Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

Firstly, I will show why the orthodox analysis of existence championed by Frege and Russell provides neither an adequate analysis of existential discourse nor a plausible conception of existential commitment. Secondly, I will introduce the closest first-order relative of the classical conception of existence, based on negative free logic. I will confront this view with one major problem posed by Meinongianism. I will show that none of three standard responses to this problem provide a plausible solution. Based on this diagnosis, I will, fourthly, propose a Quasi-Meinongian conception of existence that combines advantages of Meinongianism and the mentioned view based on negative free logic without adopting some of the main disadvantages of both views. Finally, I will make use of a de re pretense theory concerning worlds and possibilia to address a remaining standard worry about Meinongianism and, hence, transform Quasi-Meinongianism into Pretense-Quasi-Meinongianism.