Content externalism is committed to the claim that concept-possession is a matter of degree. This means it is possible for a subject to grasp a concept incompletely, and possible for one subject to grasp a given concept more fully than another subject grasps that concept. This in turn implies a distinction between a subject's thoughts, on the one hand, and her states of mind, on the other. In this talk, I will use the fact that concepts can be grasped incompletely to ground a model of self-knowledge. On the model I provide, conscious thought provides reasons for self-ascriptions, but those reasons are defeasible precisely because of the disinction between thoughts and states of mind. The model does justice to the authority and knowledgeable status of self-ascriptions while also acknowledging their potential defeat by evidence from others.
Activities > Colloquium > Grasping Concepts Incompletely
Grasping Concepts Incompletely
Sarah Sawyer (Sussex)
