Abstract: In this talk, I try to provide one possible picture of the subject matter of epistemology. In recent discussions in metaepistemology, various proposals have been made concerning what the subject matter of epistemology is. However, despite these proposals, I think that one important point has been overlooked. This point concerns the fact that metaepistemology has developed in response to developments in its twin discipline, metaethics. My idea is that a Moorean approach might also be useful for clarifying the subject matter of epistemology. More specifically, just as distinguishing good from the good or that which is good, and treating good as an unanalyzable concept, can help us clarify the subject matters of ethics and metaethics, distinguishing knowledge from justified true belief plus X, and treating knowledge as an unanalyzable concept, might help us clarify the subject matters of epistemology and metaepistemology. If my proposal is plausible, I conclude that knowledge-first epistemology and other approaches to epistemology, which have appeared to be in conflict prima facie, are not in conflict, at least with respect to the subject matter of epistemology.
Activities > Extra talks > Characterising the subject matter of epistemology in terms of the knowledge-first approach
Characterising the subject matter of epistemology in terms of the knowledge-first approach
Satsuki Inoue (Chiba University)
