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De Se

DS   |   2017 / 2018
Convenor: Víctor Verdejo

Readings are about the first person with an emphasis on metaphysics, self-experience and the meaning of "what it's like". Meetings are on Thursdays, 13:00-15:00.

 

There are three convenors of the reading group: Michele Palmira, Victor Verdejo and Carlota Serrahima. Please, send us a message if you'd like to join in.

 

List of readings

 

Metaphysics of the Self, and Personhood

Bayne, T. (2010) The Unity of Consciousness, OUP (Chapter 12, ‘The Self')

Bermúdez, J.L. (2017) Understanding ‘I', OUP (Chapter 5 ‘Token-Sense and Type-Sense' & Chapter 6 ‘‘I': Token-Sense and Type-Sense')

Campbell, J. (2011) "Does Perception Do Any Work in an Understanding of the First 
Person?". In Coliva, A. (ed.) The Self and Self-Knowledge. OUP.
 
Cassam, Q. (1999) Self and World. OUP (Chapter 4, ‘The Identity Argument').

Geddes, A. (2013). Think twice, it's alright: Animalism, disunity and the self. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 113, 371-380.
For some background on animalism…: Bailey, A. M. (2015). Animalism. Philosophy Compass, 10, 12867-883

Hutto, D. D. (2016) "Narrative self-shaping: a modest proposal". Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 15 (1): 21-41.

Lowe, E.J. (2008) Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action OUP (Chapter 5, ‘The Self as Emergent Substance').

McClelland, T. (2017) "Against Virtual Selves", Erkenntnis online first: 1-20.

Nida-Rümelin, M. (2007) "Doings and Subject Causation", Erkenntnis 67(2), S. 147- 372.

Peacocke, C.(2014) The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness. OUP. (Chapter 3, ‘The Metaphysics of Conscious Subjects').

Peacocke, C. (2017) "Philosophical Reflections on the First Person, the Body and Agency." In F. de Vignemont and A. Alsmith (eds.) The Body and the Self, Revisited, OUP

Simmons, A. (2017)  "Mind-Body Union and the Limits of Cartesian Metaphysics", Philosophers' Imprint 17(14): 1-36.

Self-experience

Martin, M. F. G. (1997) "Self-Observation". European Journal of Philosophy, 5: 119-140.

Maiese, M. (2017). "Higher-Order Thought, Self-Identification, and Delusions of Disownership". Review of Philosophy and Psychology (online first)

Related to this, there's also the 2009-2010 exchange in Analysis between Rosenthal and Lane & Liang, on higher-order thought theories, immunity, and the challenge from somatoparaphrenia. 

Duncan, M. (2017). "The Self shows up in Experience". Review of Philosophy and Psychology (online first)

Giustina, A. & Kriegel, U. (2017) "Fact-Introspection, Thing-Introspection, and Inner Awareness". Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 8, 1, 143-164. 

The Meaning of "What it's like"

Farrell, J. (2016) "‘What it is like' talk is not technical talk", Journal of Consciousness Studies 23: 50-65.

Gaskin, R. (2017) "A Defence of the Resemblance Meaning of ‘What it's like', Mind online first: 1-26.

Stoljar, D. (2016) "The Semantics of ‘What its' like' and the Nature of Consciousness", Mind 125(500): 1161-1198.
 

31 May

Tim Bayne

31 May 18    
13:00 - 15:00
Seminari Joan Lluís Vives
03 May

Christopher Peacocke

3 May 18    
13:00 - 15:00
Seminari de Filosofía Teorética
12 Apr

Mike Martin

12 Apr 18    
13:00 - 15:00
Seminari de Filosofía Teorética
22 Mar

Matt Duncan

22 Mar 18    
13:00 - 15:00
Seminari de Filosofía Teorética
01 Mar

Michele Palmira

1 Mar 18    
13:00 - 15:00
Seminari de Filosofía Teorética
22 Feb

Ivan Hu

22 Feb 18    
13:00 - 15:00
Seminari de Filosofía Teorética
08 Feb

Richard Gaskin

8 Feb 18    
13:00 - 15:00
Seminari de Filosofía Teorética
01 Feb

Daniel Stoljar & Jonathan Farrell

1 Feb 18    
13:00 - 15:00
Seminari de Filosofía Teorética
25 Jan

Daniel Stoljar

25 Jan 18    
13:00 - 15:00
Seminari de Filosofía Teorética

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