Epistemology

Higher-order evidence will be the general theme of the 2021/22 Epistemology Reading Group at least until the Christmas break. 

Topic description

We form our beliefs following the evidence we have available. For instance, a police officer tells you that the butler’s alibi has holes and you then see the butler with a bloody knife in his hand. Drawing on this evidence, you come to believe that the butler did it. Such evidence is first-order, i.e., evidence that directly bears on the proposition that the butler did it. Sometimes, however, we also come across higher-order evidence, i.e., “evidence for or against the truth of a proposition about the first-order evidence” (Whiting 2020). As Whiting puts it, higher-order evidence comes in different forms, including evidence concerning (i) what evidence one has available; (ii) the strength and valence of one’s evidence; (ii) the normative import of one’s evidence; or (iv) one’s capacities and dispositions for assessing one or more of (i-iv), or for rationally responding to one’s first-order evidence. 

The epistemic significance of higher-order evidence is a matter of heated debate. Some cases suggest that it not only makes a difference “to what one believes about the first-order evidence but also to one’s beliefs about the world itself (Kelly 2014). But in some other cases (especially those where one’s higher-order evidence is misleading), it is unclear what its epistemic significance for one’s beliefs about the world should be. Suppose that someone cleverly misleads you into thinking that you’ve been given “a judgement-distorting drug that has been shown through many trials to cause 99% of the people who take it to make mistakes in tasks like dosage” (Christensen 2007). Would you now administer a covid-19 vaccine to your patient? What are we rationally required (or permitted) to believe in such cases? 

In this reading group, we will address these kinds of puzzles about rationality. Yet, as the latest research on the topic shows, discussions about higher-order evidence also have ramifications for other important debates in epistemology (e.g., peer disagreement, epistemic defeat) and beyond (e.g., ethics, aesthetics; see especially Whiting (2020) in this regard). During the course of the reading group, we will decide what specific subtopics we shall focus on.

Work-in-progress sessions

In addition, participants will also have the opportunity to present their work in progress, either in full two-hour-sessions (research papers, dissertation chapters), or else 15-30 min before or after the main discussion (sections of papers/chapters, more or less formal arguments or objections that are not sections themselves, reviewer comments). PhD students are especially encouraged to take this opportunity. 

We will decide an appropriate ratio of reading group sessions to work-in-progress sessions so that we get new input in a systematic fashion that allows us all to deepen our understanding of the reading group’s topic while also benefiting from the participants’ feedback on our work.

Frequency

Weekly (both semesters). 

Day & time 

Thursdays, 11:30-13:30

Where?

Until further notice, all meetings will be held online (Zoom).