Convenors: Daniel Morgan, Michele Palmira and Carlota Serrahima
The Reading Group will focus on the issue of how, if at all, we can have knowledge of our sensations, beliefs, and other mental states.
Some of the questions that will be taken up are the following: Do we know what mental states we are in (e.g. does an avowal such as "I'm in pain" represent one's knowledge that one is in pain, or does it express one's pain?)? And if so, is this knowledge attained in the same way as we get to know others' mental states (e.g. do we infer what kind of mental state we are in by looking at our behavior?)? If not, which methods enable us to acquire such distinctively first-personal knowledge (e.g. do we have a direct internal access to our mental states via introspection, or do we know which beliefs we have by looking at the states of affairs they represent?)? Does self-knowledge have the same features of our knowledge of external objects (e.g. is it more epistemically secure than, say, perceptual knowledge?)? How do phenomena such as thought insertion and self-deception affect our knowledge of ourselves?
The group will meet on Thursdays, from 13:00 to 15:00, at the Seminar Room of the ex-Departament de Lògica, Història i Filosofia de la Ciència.
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