Decision-making in Centrifugal Federal Systems: what can Catalonia and Spain truly learn from the Canadian experience? (PRE223/25/000008)
DETALLES
Entidad financiadora: Institut d’Estudis d’Autogovern.
Investigador Principal: Elia Marzal Yetano (Universidad de Barcelona).
Duración: 06/11/2025-05/11/2027
RESUMEN
This project develops a normative and analytical framework to assess the constitutional legitimacy of decision-making procedures in deeply plural and plurinational states. It takes as its point of departure the 1998 Reference re Secession of Quebec of the Supreme Court of Canada, understood not merely as a doctrinal pronouncement on secession, but as a constitutional theory of negotiated sovereignty grounded in democratic principles.
The Court’s reasoning articulated a conditional “duty to negotiate” triggered by a clear expression of popular will. Rather than endorsing unilateral secession or entrenching a veto structure, the judgment proposed a procedurally mediated model of constitutional change that seeks to reconcile federalism, democracy, constitutionalism, and the protection of minorities. This project interprets that model as an attempt to address a structural tension characteristic of centrifugal federal systems: the conflict between majority rule at the state level and the claims of territorially concentrated permanent minorities.
The research pursues three theoretical objectives. First, it reconstructs the internal normative logic of the Court’s framework and situates it within competing paradigms of Canadian federalism (bilateral, multilateral, and federal-institutional). Second, it evaluates the model through the lens of democratic theory, drawing in particular on social choice theory, public choice theory, and theories of consensus democracy to examine whether procedural clarity can generate legitimacy under conditions of deep disagreement. Third, it critically assesses subsequent institutional responses—most notably the federal Clarity Act and Quebec’s Loi 99—as competing interpretations of the scope and limits of constitutional negotiation.
Through a structured comparison with Spain, the project aims to refine the theoretical conditions under which a constitutional duty to negotiate can be normatively justified in plurinational democracies.