Abstract. The Argument from Heuristics moves from the premise that many data points prompting the revision of philosophical theories are the product of fallible heuristics to the conclusion that these same data points ultimately warrant no such revision. Earlier criticisms of epistemic contextualism have relied on a similar argument (cf. Vogel 1990; Hawthorne 2004, Nagel 2010), but the most developed and recent version is due to Williamson (2024).
In this talk, we outline a principled strategy to coherently reject the conclusion of Williamson’s version of this argument while at the same time accepting the conclusion of different heuristics-based arguments. We take stock of the discussion by articulating a general methodological upshot: to properly evaluate these arguments, more attention must be paid to some crucial features of the heuristics at issue.
(Joint work with Sabina Domínguez-Parrado)
Activities > Seminar > On The Argument from Heuristics
