Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

I discuss Michael Dummett’s ideas about the past, focusing on his later works: Truth and Reality (T&R, 2006—Gifford talks, delivered in 1996-7) and Truth and the Past (T&P, 2003—The Dewey talks, delivered in 2002). In T&R, Dummett adheres to a “moderate” justificationist semantics, accepts the reality of most of the past, and rejects the reality of the future. I label this view “anti-symmetrical” realism. Most commentators reject Dummett’s version of justificationism and find his views on the past unpalatable (see for instance, Boghossian, 2008, and Peacocke, 2005). Dummett himself rejected “anti-symmetrical” realism in T&P.   The aim of this paper is to argue in favor of Dummett’s anti-symmetrical realism, and to defend it both from commentators and from Dummett’s own criticisms in T&P. I propose an alternative account: I reject Dummett’s focus on (Fregean) propositions as bearers of truth and his account of language acquisition, and I present a view based on utterances, events and situations. I believe my proposal makes Dummett’s overall views on truth and the past in T&R much more compelling.