Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Esa Díaz-León

I am an Associate Professor ("profesora agregada") in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Barcelona.
Esa Díaz-León


E-mail: ediazleon AT ub DOT edu

Phone: +34 934037904

Address: C/Montalegre, 6, 4th floor, Barcelona 08001, Spain. 

Office number: 4026 

Curriculum Vitae

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I received my PhD from the University of Sheffield (UK) in 2007, and my BA from the University of Murcia (Spain) in 2000. I was an Assistant and then Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Manitoba (Canada) from 2008-14, and a Ramón y Cajal researcher at the UB from 2014-19. I specialize in philosophy of mind and language, and the philosophy of gender, race and sexuality. My main interests include the metaphysics of gender, race and sexual orientation, the nature of social construction, as well as methodological issues having to do with conceptual ethics.

Selection of Publications

  • Esa Díaz-León. 2020

    "Descriptive vs Ameliorative Projects: The Role of Normative Considerations"

    In A. Burgess, H. Cappelen & D. Plunkett (eds.) Conceptual Engineering & Conceptual Ethics, Oxford University Press, pp. 170-86, January 2020.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2020

    "The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy"

    Journal of Consciousness Studies, 27 (5-6), pp. 62-73.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2020

    "On the Conceptual Mismatch Argument: Descriptions, Disagreement, and Amelioration"

    In T. Marques & A. Wikforss (eds), Shifting Concepts: The Philosophy and Psychology of Concept Variability, Oxford University Press, pp. 190-212, May 2020.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2019

    "Pejorative Terms and the Semantic Strategy"

    Acta Analytica, 35(1), pp. 23-34.  DOI: 10.1007/s12136-019-00392-2
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2019

    "Relativism and Race"

    In M. Kusch (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, Routledge, pp. 265-71.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2019

    "On how to achieve reference to covert social constructions"

    Studia Philosophica Estonica, 12.1, pp. 34-43.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2018

    "Kinds of Social Construction"

    In Pieranna Garavaso (ed.) Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Feminism, Bloomsbury Academic, pp. 103-22.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2018

    "On Haslanger's Meta-metaphysics: Social Structures and Metaphysical Deflationism"

    Disputatio, vol. X (50), pp. 201-16.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2017

    "Epistemic Contextualism and Conceptual Ethics"

    In Jonathan Ichikawa (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, Taylor & Francis, pp. 71-80.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2017

    "Sexual Orientation as Interpretation? Sexual Desires, Concepts, and Choice"

    Journal of Social Ontology, 3(2), pp. 231-48.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2017

    "Feminist Metaphysics and Philosophy of Language"

    In Carol Hay (ed.), Philosophy: Feminism. Macmillan Interdisciplinary Handbooks, Macmillan Reference USA, pp. 251-71.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2016

    "'Woman' as a Politically Significant Term: A Solution to the Puzzle"

    Hypatia 31(2), pp. 245-58.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2016

    "Norms of Judgement, Naturalism, and Normativism about Content"

    Philosophical Explorations 19(1), pp. 48-58.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2016

    "Phenomenal Concepts: Neither Circular Nor Opaque"

    Philosophical Psychology, 29(8), pp. 1186-99.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2015

    "In Defence of Historical Constructivism about Races"

    Ergo, 2(21), pp. 547-62.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2015

    "What is Social Construction?"

    European Journal of Philosophy, 23(4), pp. 1137-52.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2014

    "Do A Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong?"

    Ratio 27(1), pp. 1-16
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2012

    "Social Kinds, Conceptual Analysis, and the Operative Concept: A Reply to Haslanger"

    Humana.Mente--Journal of Philosophical Studies 22, pp. 57-74.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2012

    "Actors are not Like Zombies"

    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112(1), pp. 115-22.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2012

    "Are Ghosts Scarier than Zombies?"

    Consciousness & Cognition 21(2), pp. 747-8.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2011

    "Reductive Explanation, Concepts, and A Priori Entailment"

    Philosophical Studies 155(1), pp. 99-116.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2010

    "Can Phenomenal Concepts Explain the Epistemic Gap?"

    Mind 119(476), pp. 533-51.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2009

    "How Many Explanatory Gaps Are There?"

    APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 8(2), pp. 33-35.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2008

    "We are living in a material world (and I am a material girl)"

    Teorema 27(3), pp. 85-101.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2008

    "Defending the Phenomenal Concept Strategy"

    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86(4), pp. 597-610.