Epistemology

Time: Friday, 11-13

Start date first term: 15 October, 2020

Start date second term: 19 February, 2021

In this reading group we discuss recent work on various current issues in epistemology. This includes both work in progress by those who attend and work by other authors.

The overall topic to be addressed in the first term is epistemic consequentialism, for which a first list of readings is given below. Topics for the second term are yet to be decided.

Background reading:

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on ‘Epistemic consequentialism’

Ahlstrom-Vij, K., and Dunn, J. (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism, Oxford, 2018: OUP.

Papers:

• Berker, S. 2013a: ‘Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions’, Philosophical Review 122 (3), 337-93.

• Berker, S. 2013b: ‘The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism’, Philosophical Issues 23 (1), 363-87.

• Berker, S. 2015: ‘Reply to Goldman: Cutting Up the One to Save the Five in Epistemology’, Episteme 12 (2), 145-53.

• Dunn, J., and Ahlstrom-Vij, K. 2017: ‘Is Reliabilism a Form of Consequentialism?’, American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2), 183-94.

• Goldman, A. 2015: ‘Reliabilism, Veritism and Epistemic Consequentialism’, Episteme 12 (2), 131-43.

• Singer, D. 2018: ‘How to be an epistemic consequentialist’, Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272), 580-602.

• Sylvan, K. 2020: ‘An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism’, The Philosophical Review 129 (1), 1-51.

• Sylvan, K. 2018: ‘Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3): 525-55.