Activities

Room 1037, 690 Building

Room 1037, 690 Building

Seminar Room 3, Espais de Recerca (ERE)

Room 2302, 696 Building

Sala de Recepcions, 690 Building

Sciences Courtyard, 1st floor, Historic Building

Invitation HERE. More information HERE.

Room 1038, 690 Building

Seminar Room 2, Espais de Recerca (ERE)

Room 1038, 690 Building

Seminar Room 3, Espais de Recerca (ERE)

Room 1038, 690 Building

Room 2302, 696 Building

Room 1037, 690 Building

Room 1038, 690 Building

Seminar Room 2, Espais de Recerca (ERE)

Room 1037, 690 Building

Sala de Recepcions, 690 Building

Room 1038, 690 Building

Room 1037, 690 Building

Seminar Room 2, Espais de Recerca (ERE)

Seminar Room 2, Espais de Recerca (ERE)

Romm 1038, 690 Building

Room 2302, 696 Building

Seminar Room 3, Espais de Recerca (ERE)

Seminar Room 2, Espais de Recerca (ERE)

Room 1038, 690 Building

Room 1037, 690 Building

Room 1037, 690 Building

Duration: 30 minutes

Abstract: The increase in income inequality and the population ageing are two of the major trends in developed countries. In this paper, we analyse the effect of these trends on the level of public education and pensions spending. For this, we develop an overlapping generations model with public and private education, a pay-as-you-go pension system, endogenous fertility, and probabilistic voting on pensions and education spending. In this model, an increase in income inequality increases public education and pensions spending per enrolled student and retiree, respectively. An increase in the share of retirees in the economy increases the per student spending on public education and pensions. A panel data analysis on OECD countries mostly conrm our theoretical predictions regarding public education spending.

Room 1037, 690 Building

Seminar Room 2, Espais de Recerca (ERE)

Room 1032, 690 Building

Room 2302, 696 Building

Sala de Recepcions, 690 Building

More information HERE
Registration HERE (limited capacity)

Room 1034, 690 Building

Room 1037, 690 Building

In the past few years, there has been a growing popular backlash against international institutions. Much has been written about the reasons of why voters in countries have turned against international institutions. Much less is known about the receiving end of such processes: the international organization’s remaining member states, who are also affected by a member state’s withdrawal from the international organization (IO). Our paper examines how voters in these countries expect their governments to conduct the withdrawal negotiations. It argues that voters who support the IO face an accommodation dilemma: on the one hand, insisting that an exit from the IO means that the country can no longer enjoy the benefits of cooperation highlights the benefits of IO membership and reduces the risk of political contagion. At the same time, such a strategy is costly not just for the leaving state, but also for the remaining member states. Voters are therefore more accommodating on cooperation issues, in which a hard stance also creates costs for themselves, whereas they are likely to support a tougher stance on zero-sum issues. In contrast, those critical of the IO face a “non-accommodation dilemma” with regard to zero-sum issues, but are accommodating on cooperation issues. We examine our argument using a conjoint experiment about preferred Brexit packages among voters in Germany and Spain. Our results show that voters are well attuned to the dilemmas surrounding the Brexit negotiations. Europhiles take a much harder line with regard to the Brexit negotiations than euroskeptics, and are particularly uncompromising on zero-sum issues such as the Brexit bill.

Seminar Room 3, Espais de Recerca (ERE)

More information HERE.

Sala de Graus, 690 Building

Sala de Recepcions, 690 Building

Room 2302, 696 Building

Room 1037, 690 Building

Room 1037, 690 Building

Sala de Recepcions, 690 Building

Room 4224, 690 Building

More information HERE

Seminar Room 2, Espais de Recerca (ERE)

Joint seminar with Political Sciences Department

Room A218, Faculty of Law

Abstract: Under what circumstances does nationalist mobilization dominate over class-based mobilization in legislative elections? This paper draws on the nationalism and inequality, ethnic politics, and party politics literatures to argue that nationalist parties are not mere reflections of pre-existing societal structures, but actively create support by linking political issues to group identities in their electoral campaigns. We test this expectation on a case of mass mobilization in a multinational, industrializing society: the first elections to the Imperial Austrian parliament following the full implementation of universal manhood suffrage (1907 and 1911). This analysis combines district-level electoral and demographic data on the ethno-linguistic and socio-economic composition of the electorate with an original data-set that assesses German and Czech parties’ issue claims and appeals to group identities, based on the systematic content analysis of historical programmatic and electoral documents. On this basis, the project contributes to our understanding of the causal relationship between social heterogeneity and party strategies in fostering nationalist versus class mobilization.

Sala de Recepcions, 690 Building

Sala de Recepcions, 690 Building

Room 2302, 696 Building

Room 1037, 690 Building