Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

What is the state of mind one is in when one is inquiring into some

matter (call it the inquiring state of mind)?

I defend the contention that the inquiring state of mind is

multiply realised by different doxastic attitudes, depending on the

stage of the inquiry one is at.

I argue for this account by contrasting it with the view  –

defended by Jane Friedman (“Why Suspend Judging?”,

Noûs 2015) – that the inquiring state of mind is identical to the

attitude of suspended judgement. More specifically, I make the

case for the existence of a distinctive type of doxastic attitude we

entertain while being at a given stage of the inquiry – what I shall

dub an attitude of hypothesis – which differs from suspended

judgement and belief.

In closing, I point to the epistemological significance of my

account of the inquiring state of mind for debates about peer

disagreement.