Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

Recent metaethical discussions have taken increased interest in fitting attitude accounts of value, according to which (roughly) x is good iff it is fitting to have a pro attitude toward x. Franz Brentano is widely credited as the first fitting attitude theorist. The particulars of Brentano’s version of the theory, however, are roundly ignored. Here I argue that Brentano’s version offers a compelling answer to a fundamental question raised by fitting attitude theories, namely: what does it mean for an attitude to be fitting? According to Brentano, fittingness is a primitive normative notion, one that can be accounted for neither (i) in naturalistic, nonnormative terms nor (ii) in terms of other normative notions. Nonetheless, Brentano offers certain intellectual exercises through which we can, he claims, grasp directly the nature of fittingness. What follows is an elucidation and defense of Brentano’s overall account.