Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

Jennifer Lackey (2007/2008) has recently offered two arguments against the orthodox view that truth is a necessary condition for proper assertions. In her first argument, Lackey discusses the 'imprecise assertions' as the alleged evidence that false assertions can also be proper. Relying on some observations made by Grice (1975) and Lewis (1979), I try to show that these assertions are either (i) true and proper or (ii) false and improper, where both (i) and (ii) can be accounted by the view she attempts to discard. In her second argument, Lackey offers another case of false but supposedly proper assertions, this time introducing the assertions made in the evil demon world. I try to show that such assertions turn out to be improper on some fairly intuitive generalizations of our linguistic behavior and even on Lackey's own criterion of propriety of assertions.