Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Philosophy of language/ Metaethics

GOAL

• examine metaphysical, epistemological, psychological, and

semantic issues concerning moral thought and talk in

contemporary metaethics.

• questions of interest: Are there moral facts? If there are, are they

objective? What is the nature of moral judgment? Are moral

judgments more like belief or more like desire? What relationship

is there, if any, between the nature of moral judgment and the

conventional meaning of moral language? What is the connection

between making a moral judgment and being motivated to act in

accordance with it?

• examine issues in debates between Cognitivism vs. Expressivism

vs. Hybrid theories

• investigate prospects of resolving the Frege-Geach problem;

• examine issues about moral truth and moral disagreements

• discuss recent literature on slurs and pejoratives and the

prospects of the analogy between moral terms and pejorative/slur

terms

1. Stephen Barker
Is Value Content a Component of Conventional Implicature?
11 November 2014
16:00
2. Stephen Finlay
Value and Implicature
18 November 2014
16:00
3. Stephen Barker
Pure versus Hybrid Expressivism and the Enigma of Conventional Implicature
25 November 2014
16:00
4. Mark Schroeder
Truth In Hybrid Semantics
02 December 2014
16:00
5. Laura Schroeter and Francois Schroeter
Why Go Hybrid? A Cognitivist Alternative to Hybrid Theories of Normative Judgment
09 December 2014
16:00
6. David Copp
Can a Hybrid Theory Have it Both Ways? Moral Thought, Open Questions and Moral Motivation
16 December 2014
16:00
7. Alex Silk
How to Be an Ethical Expressivist
20 January 2015
16:00
8
27 January 2015
16:00
9
02 February 2015
16:00
10
10 February 2015
16:00
11
17 February 2015
16:00
12
24 February 2015
16:00
13
10 March 2015
16:00
14
17 March 2015
16:00
15
24 March 2015
16:00
16
31 March 2015
16:00