Logos

Logic, Language and Cognition Research Group

De se contents & attitudes (DeSe)

Semester 2 topic: "The Sense of Mineness"
 

Convenors for Semester 2: Marie Guillot and Carlota Serrahima

 

Archive: 2013-2014
 
 

Change of time: the De Se RG now takes place on Tuesdays, from 13:00 to 15:00 in the Seminar Room of the Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science (Room # 4047).

 

 

In recent discussions of phenomenal consciousness, a distinction is sometimes made between the qualitative character of an experience (i.e. the specific way it feels to the subject, e.g. painful or reddish or funny) and its subjective character (Kriegel 2009), i.e. the fact that there is something it is like at all for the subject. This second component, which is discussed under a variety of names by different authors (e.g. “for-me-ness” or “mineness”, Zahavi 1999, 2005; “subjectivity”, Levine 2001), would be what makes my conscious states feel like they are mine

 

The reading group will examine arguments for and against the claim that there is a distinctive sense of mineness, as well as related topics, including: bodily awareness; the sense of agency; mental actions; pathologies affecting the sense of mineness (inserted thoughts, auditory-verbal hallucinations, depersonalisation); existential feelings; etc. Some sessions may be dedicated to work-in-progress by group members.

 

The first five sessions, starting on 17th February 2015, will serve as preparation for the 21-22 March LOGOS conference on the sense of mineness. In these first few sessions, we plan to focus mostly on texts authored by the invited speakers. Please see the detailed schedule at the end of this page

 

 

 

Semester 1 topic: "De Se Thoughts and Singular Reference"

 
Convenors for Semester 1: Gregory Bochner and Marie Guillot  

 
Archive: 2013-2014
 

 

It is nowadays widely accepted that both de se and de re thoughts have
singular truth-conditions. The question we will discuss is whether both
types of thought have the same kind of content.

This question raises a series of semantic, cognitive and metaphysical
issues, including the following:

(1) Supposing that de se thoughts are singular, does "the problem of the
essential indexical" dissolve into more general issues concerning singular
reference, as recent sceptical voices have claimed, or does the de se still
pose specific problems?

(2) How to account for the intuition, and even the feeling experienced
both in de se and in de re thinking, that one is somehow "directly
presented" with the referent? Does that intuition register a fact about
content, or does it stem only from the singular truth-conditions? How do
the relativist and propositionalist approaches compare as accounts of this
aspect?

(3) How does this feeling of "referential presence" connect with
metaphysical issues about the individuation of the referents themselves? In
particular, does it have any bearing on the debate about Haecceitism, the
view that particulars are individuated not just by qualitative properties

("whatnesses") but also by haecceitic properties ("thisnesses")? 



Sessions

  • The Myth of the De Se

    Ofra Magidor (in press)

    [Draft ]

    21 October 2014

    14:00

  • Context, Chapter 5

    Robert Stalnaker (2014)

    11 November 2014

    14:00

  • Indexical Beliefs and Communication: Against Stalnaker on Self-Location

    Clas Weber (2014)

    [PDF ]

    18 November 2014

    14:00

  • Modeling a Perspective on the World

    Robert Stalnaker (ms)

    25 November 2014

    14:00

  • Self-Location and Other-Location

    Dilip Ninan (2013)

    [PDF ]

    02 December 2014

    14:00

  • What is the Problem of the Essential Indexical?

    Dilip Ninan (ms)

    09 December 2014

    14:00

  • De Se Thoughts and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification

    Manuel García-Carpintero (ms)

    16 December 2014

    14:00

  • Reflections on Fran├žois Recanati's 'Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: What it is and Where it Comes From'

    Crispin Wright (2012)

    13 January 2015

    14:00

  • The First-Person Point of View and De se Attitudes

    Wolfgang Carl

    NB: this is a joint session with the Other Talks series

    20 January 2015

    14:00

  • Indexical Belief and the Problem of the Essential Circumstance

    Gregory Bochner (ms)

    27 January 2015

    14:00

  • Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory

    Uriah Kriegel (2009)

    Chapter 4 (esp. Sections 3-5-6).

    Background reading: Chapter 2 (esp. Section 3).

    17 February 2015

    14:00

  • The Self and the Phenomenal

    Barry Dainton (2004). 

    Background readings:

    - Dainton, Barry (2008), The Phenomenal Self (OUP), Sections 8.1 and 8.2.

    - Zahavi, Dan & Kriegel, Uriah (2015), "For-me-ness: What It Is and What It Is Not".

    24 February 2015

    13:00

  • Subjects and Consciousness

    Christopher Peacocke (2012)

    03 March 2015

    13:00

  • The Mark of Bodily Ownership

    Frédérique de Vignemont (2013)

    Additional reading: de Vignemont (2014), "Pain and Bodily Care: Whose Body Matters?"

    10 March 2015

    13:00

  • Feeling My Body as Mine: On Deflationism About Body Ownership

    Carlota Serrahima (ms)

    17 March 2015

    13:00

  • The Self

    Galen Strawson (1999)

    Background readings:

    - G. Strawson (2004), "Against Narrativity"

    - G. Strawson (2010), "Radical Self-Awareness"

    14 April 2015

    13:00

  • Unity of Consciousness and the Problem of the Self

    Dan Zahavi (2010)

    Background reading:

    Zahavi, D. (2005), Subjectivity and Selfhood, Chapter 5, Sections IV, V, VI

    21 April 2015

    13:00

  • Experience and Self-Consciousness

    Joseph Schear (2009). [PDF ]

    Additional reading: Zahavi, Dan & Kriegel, Uriah (2015), "For-me-ness: What It Is and What It Is Not".

    28 April 2015

    13:00

  • Waiting for the Self

    Jesse Prinz (2011)

    05 May 2015

    13:00

  • Affording introspection: an alternative model of inner awareness

    Tom McClelland (2014) [PDF ]

    19 May 2015

    13:00

  • Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance

    Kenneth Williford (2015) [PDF ]

    Background readings:

    - T. Schlicht (2015), "Explaining Subjective Character: Representation, Reflexivity, or Integration?" (commentary)

    - K. Williford (2015), "Individuation, Integration, and the Phenomenological Subject" (reply)

    26 May 2015

    13:00

  • Renewed Acquaintance

    Brie Gertler (2012)

    02 June 2015

    13:00

  • TBA

    Marie Guillot (ms)

    09 June 2015

    13:00

  • The sense of ownership: an analogy between sensation and action

    Jérôme Dokic (2003)

    Background reading: Hohwy, J. (2007): "The Sense of Self in the Phenomenology of Agency and Perception".

    16 June 2015

    13:00

Convenor: