Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Michele Palmira

Postdoctoral Research Fellow

Principal Investigator of the I+D+I Project "Towards and Enquiry-Based Pluralist Epistemology" (RTI-2018-096225-J-100) 

Barcelona Institute for Analtyic Philosophy (BIAP) / LOGOS Research Group in Analytic Philosophy

Department of Philosophy

Faculty of Philosophy

University of Barcelona 

Michele Palmira


University of Barcelona

Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, 4th floor, office #4067

C/Montalegre 6-8, 08001, Barcelona 


Curriculum Vitae

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I obtained my PhD from the University of Modena in 2013. My supervisor was Annalisa Coliva. During my PhD I was a research visitor at the Institut Jean Nicod, the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee and the University of Barcelona. Since 2009, I am a member of COGITO Research Centre in Analytic Philosophy (Bologna).

Before joining LOGOS, I held postdoctoral positions at the University of Modena (2013-2014) and at McGill University (2014-2015).

I work mainly in epistemology and the philosophies of language and mind. I'm interested in disagreement, relativism, objectivity, singular thoughts, first-person judgements, propositions, expert deference, inquiry, and doxastic attitudes.

Drafts of my papers are available on my webpage.

Selection of Publications

  • Michele Palmira. 2020

    "Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept"

    Philosophical Studies doi: 10.1007/s11098-019-01411-z: 1-28
  • Michele Palmira, Annalisa Coliva. 2020

    "Hinge disagreement"

    Social Epistemology and Relativism ed. by N. Ashton, M. Kusch, R. McKenna and K. A. Sodoma, London: Routledge.
  • Michele Palmira. 2020

    "Expert deference about the epistemic and its metaepistemological significance"

    Canadian Journal of Philosophy, doi: 10.1017/can.2019.46: 1-16
  • Michele Palmira. 2019

    "Defending nonreductionism about understanding"

    Thought, doi: 10.1002/tht3.424: 1-10
  • Michele Palmira. 2019

    "Arithmetic judgements, first-person judgements and immunity to error through misidentification"

     Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 10(1): 155-172
  • Michele Palmira. 2019

    "How to solve the puzzle of peer disagreement"

    American Philosophical Quarterly, 56(1): 83-96
  • Michele Palmira. 2018

    "Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes"

    Synthese doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-01955-3: 1-27
  • Michele Palmira. 2018

    "Philosophical equilibrism, rationality, and the commitment challenge"

    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 118(3): 377-385

  • Michele Palmira. 2018

    "Arbitrary reference, numbers, and propositions"

    European Journal of Philosophy, 26(3): 1069-1085
  • Michele Palmira. 2018

    "Disagreement, credences, and outright belief"

    Ratio, 31(2): 179-196.

  • Michele Palmira. 2018

    "Towards a pluralist theory of singular thought"

    Synthese, 195(9): 3947-3974
  • Michele Palmira. 2017

    "How to be a pluralist about disagreement"

    in A. Coliva and N.J.L.L. Pedersen (eds.) Epistemic Pluralism, London: Palgrave: 285-316

  • Michele Palmira, Cory Davia. 2015

    "Moral deference and deference to an epistemic peer"

    The Philosophical Quarterly, 65(261): 605-625

  • Michele Palmira. 2015

    "Why truth-relativists should be non-conformists"

    Acta Analytica, 30(3): 239-247

  • Michele Palmira. 2015

    "The semantic significance of faultless disagreement"

    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 96(3). 349-371

  • Michele Palmira. 2015

    "How to Condorcet a Goldman"

    Episteme, 12(3): 413-425

  • Michele Palmira. 2014

    Book: "Il disaccordo. Riflessione critica tra epistemologia e filosofia del linguaggio"

    Roma: Aracne

  • Michele Palmira. 2013

    "On the necessity of evidential equality for epistemic peerage"

    Logos & Episteme, 4(1): 113-123

  • Michele Palmira. 2013

    "A puzzle about the agnostic response to peer disagreement"

    Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 41(4): 1253-1261

  • Michele Palmira, Delia Belleri. 2013

    "Towards a unified notion of disagreement"

    Grazer Philosophische Studien, 88: 139-159