Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy
Objectivity-Subjectivity in Knowledge and Singular Representation
Duration: 2016 - 2019
Code: FFI2015-63892-P
Principal Investigator
All researchers
Claudia PicazoManuel Pérez Otero (U. Barcelona)
Bartłomiej Czajka (U. Barcelona)
Víctor Verdejo (2017)
Olga Fernández Prat (Univ. Autónoma de Barcelona)
Hemdat Lerman (University of Warwick)
Julián Pacho (Univ. del País Vasco)
Claudia Picazo (Univ. de Barcelona)
Daniel Quesada (Univ. Autónoma de Barcelona)
Víctor M. Verdejo (University College, Londres)
Ignacio Vicario (Univ. Autónoma de Madrid)
Bartlomiej Czajka (Univ. de Barcelona)
Pablo Gutiérrez (Univ. Autónoma de Barcelona)
Summary
This is a project mostly about Epistemology. It also concerns other areas: Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphilosophy and Metaphysics. Our research aims to reach seven objectives:
(1) To provide solutions to certain epistemological tensions about draws and analogous situations, through the analysis of cases in which there seems to be knowledge of apparently very unlikely propositions; and also cases in which we allegedly know P in spite of not knowing certain highly likely propositions which we know follow from P.
(2) To revise the status of Shoemaker’s thesis according to which judgments that present “the I as a subject” both have an absolute immunity to error due to a mistaken singular identification and are first-person (de se) psychological judgments, in the light of recent criticisms to the effect that certain bodily judgments also possess that kind of immunity and, hence, should be regarded as well as judgments that also present “the I as a subject”.
(3) To explore a number of thesis in connection with an understanding of philosophy as a theoretical activity as a result of the appropriate elucidation and calibration of intuitions. This includes (a) to develop the hypothesis that to intuit that P corresponds with an appraisal/grasp of the simplicity of a belief system; (b) to complete the theoretical view that individuate concepts via their possession conditions with an analysis of cases of partial understanding; (c) to assess the reach and plausibility of Williamson’s thesis according to which knowledge cannot be decomposed or defined in the traditional way; (d) to analyze some aspects of the distinction philosophy/science, appealing to the notions of simplicity and naturalness.
(4) To elucidate the conditions for representation in three kinds of cases: (a) sentences containing proper names (hence singular representation); (b) sentences containing indexicals that allow for belief attributions de se (also involving singular representation); (b) sentences containing general kind terms.
(5) To explore a variety of cases in relation to which our pretheoretical convicitions or some hypothesis by several philosophers (Wittgenstein, C. Wright, Travis), or both elements simultaneously, would yield subjectivist interpretations (or less realist-objectivist than their statement intially suggests). Those cases include: linguistic meaning, in general; rule following, modal statements, free-will, certain kind of epistemic statements, humor, fiction.
(6) To clarify the way in which phenomenal consciousness contributes–in perceptual experiences–to putting the subject in a position to non-inferentially formulate judgments which singularize and attribute objective (mind-independent) properties to objects and events.
(7) To critically revise Stace’s thesis, according to which, the application of the orderliness criterion distinguishes mystic experiences and certain states of meditation from states that are characteristic of altered consciousness (induced by drug and alcohol consumption) and credit the former, but not the latter, with “objective validity”.
Publications
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2022
Williamson on Defining Knowledge
Episteme. A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology 19/22, pp. 286-302. DOI: 10.1017/epi.2020.27. (URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2020.27). Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 July 2020.
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2021
Epistemología de virtudes y concepciones del análisis filosófico
M. Gómez-Alonso y D. Pérez Chico (coordinadores), Ernesto Sosa. Conocimiento y virtud, Zaragoza: Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza, pp. 43-61.
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2021
Referencia singular en Bertrand Russell
Joan Gimeno-Simó, Víctor J. Luque y Saúl Pérez-González (eds.) Bertrand Russell: Herencia y actualidad, Valencia: Tirant Humanidades, pp. 45-62.
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2020
Externismo semántico
Enciclopedia de la Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica (URL: http://www.sefaweb.es/externismo-semantico/).
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2019
Intuiciones, simplicidad y extrapolación de conceptos
Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 51/152, pp. 33-59. DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.08.
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2019
An Epistemic Puzzle about Knowledge and Rational Credence
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 32/3-4, pp. 195-206. DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2019.1704615. (URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2019.1704615)
Claudia Picazo. 2019
Are mental representations underdeterminacy-free?
Synthese
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2018
Cogency, Warrant Transmission-Increase and Non-Ideal Thinkers
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 99/S1. DOI: 10.1111/papq.12211 .
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2018
Relevancia epistémica de las intuiciones
Cristian Saborido, Sergi Oms y Javier González de Prado (eds.), Proceedings of the IX Conference of the Spanish Society of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Madrid, pp. 251-255. (Publicación en CD.) ISBN: 978-84-09-06054-2.
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2018
El dominio de lo mental en la filosofía de Williamson
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, vol. 33/1, pp. 23-40.
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2018
Semántica y ontología de mundos posibles
David P. Chico (coordinador) Cuestiones de la filosofía del lenguaje, Zaragoza: Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza, pp. 199-233.
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2018
La comicidad como perjuicio de sujetos intencionales
Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, 50/150, pp. 43-63.
DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.15
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2018
Dos versiones de la contraposición entre naturaleza y libre albedrío
Manuscrito. International Journal of Philosophy 41/2, pp. 89-110.
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2018
Vericuetos de la filosofía de Wittgenstein en torno al lenguaje y el seguimiento de reglas
Zaragoza: Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza.
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2018
¿Existe conocimiento epistémicamente irracional?
Principia: an international journal of epistemology, 22/2, pp. 229-249 .
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2017
Teorías de la referencia, “filosofía experimental” y calibración de intuiciones
Theoria, vol. 32/1, pp. 41-62.
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2017
Ensayos filosóficos sobre el conocimiento y el escepticismo epistémico
Saarbrücken: Editorial Académica Española
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2017
La justificación de algunas teorías relativistas contemporáneas
Teorema 36/2, pp. 105-122.
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2017
El problema Wittgenstein-Kripke sobre seguimiento de reglas desde una perspectiva teleológica
Manuel Berrón, Griselda Parera y María Sol Yuan (compiladores) Actas del XVII Congreso de AFRA (Asociación Filosófica Argentina, 2015), Santa Fe: Universidad Nacional del Litoral, pp. 362-368. Libro digital. ISBN 978-987-692-149-7.
Claudia Picazo. 2017
Utterance content, speaker´s intentions and linguistic liability
Theoria, An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations for Science, vol 32 n.3.
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2016
How Indeterminism Could Help Incompatibilism on Free Action
dialectica 70/2, pp. 169-184. DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12142
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2016
Respuestas disposicionalistas al problema wittgensteiniano-kripkeano sobre el significado y el seguimiento de reglas
Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, 48/143, pp. 21-45.
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2016
Variedades del escepticismo y del anti-escepticismo
Análisis Filosófico 36/1, pp. 7-27.
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2016
El papel de la discriminabilidad en el conocimiento
Proceedings of the XXIII World-Congress of Philosophy. Philosophy as Inquiry and Way of Life, Athens: Philosophy Documentation Center. (Publicación on-line y en CD.)
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2016
La teoría de Williamson sobre los conceptos y los estados mentales
Proceedings of the Eighth Meeting of the SEFA, Oviedo: KRK Ediciones, pp. 148-151.
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2016
La teoría competencial del saber de E. Sosa
Teorema 35/2, pp. 181-195.
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2015
Hacia una reinterpretación del concepto de proposición singular
J. Díez et al. (eds.), Proceedings of the VIII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Barcelona: Univ. de Barcelona, pp. 147-150. (Publicación en CD. ISBN: 978-84-606-9303-1.)
