Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

I first sketch the semantic problem with future contingents stressing two conflicting intuitions (a) that some future contingents are true and (b) that all of them are untrue. Then, I briefly outline the Ockhamist semantics and use it to define supervaluationism (SV) which is an immediate predecessor of John Mac-Farlane’s assessment relativism (AR). I reconstruct MacFarlane’s criticism of SV and his own relativist modification of the theory. In AR, the accuracy of assertion depends not only on the context of its use, but also on the context of its assessment. MacFarlane uses this feature of the theory to overcome the shortcomings of SV.

I first show that one can generate relativist effects within supervaluational, absolutist theory. Then, I reformulate MacFarlane’s objections towards SV to attack his own AR. Just as SV mishandles retrospective accuracy ascriptions, AR misrepresents counterfactual and prospective accuracy ascriptions. Finally, I argue that AR is problematic as a normative theory of linguistic behavior and explain away the tension that motivates AR.