, 8 volums (I-VI, IX-X) Mainz 1721-1742. Anastatic Edition by F. Stegmüller, Minerva, Frankfurt 1965.

Raimundus Lullus, *Raimundus Lullus, Opera*. Reprint of the Strasbourg 1651 edition, ed. and intr. Anthony Bonner, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Frommann-Holzboog, 1996.

Ramon Llull, *Logica nova. Logicalia parva. De quinque praedicabilibus et decem praedicamentis. Liber de natura*, ed. and intr. Charles Lohr, "Opera parva" 2, Frankfurt/M, 1971-2.

Ramon Lull, *Selected Works of Ramon Lull*, ed. transl. Bonner Anthony, Princeton, New York, 1985.

Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio libri Posteriorum Analyticorum*, Ed. Commissio Leonina, Roma 1882.

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Ed. Commissio Leonina, Roma 1882.

William of Ockham, *Philosophical writings : a selection*, Ed. and transl. by Philotheus Boehner, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1990.

William of Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, Ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure NY 1974.

William of Sherwood (1983), "Introductiones in logicam", Ed. C. Lohr in *Traditio* 39, pp. 219-299.

William of Sherwood, "Syncategoremata", ed. J. R. O'Donnell in *Medieval Studies* III, 1941, pp. 46-93.

C. Secondary Sources: Critical Studies

Abulafia D. (1995- 96), "Commerce and the Kingdom of Majorca 1150-1450", in *Iberia and the Mediterranean world of the Middle Ages*, Brill, Leiden.

Aristotelica et Lulliana : magistro doctissimo Charles H. Lohr septuagesimum annum feliciter agenti dedicata. Ed. Fernando Domínguez, Steenbruge, Abbatia S. Petri, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1995.

Artus W. (1986), "Man as a centre and end of the world within the thought of Ramon Llull" in *Philosophes medievales* 26.

Ashworth, E. J. (1974), *Language and logic in the post-medieval period*, Dordrecht, Boston, Reidel.

Ashworth, E. J. (1978), *The tradition of medieval logic and speculative grammar from Anselm to the end of the seventeenth century : a bibliography from 1836 onwards*. Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

Bäck, Allan. (1996), *On reduplication : logical theories of qualification*, Brill, Leiden, New York.

Badia Lola (1985), *Literatura catalana medieval*, Les Naus d'Empúries, Barcellona.

Badia Lola (1995), "Ramon Llull: autor i personatge" in *Aristotelica et Lulliana*, Instrumenta Patristica XXVI, Nijhoff.

Badia Lola e Bonner Anthony (1988), *Ramon Llull Vida, pensament i obra literària*, Les Naus d'Empúries, Barcellona.

Badia Lola (1988). *De Bernat Metge a Joan Roís de Corella : estudis sobre la cultura literària de la tardor medieval catalana*. Barcelona, Quaderns Crema,

Bataillon Marcel (1966), *Erasmus y Espana. Estudios sobre la historia espiritual del siglo XVI*, trad. Antonio Alatorre, Fondo de cultura economica, Mexico - Buenos Aires.

Josep Batalla (2007), "Es pot ésser Lul·lista avui dia? Reflexions entorn de Kurt Flasch, El pensament filosòfic a l'edat mitjana", *Arxiu de Textos Catalans Antics* 26, pp. 617-635.

Batllori Miguel (1943), "El lulisme en Italia. Ensayo de síntesis" in *Revista de Filosofia* 2, pp. 253-313 and pp. 479-537.

Batllori Miquel (1955), *El Lul·lisme del primer renaixement*, EXCMA. Disputacion proucial de Balears, IV Congreso de historia de la corona de Aragon, Palma de Mallorca.

Batllori Miquel (1973) "Sur le lullisme en France au XV siècle" in *Colloque International de Tours: L'humanisme français au début de la Renaissance*, pp. 117-126

Batllori Miquel (1993), *Ramon Llull i el Lul·lisme*, Biblioteca de Estudis i Investigacions 19, Valencia.

- Batllori, Miquel (2004), *Il Lullismo in Italia. Tentativo di sintesi*, ed. and intr. by Francesco Santi and Michela Pereira; trad. Francisco José Díaz Marcilla, Pontificio Ateneo Antonianum, Roma.
- Boccali G. (1990), "Il codice 226 della biblioteca Comunale di Terni" *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 83, pp. 307-316.
- Bochenski, J.M. (1970), *A History of Formal Logic*, Translated and edited by Ivo Thomas, Chelsea New York.
- Böhner, P. (1959) *Medieval Logic: An Outline of Its Development from 1250 to c. 1400* Barnes & Noble, New York.
- Bonner Anthony (1985), "Introduction", in *Selected works of Ramon Llull*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Bonner Anthony (1986), "L'Art de Ramon Llull com a sistema lògic" *Randa* 19.
- Bonner Anthony (1988), "La cronologia dels anys 1303- 1308 i de l'estada a Pisa de Ramon Llull" *Estudios Lulianos* 28.
- Bonner Anthony (1990), "Ramon Llull and the Dominicans" *Catalan Review* 4.
- Bonner Anthony (1993), "L'art lul·liana com a autoritat alternativa" *Studia Lulliana* 33.
- Bonner Anthony (1994), "Ramon Llull: Relaciò, Acciò, combinatòria i lògica moderna" *Studia Lulliana* 34.
- Bonner Anthony (1995), "Syllogism, fallacies and Hypotesis, Llull's new weapon to combat the Parisian Averroists" in *Aristotelica et Lulliana, Instrumenta Patristica XXVI*, Nijhoff.
- Bonner Anthony (1996), "Introduction" in *Raimundus Lullus Opera, Reprint of the Strasbourg 1651 edition*, Frommann Verlag, Stuttgart- Bad Cannstatt.
- Bonner Anthony (1998), "Introducció" in *Nova edició de les obres de Ramon Llull, Logica Nova*, NEORL IV, Palma de Maiorca.
- Bonner Anthony (1998B), Ressenya a *Studia Luliana* 38, pp. 154-6.
- Bonner Anthony and Ripoll Perelló Maria Isabel (2002), *Diccionari de definicions lul·lianes. Dictionary of Lullian Definitions*, Universitat de Barcellona and Universitat de les Illes Balears, Xisco Arts Gràfique, Palma (Illes Balears).
- Bonner Anthony (2003), "Estadístiques sobre la recepció de l'obra de Ramon Llull", *SL* 43, pp. 83-92.
- Bonner Anthony (2007), *The art and logic of Ramon Llull: a user's guide*, Leiden-Boston, Brill.
- Brancaleone David (2002), "Il *Libro dele Bestie* di Raimondo Lullo nella versione trecentesca veneta", in *Per leggere i generi della letteratura* 2, 2 , pp. 17-62.
- Broadie A. (1993), *Introduction to medieval logic*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
- Brummer R. (1976), *Bibilographia Lulliana. Ramon-Llull- Schrifttum 1870-1973*, Gerstenberg Verlag, Hildesheim.

- Cantoni Alzati G. (1982) *La Biblioteca di S. Giustina di Padova: libri e cultura presso i benedettini padovani in età umanistica*. Antenore, Padova.
- Carreras y Artau T. e Carreras y Artau J. (1939), *Historia de la filosofía española cristiana de los siglos XIII al XV*, Real Academia de Ciencias, Tomo I, Madrid.
- Carreras y Artau T. e Carreras y Artau J. (1943), *Historia de la filosofía española cristiana de los siglos XIII al XV*, Real Academia de Ciencias, Tomo II, Madrid.
- Carreras y Artau, Joaquin (1946), *De Ramón Lull a los modernos ensayos de formación de una lengua universal, por Joaquin Carreras y Artau*, Barcelona.
- Catalogo di manoscritti filosofici nelle biblioteche italiane*, V, Cesena, Cremona, Lucca, S.Daniele del Friuli, Teramo, Terni, Trapani, Udine, ed. Olschki, Firenze, 1985.
- Colloque International de Tours: L'humanisme français au début de la Renaissance* Vrin, Paris, 1973.
- Colomer Eusebi (1979), "De Ramón Lull a la moderna informàtica", *Estudios Lulianos* 23, pp. 113-135.
- Colomer Eusebi (1988), "Ramón Lull y Ramón Martí", *Estudios Lulianos* 28, pp. 1-37.
- Colomer Eusebi (1990) "Nicolau de Cusa i el lul·lisme europeu quatrecentista" in *Del frau a l'erudició. Aportacions a la història del lul·lisme dels segles XIV al XVIII "Randa"* 27, pp. 71-85.
- Conde y Delgado De Molina R. (1983), "Los Lull: una família de la burguesia barcelonesa del siglo XIII", in *La societat mediterranea all'epoca del Vespro*, Atti del XI Congresso di Storia della Corona d'Aragona, Accademia di Scienze Lettere e Arti, Palermo.
- Congreso Internacional de Lulismo (2nd, 1976, Monasterio de Miramar), *Actas del II Congreso Internacional de Lulismo : Miramar, 19-24 octubre 1976*. Palma de Mallorca, Miramar, 1979.
- Congressus Scotisticus Internationalis (2d, 1966, Oxford and Edinburgh, Lothian), *De doctrina Ioannis Duns Scoti. Acta Congressus Scotistici Internationalis Oxonii et Edimburgi 11-17 Sept. 1966 celebrati*. Cura Commissionis Scotisticae, Roma, 1968.
- Constantes y fragmentos del pensamiento luliano. Actas del simposio sobre Ramon Lull en Trujillo, 17-20 septiembre 1994*, ed. F. Domínguez e J. de Salas, "Beihefte zur Iberoromania" 12, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen, 1996.
- Cordeschi Roberto (1983), "I sillogismi di Lullo" in *Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Storia della Logica*, CLUEB, Bologna.
- Courtenay William J. (1982), "The Early Stages in the Introduction of Oxford Logic into Italy", in *English logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th centuries : acts of the 5th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Rome, 10-14 November 1980*. ed. A: Maierù, Bibliopolis, Napoli 1982, pp. 13-32.
- Cruz Hernandez M. (1977), *El pensamiento de Ramon Lull*, Castalia, Valencia.
- D'Ors Angel (1996), " Raimundo Lulio, Nicolas de paz y la "Logica Parva""", *Documenti e Studi* 7, pp .115-130.

- De Libera A. (1995), *Storia della Filosofia Medievale*, Jaca Book, Milano.
- De Robertis T. - Miriello R. (1999), “Manoscritti datati della biblioteca Riccardiana di Firenze” II, SISMEL, Edizioni del Galluzzo.
- Dominguez Reboiras Fernando (1986), “In civitate pisana, in monasterio Sancti Domnini Algunas observaciones sobre la estancia de Ramon Llull en Pisa (1307-1308)” in *Traditio* 42.
- Dominguez Reboiras Fernando (1987), «Idea y estructura de la vida de Ramon Llull», *Studia Lulliana* 27.
- Dominguez Reboiras Fernando (1991), «La cronologia de las obras pisanas de Ramon Llull. Observaciones a la propuesta de A. Bonner», *Estudios Lulianos* 31.
- Dominguez Reboiras Fernando (1994), «Principia Philosophiae [Complexa] y Thomas Le Myèsier», *Studia Lulliana* 34.
- Dominguez Reboiras Fernando (1995 A), “Raimundo Lulio y el ideal mendicante. Afinidades y Divergencias” in *Aristotelica et Lulliana*, Instrumenta Patristica XXVI, Nijhoff.
- Dominguez Reboiras Fernando (1995 B), “Geometria, Filosofia, Teologia y Arte. En torno a la obra Principia Philosophiae de Ramon Llull” *Studia Lulliana* 35.
- Dominguez Reboiras Fernando (1998 A), Introducción in *Raimundi Lulli Principia Philosophiae*, ROL 19, Brepols, Turnhout.
- Dominguez Reboiras Fernando (1998 B), “La España medieval, frontera de la cristiandad” in *Cristianismo y Europa ante el Tercer Milenio*, Salamanca.
- Dominguez Reboiras Fernando e Madre Aloisius (1998), Einleitung in *Raimundi Lulli Liber De Venatione Substantiae Accidentis et Compositi*, ROL 22, Brepols, Turnhout.
- Dominguez Reboiras Fernando (1990) "Els apòcrifs lul·lians sobre la Immaculada. La seva importància en la història del lul·lisme", *Del frau a l'erudició. Aportacions a la història del lul·lisme dels segles XIV al XVIII*. Randa 27, pp. 11-43
- Dumitriu, Antoniu (1977) *History of logic*, Abacus Press, Tunbridge Wells
- Eimeric, Nicolau, *Manuale dell'inquisitore: A.D. 1376*, a cura di Rino Cammilleri, Casale Monferrato (Alessandria), Piemme, 1998.
- English logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th centuries : acts of the 5th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Rome, 10-14 November 1980*. ed. A. Maierù, Bibliopolis, Napoli 1982.
- Euler Walter (1998), Einleitung in *Raimundi Lulli Logica Nova*, ROL 23, Brepols, Turnhout.
- Fedriga R. e Puggioni S. (1993), *Logica e Linguaggio nel Medioevo*, Edizioni Universitarie di Lettere Economia Diritto, Milano.
- Fidora Alexander and Wyllie Guilherme (2008-09) “Ramon Llull i el tractat *De fallaciis* del pseudo-Tomàs d’Aquino”, forthcoming in *Enrahonar. Quaderns de Filosofia*.

- Forlivesi Marco (2008), *Gli scotisti secenteschi di fronte al dibattito tra bañeziani e molinisti: un'introduzione e una nota*, in *Conoscenza e contingenza nella tradizione aristotelica medievale*, a cura di St. Perfetti, E.T.S., Pisa, pp. 243-285.
- Fumagalli Beonio Brocchieri M. e Parodi M. (1989), *Storia della filosofia medievale*, Laterza, Roma- Bari.
- Gardner Martin (1958), *Logic machines and diagrams*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Garin Eugenio (1987), "Introduzione" a *Charles de Bovelles, Il libro del Sapiente*, Einaudi, Torino.
- Garin Eugenio (2001), *La cultura filosofica del rinascimento Italiano*, Bompiani, Milano.
- Gayà Jordi (1979), *La teoria lulliana de los correlativos*, Palma de Mallorca.
- Gayà Jordi (1989), "Honoris d'Autun i Ramon Llull: Raons per a una ipotesi" *Estudis Balearics* 29-30.
- Gayà Jordi (1991), "Concepto de <<Ars>> , y su uso en Juan Escoto Eriùgena", *Estudios Lulianos* 31.
- Gayà Jordi (2006), «*Que el llibre multiplicàs*», *Ramon Llull i els llibres*, pres. Anthony Bonner, "Publicacions del Centre d'Estudis Teològics de Mallorca", Mallorca.
- Gilson Etienne (1922), *La Philosophie au moyen age*, I, II, Payot, Parigi.
- Hames H.J. (2000), *The art of Conversion. Christianity and Kabbalah in the Thirteenth Century*, Brill, Leiden.
- Hamesse Jacqueline (1974), *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval. Étude historique et édition critique*, Louvain-Paris.
- Hillgarth Jocelyn N. (1971), *Ramon Lull and Lullism in Fourteenth-century France*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Hillgarth Jocelyn N. (1963) «La biblioteca de La Real: Fuentes posibles de Lull», *Estudios lulianos* 7.
- Hillgarth Jocelyn N.(1964) «Some Notes on Lullian Hermits in Majorca, Saec. XIII-XVII» *Studia Monastica* 6, pp. 299-328.
- Hillgarth Jocelyn N. (1991 A), "Ramon Lull's early life: new documents", *Mediaeval Studies* 53.
- Hillgarth Jocelyn N. (1991 B), *Readers and books in Majorca 1229-1550*, Editors du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris.
- Hillgarth Jocelyn N. (2001), *Diplomatari lul-lià: documents relatius a Ramon Llull i a la seva família*, trad. L. Cifuentes, Edicions de la Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona.
- Hösle Vittorio (1985), "Einführung" in *Raimundi Lulli Logica Nova Die Neue Logik*, Meiner Verlag, Hamburg.
- Imbach Ruedi (1987), «Lulle face aux Averroïstes parisiens», *Cahiers de Fanjeaux* 22.

Intel·lectuals i escriptors a la baixa Edat Mitjana : treballs del Seminari de Literatura Medieval del Departament de Filologia Catalana, Universitat de Barcelona, 1988-94, ed. Lola Badia and Albert Soler. 1. ed. Barcelona, Curial Edicions Catalanes, Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat, 1994.

Johnston M. D. (1981), "The reception of the Lullian Art, 1450-1530", *Sixteenth Century Journal* 12, pp. 31-48.

Johnston M. D. (1987), *The spiritual logic of Ramon Lull*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Johnston M. D. (1995- 96), "Ramon Llull and the compulsory evangelization of jews and muslims" in *Iberia and the Mediterranean world of the Middle Ages*, Brill, Leiden.

Johnston M. D. (1996), *The evangelical Rhetoric of Ramon Lull*, Oxford University Press, Oxford- New York.

Kneale, W.C., Kneale, M. (1962), *The development of logic*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Kristeller Paul Oscar (1963-1993), *Iter Italicum*, XX vols, The Warburg Institute, London.

Lilao Franca Óscar and Castrillo González Carmen (2002), *Catálogo de manuscritos de la Biblioteca Universitaria de Salamanca II. Manuscritos 1680-2777*, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca.

La cultura della memoria. Uomini libri e carte della Biblioteca Morcelliana. AAVV, Chiari, Fondazione Biblioteca Morcelli-Pinacoteca Reppi, 2002.

Llinares A. (1973), "Le lullisme de Lefèvre d'Étaples et de ses amis humanistes" in *De Pétrarque à Descartes 29: Colloque International de Tours (XIVe stage). L'Humanisme français au début de la Renaissance*, pp. 127-136.

Llinares A. (1987), «Raymond Lulle à Montpellier. La refonte du <<Grand art>>» *Cahiers de Fanjeaux* 22.

Llinares A. (1990 A), "Les Dignités divines dans le Livre de Contemplació" in *Catalan Review* 4.

Llinares A. (1990 B), *Ramon Llull*, Moll, Palma de Maiorca.

Lohr Charles H. (1965), "Logica Algazelis Introduction and Critical text" *Traditio* 21.

Lohr Charles H. (1972 A), "Ramon Llull, Logica Brevis", *Estudios Lulianos* 46 pp. 1-11.

Lohr Charles H. (1972 B), "Ramon Llull, Logica Brevis", *Franciscan Studies* 32.

Lohr Charles H. (1983), "William of Sherwood, 'Introductiones in logicam' Critical Text" *Traditio* 39, p. 219-299.

Lohr Charles H. (1984), "Christianus arabicus, cuius nomen Raimundus Lullus" *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 31.

Lohr Charles H. (1987), «Les fondements de la logique nouvelle de Raymond Lulle», *Cahiers de Fanjeaux* 22.

- Lohr Charles H. (1988), "16: Metaphysics", *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, a cura di C. B. Schmitt e Q. Skinner, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Lohr Charles H. (1989), "Islamic influences in Lull's logic", *Estudi General* 9.
- Lohr Charles H. (1990), "Raimondo Lullo, l'azione e il pensiero" in *Conciliarismo, Stati Nazionali, Inizi dell'Umanesimo*, CISAM, Spoleto.
- Lohr Charles H. (1993), "Ramon Lull's theory of scientific demonstration" in *Argumentationstheorie: Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgerns*, Brill, Leiden.
- Lohr Charles H. (1994), "Ramon Lull's theory of the Quantification of qualities" in *Costantes y Fragmentos del pensamiento humano*, Editore National, Madrid.
- Lohr Charles H. (1998 A), "Ramon Lull's new theory of the logical categories" in *Pensamiento medieval hispano*, Madrid.
- Lohr Charles H. (1998 B), "Raimondo Lullo e Anselmo d'Aosta" in *Studi Medievali* 29.
- Lohr Charles H. (2000), "The arabic background to Ramon Lull's Liber Chaos" *Traditio* 55.
- Longprè P.E. (1926), «Lulle» s.v. in *Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique*, IX, 1, Parigi, col 1072-1141.
- Lopez Athanasius (1910), "Descriptio codicum franciscanorum Bibliothecae Riccardianae Florentinae", in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 3, pp. 739-742.
- Madre Aloisius (1960), "Raimundus Lullus und Johan Heinrich Alsted" *Estudios Lulianos* 4.
- Madurell y Marimont J. M. (1962- 64- 65), "Documentos de la Escuela lulliana in Barcelona", *Estudios Lulianos*, 6- 8- 9.
- Mazzoli Corrado (1993), *Tra i gioielli dell'Umbria. Catalogo di manoscritti (sec. XIII-XV) della Biblioteca Comunale di Terni*, Vecchiarelli Editore, Roma.
- Medieval formal logic : obligations, insolubles and consequences*, ed. Mikko Yrjönsuuri. Dordrecht, Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001.
- Merle H. (1977), «Dignitas: Signification philosophique et theologique de ce term chez Lulle et les predecesseurs medievaux», *Estudios Lulianos* 21.
- Moody, Ernst .A. (1953), *Truth and consequence in mediaeval logic*, North-Holland Amsterdam Pub.
- Muñoz Delgado, V. (1964), *La lógica nominalista en la Universidad de Salamanca, 1510-1530; ambiente, literatura, doctrinas*, Revista Estudios, Madrid.
- O'Callaghan J.F. (1995-96), "Kings and Lords in conflict in late thirteenth- century Castile and Aragon" in *Iberia and the Mediterranean world of the Middle Ages*, Brill, Leiden.
- O'Callaghan, J.F. (1975) *A history of medieval Spain*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

Olivier A. (1965- 66- 67- 69), "Ramon Lull y la escuela franciscana de los siglos XIII- XIV" *Estudios Lulianos* 9-10-11-13.

Ottaviano Carmelo (1930) *L'Ars compendiosa de R. Lulle : avec une étude sur la bibliographie et le fond ambrosien de Lulle*, J. Vrin, Paris.

Peers E. A. (1946), *Fool of Love: the life of Ramon Lull*, S.C.M. Press, London.

Perarnau i Espelt Josep (1979) "Sobre mestre Antoni Sedacer i l'ambient de l'Escola lul·liana de Barcelona" in *Homenaje en honor de Josep M. Madurell i Marimon. Estudios históricos y documentos de los Archivos y Protocolos 7* Barcelona, , pp. 133-153

Perarnau i Espelt Josep (1983), "Consideracions diacronique entorn del manuscrits lul lians medieval de la *Bayerische Staatsbibliothek*" *ATCA* 2, 1983, pp. 123-169.

Perarnau i Espelt Josep (1985), "El lullisme de Maiorca a Castella a través Valencia. Edicio de l'Art abrevjada de Confessio" *ATCA* 4, 1985, pp. 61-172.

Perarnau i Espelt Josep (1986 B), "Indicacions esparses sobre Lul lisme a Itàlia abans de 1450" *ATCA* 5, 1986, pp. 296-302.

Perarnau i Espelt Josep (1986), *Els manuscrits lul-lians medievals de la «Bayerische Staatsbibliothek» de Munic. II. Volums de textos llatins* Facultat de Teologia de Catalunya, Barcelona.

Perarnau i Espelt Josep (1991), "Francescanesimo ed eremitismo nell'area catalana" in *Eremitismo nel Francescanesimo medievale. Assisi, 12-13-14 ottobre 1989* Centro di Studi Francescani, Assisi, pp. 165-185.

Perarnau i Espelt Josep (1997), "De Ramon Llull a Nicolau Eimeric. Els fragments de l'Ars amativa de Llull, en còpia autògrafa de l'inquisidor Eimeric integrats en les cent tesis antilul·lianes del seu Directorium Inquisitorium", *ATCA* 16, pp. 7-129.

Pereira Michela (1974), "L'uso del 'Panepistemon' del Poliziano nella 'Isagoge in Rhetoricam' Pseudolulliana" *Physis* 16.

Pereira Michela (1984), "Bernardo di Lavinheta e la diffusione del Lullismo a Parigi nei primi decenni del '500" *Interpres* 5, pp. 242-265.

Pérez Martínez Lorenzo (1960) "El maestro Pedro Dagú y el lulismo mallorquín de fines del siglo XV", *Estudios Lulianos* 4, pp. 291-306.

Pérez Martínez Lorenzo (1961) in *Los fondos lulianos existentes en las bibliotecas de Roma*, Publicaciones del Instituto de Estudios Eclesiásticos en Roma, Roma.

Piccinni Gabriella (1999), *I mille anni del Medioevo*, Bruno Mondadori, Milano.

Pinborg Jan (1984), *Logica e Semantica nel Medioevo*, Boringhieri, Torino.

Pistarino Geo (1979), *Italia Benedettina II- Liguria Monastica*, Pubblicazioni del Centro Storico Benedettino Italiano, Cesena, Badia di Santa Maria del Monte.

Platzeck E. W. (1954), "La combinatoria Luliana", *Revista de Filosofia* 48, Madrid.

Platzeck E. W. (1972), "Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz y Raimundo Llull", *Estudios Lulianos* 16, pp. 129-193.

Platzeck E. W. (1977), "Einleitung" in Bernardi di Lavinheta *Explanatio compendiosaque applicatio Raymundi Lulli*, [cit.].

Pomaro, Gabriella (2005), "«Licet ipse fuerit, qui fecit omnia»: il Cusano e gli autografi lulliani", *Ramon Lull und Nikolaus von Kues: eine Begegnung im Zeichen der Toleranz. Raimondo Lullo et Niccolò Cusano: un incontro nel segno della tolleranza*, ed. Ermenegildo Bidese, Alexander Fidora i Paul Renner, "Instrumenta Patristica et Mediaevalia. Subsidia Lulliana" 2, Turnhout, Brepols, 2005, pp. 175-204.

Priest Graham and Read Stephen (1981) "Ockham's Rejection of Ampliation". In *Mind, New Series*, Vol. 90, pp. 274-279.

Pring-Mill Robert (1956) "The Trinitarian world picture of Ramon Lull" in *Romanische Jahrbuch* 7, pp. 229-256.

Pring-Mill Robert (1961), *El microcosmos Lul·lià*, Moll, Palma de Maiorca.

Pring-Mill Robert (1990), "The Lullian 'Art of finding Truth': a medieval system of enquiry", *Catalan Review* 4.

Pring-Mill Robert (1958), "El numero primitivo de las dignidades en el 'Art General'" *Estudios Lulianos* 2.

Rice Eugene F. (1972), *The prefatory epistles of Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples*, Columbia University Press, New York and London.

Riedlinger H. (1978), Prolegomena in Raimundi Lulli *Liber De Conversione Subiecti et Predicati et Medii*, ROL 6, Brepols, Turnhout.

Riforma della chiesa, cultura e spiritualità nel Quattrocento Veneto : atti del convegno per il VI centenario della nascita di Ludovico Barbo, 1382-1443, Padova, Venezia, Treviso, 19-24 settembre 1982, ed Giovanni B. Francesco Tirolese, Cesena, Badia di Santa Maria del Monte, 1984.

Rogent Elies and Duràn Estanislau (1989), *Bibliografia de les impressions lul·lianes* vol. I, Palma de Mallorca, Miquel Font, [reprint from the 1927 edition].

Romano Marta M.M. (2007), "Il primo lullismo in Italia: tradizione manoscritta e contesto della *Lectura* de Joan Bolons" in *Studia Lulliana* 47, 2007, pp. 71-115.

Romano Marta MM (2008), "I *Canti* di Bartolomeo Gentile da Fallamonica (1450-1510/20). Poesia, scienza e studio di Lullo" in *Pan* 24, 2008, pp. 273-299.

Rossi Paolo (1960), *Clavis Universalis Arti mnemoniche e logica combinatoria da Lullo a Leibniz*, Ricciardi, Milano- Napoli.

Rubió i Balaguer Jordi (1985), *Ramon Llull i el lul·lisme*, pr. Lola Badia, Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat, Barcelona.

Ruiz Simon Josep M. (1993), "«<<Quomodo est haec ars inventiva?>> L'art de Llull i la dialèctica escolàstica", *Studia Lulliana* 33.

Ruiz Simon Josep M. (1999), *L'art de Ramon Llull i la teoria escolàstica de la ciència*, Assaig, Quaderns Crema, Barcellona.

Sales T. (1998), "La informàtica moderna, hereva intel·lectual directa del pensament de Llull" *Studia Lulliana* 38.

Santi Francesco (1986), "Osservazioni sul manoscritto 1001 della Biblioteca Riccardiana di Firenze, per la storia del Lullismo nelle regioni meridionali dell'Impero nel secolo XIV", *ATCA* 5, pp. 231-267.

Santi Francesco (1988), "La fortuna de Ramon Llull a les regions meridionals de l'Imperi al segle XIV. Esbós sobre les perspectives de recerca", *Ateneu. Revista de Cultura* 14, pp. 13-16.

Santi Francesco (1990) "Episodis del lul·lisme genovès a les acaballes del segle XIV: la confluència amb l'ockhamisme", *Del frau a l'erudició. Aportacions a la història del lul·lisme dels segles XIV al XVIII*. "Randa" 27, pp. 57-69.

Santi Francesco (2004) "El Lul·lisme a Itàlia" in Batllori M. (2004) *Il lullismo in Italia. Tentativo di sintesi*, ed. and intr. by Francesco Santi and Michela Pereira, trad. Francisco José Díaz Marcilla, Pontificio Ateneo Antonianum, Roma.

Scarsella Attilio Regolo (1914), *Annali di Santa Margherita Ligure*, Forni Editore, Bologna.

Simon L. F. (1995- 96), "The church and slavery in Ramon Lull's Majorca" in *Iberia and the Mediterranean world of the Middle Ages*, Brill, Leiden 1995- 96.

Studies on the history of logic : proceedings of the III. Symposium on the History of Logic, ed. Angelelli I. and Cerezo M. Berlin-New York, 1993.

Tarré Josep (1951), "Un quadrienni de producció lul·lística a València (1335-1338)", *Studia monographica & recensioni* 6, pp. 22-30.

The Cambridge companion to Ockham, ed. Spade P. V., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.

Trobada Internacional d'Estudis sobre Arnau de Vilanova. Actes de la I Trobada Internacional d'Estudis sobre Arnau de Vilanova, ed. Perarnau Josep, Institut d'Estudis Catalans, Barcellona, 1995.

Umanesimo e culture nazionali europee : testimonianze letterarie dei secoli XV-XVI, a cura di Sasse B., Palumbo, Palermo, 1999.

Vennebusch J. (1972), «De Venatione Medii inter Subiectum et Praedicatum: ein Abschnitt aus "De Venatione Substantiae Accidentis et Compositi" des Raimundus Lullus» *Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale* 14.

Victor J.M. (1975), «The Revival of Lullism at Paris 1499-1516», *Renaissance Quaterly* 28, pp. 504-534.

Vignaux Paul (1990), *La filosofia nel medioevo*, Laterza, Roma- Bari.

Wadding Luke (1931), *Annales Minorum*, 3rd ed. , Vol. 5, Quaracchi.

Welch J. (1990), "Lull and Leibniz: the logic of discovery", *Catalan Review* 4.

Yates Frances A. (1954) "The Art of Ramon Lull." In *Journal of the Warburg & Courtauld Institutes* 17, pp. 115-173.

Yates Frances A. (1972), *L'arte della Memoria*, Einaudi, Torino.

Yates Frances A. (1982 A), "The Art of Ramon Lull: an approach to it through Lull's theory of the elements" in *Collected Essays: Lull and Bruno*, Routledge and Kegan, London.

Yates Frances A. (1982 B), "Ramon Llull and John Scotus Erigena" in *Collected Essays: Lull and Bruno*, Routledge and Kegan, London.

Zambelli Paola (1962), "Intorno al lullismo, alle arti mnemoniche e occulte e al metodo del loro studio" *Studi Storici* 3.

Zambelli Paola (1965), "Intorno a possibili fonti di Lullo e ad alcuni sviluppi della sua combinatoria entro la trattatistica astrologico-magica dei secoli XIII-XIV" in *La filosofia della natura nel Medioevo. Atti del III Congresso internazionale di filosofia medievale*, Vita e Pensiero, Milano.

D- On-line Resources and Databases.

The Aristoteles Latinus Database, ed. Brepolis. Online edition, web address:
<http://clt.brepolis.net.lib-proxy.nd.edu/ald/>

The Ramon Lull Database, ed. University of Barcelona, Online edition, web address :
<http://orbita.bib.ub.es/ramon>.