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Projects
Towards an Enquiry-Based Pluralist Epistemology (TEBAPE)
1 Oct 2019 / 30 Mar 2020 |DIAPHORA
1 Jan 2016 / 31 Dec 2019 |List of Publications
"Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept"
Philosophical Studies doi: 10.1007/s11098-019-01411-z: 1-28
"Hinge disagreement"
Social Epistemology and Relativism ed. by N. Ashton, M. Kusch, R. McKenna and K. A. Sodoma, London: Routledge.
"Expert deference about the epistemic and its metaepistemological significance"
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, doi: 10.1017/can.2019.46: 1-16
"Defending nonreductionism about understanding"
Thought, doi: 10.1002/tht3.424: 1-10
"Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes"
Synthese doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-01955-3: 1-27
"Philosophical equilibrism, rationality, and the commitment challenge"
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 118(3): 377-385
"Arbitrary reference, numbers, and propositions"
European Journal of Philosophy, 26(3): 1069-1085
"Arithmetic judgements, first-person judgements and immunity to error through misidentification"
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 10(1): 155-172
"How to solve the puzzle of peer disagreement"
American Philosophical Quarterly, 56(1): 83-96
"How to be a pluralist about disagreement"
in A. Coliva and N.J.L.L. Pedersen (eds.) Epistemic Pluralism, London: Palgrave: 285-316
"Disagreement, credences, and outright belief"
Ratio, 31(2): 179-196.
"Towards a pluralist theory of singular thought"
Synthese, 195(9): 3947-3974
"Belief revision, uniqueness and the equal weight view"
The Reasoner, 7(1): 4-5
"On the necessity of evidential equality for epistemic peerage"
Logos & Episteme, 4(1): 113-123
"Is rational disagreement in philosophy possible?"
Iride 27(73), 595-612
"A puzzle about the agnostic response to peer disagreement"
Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 41(4): 1253-1261
"Towards a unified notion of disagreement"
Grazer Philosophische Studien, 88: 139-159
Book: "Il disaccordo. Riflessione critica tra epistemologia e filosofia del linguaggio"
Roma: Aracne
"Why truth-relativists should be non-conformists"
Acta Analytica, 30(3): 239-247
"The semantic significance of faultless disagreement"
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 96(3). 349-371
"How to Condorcet a Goldman"
Episteme, 12(3): 413-425
"Moral deference and deference to an epistemic peer"
The Philosophical Quarterly, 65(261): 605-625
