Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

Kilimanjaro is an example of what some philosophers would call a 'vague object': it is only roughly 5895 metres tall, its weight is not precise and its boundaries are fuzzy because some particles are neither determinately part of it nor determinately not part of it. It has been suggested that this vagueness arises as a result of semantic indecision: it is because we did not make up our mind what the expression “Kilimanjaro” applies to that we can truthfully say such things as “It is indeterminate whether this particle is part of Kilimanjaro”. This approach, however, has several intrinsic limitations. After reviewing some of these limitations, I will sketch the contours of an alternative account, based on the idea of a sui generis semantic relation – multiple reference – capable of holding in a one-many pattern between certain terms of our language – multiply referring terms – and several objects in the domain, instead of just one. I will explain how multiple reference works, what differentiates it from plural reference and how it might be used to accommodate at least some aspects of our ordinary discourse about vague objects.