Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

Abstract: Relevant Alternatives Theory is a natural account of knowledge, but it faces the problem of saying what makes an alternative relevant in any particular case. One promising idea is that a reasonable person standard (RPS) supplies the needed specification of relevance. But just what standard is invoked by the RPS exactly? Examination of the use of the RPS in the law allows us to reflect on the conceptual role and features of a RPS. Importantly, in the law, use of the RPS raises a dilemma: Is RPS a substantive standard, incorporating specific ideas about justification, or an “open” standard? If more open, then the standard creates uncertainty for disputants; if more substantive, then the standard proves less responsive to novel situations. A similar dilemma faces us in applying the RP as a standard of relevance. I argue that the best characterization of RPS in epistemic setting is an open standard. So the dilemma forces us to confront hermeneutical issues raised by invoking a RPS. Several upshots concerning disagreement are discussed.