Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Women, People, and Humans: A Response to Witt’s "Metaphysics of Gender"

13 April 2016  |  15:00  |  Seminari de Filosofia UB

Abstract

Two crucial tenets of Witt’s book The Metaphysics of Gender (2011) are that gender is essential, in a certain sense, to the social individuals we are, and that it be coherent that this is so is significant with respect to the project of political and social change directed against the discrimination of women. Following previous critics (including Cudd (2012), Mikkola (2012) and Sveinsdóttir (2012)) in this note I aim to raise doubts concerning both elements: gender need not be essential, in that sense, to the social individuals we are, but whether it is coherent this be so is not significant in the envisaged way. The structure is as follows. I begin presenting Witt’s general conception of something being unification essential to an individual (uniessentialism), and in particular of genderbeing uniessential to the social individuals that we are. Then I argue that Witt’s argument for gender uniessentialism can be regarded as an instance of arguments from essentialist intuitions for uniessentialism. Cudd (2012) provides some reasons for doubting the particular premises of these in the specific case of gender. But in my view, there is a more general legitimate concern regarding the ultimate cogency of all such arguments. Following Sveinsdóttir (2012), I will illustrate this general concern with the case of clear phase concepts and terms. If this is right, the conclusions of these arguments are crucially weaker that uniessentialism proper: they only establish soft essentialism, as I will call it.  Mikkola (2012) voices some concerns against the importance of gender in order to engage in the project of political and social change directed against discrimination of women, to which I am broadly sympathetic. In the last part of this note I suggest that if gender has nonetheless such importance, the coherence of soft essentialism, as opposed to uniessentialism proper, should suffice.

References

Cudd, Ann E. (2012): “Comments on Charlotte Witt, The Metaphysics of Gender”, Symposia on Gender, Race, and Philosophy 8/2, http://web.mit.edu/~sgrp/2012/no2/Cudd0512.pdf

Mikkola, Mari (2012): “How Essential is Gender Essentialism?”, Symposia on Gender, Race, and Philosophy 8/2, http://web.mit.edu/~sgrp/2012/no2/Mikkola0512.pdf

Sveinsdóttir, Ásta Kristjana (2012): “Comments on Charlotte Witt, The Metaphysics of Gender”, Symposia on Gender, Race, and Philosophy 8/2,http://web.mit.edu/~sgrp/2012/no2/Sveinsdottir0512.pdf

Witt, Charlotte (2011): The Metaphysics of Gender, OUP

Witt, Charlotte (2012): “The Metaphysics of Gender: Replies to Critics”, Symposia on Gender, Race, and Philosophy 8/2, http://web.mit.edu/~sgrp/2012/no2/Witt0512.pdf