Abstract: Epistemic injustice occurs when—due to identity prejudices or structural marginalization—subjects are wronged in their capacity as knowers (Fricker 2007). According to Fricker, epistemic injustice can take two forms: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In this talk, I identify a further, hitherto unrecognized, form of epistemic injustice that is rooted in stereotypes which enter a subject’s cognition in the form of core beliefs. I proceed as follows: First, I explicate the key features and the specific functional profile of core beliefs. Second, I explore how social identity stereotypes and adversity faced when (dis)conforming to these stereotypes can lead to the formation of distorting core beliefs. Third, I analyze various ways how such core beliefs generate epistemic injustice. Finally, I argue that due to the specific profile of core beliefs, this type of epistemic injustice is particularly hard to resolve.
Activities > Colloquium > Core beliefs and epistemic injustice
