Modal terms are no less susceptible to the Sorites paradox than predicates. Supervaluationism has been well-studied for propositional and first-order languages and, as a framework for a gappy theory of truth, it is one of the main contenders in debates between theories of vagueness (as is, to a lesser extent, its glutty counterpart, subvaluationism). In this paper, I describe a supervaluationist and subvaluationist (i.e., s’valuationist) possible-world semantics for modal logic, and I discuss deontic logic applications in more detail. I show that the resulting s’valuationist logics relate to Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) in the same way that they would for their propositional counterparts. I also use the resulting model to illustrate different interdependencies between the vagueness and precision of the modal and propositional parts of a language, and I discuss how this applies to the relevant versions of the Sorites paradox.
Activities > Graduate Research Seminar (GRSem) > S’valuationist models for the deontic Sorites
