Research fields
- Assignment mechanisms
- Organization and markets
- Strategic decisions
Selected publications
- Núñez, M., Robles, F. 2023. Overbidding and Underbidding in package allocation problems – accepted in Social Choice and Welfare.
- van den Brink, R., Nunez, M., & Robles, F. 2021. Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems. Journal of Economic Theory, 195, 105277.
- Núñez, M., Rafels, C., & Robles, F. 2020. A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 87, 6-14.
- Robles, F., & Núñez, M. 2019. One‐seller assignment markets with multi‐unit demands: Core and competitive equilibrium. International Journal of Economic Theory, 15(2), 169-182.
