Projects
Method-Centred Epistemology (MECEP)
1 Sep 2025 / 31 Aug 2028 |Methods: Epistemology beyond belief
1 Sep 2022 / 31 Aug 2025 |Perspectival Thoughts and Facts: New Issues
1 Jul 2017 / 30 Jun 2020 |Justification, its Structure and Grounds
1 Jan 2019 / 31 Dec 2022 |DIAPHORA
1 Jan 2016 / 31 Dec 2019 |Fallibility, Rational Belief, and Knowledge (FARBEK)
1 Jan 2014 / 31 Dec 2017 |PETAF – Perspectival Thoughts and Facts
1 Jan 2010 / 31 Dec 2013 |PERSP – Philosophy of Perspectival Thoughts and Facts
17 Dec 2009 / 15 Dec 2015 |Foundations of Semantics: non-factual and non-representational aspects of meaning
30 Nov 2004 / 30 Nov 2007 |C-project: Truth, Semantic Confusion and Embodiment
1 Oct 2006 / 30 Sep 2011 |Vagueness and Physics, Metaphysics, and MetaMetaphysics
1 Jan 2009 / 31 Dec 2012 |List of Publications
‘What price norm iteration? Comments on Simon Goldstein’s Iterated Knowledge’
Inquiry. Published online 2025: 1-9.
Topic-sensitivity and the hyperintensionality of knowledge
Episteme. Published online 2025: 1-14.
Safety’s coordination problems
Philosophical Studies, forthcoming.
‘Replies to critics’
Disputatio 13 (2021), 445-93.
‘Justification and being in a position to know: Reply to Waxman’
Analysis, online first.
‘From Tense Realism to Realism about Temporal Passage: Reply to Nihel Jhou’
Analysis, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anab088.
‘Presentism, Ockhamism, and Truth-Grounding’
In: Santelli, A. (ed.), Ockhamism and Philosophy of Time: Semantic and Metaphysical Issues Concerning Future Contingents, Synthese Library Series, Vol. 452, Cham/Switzerland 2022: Springer Nature, 117-30. https://doi-org.sire.ub.edu/10.1007/978-3-030-90359-6_7
‘Replies to critics’
Asian Journal of Philosophy 1, 29 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-022-00021-7
‘Précis of Justification as Ignorance’
Asian Journal of Philosophy, 1, 28 (2022).https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-022-00017-3
Justification as Ignorance: an Essay in Epistemology
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
‘Problems for factive accounts of assertion’
Noûs 57, 128-43.
Inexact Knowledge 2.0
Inquiry 63 (2020), 812-30.
On the Relation between Modality and Tense
Inquiry 63 (2020), 586-604
The Formalities of Temporaryism without Presentness
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 61 (2020), 181-202
Temporal Existence and Temporal Location
Philosophical Studies 177 (2020), 1999-2011
Unfreezing the Spotlight: Tense Realism and Temporal Passage
Analysis 80 (2020), 21-30
Nothing To Come. A Defence of the Growing Block Theory of Time
Synthese Library Series 395, Berlin/New York: Springer Press
The Structure of Justification
Mind 127 (2018), 309-38
Being in a position to know and closure: Reply to Heylen
Thought 5 (2016), 68-72
'In Defense of Ockhamism'
in Fischer, J.M./Todd, P. (eds.), Freedom, Fatalism, and Foreknowledge, New York: Oxford University Press, 343-60 (reprint of the 2012 Philosophia article)
'Peer Disagreement: A Call for the Revision of Prior Probabilities'
Dialectica 69 (2015), 551-86
'Presentism without Presentness'
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4, 19-27
'Return of the Living Dead: Reply to Braddon-Mitchell'
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 9, 376-89
‘Fallibility and Trust’
Noûs 49, 616-41
'Realism and Anti-Realism'
in: Pritchard, D. (ed.), Oxford Bibliographies: Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/obo/page/philosophy
'Living on the Brink, or Welcome Back, Growing Block!'
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8 (2013), 333-50
'Determinism, Open Future, and Branching Time'
in: Correia, F. and Iacona, A. (eds.), Around the Tree, Synthese Library Vol. 361, 47-72
'In Defence of Ockhamism'
Philosophia – Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 40, 617-31 (to be reprinted in Fischer, J. M./Todd, P. (eds.), Freedom, Fatalism and Foreknowledge, Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2013)
'Radical Scepticism without Epistemic Closure'
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85, 692-718
As Time Goes By
monograph, Paderborn 2011: Mentis
'Eternal Facts in an Ageing Universe'
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90, 307-20
'Objective Content'
Erkenntnis 74, 177-206
'Liberalism, Entitlement, and Verdict Exclusion'
Synthese 171 (2009), 481-97
'European Functionalism'
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2011), 229-49
‘Frege, Relativism, and Faultless Disagreement'
in: García-Carpintero, M./Kölbel, M. (eds.), Relative Truth, Oxford 2008: Oxford University Press, 225-237
‘Agnosticism as a Third Stance'
Mind 116 (2007), 55-104
‘Knowability, Closure, and Anti-Realism'
Dialectica 62 (2008), 59-75
‘Agnosticism and Vagueness'
in: Dietz, R./Moruzzi, S. (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Essays on the Nature and Logic of Vagueness, Oxford 2010: Oxford University Press
